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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses on the consequences for understanding of human nature in 
theology and philosophy arising from the 'necessitarian crisis' of the 13th 
century. This was caused by official reaction to misappropriation of Aristotle by 
some philosophers and theologians, resulting in the Paris 'Condemnations' of 
1270 and 1277. Flourishing before the crisis came to a head, Aquinas and 
Bonaventure made use of Aristotle's eudaemonism (happiness-oriented ethics) 
and natural finality to produce their own accounts of the teleological 'ordering' of 
human nature to its ultimate perfection and goal in God. Scotus and Ockham 
represent progressive stages in the subsequent eclipse and loss of the 
teleological perspective and natural finality, and its replacement by a more 
voluntarist, juridical and legalistic outlook, with consequences for the 
understanding of human nature. 
An assessment is made of the impact of the resurgence of philosophical 
nominalism in the person of its principal 14th century exponent, William of 
Ockham. Each chapter charts the change in outlook from Aquinas to Ockham, 
under the respective headings of 'nature', 'freedom', 'grace' and the imago Dei. 
The focus is particularly on the effects of Ockham's logic and semantics on his 
own account of these realities. 
The research provides evidence that Scotus and, especially, Ockham can be 
seen as contributors to the devaluation of nature. It is suggested that there is in 
Ockham's accounts of nature, grace and freedom a diminution of the sense of 
'receptivity' to the divine which would mark the disposition of a soul being 
sanctified. It is shown that this receptivity has its source in the Trinitarian 
relations, where being is both given and received. In spite of his nominalist 
account of the category of 'relation', Ockham's portrayal of the imago Dei 
accurately reflects the intra-divine relations. 
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Introduction and Select Literature Survey 
The inspiration for this research came, in the first place, from reading Henri de 
Lubac's Surnaturel (1946) in its revised and updated two-volume edition and 
translation, 1 and Servais Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics (1985).2 
Both are concerned with the eclipse, over a long period of time (15th to 20th 
centuries), of understanding of 'natural finality' in human nature, as it is found in 
St. Thomas Aquinas, and, with different emphasis, in St. Bonaventure. There 
seemed to be surprisingly little academic follow-up to the claims made by de 
Lubac and Pinckaers, despite general agreement that a significant change in 
understanding of human nature had come about in the 14th century. This 
research has aimed to elucidate something of the "how and why" of this change 
in understanding, in terms of natural finality, the "lost dimension" of human 
nature, by examining the relevant aspects of the works of Aquinas, 
Bonaventure, Scotus and, especially, Ockham, who seems to have made the 
greatest single contribution to the change. I have also given, in chapter 1, a 
short account of the 1277 'Paris Condemnations', the historical event which 
provided the original impetus for the change. 
I have made a number of observations which seem to me valid, though I 
would not claim originality for them. I have called Ockham's metaphysics a 
"metaphysics of separation and isolation", because of its very evident 
'singularising' purpose. By the same token, Ockham's 'razor' seems to me to be 
aimed as much at the intelligible connections between things as at their claimed 
1 Henri de Lubac,SJ, The Mystery of the Supernatural, and Augustinianism and Modern 
Theology, NY, Crossroad Herder,1998 and 2000. 
2 Servais Pinckaers,OP, The Sources of Christian Ethics, Sr.M.T.Noble trans., Edinburgh, 
T &T.Clark, 1995. 
1 
superfluous number. What seems to me an important example is his account of 
the "divine ideas" (p.73), as it concerns the divine essence and the sphere in 
which the universal has to be acknowledged as real. Ockham, not 
unexpectedly, makes a clean break with it. 
He also makes a clean break with the concept of freedom as generally held 
before his time, and which Pinckaers calls "freedom for excellence", as opposed 
to Ockham's "freedom of indifference". The latter was revolutionary at the time 
for placing a choice of good and a choice of evil on an identical footing vis-a-vis 
freedom. From being a "principle of human perfectibility", as explained in 
chapter 2, freedom becomes univocally a "principle of accountability or 
responsibility", in an increasingly juridical or forensic frame of moral reference. 
The understanding of grace as "gift of divine intimacy" is correspondingly 
weakened (chapter 3). 
As far as breaking "new" academic ground is concerned, I have not found 
elsewhere, with the exception of Henninger on 'Relation', a direct comparison in 
one volume between the four scholars treated here, on the issues dealt with. I 
would lay claim to originality only in the treatment of 'Ockham on the Imago Dei' 
in chapter 4. There, I establish the orthodoxy of his conclusion, despite the fact 
that his account of the soul's faculties (p.244) seems to point to a Sabellian or 
Modalist (unitarian), as opposed to Trinitarian, imago in man. He successfully 
avoids this outcome. 
Lastly, I draw attention by occasional emphasis or comment throughout the 
text to a theological and anthropological theme which Ockham does not treat 
2 
himself, but which seems to me to represent a consistent deficiency in his 
concerns and outlook. This is the theme of 'receptivity' in divine-human 
relations, which I base in the first place on the 'passive relations of origin' in the 
intra-divine life of the Trinity, in which being is both given and received. I devote 
some space to this issue in the conclusion, as I consider it important; however, 
this is an area requiring further research. The same applies to the claim I make 
in chapter 3, that Scotus's banishment of direct unmediated 'divine illumination' 
on the natural level represents the start of a 'paradigm shift' from a perspective 
based on the metaphor of 'sight' to a perspective based on the metaphor of 
'hearing' (p.192). 
SELECT LITERATURE SURVEY 
Aquinas and Bonaventure are well served in terms of English translations, with 
the notable exceptions of their commentaries on the Sentences of Peter 
Lombard. The latter applies also to Scotus and Ockham, despite the fact that 
their commentaries comprise a high proportion of their extant works. Scotus's 
and Ockham's Quodlibets are readily available in translation, though not 
Aquinas's (Bonaventure seems not to have produced any). Aquinas's 
commentaries on Aristotle are now appearing in translation in the very useful 
'Dumb Ox' series, which include Aristotle's texts. Most of Ockham's Summa 
Logicae can now be found in translation, including Books I and II. The 
Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts now appearing are 
helping to fill a very large gap. See the Bibliography below (p.289) under 
Primary Sources. 
3 
Of secondary sources, Aquinas, Scotus and Ockham in the Cambridge 
Companion series contain very useful essays on all aspects of the philosophy of 
each. The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy (2010) and of Later 
Medieval Philosophy (1982) likewise contain a comprehensive range of articles. 
On Aquinas's ontology of being and essence, Maritain's Existence and the 
Existent, and J.Wippel, chapter 19 in the Cambridge History, 1982 are good 
introductions. The best recent article I have found on the subject is James 
Lehrberger (1998), who points out that "the definition of man as 'rational animal' 
takes no account of the riches discovered by the 'esse-essentia' analysis of the 
human soul"; also Eberl (2004). On Aquinas's analogy of being, apart from his 
own clear exposition in ST.la.13.5, there is Lee (1994), one of very few recent 
treatments of the subject. On Scotus's and Ockham's univocal concept of being, 
Langston (1979) and Dumont (1987) are recommended, and Amerini (2005) on 
the reception of Ockham's ontology in Italy in the 1330s, which describes what 
must have been the concerns of many at the time regarding the dismissal of 
any and all reality from universals. Leff (1975) is a very abundant source of 
primary references on every aspect of Ockham. 
On the always-contentious subject of the relationship between intellect and 
will regarding freedom in human beings, a good recent overview is Hoffmann's 
chapter 30 in the 2010 Cambridge History. Hoffmann (1999) is a goldmine of 
references on the same subject; I also recommend Ingham (2002) on Scotus's 
'advancing' voluntarism. Williams (1998 both) is an example of a modern 
scholar who interprets Scotus as an 'extreme' voluntarist. A more moderate 
view is found in the introduction to Wolter (1986). For accounts of Aquinas on 
freedom, see e.g. MacDonald and Stump, pp.98-100 below. On Scotus on 
4 
freedom, Incandela (1992) can be recommended. Frank (1992) gives Scotus's 
account of the working of divine concurrence. Clark (1978) is a useful 
exposition of Ockham's basic positions on freedom and the will. Gaine (2003) is 
an excellent introduction to the subject in general. 
In connection with the 20th century controversy over human finality which I 
describe in chapter 1 (pp.28-31), there is also the recent article by Thomas 
Osborne (2008). On finality in general, material is scarcer, but de Lubac (1998 
and 2000) and Pinckaers (1995) are really essential reading. Celano (1986) 
provides a useful background to the subject. Aertsen (1988), chapter 8, is 
essential reading for Thomas on finality, also Ingham (1990) for Scotus, and for 
Ockham on finality - a very sparsely covered subject - there is Klocker (1966), 
and Marilyn Adams (1998) is important on Ockham's perspective and the "shift 
to the willing subject". Adams's 2-volume "William Ockham" (1989) is an 
authoritative source on every aspect of Ockham's philosophy, but does not 
cover his morality and ethics. She helps to fill this 'lacuna' in chapter 11 of the 
Cambridge Companion (Spade ed., 1999). On Thomas's 'connaturality', an 
important subject regarding finality, Tallon (1984) is useful, also Pinckaers 
(1995), and in Suto (2004) a Japanese scholar is calling the attention of 
Christians to the long-neglected subject of connatural knowledge in Aquinas. 
On the important subject of divine illumination (chapter 3, pp.150-156), 
Timothy Noone writes a chapter (27) in the new (2010) Cambridge History; also 
Carpenter (1999), chapters 3 and 4, is an excellent source for Bonaventure on 
illumination; and for Scotus, Robert Pasnau in the Cambridge Companion 
(Williams ed., 2003), pp.300-304. On morality and virtue, Torchia (2002) draws 
5 
attention to the necessity of recovering "the vitality inherent in Aquinas's 
interpretation of virtue and its bearing on what it means to be fully human". 
Ingham (1996) writes on Scotus's moral doctrine as representing the via 
pulchritudinis (way of beauty). Hare (2000) and Cross (1997) are illustrative of 
some of the ways Scotus comes up in contemporary moral debate. Cross 
(1999) gives wide coverage of Scotus in the Great Medieval Thinkers series. 
For Ockham on moral issues, see Rega Wood (primary sources 1997), and 
Clark (1971 and 1973). Also Goddu (1996) describes the shift in moral 
perspective under Scotus and Ockham from evil as privation of good to evil as 
failure in obligation, and Osborne (2007) the increasing separation of interior 
and exterior acts in moral evaluation from Scotus to Ockham. Freppert (1988) 
gives a wider overview. 
I recommend Mary Anne Pernoud's two articles (1970 and 1972) on 
Ockham's strategic use of the potentia absoluta Dei in pursuit of his 
metaphysical goals. For a wide range of basic articles on Ockham's logic, 
semantics and metaphysics, Boehner (1958) was considered ground-breaking 
in its time and is still very useful. Much more recent and including Ockham's 
theology and anthropology is Maurer (1999). Baudry (1958 in French) is still the 
only Ockham lexicon, and covers philosophy only. On Scotus's pioneering use 
of 'intuitive' as distinct from 'abstractive' cognition, see Dumont (1989) and 
Wolter and Adams (1993). There is an abundance of literature on Ockham's 
logic and semantics: in addition to the Cambridge Companion, see Spade 
(1975) and Boler (1985) on absolute and connotative terms, Rayman (2005) on 
natural signification and Lenz (2008) on his theory of mental language. On 
Ockham's use of the 'razor', see Maurer (1984 and 1996). On his doctrine of 
6 
universals, see Adams, chapter 20 in the Cambridge History (1982), Matteo 
(1985) and Panaccio (2004) as well as the Cambridge Companion. On the 
subjects of the 1277 Condemnations (chapter 1), Ockham's referral to the papal 
court at Avignon (chapter 3), and the issues of 'relation' and the imago Dei 
(chapter 4), see the references in the text. 
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Chapter One. 
Human Nature as Principle of Finality Ordered to the Highest Good 
of the Person 
Introduction 
The concept of the 'ordering' or 'ordination' of a nature, as found in individuals, 
to its own highest good or ultimate perfection is one of the fruits of Aristotle's 
painstaking observations of what happens in the natural world. Thomas not only 
perceived the validity of the observation in itself, but also its implications for a 
more profound appreciation and explanation of the working of divine providence 
in creation. In the course of this chapter I will say something briefly about the 
rediscovery and re-appropriation of Aristotle in the West in the 1 ih and 13th 
centuries, and of its impact and repercussions in the philosophy and theology of 
the Schools. The main purpose of the chapter, however, is to give an account of 
the change in understanding of 'natural finality', from Aquinas to Ockham, from 
an ontological concept, grounded in the nature of human 'being' as creation and 
gift of divine providence, to a voluntarist concept based entirely in the 
individual's free choice to love and serve God, or not. 
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS (1225-1274) 
Modes of Being: God and Creatures 
Aquinas's account of human nature, and indeed of all nature, has its source and 
point of origin in the material contained in his treatise on God, found in its final 
and definitive form at the beginning of the Summa Theologiae. It is drawn in the 
first place from the revelation to Moses, in Exodus 3: 14, of the divine name: "I 
Am Who Am". In Thomas's view, 'finality' or teleological ordering of a nature-
8 
that is, of every created nature - to an end or goal representing its ultimate 
perfection and fulfilment, has its source here, in what is revealed of the divine 
nature; so much so that he uses it as the main element in the first of his five 
'ways' of proving the existence of God, drawing on Aristotle's proof for an 
Unmoved First Mover:3 
Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in 
motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; 
whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else 
than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality.4 But nothing 
can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state 
of actuality ... Therefore whatever is in motion must be put in motion by 
another ... Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion 
by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.5 
In the following question in the Summa, on divine simplicity, Thomas goes on to 
show that in God, who is uncaused, and simple (non-composite) in his being, 
essence and existence are identical: God is his essence, and is his existence. 
Here, Aristotle's distinction between matter and form (hylomorphism), applied to 
creatures, serves to illustrate one of the differences in mode of being between 
Creator and creatures, in this case material, sensible creatures, which are 
composites. In addition to the non-composite/composite difference: 
.. in things composed of matter and form, the nature or essence must differ 
from the suppositum, because the essence or nature connotes 
(comprehendit) only what is included in the definition of the species; as 
humanity connotes all that is included in the definition of man, for it is by 
this that man is man, and it is this that humanity signifies, that, namely, 
whereby man is man. Now individual matter, with all the individualizing 
accidents, is not included in the definition of the species ... Therefore this 
flesh, these bones, and the accidental qualities distinguishing this particular 
matter, are not included in humanity; and yet they are included in the thing 
which is a man. Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it 
than has humanity.6 
Hence, the individual existent, the "thing which is a man", with all his uniquely 
individual accidents, making up "the form of the whole" (i.e. the whole man), is 
3 Aristotle, Physics, VI 11,4. 
4 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, IX, 1 on actuality and potentiality (act and potency). 
5 Aquinas, ST.la.2.3c,(Leo.IV,31). All Aquinas ST quotes are from the Dominican 1920 
translation: see Bibliography,p.287. 
6 Aquinas, ST.la.3.3c,(Leo.IV,39-40); cf.SCG.1.21.2,(Leo.xIlI,63-4). 
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distinct from the essence or nature, signified by 'humanity', the "form of the 
part", signifying only what is common to all men.? None of this can apply to God: 
"Since God then is not composed of matter and form,8 He must be his own 
Godhead, his own Life, and whatever else is predicated of Him".9 But as God is 
the "first efficient cause", his existence cannot differ from his essence. 
Therefore, "God is his own existence, and not merely his own essence" .10 For 
Thomas, composition in a created thing results primarily from the fact that its 
essence is not the same as its existence, in which case something superadded 
to its essence must necessarily be found in it. But God's essence is simple, 
containing no composition; therefore, "God is the same as his essence or 
nature".11 
In proving this of God, Thomas also clarifies the situation of all creatures, in 
whom essence and existence are distinct: 
Existence is that which makes every form or nature actual. .. Therefore, 
existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is a distinct reality, as 
actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality ... it 
follows that in him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore his 
essence is his existence. 12 
Consequently, the esse of creatures relates to the divine esse as a 
participation: " .. just as that which has fire, but is not fire, is on fire by 
participation; so that which has existence but is not existence, is a being by 
participation".13 Likewise, what participates cannot be its own cause: 
Now it is impossible for a thing's existence to be caused by its essential 
constituent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own 
existence, if its existence is caused. Therefore that thing, whose existence 
7 Aquinas, De Ente,11.9,(Leo.xLlII,373), Maurer trans.,41. 
8 See Aquinas, ST.la.3.2c,(Leo.IV,37). 
9 Aquinas, ST.la.3.3c,(Leo.IV,39-40). 
10 Aquinas, ST.la.3.4c,(Leo.IV,42). 
11 Aquinas, ST.la.3.3c,(Leo.IV,39). 
12 Aquinas, ST.la.3.4c,(Leo.IV,42). 
13 Aquinas, ST.la.3.4c,(Leo.IV,42). 
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differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by another. But 
this cannot be true of God; because we call God the first efficient cause 
[from the second of Thomas's five 'proofs,14]. Therefore it is impossible that 
in God his existence should differ from his essence.15 
Therefore, in creatures, essence and existence are distinct, and essence is in 
potentiality to existence. Hence, natural finality marks the being of all creatures. 
This includes immaterial creatures (angels), even though they are not 
composed of matter and form. In SCG.II.S4, Thomas explains that the 
composition of substance [or essence] and being is not the same as the 
composition of matter and form, "although both are compositions of potentiality 
and act".16 Angelic being differs from divine being because, as with material 
beings, the essence or nature of angels is distinct from, and therefore in 
potentiality to, their existence. Therefore we can deduce that angelic nature 
possesses finality, like human nature, even if its sphere of operation is outside 
time. Neither is the power of operation, i.e. the faculties, the same as its 
essence in any creature. 17 For this last point, he cites Pseudo-Oionysius 18 in 
support, but it will provide a significant point of disagreement with Thomas for 
both Scotus and Ockham.19 
Aquinas: Being and Essence 
Thomas's account of natural finality is closely bound up with his account of 
being. In the order of apprehension, Thomas says, being is what first enters the 
intellect and "falls under the apprehension simply". 20 However, the primary 
datum of the intellect from the point of view of intelligibility is essence. This is 
14 Aquinas, STla.2.3c,(Leo.IV,31-2). 
15 Aquinas, STla.3.4c,(Leo.IV,42); cf.SCG.1.21 ,(Leo.XIII ,63-4). 
16 Aquinas, SCG. 11.54.1 ,(Leo.XIII,392), Anderson trans., 156. 
17 Aquinas, ST.la.54.3c,(Leo.V,47). 
18 Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial HierarchY,XI,(PG.3,286). 
19 Scotus, pp.56-7 below; Ockham, p.82 below. 
20 Aquinas, STI-II.94.2c,(Leo.VII,169). 
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being insofar as it is adapted to enter the mind, or is capable of being 
apprehended by the intellect. Intelligibility, as such, is co-extensive with that 
which is or can be, and therefore infinitely exceeds what the human intellect is 
capable of apprehending. God, in fact, is pure, infinite intelligibility. However, 
every idea (or similitude or concept) brings something immediately before the 
mind. This is an essence or a nature, in the wide sense, which includes 
everything except privations, such as blindness or nothingness. Privations have 
no essence,21 as they signify only the absence of what should be there. 
Essence, however, can be something with real existence, or something only in 
the mind: 
Now every essence or quiddity can be understood without knowing 
anything about its being. I can know, for instance, what a man or a phoenix 
is and still be ignorant whether it has being in reality. From this it is clear 
that being is other than essence or quiddity, unless perhaps there is a 
reality whose quiddity is its being. 22 
Being, therefore, has two senses: a) entitas or esse, this is the act of being 
(actus essendi) or existence (existentia), and b) ens, that is, the thing itself 
which exists; this is essence in the wide sense: that which possesses esse. 
Essence in the strict sense is what a thing is, not the thing itself. 
According to Thomas, essence is the same as nature or quiddity, but 
conceived as a potentiality to being: "I call essence that whose actuality is 
being".23 He also says in the De Ente that 
Because the definition (ratio) telling what a thing is signifies that by which a 
thing is located in its genus or species, philosophers have substituted the 
term 'quiddity' for the term 'essence'. The Philosopher frequently calls this 
'what something was to be' (quod quid erat esse), that is to say, that which 
makes a thing to be what it is ... The term 'quiddity' is derived from what is 
21 Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia,l.3,(Leo.XLlII,369), Armand Maurer trans.,Toronto,P.I.M.S., 
1968,30. 
22 Aquinas, De Ente,IV.6,(Leo.XLlII,376), Maurer,55. 
23 Aquinas, Sent.l.d.23.q.1 a.1,(Mandonnet,I.555). 
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signified by the definition, while 'essence' is used because through it, and in 
it, that which is has being.24 
Genus, species and difference are the categories or classes of universal 
being in creatures. The fact that they each, though in different ways, signify the 
whole enables them to be classified as universals. The ability to be categorized 
in terms of genus and species requires that a thing's essence be (at least 
notionally or conceptually) distinct from its being or existence. For this reason 
God cannot be placed in a genus, because, " .. to the divine being nothing can be 
added that determines it in an essential way, as the difference determines the 
genus".25 Misinterpretation, by Amaury of Bene (d .c.1207) and his followers, of 
a text of Pseudo-Dionysius which states that "The being of all things is the 
super-essential divinity,,26 had led to the claim that God is the formal being, or 
formal cause, of all things,27 in other words, that God is universal being, or 
common being (esse commune). Thomas comments: 
If we say that God is pure being (esse tantum), we need not fall into the 
mistake of those who held that God is that universal being by which 
everything formally exists. The being that is God is such that no addition 
can be made to it. Because of its purity, therefore, it is being distinct from 
all other being ... But even though the notion of universal being does not 
include any addition, it implies no prescinding from an addition.28 
However, while not the universal being of all things (pantheism), God is their 
universal cause.29 
24 Aquinas, De Ente,1.4,(Leo.XLlII,369), Maurer,31-32. 
25 Aquinas, SCG 1.24; cf.1.25,(Leo.XIII, 74,76-7); De Ente, V.1 ,(Leo.XLlII,377), Maurer,60. 
26 Ps.-Dionysius, De Cae/esti Hierarchia,IV.1 ,(PG.3, 178). 
27 Aquinas refers to this in SCG.1.26.1 O,(Leo.XIII,81-2). 
28 Aquinas, De Ente,V.2,(Leo.XLlII,378), Maurer,60-61. 
29 Aquinas, SCG.11.15,(Leo.XIII,295). 
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Aquinas: Being and Substance 
With Aristotle, the idea of potency (potentiality) is exclusively bound up with 
materiality. Therefore, everything immaterial is pure act, i.e. a god. From a 
Christian standpoint, as already noted, a creature that is immaterial is not yet a 
pure act: it is in potency with respect to its own existence. Thomas, therefore, 
expands the notion of potentiality by extending it to existence itself: "l call 
essence that whose actuality is being".3o Regarding the relationship between 
the terms 'nature' and 'essence', he says, 
The term 'nature' ... seems to mean the essence of a thing as directed to its 
specific operation, for no reality lacks its specific operation ... The term 
'essence' [from esse] is used because through it, and in it, that which is has 
being.31 
The essence does not confer being on a substance, but is that through which, 
or by means of which, being (esse) is conferred. The esse of a thing is its 
supreme perfection, lithe actuality of all acts, and therefore the perfection of all 
perfections".32 Therefore, inasmuch as a thing is in actuality in accordance with 
its own essence or nature, so it is in actuality toward its own perfection. That 
which seeks its own perfection seeks the fullness of being, which is found only 
in God, who is Being itself,33 and therefore moves closer to God in likeness: 
All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch 
as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes of the divine being. 
As "a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality",34 so, in moving 
closer to God, who is pure actuality, it moves closer to its perfection, the 
fullness of its being. 
30 Aquinas, Sent.l,d.23.1.1 ,(Mandonnet,I,555). 
31 Aquinas, De Ente,1.4,(Leo.XLlII,370), Maurer.32,my parenthesis. 
32 Aquinas, De Potentia,VII.2.ad.9,St.Thomas Aquinas, On The Power Of God,Vol.3,Dominican 
Fathers trans.,London, Burns,Oates & Washbourne, 1934, 12. 
33 Aquinas, Cf.ST.la.3.3-4,(Leo.IV,39-43). 
34 Aquinas, ST.la.4.1 c,(Leo.IV,50). 
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Aquinas: The Analogy of Being 
The difference in mode of being as between God and creatures comes into play 
in the matter of predication. Because God is his being and is his attributes, 
whereas creatures have their being and their attributes, it might be thought that 
"whatever is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally", that is, 
"under the same name but not in the same sense",35 even if the infinite distance 
between God and creatures suggests that no such statement, being equivocal, 
can truly convey anything at all in God accessible to human understanding. 
However, as Thomas points out, this contradicts the words of St. Paul: "The 
invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are 
made" (Rom.1 :20). Therefore, things "are said of God and creatures in an 
analogous sense, that is, according to proportion". Being, for instance, is 
predicated of God and creatures not equivocally, but analogically. "Thus, 
whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a 
creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-
exist excellently". 36 Therefore, perfections such as being and goodness are 
possessed by creatures in a different mode from their presence in God. 
Thomas is entirely clear, on the other hand, that "Univocal predication is 
impossible between God and creatures", because of the different mode of 
being: 
Thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to a creature, it 
signifies that perfection distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for 
instance, by this term 'wise' applied to a man, we signify some perfection 
distinct from a man's essence, and distinct from his power and existence, 
35 Aquinas, ST.la.13.5sc,(Leo.IV, 146). 
36 Aquinas, ST.la.13.5c,(Leo.IV, 146-7}. 
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and from all similar things; whereas when we apply it to God, we do not 
mean to signify anything distinct from his essence, or power, or existence.37 
Likewise, perfections exist in creatures "divided and multiplied", whereas they 
"pre-exist in God unitedly"; in addition, they "circumscribe and comprehend" the 
creature of whom they are predicated, whereas they can only be applied to God 
"as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name ... Hence no 
name is predicated univocally of God and creatures".38 The Franciscan school 
would later contradict this, by the simple expedient of denying that being and 
essence are distinct in creatures, and consequently adopting univocal 
predication. 
New Light on an Old Distinction 
The enduring significance of Thomas's being/essence distinction has been 
highlighted in recent times by Hans Urs von Balthasar, in a chapter entitled 
Existence and Essence in his book on contemplative prayer. I include some of 
his comments here for reasons which will become clear later: 
Creaturely being is constituted by the tension between existence and 
essence. It is an unfathomable mystery which man shares with all 
creatures, but in him it also goes right through his spiritual being and thus 
informs all his spiritual acts.39 
He speaks of the "spiritual eye,,40 contemplating the beloved (human or divine) 
"wandering restlessly between the two poles [of existence and essence], each 
of which seeks the other and explains itself by reference to the other".41 The 
significance of this is clear, because the divine "I AM" of Exodus 3: 14 has re-
appeared in the Gospels: "Before Abraham was, I am" (John 8:58). The 
37 Aquinas, ST.la.13.5c,(Leo.IV,146). 
38 Aquinas, ST.la.13.5c,(Leo.IV, 146). 
39 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Prayer, San Francisco, Ignatius Press, 1986,p.245. German original. 
Das Betrachtende Gebet, Einsiedeln, Switzerland, Johannes Verlag, 1955. 
40 Cf. Augustine's and Thomas's 'eye of the mind' and 'intelligible light', below.pp.150,152-3. 
41 Von Balthasar, Prayer,246,my parenthesis. 
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"essence" of the Law and the Prophets, and of the salvation-history of Israel, 
has found its completion and perfection, and the fullness of its being, in the 
divine "I AM" of the New Testament: 
In the very midst of the raising of Lazarus Martha is carried beyond her 
"essential" contemplation on the subject of the resurrection on the Last 
Day, to the existential recognition of Jesus as "the resurrection and the life" 
("I am ... Do you believe this?) (John 11: 23-26).42 
The "tension between existence and essence" is ultimately resolved by the 
Incarnation, by which a nature in which they are distinct is united to a nature in 
which they are identical. 
Aquinas: The Hierarchy of Being 
In a question asking whether the divine will itself is subject to any causality, 
Thomas also describes God's intention to create as "His inclination to put in act 
what his intellect has conceived".43 The Why? of creation is ultimately a 
mystery, but we can say that "since the will follows from the intellect, there is a 
cause of the will in the person that wills". 44 God's willing of things external to 
Himself proceeds (though without necessity) from his necessary willing of 
Himself, his being and his goodness, which are all one in Him: "God wills his 
own being and his own goodness as his principal object, which is for Him the 
reason for willing other things".45 Consequently, by analogy in creatures: 
.. natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper 
good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if possessed, to rest therein; but 
also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. 
Hence we see that every agent, insofar as it is perfect and in act, produces 
its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the wi" to communicate as far 
as possible to others the good possessed; and especially does this pertain 
to the divine wi", from which a" perfection is derived in some kind of 
likeness ... Thus ... He wills both Himself to be, and other things to be, but 
42 Von Balthasar, Prayer, 254, parenthesis in original. 
43 Aquinas, ST.la.19.4c,(Leo.IV,237). 
44 Aquinas, ST.la.19.5c,(Leo.IV,239). 
45 Aquinas, SCG.1.80.2,(Leo.XIII,223), Pegis trans.,255. 
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Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that end; inasmuch as it 
befits the divine goodness that other things should be partakers therein. 46 
A principle of central importance to Thomas's account of natural finality, and 
indeed his whole system, appears here: bonum est diffusivum et 
communicativum sui esse. 47 Good, by its very nature, has an inclination or 
tendency to spread and communicate itself to others. In God, this is not 
because of any need, because in Himself He lacks no perfection, and neither 
the act of creation, nor its absence, can add anything to, or subtract anything 
from, his being. Rather, the creative act expresses the superabundance of an 
infinite Being whose perfection and love overflow. 
Thomas shows that God could not have created another infinite like Himself, 
as two infinites cannot co-exist.48 Only finites can co-exist with or in the infinite, 
and "finite" denotes determination to a final end or goal. God is therefore the 
final (not formal) cause, as well as the efficient cause, of all things. As their 
source or principle, He is also their end or goal. Creatures image the Creator in 
desiring to disseminate their own being and goodness, and are creators-by-
analogy: they participate in divine causality as secondary causes, each to the 
measure of its own capacity, in what resembles a hierarchy of causes.49 As 
Fergus Kerr points out: "Indeed this is how creatures generally attain the divine 
likeness - by causing".50 In Thomas's words: 
Now, things tend to the likeness of God in the same way that effects tend to 
the likeness of the agent...Therefore, things naturally tend to become like 
God by the fact that they are the causes of others. 51 
46 Aquinas, STla.19.2c,(Leo.IV,233). 
47 Aquinas, SCG.1.37.5,(Leo.XIII, 111), Pegis,152. 
48 Aquinas, STla.7.2c,(Leo.IV,74). 
49 Aquinas, STla.19.2c,(Leo.IV,233). 
50 Fergus Kerr, After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism, Oxford, Blackwell, 2002,143. 
51 Aquinas, SCG.111.21.5,(Leo.XIV,50-51); Bourke,pt.1 ,82; cf.ibid.,1I1.20,(Leo.XIV,46-7). 
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However, this assimilation to divine likeness is not possible for human agency 
alone. This brings us to an issue which Kerr describes as 
the problem central in all Western theology: the problem of the co-operation 
between the graceful God and the graced creature ... Whether co-operation 
is necessarily competition ... takes us right to the heart of Thomas's 
theology. He often quotes Isaiah 26: 12: 'Lord, you have wrought all our 
works in us', which he takes52 precisely as excluding all competitiveness 
between divine and human agency ... He sees it as the mark of God's 
freedom, and ours, that God 'causes' everything in such a way that the 
creature 'causes' it too. 53 
Thomas himself refers to the difficulty some people have with a graced co-
operation between God and creature which in no way detracts from either divine 
power and freedom or human freedom.54 Neither is it a shared effort in the 
sense of two creatures sharing a task: 
It is also apparent that the same effect is not attributed to a natural cause 
and to divine power in such a way that it is partly done by God, and partly 
by the natural agent; rather it is wholly done by both, according to a 
different way, just as the same effect is wholly attributed to the instrument 
and also wholly to the principal agent.55 
The issue of divine and human freedom will be taken further in Chapter 2, and 
that of gratia co-operans in Chapter 3. 
A complement to the 'hierarchy of causes' is found in the Contra Gentiles, in 
what might be described as a 'hierarchy of ends'. All proximate ends are 
ordered to one ultimate end: 
Order among ends is a consequence of order among agents, for, just as 
the supreme agent moves all secondary agents, so must all the ends of 
secondary agents be ordered to the end of the supreme agent, since 
whatever the supreme agent does, He does for the sake of his end. Now 
the supreme agent does the actions of all inferior agents by moving them 
all to their actions and, consequently, to their ends. Hence, it follows that all 
the ends of secondary agents are ordered by the first agent to his own 
52 E.g. in ST.la.1 05.5,(Leo.V,475). 
53 Kerr, After Aquinas, 142-3. 
54 Aquinas, SCG.III. 70.1 ,(Leo.XIV,206-7), Bourke,pt.1 ,235. 
55 Aquinas, SCG.1I1.70.8,(Leo.xIV,207), Bourke,pt.1 ,237. 
19 
proper end. Of course, the first agent of all things is God ... There is no other 
end for his will than his goodness, which is Himself ... 56 
Hierarchy is concerned with the perfection of the beings that constitute it, and 
therefore with the working of grace. Each grade or degree, by sharing its own 
goodness, perfects the grade below it. David Luscombe points out that Aquinas, 
already in his earliest commentaries, on Isaiah (1252-3) and the Sentences 
(1254), "writes of an inviolable law according to which those who occupy the 
lowest grade are led back to the highest by means of intermediate grades".57 In 
view of this perfecting function, the ecclesiastical hierarchy represents the 
heavenly hierarchy on earth, and above them the angelic hierarchy act as 
perfecting agents on behalf of divinity. 
Thomas also describes the arrangement of potencies involved in the process 
of perfection, sanctification and salvation in terms of a 'hierarchy of desires': 
Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end ... 
And if he desire it, not as his perfect good, which is the last end, he must, of 
necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good, because ... every 
beginning of perfection is ordained to complete perfection which is 
achieved through the last end ... (and) secondary objects of the appetite do 
not move the appetite, except as ordained to the first object of the appetite, 
which is the last end.58 
In answer to an objection that "man does not always think of the last end in all 
that he desires or does", Thomas replies: 
One need not always be thinking of the last end, whenever one desires or 
does something: but the virtue of the first intention, which was in respect of 
the last end, remains in any desire directed to any object whatever, even 
though one's thoughts be not actually directed to the last end. 59 
56 Aquinas, SCG.1I1.17.7,(Leo.XIV,40), Bourke,pt.1, 72-3. 
57 David E.Luscombe, Thomas Aquinas and Conceptions of Hierarchy in the Thirteenth Century, 
Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 19, 1988,263-277. He gives as reference, among others (p.266,n.12): 
In Isaiam,c.6: "hanc dicit esse legem inviolabilem ut per prima media reducantur infima ". 
58 Aquinas, ST.I-11.1.6c,(Leo.VI,14). 
59 Aquinas, ST.I-11.1.6c,(Leo.VI,14). This should certainly not be seen as a licence to practice a 
"fundamental option" type of ethic, but is to be interpreted as the counterpart of Thomas's 
account of evil and sin as a falling-short of the good, or the ordered ness to the good, that ought 
to be in any actions. See below, pp.35 - 37. 
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This question in the Summa is immediately followed by Thomas's treatise on 
happiness,6o which "means the acquisition of the last end",61 based partly on 
Aristotle's eudaemonistic account of virtue62. Neither the desire for good nor the 
desire for happiness can be satiated in this life, because: 
.. the goods of the present life pass away; since life itself passes away, 
which we naturally desire to have, and would wish to hold abidingly, for 
man naturally shrinks from death. Wherefore it is impossible to have true 
happiness in this life.63 
The "specific nature of happiness" is nothing less than "the vision of the divine 
essence, which man cannot obtain in this Iife".64 This does not invalidate, but 
rather confirms, Aristotle's dictum that happiness is the good at which all 
rational beings aim, and that "the good for man is "an activity of soul in 
accordance with virtue". 65 If Aristotle is here speaking of the highest happiness 
attainable in this life, It is clear that for Thomas this corresponds to activity in 
this life in accordance with the natural desire for ultimate beatitude. 
Aquinas: Divine Generosity, Human Receptivity. 
I want to draw attention to another point concerning the relationship between 
divine and human agency in the whole working of natural finality as portrayed 
by Thomas and, with different emphases, by Bonaventure. Here we are at a 
point in time prior to the climactic watershed of the "necessitarian crisis" in 
1277,66 after which the operations of "nature" are progressively devalued in the 
interests of untrammelled free-will and accountability. It seems to me quite clear 
that both of these Doctors see the workings of nature oriented to the highest 
60 Aquinas, ST.I-11.2-S,(Leo. VI,17 -54). 
61 Aquinas, ST.I-II.1.8c,(Leo. VI,16). 
62 Aristotle, Nic. Eth.1. 7. 
63 Aquinas, ST.I-II.S.3c,(Leo.VI,49). 
64 Aquinas, ST.I-II.S.3c,(Leo.VI,49). 
65 Aristotle, Nic. Eth.1. 7. 
66 Below, p.4S. 
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good of the creature as entirely unproblematic precisely because of their 
"givenness", and not in spite of it. Not only divine providence is at work here, but 
divine intimacy and a divine generosity which is entirely natural to God without 
in any way diminishing divine or human freedom. It only began to be widely 
seen as a "problem" after 1277. At this stage, I would point out that, for Thomas, 
the fact of a creature's being "ordered to God" is a sign or manifestation of 
'enrichment'. He himself uses the word elargiri, from which comes elargitio, a 
'giving' or 'bestowal', or 'largesse', to describe this patrimony of nature: 
Now, God, Who is the first agent of all things, does not act in such a way 
that something is attained [for Himself] by His action, but in such a way that 
something is enriched by His action. For He is not in potency to the 
possibility of obtaining something; rather, He is in perfect act simply, and as 
a result He is a source of enrichment. So, things are not ordered to God as 
to an end for which something may be obtained, but rather so that they may 
obtain Himself from Himself, according to their measure, since He is their 
end.67 
God, the First Agent, is pure generosity, pure largesse: "He intends only to 
communicate his perfection, which is his goodness",68 in keeping with the 
primary characteristic of Goodness: Bonum est diffusivum seu communicativum 
sui esse.69 Every creature, on the other hand, "intends to acquire its own 
perfection, which is the likeness of the divine perfection and goodness. 
Therefore the divine goodness is the end of all things". 70 If, notwithstanding the 
Fall and concupiscence (not to be underestimated), nature still seems to be, in 
some way, inclined in our favour where our true end is concerned, this does not 
constitute inadmissible necessity or a threat to free-will and accountability, but, 
on the contrary, a matter for profound thanksgiving and praise. Human nature 
is, after all, the means by which the divine goodness has chosen to 
communicate itself. It is 'capax Dei'. 
67 Aquinas, SCG.1I1.18.5,(Leo.xIV,42); Bourke,pt.1,75 
68 Aquinas, STla.44.4c,(Leo.IV,461). 
69 Aquinas, STla. 73.3.ob.2,(Leo. V, 188). 
70 Aquinas, STla.44.4c,(Leo.IV,461). 
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A principle of divine generosity, but which, for Thomas, in no way threatens 
divine freedom, stems from the fact that in God is no potentiality, therefore no 
matter; He is pure actuality, actus purus, "pure Act". 71 Neither is God's essence 
in potentiality to his existence, as in Him they are identical. Matter, as pure 
potentiality, is "most imperfect", whereas: 
God is the first principle, not material, but in the order of efficient cause, 
which must be most perfect. For just as matter, as such, is merely potential, 
an agent, as such, is in the state of actuality. Hence the first active principle 
must needs be most actual, and therefore most perfect; for a thing is 
perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that perfect 
which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection. 72 
Act is prior to potency, just as the animal or plant is prior to the seed which is its 
life principle. 73 Therefore the perfect is prior to the imperfect and, 
Existence is the most perfect of all things, for it is compared to all things as 
that by which they are made actual; for nothing has actuality except so far 
as it exists. Hence existence is that which actuates all things, even their 
forms.74 
The continuation of this passage has particular significance for the theme of this 
thesis, because of what Thomas says here about existence: 
Therefore it is not compared to other things as the receiver to the received; 
but rather as the received to the receiver. When therefore I speak of the 
existence of man, or horse, or anything else, existence is considered a 
formal principle, and as something received; and not as that which exists. 
In other words, existence is what all existing created things receive; neither is it 
identical with the thing that receives it. However, the divine mode of being is 
identical with divinity; and it seems appropriate to note at this point that within 
the tri-personal divine life (circumincession) of the Godhead, being is both given 
and received. 7s The dignity of receptivity therefore exists at the very heart of 
being. 
71 Aquinas, e.g.ST.la.90.1 c,{Leo. V,385); ST.la. 79.2c,{Leo, V,259). 
72 Aquinas, ST.la.4.1 c,{Leo.IV,50). 
73 Aquinas, ST.la.4.1.ad.2,{Leo.IV,50). 
74 Aquinas, STla.4.1.ad.3,{Leo.IV,50); cf.De Potentia,VII.2.ad.9. 
75 E.g.,Aquinas,ST.la.33.3.ad.2,{Leo.IV,361); SCG.IV,26.12,{Leo.XV,1 01-2). 
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Aquinas: Being as Universal: The Transcendental Attributes of Being 
The attributes which can be applied to every being, just from the fact that it 
exists, are the transcendentals. Thomas lists five in De Veritate I, namely, 'one', 
'true', 'good', 'thing' and 'something', with 'being' itself making a sixth. Like 
'being' itself, each has the essential characteristics of a universal: i.e. both unity 
and community: 
Now, since one is a transcendental, it is both common to all and adapted 
to each single thing, just as the good and the true. 76 
Consequently, each is said to be 'convertible' with being,77 in that each is said 
to be really the same as being, but differing only "in idea",78 or "as considered 
by reason".79 The essential character of 'one' is undividedness, "for 'one' 
signifies undivided being".8o 'Thing' is used to express 'one' with reference to its 
essence, and 'something' to express one thing as distinct from another.81 In the 
case of 'good', 
The essence of goodness consists in this: that it is in some way desirable ... 
Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only insofar as it is perfect; for all 
desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as it is 
actual. .... Hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same really. But 
goodness presents the aspect of desirableness, which being does not 
present.82 
Thomas does not include 'beautiful' among the transcendentals, but it is clear 
from all he says that he would place it under 'good'. He relates both 'good' and 
'true' to their respective powers of the soul: 
Good expresses the correspondence of being to the appetitive power ... and 
so we note in the Ethics, the good is "that which all desire". 83 True 
expresses the correspondence of being to the knowing power, for all 
76 Aquinas, ST.la.93.9c,(Leo.V,412). 
77 Aquinas, ST.la.6.3.ob.1 ,(Leo.IV,68); la.1.1.ob.2:verum, quod cum ente convertitur, (Leo.IV.6); 
ST.I-11.18.1 c,(Leo. VI, 127): bonum enim et ens convertuntur. 
78 Aquinas, ST.la.5.1c,(Leo.IV,56). 
79 Aquinas, ST.I-11.29.5c,(Leo.vI,206). 
80 Aquinas, ST.la.30.3c,(Leo.IV,339); De Veritate, 1.1 c,(Leo.XXII,VoI.1 ,5). 
81 Aquinas, De Veritate, 1.1 c,(Leo.XXII,VoI.1 ,5). 
82 Aquinas, ST.la.5.1 c,(Leo.IV,56). 
83 Aristotle, Nic.Eth.1.1 ,(1 094a 2). 
24 
knowing is produced by an assimilation of the knower to the thing known, 
so that assimilation is said to be the cause of knowledge.84 
Being and truth are also really the same, hence, "there is no falsity in things, 
because, in so far as each thing has being, to that extent does it have truth".85 
The true is also "the good of the intellect",86 and "the adequation of intellect and 
thing".87 Each transcendental, like being itself, is concerned with perfection, and 
is therefore the goal of natural finality. Each is also universal, as an aspect of 
universal being, which participates in divine being: "But God is good through His 
essence, whereas all other things are good by participation".88 
Aquinas: Natural Finality: Being as Perfection 
Because "the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a more eminent 
way",89 Thomas takes a very different view of secondary causality to that which 
underlies the Augustinian system of 'seminal principles', espoused by 
Bonaventure (see p.151 below). The real efficacy of secondary causes reflects 
the glory of their Creator, rather than detracting from it as the Franciscan School 
tended to assume. On the contrary: 
But if no creature has any active role in the production of any effect, much 
is detracted from the perfection of the creature. Indeed, it is part of the 
fullness of perfection to be able to communicate to another being the 
perfection which one possesses. Therefore this position detracts from the 
divine power. 90 
It also detracts from the natural tendency of the creature to seek its perfection 
by imitating or imaging the Creator: 
In fact, a created thing tends toward the divine likeness through its 
operation. Now through its operation one thing becomes the cause of 
84 Aquinas, De Veritate,l,a.1 ,(Leo)(XII,VoI.1 ,5-6), Hackett,VoI.1.Mulligan,trans.,6. 
85 Aquinas, SCG.1.61. 7,(Leo.XIII, 175), Pegis,207. 
86 Aquinas, SCG.1.59.5,(Leo.XIII,168), quoting Aristotle,Nic.Eth.VI.2,(1139a 27). 
87 Aquinas, SCG, 1.59.2,(Leo.XIII, 167), quoting Avicenna,Metaphysics,l.9. 
88 Aquinas, SCG.1.40.3,(Leo.XIII, 116), Pegis,156. 
89 Aquinas, STla.4.2c,(Leo.IV,51). 
90 Aquinas, SCG.1I1.69.15,(Leo.XIV,200), Bourke trans.,pt.1 ,230. 
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another. Therefore, in this way, also, do things tend toward the divine 
likeness, in that they are the causes of other things.91 
Consequently, the 'finality' of a nature represents an 'inclination', a 'tendency', 
which Thomas also calls an 'appetite' and a 'desire', to attain its own fullest 
perfection by seeking to become 'like God' in whatever way it is ordained to 
share in divine being and life, whether as a vestige, an image or a likeness. 
The term 'finality' itself is of later coinage than the period covered by this 
thesis, though derived from 'final causality', as applied especially to God as first 
and final Cause. I use it as a general term covering the reality for which Thomas 
uses the expressions, "natural appetite" (appetitus naturalis)92, "natural 
inclination" (inclinatio naturalis)93, "natural tendency" (usually in verbal form, e.g. 
tendere in finern),94 "natural desire" (desideriurn naturalis)95, and even on 
occasions "natural love" (arnor naturalis)96, referring to love of the end or goal of 
a thing's operation or existence. 
Thomas uses these expressions interchangeably, to an extent that is perhaps 
surprising, although he uses "appetite" more often when speaking of the 
inclinations of the senses. I propose to use "natural desire" as the 'default' 
expression for them, where appropriate. What all have in common, in notable 
distinction from their general modern tenor, is an association with the 
perfectibility, and the ultimate perfection, of their subjects. This has its basis and 
91 Aquinas, SCG.111.21.2,(Leo.XIV,50), Bourke trans.,pt.1 ,81. 
92 E.g.,STI-11.2.8c,(Leo. VI,24); 1-11.17.9c,(Leo.VI, 125). 
93 E.g.,STla.82.1 c,(Leo.V,293); 1-11.6.4c,(Leo.VI,59). 
94 E.g.,STI-11.12.1 c,(Leo.94); la.20.1.ad.3,(Leo.IV,253). 
95 E.g.,SCG.1I1.48.3,(Leo,XIV, 130); STla.12.8.ad.4,(Leo.IV,129). 
96 E.g.,STla.60.1.ad.3,(Leo.V,98); ST.I-11.26.1 c,(Leo.VI.188). 
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rationale in Aristotle's system of potency and act, drawn from his observations 
of what actually happens in nature. 
"Every agent acts for an end",97 and the end or object of a nature's natural 
desire is in every case the good of that nature, whether this is seen in terms of 
being, for "all things desire to be",98 or of perfection, for "every action and 
movement are for the sake of some perfection", and "we call what is perfect a 
good. So, every action and movement is for the sake of a good".99 Therefore all 
things are ordered to God, the source and first cause of all good. 100 
Thomas illustrates the range of 'natural desire' in a question concerning the 
natural law, as the two are inseparably connected. This range involves, quite 
unambiguously, what man has in common with the whole of sensible creation: 
.. according to the order of natural inclinations is the order of the precepts of 
the natural law. Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in 
accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances: 
inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being 
according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a 
means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to 
the natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that 
pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in 
common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, those things 
are said to belong to the natural law which nature has taught to all animals, 
such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. 
This is followed by what pertains to man, on the level of nature, as a rational 
being distinct from the rest of sensible creation: 
Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his 
reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to 
know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect, 
whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, 
97 Aquinas, SCG.1I1.2,(Leo.xIV,S); Bourke trans.,pt.1 ,34-38. 
98 Aquinas, SCG.111.3.4,(Leo.XIV,9), Bourke,pt.1 ,38-9. 
99 Aquinas, SCG.III.3.S,(Leo.XIV,9), Bourke,pt.1 ,39. 
100 Aquinas, Cf.SCG.1I1.17.1-2,(Leo.XIV,40), Bourke,pt.1, 71. 
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to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, 
and other such things regarding the above inclination. 101 
Aristotle had spoken, at the lowest end of the scale, of the "desire" of matter for 
form 102 and, at the highest, of the Unmoved First Mover moving all things, as 
the "object of desire" and the "object of thought". At the same time, he makes it 
clear that, as rational beings, 
we desire a thing because it seems good rather than consider it good 
because we desire it; for understanding is the principle of desire. And the 
intellect is moved by an intelligible object. 103 
Thomas adopts the Aristotelian priority of the intellect over the will in the natural 
operations of the rational creature, including its "natural desire" for happiness 
and the last end. The Franciscan perspective, on the other hand, gives first 
place to the will in the soul's pursuit of its fulfilment. For Bonaventure, the 
desiring would have been the starting-point, preceded, in rational creatures, 
only by "the cry of prayer" and "a flash of apprehension".104 For both Thomas 
and Bonaventure, however, in different ways, the natural operations of all things 
are moved by "desire" for the Source of their being, seeking to imitate its 
perfection, and to attain thereby the fullness of their being. 
Aquinas: Natural Desire for a Supernatural End 
The natural finality of human nature was the subject of the 20th century 
controversy in Catholic theology set off by the publication in 1946 of Henri de 
Lubac's book, Surnaturel. 105 The author insisted that, contrary to received 
101 Aquinas, ST.I-11.94.2c,(Leo.VII, 170),my emphases. 
102 Aristotle, Metaphysics,IX.5. 
103 Aristotle, Metaphysics,XII. 7. 
104 Bonaventure, Itinerarium Mentis in Deum,Prologue,3,(Quaracchi,V,296). 
105 Henri de Lubac, Surnaturel: Etudes historiques, Paris, Aubier, 1946. No English translation, 
but translated as expanded and clarified, 1965, in two works: The Mystery of the Supernatural 
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wisdom since the 16th century, passages in Thomas such as the following, 
concerning a natural desire for the beatific vision of God that can be fulfilled 
only by means of a supernatural gift of grace, mean exactly what they say: 
For there resides in every man a natural desire to know the cause of any 
effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect 
of the rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause of things, 
the natural desire would remain void. Hence it must be absolutely granted 
that the blessed see the essence of God.106 
The issue concerns essentially the image of God in which the human soul is 
created, and which makes it capax Dei, so that 
The divine substance is not beyond the capacity of the created intellect in 
such a way that it is altogether foreign to it, as sound is from the object of 
vision, or as immaterial substance is from the sense power; in fact, the 
divine substance is the first intelligible object and the principle of all 
intellectual cognition. 107 
The meaning of the phrase, capax Dei, which has its origins in Augustine,108 
had become obscured as a result of a tendency to create a rigid separation 
between human nature and the divine grace which alone can bring it to its true 
fulfilment. Divine grace, a share or participation in the life of God, comes as 
pure gift, and pre-supposes receptivity, a readiness or openness to receive, in 
the person on whom it is bestowed. Fergus Kerr makes the following 
observation on the meaning of capax Dei: 
When Thomas, like Augustine long before, speaks of the human creature's 
being capax Dei, it must be remembered that capacitas here is understood 
as a purely passive receptivity, not being 'capable' in the modern sense of 
having the ability or competence to achieve something but in the pre-
modern sense of being open to something one can receive only as a gift. 109 
Kerr describes the move to the modern sense mentioned here as a 
"theologically fateful semantic shift". 
and Augustinianism and Modern Theology, N.Y., Crossroad Herder, 1998 and 2000 
respectively. 
106 Aquinas, ST.la.12.1 c,(Leo.IV, 115); cf.ST.la.75.6c,(Leo.V,204); SCG.II.55.13,(Leo.XIII,393-5), 
Anderson,p.162; De Malo,V.1.ad.1 ,(Leo.xXIII, 131). 
107 Aquinas, SCG. III.54.8,(Leo.XIV, 149), Bourke,pt.1, 184. 
108 Augustine, De Trinitate,XIV.8,(PL.42,1 044). 
109 Kerr, After Aquinas, 231,n.2. 
29 
De Lubac speaks of the 16th to 18th centuries as "the time when the 
systematized notion of "pure nature" was developing and coming to hold 
complete sway".110 He outlines the history of the idea of a possible natura pura, 
having no finality except to a purely natural end, attainable by human effort, 
without any reference to divine grace or a supernatural ultimate destination for 
man.111 He retraces it to the Neo-Platonist Denys the Carthusian (1402-1471 ), 
who took from Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) the idea that in man natural desire 
tends to the natural end only, the natural end being contemplation of the lowest 
angelic order, the nearest above man. The idea of a human nature closed in on 
itself and self-sufficient in its own realm would then be adopted and perpetuated 
by Cajetan (1480-1547), this time based on the attribution to Aquinas of a 
passage, derived from Aristotle, quoted by Thomas as an objection, therefore 
prior to correction by him. This interpretation of Aristotle uncorrected by St. 
Thomas would then be perpetuated as Thomas's own by Suarez (1548-1617), 
another theologian of major significance. 
The passage in question, based on Aristotle, De Cae/o,112 reads as follows: 
Since man is more noble than irrational creatures, it seems that he must be 
better equipped than they. But irrational creatures can attain their end by 
their natural powers. Much more therefore can man attain Happiness by his 
natural powers.113 
De Lubac refers to "those who, after too cursory a reading of st. Thomas, have 
mistaken the objection here for the reply", 114 and have taken it as affirmation by 
Thomas of a "purely natural" beatitude attainable by man in via, while taking no 
110 De Lubac, Mystery,4. 
111 For the following account, see de Lubac, Mystery, especially 140-148. 
112 Aristotle,De Cae/o,11.11. 
113 Aquinas, ST.I-11.5.5.obj.2,(Leo.VI,51). 
114 De Lubac, Mystery,158. 
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account of Thomas's reply. Thomas begins by saying that the happiness 
attainable by man by his natural powers is only imperfect happiness, but that 
man's perfect happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. 
Furthermore: 
The rational creature, which can attain the perfect good of happiness, but 
needs the Divine assistance for the purpose, is more perfect than the 
irrational creature, which is not capable of attaining this good, but attains 
some imperfect good by its natural powers.115 
The error also suited the temper of the times, from a Catholic viewpoint, as a 
human nature still capable of attaining its supposed entire naturally-appointed 
end seemed the ideal response to the Protestant definition of human nature as 
irredeemably corrupted by the Fall. Anything beyond that, besides, was thought 
to jeopardise the gratuity of divine grace. What it actually did was to make grace 
something entirely extraneous to human nature in its operation, super-added to 
it in a quasi-miraculous manner. Thomas, for his part, had never regarded the 
operation of grace as miraculous in the strict sense, because of human nature's 
essential receptivity (habilitas) to it. Thomas had used the term 'obediential 
potency' (potentia obedientia/is) to describe the soul's openness to the 
supernatural. The fact that this potency is capable of being fulfilled by the 
reception of sanctifying grace, Thomas says, can only be called 'miraculous' on 
the grounds that "universally every work that can be performed by God alone 
can be called miraculous", 116 i.e. in a generic sense. However, in the particular 
sense, the fulfilment of a natural potency cannot be regarded as a miracle, 
therefore "God's justification of the righteous is not miraculous" .117 Thomas 
associated obediential potency with a supernatural finality of human nature; for 
115 Aquinas, ST.I-11.5.5.ad.2,(Leo.vI,52). 
116 Aquinas, ST.I-11.113.1 Oc,(Leo.VII,342). 
117 Aquinas, ST.I-11.113.1 Oc,(Leo.vIl,342). 
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him, it is a passive openness to a grace-assisted growth in connaturality with 
the divine. 118 It might conceivably, I suggest, be called a 'principle of receptivity' 
of the supernatural. 
Thomas compares the ordered finality of creatures in the universe as it 
actually exists to the melody of a harp. God could have created a different, 
better, universe (harp), but, in terms of what He has actually created: 
The universe, the present creation being supposed, cannot be better, on 
account of the most beautiful order given to things by God; in which the 
good of the universe consists. For if anyone thing were bettered, the 
proportion of order would be destroyed. As if one string were stretched 
more than it ought to be, the melody of the harp would be destroyed. Yet 
God could make other things, or add something to the present creation; 
and then there would be another and better universe. 119 
The capacitas Dei of the human rational creature is an important string in 
Thomas's cosmic 'melody', but certain distinctions have to be made in order to 
appreciate its precise 'tension', so to speak. One is the distinction between 
'desire' and 'disposition' for the supernatural end. 'Natural desire' is a capacity, 
not a disposition, to receive the supernatural end. The 'desire' is precisely for 
the disposition in the immediate sense, and only mediately, by the action of 
grace, for the end: 
Everything which is raised up to what exceeds its nature, must be prepared 
by some disposition above its nature .... But when any created nature sees 
the essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the inte"igible form 
of the intellect. Hence it is necessary that some supernatural disposition 
should be added to the intellect in order that it may be raised up to so great 
and sublime a height. .. Now this increase of the inte"ectual powers is called 
the illumination of the inte"ect. 12o 
118 Aquinas, Q.D.de Virtute, 1.1 O.ad.13,(Atkins trans.,69); cf.De Veritate VII1.4.ad.13, 
(Leo.XXII,VoI.2,233), Hackett,Vol.1 trans.,337; De Veritate XXIX,3.ad.3,(Leo.xXII,VoI.3,856), 
Hackett,VoI.3,414. 
119 Aquinas, STla.25.6.ad.3,(Leo.IV,299). 
120 Aquinas, STla.12.5c,(Leo.IV, 123). 
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At the level of 'pure nature', prescinding from grace, natural desire has often 
been described as entirely devoid of any experiential content. 121 However, since 
the conscious affective faculty is just as 'natural' as the rest of our nature, it 
seems to me unlikely that an innate capacity unfulfilled would never at any time 
impinge, however inchoately, upon its possessor's conscious experience. De 
Lubac, quoting a 19th century scholar, describes it as follows: "The longing that 
surges from this "depth" of the soul is a longing "born of a lack", and not arising 
from "the beginnings of possession"".122 The latter comes only with grace. It 
seems that Thomas would call it desire for the disposition for an end beyond 
nature's ability to attain. 
Aquinas: Receptivity and the Universal 
Thomas ascribes receptivity, in the first place, to the 'possible (or passive) 
intellect' .123 He takes from Aristotle the division of the intellect between its active 
or 'agent' power and its passive or 'possible' power. 124 The active and passive 
intellects are distinct faculties, but together constitute what Thomas calls "the 
intellect in act": 
The thing understood is in the intellect by its own likeness; and it is in this 
sense that we say that the thing actually understood is the intellect in act, 
because the likeness of the thing understood is the form of the intellect, as 
the likeness of a sensible thing is the form of the sense in act. Hence it 
does not follow that the intelligible species abstracted is what is actually 
understood; but rather that it is the likeness thereof.125 
The fact that "the likeness of the thing understood is the form of the intellect in 
act" is what is meant by the Aristotelian dictum that the intellect becomes, or is 
121 See, for instance, J.E.O'Mahoney, The Desire of God in the Philosophy of St. Thomas 
A~uinas, Cork University Press, 1929,177. 
12 De Lubac, Mystery,p.84, quoting Gratry, De la connaissance de Dieu.VoI.2, 1854,31 0-11. 
123 See also chapter 3,pp.151-6 below. 
124 Aristotle, De Anima, 111.5. 
125 Aquinas, ST.la.85.2.ad.1 ,(Leo.V,334). 
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identical with, what it knows. 126 What is abstracted by the agent intellect is the 
universal: 
we perceive that we abstract universal forms from their particular 
conditions, which is to make them actually intelligible. 127 
The universal, which for Ockham is a man-made construct, is associated by 
Aquinas, on the contrary, with intelligibility, immutability and clarity: 
For the light of the active intellect is needed, through which we achieve the 
unchangeable truth of changeable things, and discern things themselves 
from their likeness.128 
Therefore the universal abstracted is the intelligible species, and the intelligible 
is the immaterial, unchanging and eternal, which contains the light of truth about 
finite and changeable things. Consequently, in Thomas's perspective, 
knowledge of universals, as opposed to knowledge of singulars, belongs to the 
perfection of rational nature: 
The natural desire of the rational creature is to know everything that 
belongs to the perfection of the intellect, namely, the species and genera of 
things and their types, and these everyone who sees the divine essence 
will see in God. But to know other singulars, their thoughts and their deeds, 
does not belong to the perfection of the created intellect, nor does its 
natural desire go out to these things. 129 
It is quite clear that for Thomas, as for Bonaventure and Scotus in their different 
perspectives, the universal derives reality, and real intelligibility, from God the 
Creator as universal cause, and origin of the specific form. The reference to the 
vision, by the blessed, of the species and genera of things in the divine essence 
relates to the doctrine of 'divine ideas', the achetypes or exemplars of all 
created things as they exist eternally in the mind of God. They are an 
adaptation, used also by Augustine,130 of the Platonic doctrine of ideal forms. A 
divine idea or exemplar" has respect to everything made by God in any period 
126 Aristotle, De Anima,111.4,(429b-430a). 
127 Aquinas, ST.la.79.4c,(Leo.V,267),my emphases. 
128 Aquinas, ST.la.84.6.ad.1,(Leo.V,324). 
129 Aquinas, STla.12.8.ad.4,(Leo.IV,129). 
130 Augustine, QQ.83,q.46,(PL.40,29-31). 
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of time",131 like the plans of a house in the mind of an architect. But it is not the 
ideas, as such, but God Himself, as such, who is the goal of natural, rational 
finality: 
Yet if God alone were seen, who is the fount and principle of all being and 
of all truth, He would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that nothing else 
would be desired, and the seer would be completely beatified. 132 
More will be said concerning the agent intellect and its passive counterpart in 
chapter 3. 
Aquinas on Evil: (i) Evil in Relation to Being 
Thomas's account of the nature of evil and sin describes it as a privation of 
being, resulting from lack of ordination to the supernatural last end: "Now it is in 
this that evil consists, namely, in the fact that a thing fails in goodness,,133. A 
failure or "falling-short" of the good which ought to be present in any action or 
actuality constitutes the evil which is privation of being. Thomas distinguishes 
this from the defect of good which is merely negation: 
Evil. .. is the privation of good, which chiefly and of itself consists in 
perfection and act. .. (and) Because evil is the privation of good, and not a 
mere negation ... therefore not every defect of good is an evil, but the defect 
of good which is naturally due. 
Consequently, while all creatures are good insofar as they participate in the 
Good, as in Being, "no being is called evil by participation, but by privation of 
participation. Hence it is not necessary to reduce it to any essential evil".134 
"Evil. .. is the privation of good, which chiefly and of itself consists in perfection 
131 Aquinas, ST.la.15.3c,(Leo.IV,204). 
132 Aquinas, ST.la.12.8.ad.4,(Leo.IV, 129). 
133 Aquinas, ST la.48.2c,(Leo,IV,492). 
134 Aquinas, ST la.49.3.ad.4,(Leo.IV,503). 
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and act" .135 Perfection and actuality are both marks of the fullness of being. 
Consequently: 
We must speak of good and evil in actions as of good and evil in things: 
because such as everything is, such is the act that it produces. Now in 
things, each one has so much good as it has being: since good and being 
are convertible .... We must therefore say that every action has goodness, in 
so far as it has being: whereas it is lacking in goodness in so far as it is 
lacking in something that is due to its fullness of being; and thus it is said to 
be evil: for instance if it lacks the quantity determined by reason, or its due 
place, or something of the kind. 136 
Similarly, it is the object of an action that confers its moral quality: the fullness, 
or deficiency, of its being: 
.. the good or evil of an action, as of other things, depends on its fullness of 
being or its lack of that fullness. Now the first thing that belongs to the 
fullness of being seems to be that which gives a thing its species. And just 
as a natural thing has its species from its form, so an action has its species 
from its object, as movement from its term.137 
(ii) Evil in Relation to Ordination to the Last End, Happiness 
Seeing that ens et bonum convertuntur,138 evil has no being of its own; 
consequently, 
.. evil has no formal cause, rather is it a privation of form; likewise, neither 
has it a final cause, but rather is it a privation of order to the proper end; 
since not only the end has the nature of good, but also the useful [the 
bonum utile], which is ordered to the end.139 
Evil, which is a deficiency in ordination to the true good, comes about as a 
result of a deliberate "turning away". However, 
Those who sin turn from that in which their last end really consists: but they 
do not turn away from the intention of the last end, which intention they 
mistakenly seek in other things. 14o 
This misdirection of natural desire is the outcome of a failure in apprehension of 
the means to the true good: 
135 Aquinas, ST la.48.5c,(Leo.IV,496). 
136 Aquinas, ST 1-11.18.1 C (Leo.VI, 127). 
137 Aquinas, ST 1-11.18.2c (LeoVI, 128). 
138 Aquinas, ST.I-11.18.1 c,(Leo.VI, 127); la.5.1 c,(Leo.IV,56). 
139 Aquinas, ST la.49.1 C (Leo.IV,499), my parenthesis. 
140 Aquinas, STI-11.1.7 ad.1 (LeoVI,15). 
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That to which the will tends by sinning, although in reality it is evil and 
contrary to the rational nature, nevertheless is apprehended as something 
good and suitable to nature, in so far as it is suitable to man by reason of 
some pleasurable sensation or some vicious habit.141 
Aquinas: Universals and Nature 
Thomas distinguishes between the nature abstracted and its universality: the 
universality exists only in the intellect, the nature abstracted only in the 
individual: 
.. the words abstract universal imply two things, the nature of a thing and its 
abstraction or universality. Therefore the nature itself to which it occurs to 
be understood, abstracted or considered as universal is only in individuals; 
but that it is understood, abstracted or considered as universal is in the 
intellect...ln like manner humanity understood is only in this or that man; but 
that humanity be understood without conditions of individuality, that is, that 
it be abstracted and consequently considered as universal, occurs to 
humanity inasmuch as it is brought under the consideration of the intellect, 
in which there is a likeness of the specific nature, but not of the principles of 
individuality.142 
For this reason, Thomas considers a nature to be universal only in a strictly 
qualified sense, as 'considered absolutely' (absolute considerata). Therefore it 
exists in the individual only as the 'form of the part', prescinding from all 
individual differences. 'Animal' and 'man' can be taken as universals just insofar 
as "the nature predicated of (them) falls under the aspect of universality, i.e., 
insofar as animal or man is considered as a one-in-many" .143 One-in-many, 
here, does not mean one among many, but one in many, in the sense of being 
present in many. In keeping with its Platonic provenance, the type of 
immanence required by a universal is that which makes predication possible: 
complete identity in reality with the individual instance. Consequently, the 
141 Aquinas, ST 1-11.6.4 ad.3,(Leo.vI,60) 
142 Aquinas, ST.la.85.2.ad.2,(Leo.V,334). 
143 Aquinas, In Metaph.VII,lec.13, n.1570, Rowan trans.,521. 
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notions of unity and community both belong inherently to the concept 
'universal': 144 
A Thomistic universal, as such, unlike a Platonic Idea, is found only in the 
intellect, and never in the sensible thing that is known by its means. However, 
for Thomas, as for Aristotle, existence in the intellect, abstracted from sensible 
objects, is, nevertheless a type of real existence: 
.. singular things composed of matter and form are not intelligible but 
sensible. Therefore, if there is nothing apart from singular things which are 
composed of matter and form, nothing will be intelligible but all beings will 
be sensible. But there is science only of things which are intelligible. 
Therefore it follows that there will be no science of anything, unless one 
were to say that sensory perception and science are the same ... 145 
Likewise, a real distinction between essence as potentiality, and being as 
actuality and perfection, i.e., between two 'states' or degrees of perfection of the 
same subject, can be seen as a natural adjunct and prerequisite to 'finality' in 
creatures, which seek their perfection as the fullness of their being. It would 
seem that dismissal of the former must logically lead to dismissal of the latter. 
Yet there can be no doubt that Thomas saw this aspect of creaturely existence 
as a reality. Certainly, Aristotle had no notion of a real distinction between being 
and essence; but neither did he have any knowledge of a Creator God who is 
/psum Esse. 
The being of all creatures is received or participated being. Although God is 
not universal being in a pantheistiC sense that would involve Him in a form of 
unity and community with the being of creatures, He is nevertheless the 
144 Aquinas, De Ente,III,5,(Leo.XLlII,374), Maurer,47. 
145 Aquinas, In Metaph.III,lec.9,n.448, Rowan,166. 
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universal cause of being, and so enters into a "community of cause" with 
creatures as first efficient cause. This finds its crowning expression in the 
community of redemption: 
The incarnate Son of God is the common Saviour of all, not by a generic or 
specific community, such as is attributed to the nature separated from the 
individuals, but by a community of cause, whereby the incarnate Son of 
God is the universal cause of human salvation. 146 
Nature as it exists in individuals is, in Thomas's account, not strictly knowable 
by the human intellect.147 
ST. BONAVENTURE (c.1220-1274) 
Christ the Centre 
Bonaventure's metaphysics is radically and explicitly Christ-centred. It has been 
said that his most outstanding achievement is "the development of a theological 
metaphysics ... (which) enabled him to concentrate on the Word of God as the 
principle of universal intelligibility".148 The whole of reality, for him, is 
encompassed by Christ's mission and exemplarity. While Thomas undoubtedly 
agrees with this,149 he seems always to have had in mind the exigencies of 
possible dialogue with Muslim, Jewish and other non-Christian philosophers. 15o 
Bonaventure, for his part, is concerned to counter any possible separation or 
parting of the ways between theology and its 'handmaid', philosophy. 
Characteristically, he summarizes his own metaphysic along Trinitarian lines: 
146 Aquinas, ST.III.4.4.ad.1 ,(Leo.XI,82-83). 
147 Aquinas, De Veritate II.4.ad.1 ,(Leo.xXII,VoI.1 ,57), Hackett,Vol.l,Mulligan,trans.,80. 
148 Ilia Delio,OSF, Bonaventure's Metaphysics of the Good, Theological Studies,60, 1999, 228-
246,229. 
149 However, as Thomas takes the view that, without sin, there would have been no Incarnation 
(ST. IIla.1.3c,Leo,XI, 14), he regards Christ as efficient and instrumental cause, rather than 
exemplar cause, of salvation. 
150 This is clearly the intention, as the names imply, of both the Summa Contra Gentiles and De 
Rationibus Fidei Contra Saracenos. 
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As the Son expresses it: I came forth from the Father and have come into 
the world. Again I leave the world and go to the Father (John 16:28). 
Likewise let anyone say: "Lord, I came out of You, the Supreme Being: I will 
return to You and through You, the Supreme Being. 
Such is the metaphysical Centre that leads us back, and this is the sum 
total of our metaphysics: concerned with emanation, exemplarity, and 
consummation, that is, illumination through spiritual radiations and return to 
the Supreme Being. And in this you will be a true metaphysician. 151 
The mysterious way of man's participation in the divine Esse has been made 
known. In the words of Bonaventure from his treatise, The Mind's Journey into 
God (Itinerarium Mentis in Oeum): 
Christ is the way: Christ is the door. By Christ we mount, by Christ we are 
borne, for he is 'the mercy-seat placed upon the ark of God', 'the mystery 
hidden from all ages' .152 
Bonaventure describes "two ways or degrees of contemplation of the invisible 
and eternal things of God", in the two perspectives of divine Oneness and 
Threeness: 
The first way, first and foremost, signifies Him in Being itself, saying He 
Who Is is the primary name of God. The second signifies Him in His 
goodness, saying this [Goodness] is the primary name of God. The former 
refers above all to the Old Testament, which preaches the unity of the 
divine essence, whence it was said to Moses, "I am Who am". The second 
refers to the New Testament, which lays down the plurality of the Persons, 
by baptizing in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy 
Spirit. 153 
Bonaventure expresses his intention "to show that in Christ are hidden all the 
treasures of wisdom and knowledge (CoI.2:3), and that He Himself is the central 
point of all understanding".154 Christ is portrayed as the hermeneutical key, so to 
speak, to the whole metaphysical order of "essence", as well as to the other 
orders of human knowledge and understanding. The "Esse" of the Old 
Testament understanding, in which God is revealed as the "I Am", becomes one 
151 Bonaventure, In Hexaemeron 1.17,(Quaracchi,V,332); Jose de Vinck,trans.,The Works of 
Bonaventure,VoI.V, Collations on the Six Days, Paterson,N.J., St.Anthony Guild Press, 
1970,10; cf.1.13,(Quar.V,331) and De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam.4,(Quar. V,320-1). 
152 Bonaventure, ltinerarium VI1.1,( Quaracchi,V,312); Divine Office,Vol.lIl,trans., 112* 
153 Bonaventure, Itinerarium V.2,(Quar.V,308); George Boas trans.,St.Bonaventura:The Mind's 
Road to God, Indianapolis, Bobs-Merrill, 1953, p.34. 
154 Bonaventure, In Hexaemeron 1.11,( Quar. V,330-1); de Vinck,6. 
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in Christ, the "mercy-seat", with the "Essence" of the New Testament 
understanding, in which God is revealed as One-in-Three: the attributes, One, 
True and Good reflecting the Persons. Consequently, the individual creature is 
"an effect of the creating Trinity in virtue of a triple causality": 155 
Hence, He must be the threefold cause of all creatures: efficient, exemplary 
and final. As a result, every creature must bear the same threefold 
reference to the first Cause: for everyone exists (constituitur in esse) by 
virtue of the efficient cause, is patterned after the exemplary cause, and 
ordained toward the final cause. For this reason, every creature is one, 
true and good ... 156 
Bonaventure: Being and Essence 
Bonaventure's ontology of the divine and human modes of being corresponds to 
Thomas's, but with rather more emphasis on essence in the wide sense (ens). 
In the ltinerarium, in which the mind ascends by stages to the contemplation of 
God, and ultimately to the Beatific Vision, Bonaventure addresses the reader: 
If you wish then to contemplate the invisible traits of God in so far as they 
belong to the unity of His essence, fix your gaze upon Being itself, and see 
that Being is most certain in itself; for it cannot be thought not to be, since 
the purest Being occurs only in full flight from Non-Being, just as 
nothingness is in full flight from Being. 157 
Without it we can know nothing, just as the eye, without light, can see nothing. 
However, echoing Augustine and Thomas on the light of the mind: 
Just as the eye intent upon the various differences of the colours does not 
see the light by which it sees the other things and, if it sees it, does not 
notice it, so the mind's eye, intent upon particular and universal beings, 
does not notice Being itself, which is beyond all genera, though that comes 
first before the mind and through it all other things. 158 
Anyone who does see or apprehend it will come to understand that "lacking 
non-being in every respect and therefore having no beginning nor end, it is 
155 Bonaventure, Breviloquium 11.1.2,( Quar. V,219); Jose de Vinck trans.,The Works of 
Bonaventure,Vol.ll, The Breviloquium, Paterson,N.J.,St.Anthony Guild Press, 1963, 70. 
156 Bonaventure, Breviloquium 11.1.4,( Quar. V,219),de Vinck, 71,my emphases .. 
157 Bonaventure, Itinerarium V.3, (Quar.V,308), my emphases;cf.,ln Hexaemeron, 11.25, 
~ Quar. V,340). 
58 Bonaventure, Itinerarium V.4,(Quar.V,309); cf.Augustine,Oe Trin.XII, 15.24,p.150 below. 
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eternal", and that, having "nothing in itself save Being in itself ... it is in no way 
composite, but is most simple", that it "has no potentialities ... but is the highest 
actuality", that it "has no defect, for it is most perfect", and finally, that it "has no 
diversity, for it is One in the highest degree".159 
The oneness of the divine Esse is inseparable from God's activity as First 
Cause. Everything in which there is multiplicity must stem from that in which 
there is no multiplicity; everything in which there is composition of essence and 
existence, and of matter and form must stem from that which is purely simple, 
and in which essence and existence are identical. However, Bonaventure differs 
from Aquinas here in that, where Thomas speaks of distinction, or absence of 
distinction, vis-a-vis God and creatures, in terms of ens, or esse, on the one 
hand, and essentia on the other hand, Bonaventure focuses, rather, on the 
distinction between ens and esse, or 'thing' and 'being', or, in other words 
between quod est and quo est, as he understands the terms. 
The ens or quod est is the thing itself, the concrete substance or 'what is'; the 
esse or quo est is that which it is, but in the abstract or universal: 
Just as in general (or universal: in communi) in creatures here below is 
found quod est and quo est, signifying in the concrete and in the abstract, 
as with man and humanity: so in divinity, but without understanding any 
distinction between the twO. 160 
"The divine being alone is simple, for in it, there is no difference between being, 
being such, and being fittingly,,161 In creatures, ens and esse are distinct: 
159 Bonaventure, Itinerarium V.S,(Quar.V,309), Boas,36. 
160 Bonaventure, Sent.I,d.23,a.1 ,q.1,conci.,( Quar.I,409),my translation, ... cum in communi in 
inferioribus inveniatur quod est et quo est, ratione cuius significatur in concre~ione e~ in . 
abstractrione, ut dicatur homo et humanitas: sic in divinis intelligimus, quamvls non mtelllgamus 
in differentia ilia duo. 
161 Bonaventure, In Hexaemeron,11.2S,(Quar.V.340),de Vinck,34. 
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No creature is pure act, because in every creature ... quo est and quod est 
are distinct, therefore in every creature is actuality and potentiality; but 
every such being has in it multiformity and lacks simplicity.162 
Bonaventure: The Analogy of Being 
While analogy, proportion and correspondence constitute a major element in 
Bonaventure's works, his understanding of the "analogy of being" differs from 
Thomas's mainly in placing more emphasis on the analogy between relations, 
especially between Trinitarian relations and their analogical counterparts in 
creation, so that divine Fatherhood and Sonship are valid analogies for their 
human counterparts; likewise with all relationships involving measure, 
number163 and weight, which are seen as echoing the Trinitarian relations. 
Bonaventure's works witness to the extraordinary fecundity of this concept of 
analogy. We are given an entire cosmos shot through and through with 
Trinitarian analogy, and with "desire" in the form of natures "weighted" or 
"ordered" towards their own perfection. 164 In the light of the Incarnation, this 
means towards eternal redemption, a concept already enshrined in St. Paul's 
words concerning the dispositions of all created things (Rom.B: 19-22). 
Bonaventure: Natural Finality 
For Bonaventure, as we have already seen 165, Christ is the "metaphysical 
Centre", the supreme Exemplar, who "leads us back" to the Father. It is 
especially clear in Bonaventure that the element of "givenness" (Thomas's 
elargifio) , and of the divine gratuitousness it implies, lies at the heart of all 
162 Bonaventure, Sent.I,d.8,p.2,q.2,f.1,( Quar.l, 167),my trans., Nulla creatura est actus purus: .. 
quia in omni creatura ... differl quo est et quod est, erg~ in .0'!7ni creatura est actus cum posslblll: 
sed omnis talis habet in se multiformitatem et caret slmp/lcltate. 
163 Cf./tinerarium, 11.1 0,( Quar. V,302),Boas,20. 
164 CUn Hexaemeron,11.23,(Quar.V,340),de Vinck,33. 
165 p.40 above. 
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being, and of creation, and calls forth a total response in the recipient creature 
of thanksgiving, praise and love.166 The creature is made for this: it is its very 
nature, its fulfilment and its happiness, its intrinsic finality. All of this is in 
accordance with the nature of God as the Good: 
God's being is supreme good, wherefore it supremely diffuses itself in a 
threefold outpouring: utterly actual, complete, and directed toward an end ... 
Likewise, this production is utterly FINAL, in that the producing being grants 
all that He can. But the creature is unable to receive all that God can 
grant.167 
As with Thomas, finality in the creature entails natural inclination, or ordination, 
to the fullness of its being, to receiving all that its nature is capable of receiving 
of the divine gratuity, including the grace of reciprocal self-gift. This is the true 
good of the rational creature, the fulfilment of its nature. This truth is signed in 
creation itself, which was God's first word to man: 
Thus, in the state of innocence, when the image had not yet been distorted 
but was conformed to God through grace, the book of creation sufficed to 
enable man to perceive the light of divine Wisdom. He was then so wise 
that, seeing all things in themselves, he also saw them in their proper 
genus as well as in God's creating Art.168 
The phrase, "in their proper genus as well as in God's creating Art" recalls 
Bonaventure's fundamental position that all the sciences, to attain true wisdom 
and knowledge, need Divine revelation and the understanding it gives of God's 
purposes. Man, in his unfallen state, would have had true knowledge and 
understanding of his own nature's intrinsic ordination to its greatest good, which 
is union with God. The book of creation would have been open to him because 
There is a certain order in these things. For God creates all essences by 
measure and number and weight (Wisdom 11 :20). And by giving these, He 
gives mode, species and order. Mode is that by whi~h a, t~in~ ~xists; 
species, that by which it is distinct; o,rder, that by which ,It IS flttl,ng. ,For, the,r6~ 
is no creature that is not endowed with measure, quantity and Inclination. 
166 This element is especially prominent in Bonaventure's treatise, "The Mind's Journey into 
God" (/tinerarium Mentis ad Oeum) 
167 Bonaventure In Hexaemeron XI, 11 ,(Quar,V,381-2),emphasis in de Vinck,163, 
168 Bonaventure: Breviloquium 11,12,4,( Quar, V,230},de Vinck,1 OS, 
169 Bonaventure, In Hexaemeron 1I,23,(Quar.V,340},de Vinck,33. 
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This is further explained in the Breviloquium. "Mode" or "measure" refers to the 
creature's dependence on the First Principle as efficient cause and source of its 
existence (the Father); "number" or "species" refers to distinct existence, 
"patterned after the exemplary cause" (the Son), and "weight" or "order" refers 
to the creature's natural inclination or tendency towards its final end (to be 
attained in and through the Holy Spirit), for "weight is defined as an orderly 
tendency", and "All this applies to every creature in general, whether material, 
spiritual or composite, as is human nature".170 In reference to the attributes 
"one, true and good, the "natural inclination" or "orderly tendency" is identified 
specifically with "the good". In the ltinerarium he adds "substance, power and 
operation" by way of further explanation of measure, number and weight. "From 
these one can rise as from the traces to understanding the power, wisdom and 
immense goodness of the Creator',.171 
THE PARIS CONDEMNATIONS OF 1277 
The "necessitarian crisis" of the later 13th century arose in the wake of the re-
appropriation of Aristotle via the Moslem philosophers, Avicenna and Averroes. 
Here, the necessity involved in God's being, and in the Trinitarian relations, 
would be extrapolated outwards to all of God's creative actions. The earth itself, 
and all it contains, would come to be seen by some as a work of necessity, 
entailing necessary causes and relations accessible to human reason; likewise 
the Incarnation, and the history of salvation. Pieper comments: 
Such "necessitarianism", in so far as it can at all be meaningfully co-
ordinated with the Christian world view, plainly needs a double corrective. 
One corrective had already been present and effective in Western 
Christianity for several hundred years ... this was the idea of "negative" 
theology as formulated in the works of Dionysius the Areopagite [Pseudo-
170 Bonaventure, Breviloquium 11.1.4,( Quar. V,219},de Vinck,71. 
171 Bonaventure, Itinerarium 1.11 ,(Quar.V,298},Boas, 11. 
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Dionysius]. The other corrective is contained within a single watchword: 
freedom. This one word was also the battle-cry of Duns ScotuS. 172 
The Church's response at the time to what was perceived as the danger of 
extreme Aristotelianism came with the list of 219 articles condemned by edict of 
Bishop Tempier of Paris in 1277. Pieper sees the Condemnations of 1277 as a 
major watershed in the history of scholasticism, and of the teaching of theology 
and philosophy. Roland Hissette sees them as the work of "theologiens 
conservateurs, qui, pour mieux resister aux attaques de la philosophie paienne, 
se rangent sous la banniere de S. Augustin".173 On the question of free will, 
article no. 161, on the supposed determination of the will by its desired object, 
can be taken as representative of the articles condemned: 
That the will as such is, like matter, undetermined towards opposites; it is, 
however, determined by the appetible object, as matter is by the informing 
agent. 174 
Hissette comments on this: 
Source non identifiee. /I s'agit selon toute vraisemblance d'un maitre es 
arts, partisan, comme Thomas d'Aquin, de la preeminence de /,intelligence 
sur la volonte, mais moins soucieux que lui de nuancer la portee de ses 
affirmations: jamais Ie saint docteur n'aurait admis qu'en face de I'objet 
appetible, la volonte est aussi passive que la matiere soumise a /'agent qui 
lui impose sa forme. 175 
Thomas himself, to be followed by other "Aristoteliciens moderes soucieux" , 
while teaching in Paris twenty years earlier, had perceived not only the danger 
presented by radical Aristotelianism, but also the potentially serious loss to be 
incurred by its indiscriminate rejection, regardless of the truth it contains and its 
possible value in the role of ancilla theologiae. His subsequent synthesis would, 
in its own right, attract the suspicions of those "ranged under the banner of St 
Augustine". On the question of free will, and matters pertaining thereto, it would 
172 Joseph Pieper, Scholasticism: Personalities and Problems of Medieval Philosophy, South 
Bend, Indiana, St. Augustine's Press, 2001,136. 
173 Roland Hissette, Enquete sur les 219 articles condamnes a Paris Ie 7 Mars, 1277, 
Philosophes Medievaux, Tome XXII, Louvain, Publications Universitaires, 1977,7. 
174 Hissette, Enquete,253,my translation. 
175 Hissette, Enquete,254. 
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also attract the systematic opposition of, among others, Henry of Ghent and 
Duns Scotus. 
A major scholarly publication of the last decade (2001) on the subject of the 
1277 Condemnations is the collection of 35 essays published under the title, 
Nach der Verurteilung von 1277.176 In his introductory essay giving an overview 
of the volume's contents, Kent Emery points out that Bonaventure, in his last 
work before his death in 1274, gives an account of the four main errors dealt 
with in the 13 articles condemned earlier at Paris in 1270, namely, the necessity 
of fate, the eternity of the world, the specific unity of the human intellect, and a 
"natural beatitude" or intellectual felicity attainable in this life. Apart from noting 
that many other notions of the philosophers may be reduced to these four, 
Emery makes no further reference to any of them in his overview, including the 
subject of natural necessity which features prominently in the 1277 Condemn-
ations. It would appear that contemporary scholarly preoccupations lie 
elsewhere, as Emery's account focuses mainly on the following issues: 1) the 
different perceptions of the relationship between philosophy and theology at the 
time: philosophy as either ancilla the%giae, or entirely autonomous discipline; 
2) relations between Church authority and the university faculties of Arts and 
Theology, and 3) the historical significance of the Condemnations and their 
impact: whether watershed or merely symptomatic of much longer-term trends. 
The latter include the long-term survival of the condemned Aristotelian pantheist 
tendencies, notably in Germany in the mystique rhenane associated with 
Meister Eckhart and others. 
176 Jan A.Aertsen, Kent Emery Jr. and Andreas Speer eds., After the Condemnations of 1277: 
Philosophy and Theology at the University of Paris in the Last Quarter of the Thirteenth 
Century, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 28, 2001. 
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Emery's overview of these contemporary scholarly preoccupations is echoed 
in a later review (2003) of the same volume by Luca Bianchi.177 However, 
Bianchi does also make reference to a common agreement among the 
contributing authors that "doctrines of the intellect and the ideal of philosophical 
felicity" in this life were "among the main problems at stake" in the period of the 
Condemnations. 178 This clearly refers to the "natural beatitude" or intellectual 
felicity attainable in this life, without reference to divine grace, listed by 
Bonaventure among the chief concerns of the 1270 condemnations. 
In addition, Bianchi acknowledges having, in his own contribution, "included 
the distinction between God's absolute and ordained power among the main 
causes which accelerated the metamorphosis of Scholastic discourse in the 
fourteenth century", and which "introduced significant departures from the 
Aristotelian framework" .179 The distinction between God's potentia absoluta and 
potentia ordinata will be, as I show in chapter 2, an element in Scotus's account 
of divine freedom, and an essential key to Ockham's entire metaphysics. On the 
other hand, the idea of "pure nature", and an Aristotelian "natural beatitude" or 
intellectual felicity attainable in via without reference to grace or revelation, 
would, as already noted (p.30 above), enjoy a far longer and wider vogue, at 
least in the West, right up to the twentieth century. 
Neither Emery nor Bianchi, in the review essays mentioned, makes any 
reference to the issues of 'natural finality' or of 'natural necessity vs. freedom 
177 Luca Bianchi, New Perspectives on the Condemnation of 1277 and its Aftermath, 
Recherches de Theologie et Philosophie Medievales 70,n.1 ,2003,206-229. 
178 Bianchi, Perspectives,218. 
179 Bianchi, Perspectives, 229. 
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• 
and free-will'. These are evidently not among the contemporary preoccupations 
of the scholars represented in Nach der Verurteilung van 1277. They were 
certainly, however, among the principal preoccupations of the most prominent 
collaborator of Tempier in drawing up the list of articles for condemnation, 
namely, the secular clerk and scholar, Henry of Ghent (d.1293). Henry's radical 
account of the superiority of will over intellect will be dealt with in chapter 2, and 
his account of divine illumination in chapter 3. 
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS (c.1265-1308) 
Univocity of Being 
Scotus introduces what was at the time his controversial theory of univocity in 
the context of his treatment of the knowability of God in Ordinatia I. Henry of 
Ghent, in the aftermath of the 1277 Condemnations, had presented a theory of 
divine knowability which combined Augustinian illumination with Aristotelian 
abstraction, to arrive at his own distinctive theory of strictly analogical 
knowledge of God, based on Aristotelian abstraction from the sensible. Scotus 
sees Henry's account of analogy as creating an unbridgeable gap between 
ordinary language and any possible true discourse about God. He accepts that, 
in practice, we sometimes use analogy when speaking of God; however: 
I say that God is thought of not only in some concept analogous to that of a 
creature, that is, one entirely different from what is predicated of a creature, 
but also in some concept univocal to himself and to a creature ... I call that 
concept univocal that has sufficient unity in itself that to affirm and deny it of 
the same subject suffices as a contradiction. 18o 
Scotus proposes five principal reasons in favour of a univocal concept of being: 
Firstly, the concept of God as a being, which might be called an entitative 
180 Scotus, Ordinatio l,d.3,n.26,( Vat.lIl, 18); William A.Frank and Allan B.Wolter trans. ,Duns 
Scotus, Metaphysician, West Lafayette, Indiana, Purdue University Press, 1995,109. 
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concept, is clearly distinguishable from the concept of God as this or that, i.e., a 
quidditative concept. In addition, and from experience: 
.. the intellect of a person in this life can be certain that God is a being while 
doubting whether this being is finite or infinite, created or uncreated; 
therefore the concept of God as a being is other than this or that concept; 
and although included in each off these, it is none of them of itself, and 
therefore it is univocal. 181 
Being qua being is the most basic, and the most certain, of concepts. As such, it 
is the first object of the intellect, whose presence to the mind is necessary for 
any knowledge whatever. In addition, the primacy of being as a univocal 
concept is seen by Scotus as the sine qua non for metaphysics, for any 
language about God, and for any science of theology. Although he himself 
sometimes resorts to analogy, Scotus maintains that, without univocity of being, 
analogy would be mere equivocation, and no language or understanding of God 
would be possible.182 Besides this, what actually makes language about God 
possible is the fact that being, rather than quiddifas, is the first object of the 
intellect (Cf. Aquinas, p.11 above). As Ingham points out, Scotus establishes 
this "by means of his usual methodological procedure, moving from experience 
to what grounds the possibility of that experience" .183 
Secondly, he accepts and makes use of Aristotle's cognitive model, involving 
sense knowledge, mental species and agent intellect. The intellect is moved 
naturally by the object as revealed in the sense image (or phantasm), and by 
the active intellect, which assigns effects to causes. At the same time, he holds 
that this model of abstractive cognition is incapable of providing an analogical 
181 Frank and Wolter, Metaphysician, 111. 
182 See Ordinatio l,d.3,n.139,( Vat.III,8?); Lectura l,d.3,n.113,(Vat.XVI,266). 
183 Mary Beth Ingham and Mechtild Dreyer, The Philosophical Vision of John Duns Scotus, An 
Introduction, Washington DC, CUA Press,2004,41. 
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basis for natural knowledge of God.184 Such knowledge has to be based on a 
univocal concept of being, which alone is capable of bridging the chasm 
between human knowing and divine being. Without it, there can be no natural 
knowledge of God, therefore no metaphysics or science of theology. 
Thirdly, no one in this life (pro statu isto) has natural knowledge of God 
according to the divine essence "ut haec": just as it is in itself, or "in a particular 
and proper way" (in particulari et proprie).185 Such knowledge belongs only in 
the beatific vision, where the Blessed enjoy God not as a natural object, but as 
an obiectum voluntarium. Univocity of being obtains only with regard to general 
notions (in generalibus rationibus), of which the concept of being is the most 
basic, and extends virtually to all that exists. On this basis, some scientific 
reflection can take place. 
Fourthly, on the basis of a univocal concept, one can take the formal notion of 
some proper perfection: wisdom, or goodness, for instance, and attribute it to 
God in the highest degree by subtracting from it the imperfections and 
limitations seen in creatures. This is the via eminentiae (the opposite of the via 
negativa) , as formal notions are attributed to God "in a most perfect way" .186 
Scotus cites Augustine in support of it. 187 
Fifthly, the transcendental attributes of being: oneness, truth and goodness, 
which apply to God in an eminent way, are known of God from their likenesses 
in creatures: 
184 Ordinatio,l,d.3,nn.35-36,(Vat.III,21-24). 
185 Ordinatio, I,d. 3, nn. 56-57, (Vat.III,38-39). 
186 Ordinatio, l,d.3,nn.39-40,( Vat. 111,26-27). 
187 Ordinatio,II,d.3,n.399,(Vat.vIl,564); Augustine, De Trinitate, VIII,3,(PL.42,950). 
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.. and thus, creatures, which impress in the intellect a likeness (species) 
proper to themselves, can also impress the species of the transcendentals 
which are applicable commonly to themselves and to God .. 188 ' 
The transcendentals are the primary focus of metaphysical reflection. As, by 
definition, they are beyond the Aristotelian categories, and beyond sense 
perception, it follows that univocity of being is the primary condition for the 
possibility of any metaphysics or theology. 
Scotus: Being and Essence 
Scotus, according to Cross, "does not believe it is possible to make any sense 
of a distinction between essence and esse" .189 Nevertheless, he accepts divine 
being as necessary, as precluding any passivity, i.e. potentiality, and as "having 
every condition necessarily required for existence".19o He nowhere explicitly 
discusses Aquinas's view that God is identical with his esse, and therefore with 
his attributes, except to say that "I do not know that fiction according to which 
existence is something that supervenes on essence" .191 Cross expands on this: 
Causing an individual, for example, and causing its existence are just one 
and the same thing. In this sense, there is no distinction between individual 
and existence in anything, and a fortiori not in God. What precisely Aquinas 
intends is, of course, a matter of huge and sometimes acrimonious dispute. 
It is certainly clear that, whatever the teaching is supposed to be, Scotus is 
just not interested in it.192 
One of the results, as Cross acknowledges, is that Scotus's theory is criticized 
by "more apophaticallY minded" theologians, such as Aquinas's followers, "for 
sanctioning a God who is insufficiently different from creation" .193 It is true that 
188 Ordina tio , I, d.3,n.61,(Vat.III,42). 
189 Richard Cross, Duns Scotus on God, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005,10. 
190 Scotus, Ordinatio,l.d.8,p.1,q.3,n.149,(Vat.IV,227), Cross,Scotus on God,114,n.56. 
191 Scotus, Ordinatio,IV,d.11,q.3,n.46,(Olms-Wadding,VIII,649), Cross,114,n.56. 
192 The distinction between individual (ens) and existence (esse) which Cross here attributes to 
Thomas is actually Bonaventure's account of the mode of being in creatures, based on the 
notion that 'to be is to be an essence' (see p.42 above). For Thomas, to be is to be in act. and 
he places the distinction betweeen ens or esse as the being or its act of being, and essentia as 
the essence or quiddity (or nature). See George P.Klubertanz, 'Esse' and 'Existere' in St. 
Bonaventure Medieval Studies,8, 1946,169-188. 
193 Cross, Sc~tus on God,11. 
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Thomas's approach to the being of God, heavily indebted to Pseudo-Dionysius, 
is based on the via remotionis,194 meaning that we can more readily say what 
God is not, rather than what He is. It is also true that Thomas's distinction 
between being and essence in creatures stems partly from a concern to 
maintain the difference in mode of being between creature and Creator. While 
Bonaventure clearly takes a similar approach, Scotus's approach to the 
difference in mode of being rests on the infinite/finite distinction, rather than on 
Thomas's simple/composite distinction.195 The doctrine of divine ineffability, so 
much stressed by Thomas and (to a lesser extent) Henry of Ghent, is "greatly 
weakened" in Scotus, and as Cross observes: 
The difference between God and creatures, at least with regard to God's 
possession of the pure perfections, is ultimately one of degree. Specifically, 
the perfections exist in an infinite degree in God, and in a finite degree in 
t 196 crea ures .... 
Since infinity necessarily implies simplicity, it seems that there is no essential 
contradiction between their respective starting-points; but it was Scotus's more 
easily grasped univocal concept of being that would set the precedent 
thereafter. 
Scotus: Natural Finality 
What interests us here concerning the eclipse of Thomas's account of divine 
and human modes of being is its possible implication for the understanding of 
natural finality in creatures. The concept of finality is intrinsic to Thomas's 
account of the 'hierarchy of being' (above, p.17), in which multiplicity and the 
mutual ordering of creatures to one another and to God as ultimate source and 
goal are seen as necessary to the perfection of the universe. Likewise, the 
194 Ct. Aquinas, SCG.1.14,(Leo.XIII,40), Pegis,96-7. 
195 E.g.,Scotus,Quodlibet, V,(Olms-Wadding,XII, 117-141). 
196 Richard Cross, Duns Scotus, Great Medieval Thinkers, OUP,1999,39. 
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hylomorphism of matter and form, potency and act, is an integral element of the 
hierarchical nature of the cosmos. The same applies to Bonaventure's scheme 
(below, p.172) of the emanation and return (exitus - reditus) of all things to the 
Creator by means of the salvific action of the 'exemplar cause', the Incarnate 
Word, and illumination by the Holy Spirit. However, another element remains, 
which may turn out to be the key to the whole universe of natural finality: this is 
the "ordering" of essence to being ("I call 'essence' that whose actuality is 
being", p.12 above) in all created things. Whatever seeks its perfection seeks 
the fullness of its being, by drawing closer to God in likeness; and all things 
intend to seek their perfection, being "ordered" to it. This natural potency of 
essence to being in creatures is the element which Scotus rejects; it is clearly 
not in keeping with his univocal concept of being. Nevertheless, he agrees with 
Thomas on other essential aspects of finality. Scotus says of the ultimate end: 
Man is ordered to a supernatural end, for which he is of himself indisposed; 
he falls short, then, of being disposed to possessing that end. This [being 
disposed] happens through some imperfect supernatural cognition ... 197 
Man's ultimate end is natural to him if considered as "object of inclination", but 
supernatural if considered as "object of attainment" .198 He has to be "gradually 
disposed" to it; this takes place through the revelation, by sanctifying grace, of a 
certain, still imperfect, supernatural knowledge. Scotus also answers the 
objection concerning the relative 'nobility' of rational and irrational natures 
addressed earlier by Thomas (pp.30-1 above): "This vilifies nature, that it 
cannot pursue its perfection by its natural powers", to which Scotus replies: 
In this, nature is more dignified than if the supreme (happiness) possible to 
it were placed in it naturally; nor is it any wonder that there be in a certain 
197 Scotus, Ordinatio,Prologue,l,n.49,(Vat.I,30); de Lubac,trans.,Mystery,85,n.34, my 
~arenthesis. 
98 Scotus, Ordinatio,Prologue,l,n.57, Vat.I,35). 
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nature a passive capacity to perfection greater than that to which its active 
causalityextends. 199 
However, this inequality between its "purely natural" (non-graced) possibilities 
and its possibilities as capax Dei entails that our nature is not naturally 
knowable to us. In a question on the necessity of divine revelation, Scotus says: 
They ["the philosophers"] accept that our nature, or our intellective potency, 
is naturally knowable to us; this is false, under the very and specific rule 
(ratio) under which it is ordered to such an end, is completely capable of 
grace, and has God as the most perfect object. In fact, our soul is not 
known to us, nor is our nature in its present condition, except under some 
general rule that is beyond the reach of the senses.200 
Thomas says the same thing concerning natural knowledge of the final end, that 
"it is not fitting that it be first in the knowledge of the human mind, which is 
ordered to the end", but rather in the knowledge of the ordainer.201 Man, 
therefore, needs revelation in order to know distinctly what is his last end. 
Scotus: Being as Perfection 
Although we do not find in Scotus a statement such as Thomas's "I call essence 
(essentia) that whose actuality is being (esse)",202 Scotus's account of finality 
shows clearly that he does identify perfection with the "highest being", meaning 
God, identified now as the fulfilment of the finite's desire for the infinite: 
It is impossible for potency to be perfectly quieted except in what is best, in 
which the essence of its object (ratio obiecti SUI) is saved. But the whole 
being (totum ens) is an object by reason (sub ratione) of good will, and by 
reason of true intellect. Therefore the intellect and the will are quieted only 
when their object is in the height of its perfection. But in no finite thing can it 
be in its highest perfection. Therefore, only in the Infinite''.203 
As with Thomas (above, p.25), Scotus identifies the soul's perfection with an 
operation or activity, which is its goal and is identified with happiness: 
199 Scotus, Ordinatio,Prologue,I,n.75,(Vat.I,45-6), de Lubac,trans. , Mystery, 155,n.77. 
200 Scotus,Ordinatio,Prol.,p.1,q.un.,(Vat.I,17),de Lubac,trans.,Mystery,211. 
201 Aquinas, In Boetium de Trinitate,q.1,a.3,ad.4,(Leo.L,88). 
202 Aquinas, Sent.I,d.23,q.1,a.1,(Mandonnet,ptbi); cf.ST.la.3.4c,(Leo.IV,42). 
203 Scotus, Ordinatio, IV,d.1,q.6,n.5,(Olms-Wadding,VIII,), de Lubac, Mystery,trans.,192,n.27. 
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Also there are many citations from authority about happiness as the 
ultimate and most desirable end, whether they make it consist in knowledge 
(as in that text from Augustine that "vision is the whole reward,,204), or in 
love (according to his statement that "The supreme reward is our 
enjoyment of him,,205). All these agree at least in this, that the last and most 
desirable end is an activity or consists in an operation.206 
Again, as with Thomas (above, p.20), desire for the final end does not entail 
having to be always thinking of it: 
But the ultimate perfection of the living nature is what such a nature desires 
above all else by natural desire. Augustine's words can be understood as 
referring to such desire when he declares: "We all want to be happy,,207. 
This is always true whether we actually think of beatitude or not, and yet 
without actual knowledge we can have no actual volition.208 
Scotus: Universals and Nature: (i) The Formal Distinction 
Both in the matter of universals and in his doctrine of formal entities, Scotus 
was a realist. His realism, however, did not run to acceptance of the traditional 
Franciscan "plurality of forms", postulating, as it did, a real composition or 
distinction of forms in the human make-up.209 Scotus simplified it by positing a 
"formal", rather than real, distinction between them. His doctrine of "formal 
distinction" made use of a concept already known to the thirteenth century: that 
of a type of distinction intermediate between the real distinction existing among 
individuals in the extra-mental world, and the purely mental type of distinction 
created by the mind. Thomas had referred to it as a distinction arising "not 
merely by reason of the one conceiving it but in virtue of a property of the thing 
itself'.210 The distinction is in some sense real. Scotus also calls it a "virtual 
204 Augustine, De Trinitate,XIII,n.31 ,(PL.42,844). 
205 Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana,l.32.n.5,(PL.34,32). 
206 Scotus,Ouodlibet,XIII,a.1.4,(Olms-Wadding,XII,302),Alluntis,286,13.11. 
207 Augustine, De Trinitate,XIII,c.4,n. 7,(PL.42, 1 018-9). 
208 Scotus,Ouodlibet,XIII,a.1.3,(Olms-Wadding,XII,302),Alluntis,285, 13.9. 
209 i.e. the body having its own forma corpore ita tis, and the soul its own "spiritual matter". 
210 Aquinas, In I Sent.,d.2,q.1 ,a.2,(Mandonnet,I,62). 
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distinction", since what is involved is not really two things, but "one thing which 
is virtually or pre-eminently, as it were, two realities" .211 
At the same time, because he does not accept the real composition of 
essence and existence in creatures,212 Scotus can attribute several formal 
entities to any being without disrupting its actual unity. This is seen first and 
foremost in the Deity. Although all the divine attributes, because they share in 
God's infinity, are one, there is in God at least a virtual foundation for the 
distinction we posit between them. This applies, in the first place, to the 
distinction between the intellect of God and his will. The distinguishing role vis-
a-vis God and creatures played in Thomism by the existential purity of the 
divine Act of Being, is played in Scotism by the divine will. 
In Scotus, finite being is finite in virtue of the composition of matter and form 
only, and not, as in Thomas, the composition of being and essence also. In 
virtue of the formal distinction, the plurality of forms in all sensible creatures, 
including man, in no way threatens the unity of being of each.213 However, 
although he will not add an act of being to the existent (i.e. to the existent as an 
essence), Scotus does add an individuating principle, an "individual difference" 
to the form to constitute its singularity. This he also terms its haecceitas: 
"haecceity" or "thisness". The purpose of the haecceitas is to preserve the 
uniqueness of the individual, so that a formal distinction can be made between 
the essence or nature as individuated, and the essence or nature as common, 
without losing all unity in the nature. The resulting unity of the common nature is 
a less-than-individual unity. Scotus calls it unitas minor. 
211 Scotus, Ordinatio,l,d.2,nn.399-407,(Vatican,II,355-6). 
212 Scotus, Ordinatio, IV,d.11 ,q.3,n.46,(Olms-Wadding, VIII,649]). 
213 Scotus, Ordinatio,IV,d.11 ,q.3,n.47,(Olms-Wadding,VIII,649). 
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(ii) Common Nature 
All form is common to the individuals of one species. This is the nature absolute 
sumpta, as abstracted from all singularity and universality. Scotus calls it the 
"common nature", in relation to which, the haecceity is not an added form, but 
the ultimate reality of the form. It is an "ultimate difference" of formal being.214 At 
the same time, it is indifferent, in itself, to both existence and non-existence. In 
created things, it is the ultimate determination and actuality which perfects their 
being. 
Scotus' noetic makes a clear distinction between intuitive and abstractive 
cognition, as well as between the roles of the active and passive intellects. The 
proper object of intuitive cognition is the existing singular perceived as existing, 
and of abstractive cognition, the quiddity or essence of the known thing.215 
Intellective cognition has to do with universals: a "representative image", 
endowed with actual existence, of the intelligible species, i.e., the universal qua 
universal, is produced by the agent intellect. Received in the possible intellect, it 
causes intellection.216 Scotus firmly maintains the reliability of sense knowledge, 
as against Henry of Ghent.217 
The locus of the real in Scotus is the essence as abstracted by the intellect 
from its objects. It is neither pure universality nor pure individuality, but, as the 
intrinsic indetermination of essence, it is the metaphysical ground of both. 
214 Scotus, Ordinatio, II,d.3,q.6,( Vatican, VII,463-494). 
215 Scotus, Ordinatio,I/,d.3,p.2,q.2,n.6,(Vatican,VI/,553). 
216 Scotus, Ordinatio,l,d.3,p.3,q.1,n.8,(Vatican,I/1,217-220). 
217 Scotus, Ordinatio,l,d.3,p.1 ,q.4,a.5,( Vatican, "I, 133-4). 
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Consequently, for Scotus, the "common nature" of a thing has a kind of real 
being, based on the "formal distinction" of attributes. For the most part, like 
Thomas, he does not equate "nature" with "universal", though, like Thomas, he 
allows the use of the term "universal" to designate the nature taken absolutely, 
as abstracted from all reality: 
In the first way, nature taken absolutely is called 'universal', because it is 
not, of itself, a "this", and therefore does not, of itself, preclude being used 
of many. In the second way, it is not universal, except in the sense of an 
indeterminate act, such that an identical name can be given to each 
suppositum, and in that sense, it is truly universal.218 
In general, in Scotus, "common nature" is contrasted with singularity and 
universality, both of which are accidental to it. It is neither singular nor plural: 
not singular because it does not have the specific unity of an individual as 
individual. However, Scotus does assign to it a lesser but real unity, based on 
Aristotle:219 The unitas minor is never found in reality apart from the existent 
individuals. In any individual, the nature has a two-fold unity: that which belongs 
to the individual as individual, as well as the lesser unity that belongs to the 
nature in itself. For Scotus, the difference in the nature as it is found in different 
individuals is not at all incompatible with the unitas minor that embraces all 
human nature Whatever, and which constitutes a really existent unity outside the 
intellect. Therefore, "the community of nature is a real community outside the 
mind, and is the real foundation of all universal predication and scientific 
knowledge".220 Without a proper being and unity of the nature in itself, there 
could be no community of nature. As it is, it has enough being of its own to be 
the source of true quidditative propositions, since truth, like unity, is a 
transcendent attribute of being. 
218 Scotus, Q.in Metaph.VII, 18,n.6,(Olms-Wadding,IV,723). 
219 Aristotle, Metaphysics, X , 1 (1052b 18-24). . . . . 
220 Joseph Owens, Common Nature: A Point of Comparison Between ThomIstIc and ScotlStlC 
Metaphysics, Mediaeval Studies 19,1957,1-14,10. 
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Because it has a proper being of its own, the Scotistic common nature, unlike 
the Thomistic, cannot be predicated of individuals. Predication involves 
complete identity in reality, where one can say, in Scotistic terms, hoc est hoc. 
Consequently, only Thomas's natura absolute considerata, abstracted from all 
being without precision, can be predicated of all individuals as a universal. 
However, Scotus's 'formal distinction' allows him to attribute the common nature 
to individuals without either predication or loss of unity: 
Thus whatever is common and yet determinable can still be distinguished 
(no matter how much it is one thing) into several formally distinct realities of 
which this one is not formally that one. This one is formally the entity of 
singularity, and that one is formally the entity of the nature.221 
For Scotus, as previously stated, the common nature is prior in being to either 
universality or singularity. Therefore the nature is not of itself a universal, but 
universality accrues to it accidentally.222 In Scotus' view, to equate the two 
would amount to fundamental confusion of the logical and metaphysical realms. 
The common nature is more properly the metaphysical ground of the universal. 
Universal predicability does not necessarily entail a common essence in 
reality. Scotus makes this claim only for predicables that are absolute terms: 
this on the basis of the medieval distinction between absolute and connotative 
terms. An absolute term denotes reality outside the mind, for instance, "human 
being", "tree", "water". Connotative terms denote real things only indirectly, 
relatively or negatively, in virtue of some accidental quality, for example, 
"father", "carpenter", "drunkard". As a logical universal (i.e., in the mind), 
221 Scotus, Ordinatio,II,d.3,p.1,q.6,(Vatican,VII,484), Paul Vincent Spade ed. and tran~.,~ive 
Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals, Indianapolis/Cambridge, Hackett Publishing 
CO.,1994,107. 
222 Ordinatio,II,d.3,p.1,q.1,n. 7,(Vatican,VII,404), Spade,Five Texts, 64. 
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"human being" is predicable of all actually existing humans. But this logical 
universality is grounded in a metaphysically prior "humanity" as a common 
nature existing outside the mind. The absolute term, "human being", therefore, 
has a dual universality, both logical and metaphYSically-grounded. Connotative 
terms, on the other hand, are purely logical, and do not entail positing a 
common nature of "fatherhood", "carpenterhood" etc. On this subject, A. Matteo 
observes that: 
.. Scotus, in expounding his doctrine of the common nature, was not setting 
out to multiply metaphysical entities with reckless abandon. He clearly 
recognized a whole host of purely logical universals which were solely entia 
rationis ... Nonetheless, he identified another class of logical universals that 
referred directly to external reality. For the latter an objective grounding in 
reality had to be established by the first intentional science of metaphysics 
if our conceptualization and discourse vis-a-vis external reality were not to 
be reduced to a subjectivist status.223 
In the case of Aquinas and Scotus, the divergence in their understandings of 
common nature is underscored by their contrasting doctrines of being and 
essence. For Thomas, a finite essence always remains other than any being it 
may possess: in itself, absolute considerata, it has no being at all. For Scotus, 
an essence in and of itself, for which he uses the term absolute sumpta, has a 
positive being of its own, on which there follows a minor unity and a formal 
distinction. All of this constitutes a concept entirely foreign to Thomistic 
philosophy. For St. Thomas, only in infinite being are nature and individuality 
identical, as only in God do essence and being coincide. 
Scotus's univocal concept of being, which entails a real identity of being and 
essence in creatures, can be seen as a sine qua non for his doctrine of the 
223 Anthony M. Matteo. Scotus and Ockham: A Dialogue on Universals. Franciscan Studies 45, 
1985,83-96.88. 
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common nature. His purpose in positing the metaphysical formality of a less-
than-numerical unity (unitas minor), is, as he sees it, to safeguard the vital link 
between thought and being, lest our intellectual life be rendered unintelligible. 
WILLIAM OF OCKHAM (c.1285-1347) 
Ockham is a radical opponent of Scotus's realism, and uses his formidable 
talents as a logician to deliver it fatal blows wherever he comes up against it. 
Scotus's 'common nature' and 'formal distinction' are two of the principal 
casualties. Any suggestion of reality in universals tends to attract his attention in 
this way, and occupies considerable space in his works. At the same time, he is 
deeply indebted to Scotus on a number of important counts, notably, the 
distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition224 (Thomas and 
Bonaventure dealt with abstractive alone), and the distinction between absolute 
and connotative terms.225 As we will see in chapter 2, he also shares Scotus's 
passionate concern for divine and human freedom, and carries the concern to 
new lengths. 
Ockham: Being and Essence 
Thomas, as we have seen, had added to the Aristotelian distinction of matter 
and form in a substance the additional distinction between its act of being and 
its essence (esse et essentia), or between 'a being' (ens) and its essence 
(essentia). Ockham, who was far from being alone in wishing to refute the 
notion, almost invariably speaks of it as a distinction between 'two things' (duae 
res): 
224 I See pp.69-70 be ow. 
225 See pp.60 above, 247 below. 
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.. we shall. .. consider how the existence ('esse existere,) of a thing is related 
to the thing, i.e., whether the existence of a thing and its essence are two 
entities extra-mentally distinct from each other.226 
If they were distinct, the existence of a thing would be either a substance or an 
accident. If an accident, "the existence of a man would be a quality or a 
quantity, which is manifestly false". Neither can it be a substance, because 
every substance is either matter or form, or a composition of matter and 
form, or a separated substance. But it is manifest that none of these can be 
called the existence (esse) of a thin~, if existence is a thing distinct from the 
essence (entitas) of the thing itself.2 7 
He also brings to bear on the subject his own favoured metaphysical 'trump 
card', the separability by divine absolute power of all real 'things': if existence 
and essence were really distinct in a thing, God would be able to preserve 
either one without the other, which is impossible. He concludes, using his own 
terminology: 
We have to say, therefore, that essence (entitas) and existence (existentia) 
are not two things. On the contrary, the words 'thing' (res) and 'to be' (esse) 
signify one and the same thing, but the one in the manner of a noun and 
the other in the manner of a verb.228 For that reason, the one cannot be 
suitably substituted for the other, because they do not have the same 
function.229 
The distinction is semantic, not real or metaphysical. 
Ockham: The Concept of Univocity 
Where Thomas sees the difference in mode of being between God and 
creatures as requiring the analogical mode of predication,23o Ockham finds 
nothing in the notion of 'analogy' that is not adequately covered by univocal, 
226 Ockham, SL 11I-2.27,Philos 1,553); Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., trans: Ockham, Philosophical 
Writings, Indianapolis, Hackett,1990,92. 
227 Ockham, SL 11I-2.27,(Philos.I,553), Boehner,trans.,93. 
228 Cf. Quodlibet,11. 7,( Theol.IX, 143-144), Freddoso,119-122. 
229 Ockham, SL 11I-2.27,(Philos.I,554), Boehner,trans.,93. 
230 Aquinas, SCG.I,32-34,(Leo.XIII,97-104). 
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equivocal or denominative predication.231 'Being' as such, by itself, is, in any 
case, only a concept, which can be predicated univocally in quid of God and of 
all creatures.232 The essence of each is as unique and singular as the 
individual. 'Being' may be predicated in quid of all created things, including the 
ultimate differences and proper attributes of which Scotus makes an 
exception.233 A univocal concept can even be common to things that have no 
likeness, either substantial or accidental. It is in this sense only that concepts 
can be predicated univocally of God and creatures; for nothing essential to God 
is of the same ratio234 as anything essential to a creature. 
Ockham observes that, "The name 'being' is equivocaf'. This is because "it is 
not predicated according to one concept of all [names] that are capable of being 
subjects, taken significatively. Instead, diverse concepts correspond to this 
name ... ".235 The diversity of concepts Ockham has in mind here are those 
signified by absolute and connotative terms respectively, even though, 
according to Ockham's ontology, connotative terms do not signify entities 
distinct from those signified by their associated absolute terms in the categories 
of substance and quality.236 Ockham continues: 
However, I do claim that the concept 'being' is univocal to God and all other 
things. This is evident from the fact that everyone concedes that we have 
some sort of noncomplex cognition of God. Then I ask: do we know God in 
himself and under a proper notion of the divine nature by means of a 
cognition that is proper, simple, absolute and affirmative? And it is not true 
that we know God in this way237 ... either by means of an intuitive cognition 
231 Ockham, Quod/ibet,IV.12,(Theol.IX,352-359), Freddoso,292-298. 
232 Ockham, Quodlibet, V.14,( Theol.IX,536-8), Freddoso,448-450. 
233 Ockham, Ordinatio,l,d.2,q.9,(Theol.II,300). ." 
234 The Latin word ratio, frequent in scholastic usage, I will let stand, as It h~s ~o precise English 
equivalent. It approximates to 'rationale', 'reason', 'meaning' or 'understanding. 
23~ Ockham, Quod/ibet, V.14,( Theol.IX,53?), Freddoso & Kelley,trans.,44~, my emphases. 
236 Ockham, Expositio in Librum Porphyrii de Praedicabilibus,lI,n.10,(Phllos.II.41-44). 
237 Cf. Quodlibets,IV.1? and V.? 
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or by means of an abstractive cognition. Or do we rather know God not in 
himself as he is, but instead in some concept?238 ' 
He goes on to show that "some concept is common to God and all other things", 
and that it "can be correctly predicated of them ... univocally".239 The concept in 
question is 'being'. However, it is precisely as a concept that 'being' can be so 
predicated. For Ockham, 'being' is only a concept. It has no reality whatever 
distinct from individual things. The locus of all reality is the singular existing 
thing (res). 
Ockham on Nature: 
Against Scotus's Formal Distinction and Common Nature 
Ockham's rejection of the Scotistic formal distinction evidently ranks high on the 
list of 'pivotal moments' in the history of Western thought. According to one 
commentator: 
It is scarcely an exaggeration to assert that if one wished to select a single 
cardinal point on which the whole history of western thought turned, then 
the Scotistic distinctio formalis a parte rei .. . would be a most prominent 
candidate for selection. Ockhamism is, to a large extent, a reaction against 
it, and in the absence of such a reaction the total complexion and 
subsequent history of European philosophy, logic and theology would have 
been quite other than in fact it has been.24o 
Maurer, too, comments on the importance of this 'moment' for Ockham's own 
thinking, describing it as "a milestone in reaching his (Ockham's) own nominalist 
position. Indeed, the method itself by which he refutes Scotus leads him 
inexorably to his position".241 The formal distinction is, indeed, entirely 
incompatible with the radical singularity of real entities which dominates 
Ockham's metaphysics. In his Ordina tio , he describes Scotus's theory as 
follows: 
238 Ockham, Quodlibet,V.14,( Theol.IX,538), Freddoso,449. 
239 Ockham, Quodlibet, V.14,( TheoI.IX,538), Freddoso,450. ... 
240 DP.Henry, Medieval Logic and Metaphysics, London, Hutchi~son University Llbrary,1972.89. 
241 Armand Maurer, Method in Ockham's Nominalism. The MOnist 61,1978,432. 
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On this question it is said that in a thing outside the soul there is a nature 
really the same as a difference that contracts it to a determinate individual 
and yet formally distinct from that difference. This nature is of itself neither 
, 
universal nor particular. Rather it is incompletely universal in the thing, and 
completely universal according to the being it has in the intellect. 242 
He goes on to attribute this theory to "the Subtle Doctor, who surpasses all 
others in the subtlety of his judgment", and to refute it at considerable length. 
Ockham, the logician, makes full use of syllogisms to reinforce his arguments, 
for, as he says in the Ordina tio , "syllogistic form holds equally for every subject 
matter".243 The 'formal distinction' lends itself only too well to dismissal by this 
mode of argument: 
I prove my premise by the following syllogism: the nature is not formally 
distinct from itself; this individual difference is formally distinct from this 
nature; therefore, this individual difference is not this nature.244 
Similarly effective is the 'principle of contradiction' (or 'of noncontradiction') 
itself, for "contradiction is the strongest way to prove the distinction of things": 
For if a nature and the contracting difference are not the same in all 
respects, then something can be truly affirmed of the one and denied of the 
other. But among creatures the same thing cannot be truly affirmed and 
truly denied of the same thing. Therefore, they are not one thing.245 
The common nature, whose real existence Scotus maintains, is the 
metaphysical ground of both the universality, which exists in the mind only, and 
of the singularity, which is the nature as contracted to individuals by an 
individual difference formally distinct from the nature as such. In the same 
question, he says: 
Just as a nature, according to its being, is not of itself universal, but rather 
universality is accidental to the nature according to its primary aspect 
according to which it is an object, so too in the external thing where the 
nature is together with singularity, the nature is not of itself determined to 
singularity but is naturally prior to the aspect that contracts to that 
242 Ockham, Ordinatio, d.2,q.6,(TheoLlI,161), Spade ed.,Five Texts,153,my emphasis. 
243 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.2,q.6,( Theo/.II,174), Spade ed., Five Texts.156. 
244 Ockham, SL.1.16,(Phi/os.I,54), Loux,trans.,82. . 
245 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.2,q.6,( Theo/.II, 173-4). Spade,ed.,Flve Texts,156. 
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sing.ularity. A~d ins.of~r as it is ~aturally prior to that contractin~ aspect, it is 
not incompatible with It to be without that contracting aspect. 2 
Therefore, universality is accidental to the common nature, and singularity is 
posterior to it. The nature as naturally prior, and as metaphysical ground, 
Scotus describes as "formally one by numerical unity": i.e., with a numerical 
unity of its own formally distinct from the less-than-numerical unity of the nature 
considered in its contractible aspect. This is the "proper unity that follows on the 
nature as a nature": that is, the nature which, for Scotus, has a real existence 
outside the mind. Scotus can still claim, therefore, that everything outside the 
mind is, of itself, really singular.247 
One of the main thrusts of Ockham's critique of the formal distinction is 
directed against the notion that individuality and unity accrue to a thing by the 
addition to its specific nature of a real individual difference formally distinct from 
it. In accordance with his ontological principle that "to be the same and to be 
diverse follow immediately on being", he cites Aristotle and Averroes to the 
effect that "every being is one through its essence and not through anything 
added ... Likewise, if the nature is numerically one then it is not common".248 
Finally, he concludes: 
.. it is clear that a nature of a stone is of itself "this", and so a nature of a 
stone cannot be in anything else ... Nevertheless you should know that 
literally 'A nature of a stone is in a stone' is false. Instead it should be 
granted that a nature of a stone is a stone. (Yet in the case of Christ it can 
be granted that a human nature is in Christ) ... But if it is understood that a 
nature of a stone is truly in a stone, as in something distinct in any way, 
then that is absolutely false. If however it is understood that the nature is 
the stone then it is true. 249 
246 Scotus, Ordinatio,lI,d.3,p.1 ,q.1,( Vat. VII,404), Spade,64,my emphases. 
247 Scotus, Ordinatio,II,d.3,q.1,n. 7,( Vat. VII,404), Spade 64. 
248 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.2,q.6,( Theo/.II, 185), Spade,163-4. 
249 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.2,q.6,( Theo/.II,224), Spade,189-190. 
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For Ockham, it is a central tenet of his whole system that the word 'thing' can 
always and only denote the singular: 
Everything really universal, whether it is completely universal or not, is 
really common to several things, or at least is able to be common to several 
things. But no thing is really common to several things. Therefore, no thing 
is in any way universal. The major is plain, because a universal is 
distinguished from a singular by the fact that the singular is determined to 
one while the universal is indifferent to many, in the manner in which it is 
universal. The minor is also plain, because no really singular thing is 
common to several things. But everything, according to them [Scotus' 
adherents], is really singular.25o 
In a question concerning the reality, or otherwise, of universals outside the 
mind, Ockham says: 
Others hold that a thing according to its actual being is singular. The same 
thing according to its being in the intellect is universal. Thus the same thing 
according to one being or according to one consideration is universal, and 
according to another being or according to another consideration is 
singular. 251 
Maurer is of the opinion that the "others" mentioned here include Thomas, and 
that a passage from his De Ente et Essentia is being referred to, in which he 
treats of human nature absolute considerata, i.e., as a universal: 
If someone should ask, then, whether a nature understood in this way can 
be called one or many, we should reply that it is neither, because both are 
outside the concept of humanity, and it can happen to be both. If plurality 
belonged to its concept, it could never be one, though it is one when 
present in Socrates. So, too, if oneness belonged to its concept, the nature 
of Socrates and of Plato would be identical, and it could not be multiplied in 
many individuals.252 
For Ockham, a nature is not multiplied in many individuals, but is singular and 
unique in each individual. Beyond that, it is only a name, conventionally 
attached to things on the basis of perceived similarities. Maurer observes that 
"Ockham couches the doctrine of universals in his own language of things (res) 
instead of Thomas' language of essences or natures",253 and that his criticism of 
Thomas's account "does not come to grips with its metaphysical notions of a 
250 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.2,q.6,( Theol.ll, 179-80), Spade,160. 
251 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.2,q. 7,( Theol.II,227), Spade,191. 
252 Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia 111,2, Armand Maurer,tran~.,Toro~to, 196.8,46.. . 
253 Armand Maurer, The Philosophy of William of Ockham In the LIght of Its Pnnclples, 79. 
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nature and its possible ways of existing".254 In Ockham's account, a nature has 
only one way of existing: as a singular identical with its subject: 
Therefore, if the thing that really is singular is universal according to its 
being in the intellect, which is not possible except because of an act of 
intellection, then any thing that can be understood can likewise be universal 
in the same way. So Socrates can be universal and common to Plato 
according to his being in the intellect. Likewise, the divine essence 
according to its being in the intellect will be universal, even though 
according to its real being in act it is most singular. All these results are 
absurd.255 
Ockham's Epistemology: Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition 
In the Prologue to Ockham's Ordinatio,256 two kinds of intellective act are 
described: apprehension and judgment: 
.. an act of apprehension ... relates to everything that can be the term of an 
act of the intellective power, whether this be something complex or non-
complex. For we apprehend not only that which is non-complex, but also 
propositions and demonstrations, and impossibilities and necessities, and, 
in general, anything within the scope of the intellective power.257 
Acts of non-complex apprehension (only) are called intuitive. "Intuitive cognition 
of a thing is cognition that enables us to know whether the thing exists or does 
not exist".258 There are two types of intuition: sensory and intellective. Sensory 
intuition gives immediate knowledge of an object present to the knower, by the 
senses. Abstractive knowledge does not enable us to know whether a thing 
actually exists or not: "In this way abstractive cognition abstracts from existence 
and non-existence".259 Empirical knowledge comes only from intuition. 
However, God, by means of his liberty and potentia absoluta, is able to 
dispense with the necessity of secondary causes for producing intuitive 
knowledge. God can cause intuitive knowledge of non-existent objects. The first 
254 Armand Maurer, The Ph i/o sophy, 80. 
255 Ockham, Ordina(io,d.2,q.7,(Theol.lI,241), Spade,199. 
256 Ockham's Ordina(io comprises only his commentary on Book I of the Sentences: Books II-IV, 
identified by me as Sent. II, Sent. III etc, are Reporta(io, i.e unrevised by him. 
257 Ockham, Ordina(io I, Prol.,q.1; Boehner trans.,18. 
258 Boehner,trans.,Ockham,23. 
259 Ockham, Ordina(io , Prol.,q.1 ,( The 0/. 1,32), Boehner,trans.,23. 
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argument he gives for this possibility reflects Ockham's propensity for making 
radical separations between, and among, acts and objects, in the interests of 
Divine freedom and absolute power: 
Vision is a non-relative quality distinct from the object; without contradiction, 
therefore, it can occur without an object. .. Intuitive cognition of a non-
existent object is possible by the divine power ... Every effect which God can 
produce by means of a secondary cause He can produce directly on his 
own account.260 
Ockham's attitude towards secondary causality and causal chains in general 
can be gauged from this. It stems from the fact that, for Ockham, only singulars 
can be intuited, whether the singulars in question are objects or acts. 
Aquinas's account of perception is based on the agent intellect's abstraction 
of the universal, i.e. the species, from the phantasm. The material object is 
received, first by the medium, then by the senses, then by the phantasia, a 
cognitive power of imagination which produces phantasms. The latter are 
described by Thomas as "actual images of certain species (which) are 
immaterial in potentiality". 261 The process to this point takes place 
unconsciously on the part of the seer. After abstracting the universal, the agent 
intellect then consciously initiates causal activity in interior judgment, forming 
"concepts", and in exterior acts. In this way, the noncomplex which is the 
material object becomes an element in the cognition of a complex notion, or 
proposition. 
The version of this "species account" of cognition inherited, or at least 
assumed, by Ockham, leads him to contradict it on a number of counts, and 
260 Ockham. Quodlibet,VI.6.(Theo/.IX.604-S). Boehner.trans .. 2S. 
261 Aquinas. ST.la.79.4 ad.4.(Leo. V.268). 
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reject it. However, in doing so, he reveals that the version he takes to be 
Thomas's is not Thomas's at al1.262 Ockham's own account has for its 
foundation the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition, which 
dates from after Thomas's time. Ockham sees it as simpler, and directs his 
'razor' against the species account: we should not do with more entities what 
can be done with fewer. 263 Stump remarks that it certainly appears simpler, 
"because it seems to posit nothing more in its account of human cognition than 
the thing cognized and the cognizer',.264 This accords with conscious experience 
as Ockham sees it: "I say that a thing is seen or apprehended immediately, 
without any intermediary between itself and the [cognitive] act".265 
Unlike Aquinas, Ockham does not think that what the intellect acquires first or 
primarily is a universal. The material object acts on the senses with efficient 
causation to produce an intuitive cognition of it in the senses.266 Next, the 
intuitive cognition in the senses causes an intuitive cognition in the intellect.267 
Both intuitive cognitions are of the same object, so there is no phantasm as in 
the species account: 
.. that very same singular which is sensed first by the sense is itself, under 
the same description, intellectively cognized first with intuitive cognition by 
the intellect.268 
The same material thing can be the object of abstractive cognition also, as 
when it is recalled by the memory in its absence. Similarly, the apprehension of 
262 An account of the differences between Ockham's and Thomas's theories of cognition will be 
found in Eleonore Stump, The Mechanisms of Cognition, Ockham on Mediating Species in Paul 
Vincent Spade,ed., Cambridge Companion to Ockham, CUP, 1999, 168-203. 
263 Ockham, Sent.lI,q.13,( Theol. V,268); Sent.lIl,q.2 (Theol. VI,59). 
264 Stump, Mechanisms,182. 
265 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.27,q.3,( TheoI.IV,241); Sent.llI,q.3,( Theol.VI, 121). 
266 Ockham, Sent.lI,q.13,(Theol.V,276). 
267 Ockham, Sent.lll,q.2,( The 01. VI,65). 
268 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.3,q.6,(Theol.II,494). 
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universals takes place by abstraction after the intuitive cognition on which it 
relies. The faculties of memory and imagination, which for Thomas are the locus 
of the storage or retention of species, Ockham sees as adequately explained in 
terms of habit.269 
For Aquinas, to perceive an object is to perceive it as. The universal as 
abstracted is the object of an act of perception. For Ockham, perception is 
essentially an act of intuition, and intuition concerns the existence, not the 
essence, of an object. He goes so far as to say that: 
.. the distinct knowledge of a singular does not necessarily require distinct 
knowledge of any universal. .. a thing can be distinctly cognized without [the 
cognition of] its defining characteristic.270 
The state of the intellect is externally caused by what the object and the senses 
impress upon it; and this happens in such a way that any subsequent act of 
judgment concerning the real existence or non-existence of the object cannot 
be false. Here is surely the foundation of Ockham's philosophic empiricism. He 
drives home the point by saying that even God, if He chooses to give an 
intuition of a non-existent object, cannot give it so as to lead to a false judgment 
concerning that non-existence.271 
Ockham's theory of cognition is closely connected to his doctrine of free will. 
The radical 'freedom of indifference' he posits could not co-exist with an 
account like Aquinas's in which it is the intellect that freely initiates a chain of 
causation vis-a-vis the phantasms and the will. For Thomas, once the intellect 
269 Ockham, Sent.lI,q.13,( The 01. V,271-2). 
270 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.3,q.6,( The 01. 11,521 ,523). 
271 Ockham, Quodlibet, V.5,( TheoI.IX,498), Freddoso,415. 
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has judged an action to be 'good', in whatever sense - justified or deficient - it 
is not possible for the will to decide otherwise or to act against it. Thomistic 
freedom is not, like Ockham's, indifferent to the real and ultimate good, the true 
finality of man, which Ockham declines to recognise as having any bearing on 
freedom. On freedom and natural finality, more will be said in chapter 2. 
As for Thomas, so for Ockham, knowledge begins with sense-experience; but 
there the similarity ends. For Ockham, empirical knowledge is the only certain 
knowledge outside the realm of faith, and empirical knowledge comes only from 
intuition, never from abstraction. Thomist and Scotist metaphysics are alike 
eliminated. All certain, empirical knowledge is described as "notitia 
scientifica ... accepta per experientiam".272 In this context, Ockham sets great 
store by "experience". The epistemological gulf thus created between the realm 
of sense-knowledge and the realm of faith is designed to safeguard divine 
freedom as Ockham interprets it. 
Ockham on Universals: The Divine Ideas 
Ockham's own understanding of the universal can be gauged from his doctrine 
of the Divine Ideas. According to Aquinas and Scotus, the ideas are the divine 
essence as imitable outside itself. Just as creatures differ really and in varying 
degrees from each other, so the ideas can be rationally distinguished from the 
divine essence and from each other, as entia rationis. Ockham rejects this as 
an impossibility, since it would make the divine knowledge dependent on 
realities rationally distinct from itself, or on creatures, whether they are real or 
272 Ockham, OrdinatiO,Prol.,q.1,( Theol.I,33), Boehner ed., Ockham,24. 
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only beings of reason. It would also threaten the divine unity. The ideas would 
also imply an intelligible pre-existence of the creature, casting doubt on creation 
ex nihilo. Therefore the ideas have no place in the Divine Essence. The idea of 
a creature in God can only be the creature itself, known directly, perfectly and 
individually by God, and as a singular, not a species, because only singulars 
are knowable: 
The ideas are not in God subjectively and really but they are in Him only 
objectively as certain things known by Him, because the ideas are the 
things themselves as producible by God ... Furthermore, the ideas are only 
of singulars and not of species because singulars are precisely what are 
knowable.273 
The function of the Ideas is to signify the creature directly, and indirectly its 
producibility by God. As far as its ultimate nature is concerned, an Idea is 
merely a connotative term or concept. It is not, as Ockham's predecessors had 
taught or implied, a quid rei. 
What has clearly been discarded by Ockham is the notion of the ideas as 
God's knowledge of his own essence as imitable. For him, the necessary 
character of the divine essence must evidently impose some sort of necessity 
upon the act of creation, either with regard to the act itself (whether to create or 
not), or with regard to what is created. However, a similar notion appears in 
Ockham's account of the divine attributes: 
Secondly I say that attributable perfections are only certain concepts or 
signs which are able to be predicated of God, and more appropriately they 
should be called attributable concepts or names than attributable 
perfections, because properly speaking a perfection is always something 
and these concepts are not properly things, nor are they simply 
perfections.274 
273 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.35,q.5,(Theol.IV,497), H.R.Klocker,Ockham and the Divine Freedom, 
Franciscan Studies, 45,1985, 245-261,254. 
274 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.2,q.2,(Theol.II,61), Klocker,254. 
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Here the words, "only ... concepts or names" (non sunt nisi .. . conceptus vel 
nomina) are indicative of the direction in which Ockham's whole project is 
moving. The ideas, along with the divine attributes, have been removed from 
the metaphysical sphere and transferred to the logical, by means of his own 
distinctive use of absolute and connotative terms. However, the divine attributes 
are predicable of God, whereas the ideas are not: 
Fourthly I say that. .. the ideas are not distinguished in God as attributes 
because the ideas in God are the things themselves as producible by God. 
Nor are they predicated of God really as the attributes are truly predicated 
of God.275 
The ideas do not signify something in God but signify only the creature as 
creatable, and indeed as eternally creatable. This leaves creation free and ex 
nihilo without affecting the divine simplicity or unity. It also leaves God entirely 
free from any trace or suggestion of Greek determinism. The Idea is a finite 
reality grounded in divine free choice and not in any absolute and necessary 
divine intelligibility, grounded in the nature of God Himself. Furthermore, God 
wills only singulars, each independently of all the others. Any historical 
connections between them are entirely contingent and likewise the result of the 
divine creative will. 
What is entirely absent from this picture is any basis for the creature's 
producibility other than the divine free will. The divine Being or essence as 
imitable does not enter the picture, for the reason that it cannot be identified 
with multiplicity: "But the divine essence is one, and in no way multipliable; 
therefore it is not itself an idea".276 Aquinas does not see this as a problem: 
2750ckham Ordinatio,d.2,q.2,( Theo/.II, 71), Klocker,255. 
276 Ockham: Ordinatio,d.35,q.5,(Theo/.IV,487),my trans.: sed essentia divina est unica, nullo 
modo p/urificabi/is; ideo ipsa non est idea. 
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The divine essence is not called an idea insofar as it is that essence, but 
only insofar as it is the likeness or type of this or that thing. Hence ideas are 
said to be many, inasmuch as many types are understood through the self-
same essence.277 
The divine essence is not multiplied by being the likeness of, and therefore 
imitable by, many things. The latter, for Aquinas, is precisely the basis of the 
communicability and diffusibility of the divine goodness. What Ockham seems 
to be implying is that any such necessary likeness to his own essence or 
goodness must place an inadmissible restriction on God's freedom in creating. 
More will be said concerning Ockham's doctrine of divine freedom in chapter 2. 
A universal, for Ockham, is itself a singular: it is a singular sign pointing out a 
plurality. Its universality lies not in its being, but in its signification only. There 
are natural universals and conventional universals. What Ockham here 
understands by 'natural' has little or nothing in common with the meaning of the 
term in Aquinas or Scotus. It signifies merely a thought-object reproducing in 
the mind an actual object outside the mind: 
I maintain that a universal is not something real that exists in a subject [of 
inherence], either inside or outside the mind, but that it has being only as a 
thought-object in the mind. It is a kind of mental picture (fictum) which as a 
thought-object has a being similar to that which the thing outside the mind 
has in its real existence.278 
These are called 'natural' universals because the intellectual act involved, by its 
nature, stands for the actual things outside the mind, or for other things in the 
mind. In no case does it stand for anything not singular in itself. The words used 
to signify them, which, for the same object, will be different in different 
languages, are 'conventional' universals. The manner in which these thought-
277 Aquinas, ST.la.1S.2.ad.1 ,(Leo.IV,202). 
278 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.2,q.8,( Theol.II,271), Boehner,trans.,41. 
76 
objects stand for multiple singular things outside the mind is called by Ockham 
"a common or confused intellection": 
And this amounts to saying that such a cognition, by some kind of 
assimilation, bears a greater resemblance to a man than to a donkey, but 
does not resemble one man more than another.279 
Ockham on Finality: "Non Potest Demonstrari" 
Ockham's treatment of finality displays what is clearly an over-riding concern 
with him, namely to establish once and for all that articles of faith are not 
susceptible of proof in terms of human reason. The phrase non potest 
naturaliter (or sufficienter) demonstrari tends to recur like a refrain throughout. 
Ockham poses the question in Quodlibet II, q.3 whether articles of faith can be 
demonstrated, and replies that "they cannot be demonstrated by a wayfarer 
(viator: person in this life) either by means of a demonstration quia (i.e. from an 
effect to its cause) or by means of a demonstration propter quid (i.e. from an 
immediate cause to its effect)".28o 
While Aquinas appeals to the authority of Scripture and/or the Fathers to 
establish the truth, and supplements and illuminates their conclusions by means 
of his own recta ratio, Ockham introduces a distinction between "two ways of 
speaking": one way, "according to the truth of the faith", and another, "if I 
accepted no authority".281 The contrast between the different approaches of 
Aquinas and Ockham is especially clear in their respective treatments of finality. 
Where Thomas sees God's causal activity as final cause as a source of 
279 Ockham, Expositio super librum Perihermenias (Philos.II,345-506), Boehner,trans.,45. 
280 Ockham, Quodlibet,11.3,(Theol.IX, 117), Freddoso,101. 
281 Ockham, Quodlibet,IV.1,( Theol.IX,295), Freddoso,246. 
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"enrichment" for the intellect to engage with, Ockham, even though he clearly 
believes in divine final causality "according to the truth of the faith", yet sees the 
interpretation and use made of it by Thomas and others as an approach that 
threatens freedom and contingency, and that cannot, in any case, be proved 
one way or the other. It may be that Ockham believes that no serious 
"enrichment" or fulfilment of the relevant human powers is possible until faith 
and reason have gone their separate ways. If not, he does surprisingly little to 
stand in the way of their parting. Ockham stands at the opposite pole to his 
Franciscan confrere, Bonaventure, who had devoted much of his intellectual 
energy and output to trying to forestall any possible separation between 
theology and its 'handmaid', philosophy. 
Ockham tends to reduce final causality to efficient causality wherever 
possible, only to inform us that "it cannot be proved by natural reason that God 
is an efficient cause of any effect".282 It is, therefore, no surprise to find him 
saying that "it cannot be sufficiently proved that every effect has a final cause", 
albeit that he is saying this with the proviso "if I did not accept any authority".283 
With regard to non-rational creatures: 
.. it cannot be sufficiently demonstrated or known [with certitude], either 
through principles known per se or through experience, that a thing that 
acts by a necessity of nature acts because of a final cause fixed 
beforehand by a will. And this is because the action of such an agent never 
varies without a change either in the agent or in the patient or in something 
that concurs in the action. Instead, the action always follows in the same 
way. And so it cannot be proved that such an agent acts because of an 
end.284 
Thomas's hierarchy of causality has, at least implicitly, been dismissed by 
Ockham as unprovable and unknowable. However, Ockham is not here 
282 Ockham, Quod/ibet,11.1,(Theo/.IX,108), Freddoso,93. 
2830ckham Quod.ibet,IV.1 ,(Theo/.IX,295), Freddoso,246. 
284 Ockham: Quod/ibet,IV.2,( Theo/.IX,302), Freddoso,251 ,parenthesis in trans. 
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claiming that natural agents do not have a final end: only that Aristotle's 
arguments to that effect do not stand up. 
Aristotle had quite clearly discerned purposiveness in non-rational nature, 
identifying the form with the end, or "that for the sake of which".285 On refusal to 
recognise purposiveness in nature, he comments: 
"When an event takes place always or for the most part [notwithstanding 
occasional deformed progeny etc.] it is not incidental or by chance. In 
natural products, the sequence is invariable, if there is no impediment. It is 
absurd to suppose that purpose is not present because we do not observe 
an agent deliberating".286 
Thomas had certainly taken Aristotle to mean, in an unqualified sense, that 
"every agent acts for an end", both non-rational and rational,287 and that "every 
action and movement are for the sake of some perfection".288 Ockham, 
however, gives an entirely different interpretation of Aristotle's meaning, 
incorporating his own "shift to the human subject": 
.. 1 reply that the Philosopher's arguments all apply just to an agent that is 
able to fail and fall short without any change at all in the concurring agent 
[God] or the patient or the other dispositions. The only sort of agent like this 
is a free agent, which is able to fail and to fall short in its own action even if 
everything else remains the same. However, the arguments in question do 
not establish that other [non-rational] agents have a final cause.289 
To the argument that, without a final cause, all agents would act by chance, 
Ockham replies: 
.. this argument goes through for a free agent, which is no more inclined by 
its nature toward the one effect than toward the other. However, the 
argument does not go through for a natural agent, since an agent of this 
sort is by its nature inclined toward one determinate effect in such a way 
that it is not able to cause an opposite effect. This is evident in the case of 
fire with respect to heat. 290 
285 Aristotle, Physics 1I.8,(199a 30-32), Blackwell et al.trans., 128. 
286 Aristotle, Physics 1I.8,(199b 23-27), Blackwell et aUrans, 131. 
287 Aquinas, SCG 1I1.2,(Leo.XIV,5-6), Bourke,1 ,trans.,34. 
288 Aquinas, SCG 1I1.3.5,(Leo.XIV,9), Bourke,1 ,trans.,39. 
289 Ockham, Quod/ibet,IV.1 ,(Theol.IX,299), Freddoso,249,my parentheses. 
290 Ockham, Quodlibet, IV, 1,( Theol.IX,300), Freddoso,249. 
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As to the reason why "natural agents" act in one determined way only, Ockham, 
when "accepting no authority", will never commit himself beyond saying that it is 
"because their nature necessarily requires this", 291 or because "apta nata sunt. .. 
si auferetur impediens".292 In the context of faith, Ockham's "ontology of the 
absolutely singular" introduces a voluntarist ruling principle into his account of 
nature. The apparent orderedness-to-an-end seen in nature, in the case of non-
rational creatures, rests entirely on the sovereign free will and concurrence of 
God, who is in no way obliged to maintain things in their current order, or 
apparent order. 
In the case of rational creatures, it rests entirely on the individual's free 
choices of ends, both proximate and ultimate: 
I claim that it can be evidently known through experience that God is a final 
cause of effects that are produced by free agents here below, since 
everyone experiences that he can perform his works in order to honour 
God, i.e., for the sake of God as a final cause.293 
Similarly, speaking "according to the truth of the faith" he says: "God, who is 
[both] an efficient cause and an end with respect to many effects, should, at 
least according to right reason, always be a final cause".294 The 'right reason' 
referred to here is that of the thinking subject freely choosing to act for the sake 
of God. The same shift to the human subject, as far as rational finality is 
concerned, underlies this statement from the same Quodlibetal Question, 
notwithstanding its ostensible Aristotelian orthodoxy: 
.. the causality of an end is nothing other than its being loved and desired 
efficaciously by an agent, so that the effect is brought about because of the 
thing that is loved. Hence, just as (i) the causality of matter is nothi~g other 
than its being informed by the form, and (ii) the causality of a. form IS . 
nothing other than its informing the matter, so too the causality of an end IS 
291 Ockham, Quodlibet,IV.1,( Theol.IX,300), Freddoso,249. 
292 Ockham, Sent.IV,q.16,(Theol.VII,356). 
293 Ockham, Quodlibet.IV.2,(Theol.IX,303), Freddoso,252. 
294 Ockham, Quodlibet, IV.1,( Theol.IX,295), Freddoso,246. 
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its being efficaciously loved and desired, so that in the absence of that love 
and desire the effect would not be brought about.295 
A final cause does not, in fact, have to exist at the time its causality comes into 
effect, it need only be desired by the agent producing or generating it.296 
Ockham: Beatitude and the Faculties of the Soul 
The end or goal of all rational finality is the 'enjoyment' (frui) of God in patria. 
Ockham describes the act of 'enjoyment', which pertains especially to the state 
of beatitude, as follows: 
.. 1 say that 'enjoying' has many senses. In a broad sense it means any act 
in which something is taken into the faculty of will for its own sake as 
supreme, whether it be present or absent or possessed or not possessed. 
In this sense, we are said to enjoy now, in this life, when we love God for 
himself as supreme and above all things. In another sense, it is taken 
strictly for the ultimate beatific act, in which the blessed are said to enjoy in 
heaven. We are not said to enjoy God now in that sense.297 
This comes in a question in which it is asked whether enjoying is solely an act 
of the will. In his reply he quotes Augustine, that "To enjoy is to inhere in 
something with love for its own sake,,298, and comments that "it pertains to the 
will alone to inhere in something through love".299 Similarly, Augustine: "We 
enjoy things cognized in which the pleased will finds rest".300 The will is the 
faculty associated with rest: 
Again, only in an act of will is there the greatest rest. But enjoying is the act 
in which there is the greatest rest. .. because the greatest rest is in that act 
which is either pleasure or the direct cause of pleasure. But only an act of 
will is of this sort ... This is confirmed because distress belongs solely to the 
wilL .. Therefore, the contrary pleasure will belong solely to the will, since 
. . th b' t 301 contranes are In e same su Jec. 
295 Ockham, Quodlibet, IV.1,( TheoI.IX,294), Freddoso,245. 
296 Ockham, Quodlibet,IV.1,( Theol.IX,298), Freddoso,245-6. 
297 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.1.q.2,(Theol.I,396-7), Cambridge Translations of Medieval 
Philosophical Texts, Vo1.2, A.S.McGrade,J.Kilcullen,M.Kempshail eds.,CUP,2001 ,368. 
298 Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana 1.4.(PL.34,20). 
299 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.1.q.2,( Theol.I,396), McGrade,368. . . 
300 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.1 ,q.2,( Theol.I,396), McGrade,368, quoting Augustine, De Tnmtate X.1 O. 
301 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.1.q.2,(Theol.I,395-6), McGrade,367-8. 
81 
In the next question of the Ordina tio , after locating pleasure in the will itself as 
subject, rather than in the act of the will, he again repeats that "every subject 
receptive of some contrary is receptive of the other contrary", but in this 
instance defends himself firstly by means of his characteristic resort to the 
potentia absoluta Dei: 
It may be said that this reasoning is not valid, because fire is receptive of 
heat, yet not of cold. To this it can be said that by God's absolute power fire 
can receive cold.302 
However, in question 2, Ockham had already told us that, "when I say that 
enjoying is not an act of the intellect but of will", he is merely "conforming to the 
way others speak". 303 By way of clarification he tells us that 
I do not mean to deny that properly speaking and in virtue of the [strict 
meaning of the] terms, enjoying is an act of the intellect, for as I will show 
elsewhere intellect and will are entirely the same [thing]. Hence whatever is 
in the intellect is in the will and conversely. So enjoying is in the intellect 
and is an act of intellect from the fact that it is an act of the will. 304 
At the conclusion of the question he casts further light on the matter: 
.. 1 concede that enjoying exists in the noblest power. When it is said that 
intellect is the noblest power, I concede it. Similarly, the will is the noblest 
power, because that power which is intellect and that which is will are in no 
way distinct either in reality or in concept. .. because those are names 
signifying the same thing, precisely connoting distinct acts, namely, the acts 
of understanding and willing. 305 
Ockham thus imposes a semantic resolution on the much-disputed question of 
the mutual priority of acts of intellect and will, by means of his own doctrine of 
signification and connotation. 
302 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.1.q.3,( Theol.I,422-3), McGrade,386. 
303 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.1.q.2,( Theol.I,396), McGrade,368. 
304 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.1 ,q.2,( The 01. 1,396), McGrade,368. 
305 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.1.q.2,( Theol.l,403), McGrade,372. 
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Conclusion to Chapter 1 
Scotus's dismissal of the 'analogy of being' (above, p.SO-1), despite its retention 
by his Franciscan predecessor Bonaventure (p.43) has eliminated the 
distinction in mode of being between God and creatures which provided the 
ontological context for Thomas's account of natural finality in creatures: namely, 
nature or essence understood as a potentiality to being ("I call essence that 
whose actuality is being", p.12). We hear no more of creatures seeking their 
perfection in "the fullness of their being". Scotus retains the concept "natural 
inclination", but now signifying the finite rational creature's desire for the infinite 
(p.S4). Non-rational nature, subject to natural necessity only, is now out of the 
picture, as far as finality is concerned; this includes, in rational beings, 
everything except the will (below, chapter 2). With Ockham, natural finality, as 
such, in the will, is eliminated too. 
I have noted (p.23) that "the dignity of receptivity lies at the very heart of 
being" in the Trinity. This is a reference to the passive (as opposed to active) 
'relations of origin' in the Godhead, by which the Son eternally receives being 
from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from Father and Son. Likewise, in human 
beings, Augustine's capacitas Dei (p.29), and Thomas's 'obediential potency' 
(p.31) are both principles of receptivity of the supernatural. We will see what 
becomes of this receptive disposition in the different accounts of freedom 
(chapter 2) and of grace (chapter 3) of the four scholars. 
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Chapter Two 
Freedom and Nature: Freedom as Rightly Orienting and Directing 
the Operation of Finality 
Introduction 
Having established the varying accounts of human nature, as related to the 
ultimate end, of the four scholars, I now turn to the role each conceives for 
freedom in that relationship. A radically different concept of freedom begins to 
emerge after the time of Thomas and Bonaventure. Freedom comes to be seen 
as a fragile plant, seriously threatened by its hitherto association with nature. 
AQUINAS ON FREEDOM 
Freedom in Scripture and St. Augustine 
For Thomas, the notion of freedom cannot be separated from that of properly 
human actions (actiones humanae). Every properly human act has fulfilment 
and happiness as its ultimate goal or last end. Furthermore, only one end can 
be ultimate for rational creatures: 
It is impossible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to diverse 
things as last ends ... First, because, since everything desires its own 
perfection, a man desires for his ultimate end that which he desires as his 
perfect and crowning good ... It is therefore necessary for the last end so to 
fill man's appetite that nothing is left besides it for man to desire. Which is 
not possible, if something else be required for his perfection. Consequently 
it is not possible for the appetite so to tend to two things, as though each 
were its perfect good.306 
In the same way, it is not possible for the will, which he calls the "rational 
appetite", and whose principle is "that which is naturally desired", to have more 
than one ultimate end, since "nature tends to one thing only".307 Clearly, for 
Thomas, in contrast (as we shall see) to Scotus and Ockham, nature "tending to 
306 Aquinas, ST.I-11.1.5,(Leo.vl, 13). 
307 Aquinas, ST.I-11.1.5,(Leo.VI,13). 
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one thing" has no adverse implications for freedom, any more than its 
corresponding tendencies to the true and the good. 
An idea of Thomas's perspective on what is most essential to human freedom 
can be had from the texts he chooses to represent patristic commentary on two 
seminal verses from the Gospel of John in his Catena Aurea308 . Almost all are 
taken from Augustine, and all without exception are concerned with freedom as 
a principle of perfectibility. For example, on John 8:31-32, "If you make my word 
your home ... you will come to know the truth and the truth will set you free", 
Augustine comments: 
To be freed is to be made free as to be healed is to be made whole. This is 
plainer in the Greek: EAEU8Ep6w; in the Latin we use the word free chiefly in 
the sense of escape from danger, relief from care, and the like.309 
From what shall the truth free us but from death, corruption, mutability, itself 
being immortal, uncorrupt, immutable? Absolute immutability is in itself 
eternity.310 
Likewise, on John 8:34 and 36, " .. everyone who commits sin is a s/ave .... so if 
the Son sets you free you will indeed be free", Augustine comments: 
Do not then abuse your freedom, for the purpose of sinning freely; but use 
it in order not to sin at all. Your will will be free if it be merciful: you will be 
free, if you become the servant of righteousness.311 
Freedom can indeed be abused, but the possibility of abuse accrues to freedom 
accidentally: it does not constitute part of the essence, or the definition, of 
freedom. The words from John 8:31, "If you make my words your home", would 
also seem to carry a particular resonance for Thomas. It is notable that he 
adverts to Scripture in support of his theses to a far greater extent than either 
Scotus or (especially) Ockham. 
308 John Henry Cardinal Newman ed., Catena Aurea: Commentary on the Four Gospels 
Collected out of the Works of the Fathers by Sf. Thomas Aquinas, VoI.IV, St. John, London, St. 
Austin Press, 1999. The commentary quotes below are from this edition,303-304. 
309 Augustine, Sermo 48. 
310 Augustine, De Trinitate,IV.18,(PL.42,905). 
311 Augustine, Tract. 41.8. 
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In fact, Scripture as a whole, in both Testaments, bears witness to the reality 
of two distinct types of freedom: the exterior or material, and the interior or 
spiritual, the former being a 'type' or sign of the latter. The theme reaches what 
can be regarded as its climax in the exchange between Christ and some of his 
followers in John 8. The words quoted above concerning truth and freedom, 
You will know the truth and the truth will make you free, are addressed to "the 
Jews who believed in him". It is evident that their belief was based on what they 
had seen and heard from him, and perhaps on the expectation of even greater 
things. Their uncomprehending reply312 reveals the essentially 'exterior' nature 
of their understanding of freedom - as freedom from coercion, religious or 
otherwise. The reply they receive opens up another dimension of freedom 
altogether: In all truth I tell you, everyone who commits sin is a slave of sin. Now 
a slave has no permanent standing in the household, but a son belongs to it 
forever. So if the Son sets you free, you will indeed be free (vv.34-36). As a 
commentary on this, Thomas offers Gregory: "And the more freely men follow 
their perverse desires, the more closely are they in bondage to them,,313, and 
Augustine again: 
o miserable bondage! The slave of a human master when wearied with the 
hardness of his tasks, sometimes takes refuge in flight. But to where does 
the slave of sin flee? He takes it along with him, wherever he goes; for his 
sin is within him. The pleasure passes away, but the sin does not pass 
away: its delight goes, its sting remains behind. He alone can free from sin 
who came without sin, and was made a sacrifice for sin.314 
The Receptive Image 
Augustine's pastoral perspective places the highest possible value on the 
human heart's "openness to receive" the gifts of grace that lead the soul 
312 John 8:33: We are descended from Abraham and we have never been the slaves of anyone; 
what do you mean, "You will be set free"? 
313 Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job XXV. 
314 Augustine, Sermo 47. 
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towards this perfect freedom. In the Catena, Thomas chooses a passage from 
Augustine's Tractatus XXII as commentary on John 5:26: "For as the Father has 
life in Himself; so He has given to the Son to have life in Himself'. Augustine 
writes: "What then is the difference between them? This, that one gave, the 
other received".315 The Son, eternally begotten of the Father, eternally receives 
his existence from the Father. Receptivity is intrinsic to the Godhead, in whose 
image we are created, and is especially appropriated to the Son in whose 
likeness we are re-created. A heart and disposition open to receive all that it is, 
and is called to be, is therefore not an aspect that can rightly be omitted from 
any understanding of interior freedom. As we have seen, Aquinas's selection of 
commentaries on John 8 points not only to a consensus among the Fathers on 
the true nature of freedom as interior freedom, but to a similar appreciation on 
his own part. I will be concerned to address the question whether such 
"openness to receive" freedom from God in the form of grace is rendered 
problematic, as a concept and as a pastoral and spiritual reality, by Ockham's 
philosophical re-casting of the principles of freedom. 
315 Augustine, Tractatus XXII,s.1 O,(PL,ptbi). This receptivity of the Son is commented on by von 
Balthasar in his Theology of History (London, Sheed & Ward, 1964, pp.25-33), in a sub-chapter 
entitled Existence as Receptivity: " ... but always he is what he is on the basis of "not my own 
will", "not my own honour" (John 7:18). It is of his essence as Son to receive life (5:26), insight 
(3:11), spirit (3:34-5), word (3:34; 14:24), will (5:30), deed (6:29), doctrine (7: 16), work (14:10) 
and glorification (8:54; 17:22, 24) from another, from the Father. He receives it, indeed, in such 
a way that he has it all in himself (5:26) and disposes of all that he receives as of his own 
(10:18,28); yet never with any denial of that receiving, but affirming it always, eternally, as the 
ground of his very being.... . . 
"The Son's form of existence, which makes him the Son from all eternity (17:5), IS the 
uninterrupted reception of everything that he is, of his very self, from the Father. It .is indeed this 
receiving of himself which gives him his "1", his own inner dimension, his spontaneity, that 
sonship with which he can answer the Father in a reciprocal giving". 
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Aquinas: The Eternal Law 
Thomas describes the Eternal Law as a 'type' (ratio) of divine wisdom "as 
moving all things to their due end". Just as the divine wisdom creating "has the 
character of art, exemplar or idea", so the Eternal Law is "nothing else than "the 
type of divine wisdom as directing all actions and movements".316 Knowledge of 
the source of human flourishing, therefore, pertains to Wisdom, of which 
Aquinas speaks as follows: 
Wisdom denotes a certain rectitude of judgment according to the Eternal 
Law. Now rectitude of judgment is twofold: first, on account of perfect use 
of reason, secondly, on account of a certain connaturality with the matter 
about which one has to judge ... Accordingly it belongs to the wisdom that is 
an intellectual virtue to pronounce right judgment about Divine things after 
reason has made its inquiry, but it belongs to reason as a gift of the Holy 
Spirit to judge aright about them on account of connaturality with 
them ... Now this sympathy or connaturality for Divine things is the result of 
charity, which unites us to God, according t01 Cor.6: 17 .. Consequently 
wisdom which is a gift has its cause in the will, which cause is charity, but it 
has its essence in the in tel/ect, whose act is to judge aright.317 
The Wisdom as gift which so operates is a participation in the Divine Wisdom. 
"Rectitude of judgment according to the Eternal Law" is not presented as a 
mere matter of the intellect adverting to a priori rules. The "perfect use of 
reason", in itself, must entail the intellectual virtue of prudence, which, Thomas 
tells us elsewhere, is "right reason about things to be done".318 However, 
prudence does not operate in isolation: 
Consequently, it is requisite for prudence, which is right reason about 
things to be done, that man be well disposed with regard to the ends: and 
this depends on the rectitude of his appetite. Wherefore, for prudence, 
there is need of a moral virtue, which rectifies the appetite ... since rectitude 
of the will is essential to prudence.319 
"Rectitude of the will", which means being "well disposed with regard to the 
ends", equates with that "sympathy or connaturality with Divine things (which) is 
316 Aquinas, ST.I-11.93.1c,(Leo.VII,162). 
317 Aquinas, ST 1I-1I.45.2c,(Leo.VIII,341 ),my emphases. 
318 Aquinas, ST 1-11.57.4c,(Leo.VI,367). 
319 Aquinas, ST.I-11.57.4c,(Leo.VI,367), my emphases. 
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the result of charity, which unites us to God", and which is the gift of the Holy 
Spirit. Intellect and will, prudence and charity, working in conjunction, constitute 
the "rectitude of judgment according to the Eternal Law" denoted by Wisdom. 
Not faculties in isolation, but the entire personality, is engaged in making the 
judgment. 
Thomas makes it abundantly clear that the "Divine Wisdom .. directing" is not a 
matter of violence or coercion, which would cancel the rational creature's 
freedom. Each created being is moved or directed by divine providence 
"according to its own nature". This movement of individual creatures, too, "bears 
the character of law"-the natural law. It operates not by coercion, but by 
means of inclination and connaturality: 
.. since all things subject to Divine providence are ruled and measured by 
the eternal law ... it is evident that all things partake somewhat of the 
eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they 
derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends. Now, 
among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the 
most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by 
being provident both for itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share of 
the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act 
and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is 
called the naturallaw.320 
The natural law is "written in the hearts of (all) men" without exception, and 
"cannot be blotted out" by any sin.321 Intellect or reason, which is the natural 
appetite for truth, and the will, which is the natural appetite for the good, are 
both involved in this inclination to the "acts and ends" proper to human beings. 
The Eternal Law, as 'type' of the divine intellect, is truth itself.322 Regarding the 
knowledge of this truth: 
So then no one can know the eternal law, as it is in itself, except the 
blessed who see God in His Essence. But every rational creature knows it 
320 Aquinas, ST.I-11.91.3c,(Leo.VII, 155). 
321 Aquinas, ST.I-11.94.6,(Leo. VII, 173). 
322 Aquinas, ST.I-11.93.1.ad.3,(Leo.VII.163). 
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in its reflection, greater or less. For every knowledge of truth is a kind of 
reflection and participation of the eternal law, which is the unchangeable 
truth, as Augustine says323 ... Hence the Psalmist. .. (says) Many say, Who 
will show us good things? in answer to which question he says: The light of 
your countenance, 0 Lord, is signed upon us: thus implying that the light of 
natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is 
the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the 
Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than 
the imprint on us of the eternallaw.324 
Similarly, the will, the source of action, is drawn (not coerced) toward the good, 
but in a manner inseparable from that of the intellect inclining toward truth: 
The good, insofar as it is a knowable form, is contained within the true as a 
certain particular truth; the true, insofar as it is an end for our intellectual 
activity, is contained within the good as a certain particular good.325 
For Thomas, all the moral precepts of the Old Law, i.e. the Decalogue, belong 
to the Natural Law, of which they are a sort of summary.326 
Aquinas: The Evangelical Law of the Gospel: the "Law of Freedom" 
The most perfect possible participation in the Eternal Law that can be attained 
in via is summed up in the New Law of the Gospel, whose defining text is not 
the Decalogue, but the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew chapters 5 to 7). This is 
the Law which fulfils and brings to perfection the Natural Law and the 
Decalogue, superseding them without destroying them. 327 It is written in the 
hearts, not of all men, but only of those who have received it in their hearts from 
Christ, and believed it, believing in Him: 
Now that which is preponderant in the law of the New Testament, and 
whereon all its efficacy is based, is the grace of the Holy Spirit, which is 
given through faith in Christ. Consequently the New Law is chiefly the grace 
itself of the Holy Spirit, which is given through faith in Christ.328 
323 Augustine, De Vera Religione XXXI,(PL.34,147-8). 
324 Aquinas, ST.I-11.91.2c,(Leo.VII, 154). ., 
325 Aquinas, De Malo. Vlc,(Leo.XXIII,149); Richard Regan trans., Thomas Aquinas: On Evil. 
OUP,2003,258. 
326 Aquinas, ST.I-11.1 00.1 c,(Leo.VII,206). 
327 Cf. Matthew 5: 18. 
328 Aquinas, ST.I-11.1 06.1 c,(Leo. VII,273). 
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The Evangelical Law is unique: it has an external origin superior to human 
nature, namely, Christ's divine revelation. As the Holy Spirit's grace, it 
penetrates to the interior of the human person and becomes the source of the 
supernatural virtues, which are consequently called "infused". 
St. Thomas gives primacy to the Evangelical Law; in Christian moral teaching 
all laws are ordered to it as to their perfection and earthly fulfilment. It is the 
closest approximation to our final goal. For Aquinas, the Sermon on the Mount 
is the primary and highest source of moral theology. His exegesis of the 
Sermon centres on the distinction between interior and exterior acts, a 
distinction involving, not two completely different acts, but two essential aspects 
of one and the same act. It is the interior act, however, that determines the 
moral value of the act. The Old Law is concerned ostensibly with exterior 
actions, the New Law of the Gospel, given in the Sermon, with interior actions. 
Accordingly, for Thomas, ethics is concerned primarily with virtues and only 
secondarily with precepts. The latter provide the necessary context for actions 
to be virtuous. Virtues regulate moral action, beginning with the interior acts of 
the person. 
Thomas sometimes uses the expressions instinctus divinus329 or instinctus 
Spiritus Sancti330 to describe the gift of wisdom necessary to discern which 
actions are in keeping with inward grace. It is an aspect of that "sympathy or 
connaturality for divine things,,331 which grace confers. Therefore, it is also 
called the "law of liberty" because: 
.. it also makes us comply freely with these precepts and prohibitions, 
inasmuch as we do so through the promptings of grace. It is for these two 
329 Aquinas, e.g.,STI-11.68.1c and ad.2,(Leo.vI,447). 
330 Aquinas, e.g.,STI-11.68.5.ad.1 ,(Leo. VI,452). 
331 Aquinas, STII-11.45.2c,(Leo. VIII,341). 
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reasons that the New Law is called the law of perfect liberty (James 
1 :25).332 
This is freedom informed by virtue, which for Thomas is true freedom, in accord 
with the Gospel. It is the freedom that St. Paul associates with the presence of 
the Holy Spirit: "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom" (2 Cor.3:17), 
and which St. James associates with revelation and the keeping of the 
commandments: "Talk and behave like people who are going to be judged by 
the law of freedom" (James 2: 12; cf.1 :25). Thomas explains it further in terms of 
habit and in relation to nature: 
According to the Philosopher (Metaph.1.2), what is free is cause of itself. 
Therefore he acts freely, who acts of his own accord. Now man does of his 
own accord that which he does from a habit that is suitable to his nature: 
since a habit inclines one as a second nature. If, however, a habit be in 
opposition to nature, man would not act according to his nature, but 
according to some corruption affecting that nature. Since then the grace of 
the Holy Spirit is like an interior habit bestowed on us and inclining us to act 
aright, it makes us do freely those things that are becoming to grace, and 
shun what is opposed to it.333 
Natural inclination and the freedom bestowed by grace work together for the 
perfection of nature. Hence the "law of freedom" is in perfect accord with natural 
finality and the ultimate end, which is Happiness. There is no trace of any 
opposition between nature and freedom, as nature is not identified univocally 
with natural necessity, nor between freedom and law, as both are intimately 
concerned with nature's perfection. Furthermore, habit is explicitly identified with 
what man does freely "of his own accord", and in a manner "suitable to his 
nature". 
According to Pinckaers' analysis, this perfect accord between nature, freedom 
and grace called the law of freedom is the source of a "spiritual spontaneity", 
which "animates all of Christian morality", and: 
332 Aquinas, ST.I-11.1 08.1.ad.2,(Leo. VII,284). 
333 Aquinas, ST.I-II.1 08.1.ad.2,(Leo. VII,284). 
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For St. Thomas there was absolutely no question of a separation between 
this inspiration, which is the very perfection of freedom, and morality. 
Christian morality was spiritual in the Pauline sense of the word or it was 
nothing. Here we are at the opposite pole from legalism. Legalism is 
characterised by the external quality of the law as opposed to freedom and 
spontaneity, and by the tension set up between the two. When law is seen 
from this standpoint, it drags morality along in its wake and hinders it from 
exercising its free spontaneity. "Law of liberty" becomes a contradiction in 
terms and loses all meaning. Moral life is adrift, separated from the Gospel 
and St. Paul.334 
Aquinas: The Freedom of the Will 
As with interior and exterior acts, so with the actions of intellect and will, for 
Thomas, freedom involves interaction and mutual dependence. This inter-
dependence is especially clear in De Malo VI. Here, the principal division of 
freedom for Thomas is between "freedom of exercise", which is the ability to act 
or not to act, in which the will plays the predominant role, and "freedom of 
specification", which is the ability to do this or that, in accordance with the 
intellect's choice of means to an end: 
Therefore, if we should consider the movement of the soul's powers 
regarding the object specifying the act, the first source of movement comes 
from the intellect, since the understood good in this way moves even the 
will itself. And if we should consider the movement of the soul's powers 
regarding performance of the act, then the source of the movement comes 
from the will. For the power to which the chief end belongs always moves to 
action the power to which the means to the end belongs ... And thus does 
the will move both itself and all the other powers. For example, I 
understand because I will to do so, and I also use all my other powers and 
habits because I will to do SO.335 
The willed act of the intellect in deliberation presents the will in turn with the 
choice between contraries which can be freedom of exercise or freedom of 
specification: 
Therefore, since the will moves itself by deliberation, and deliberation is an 
inquiry that does not yield only one conclusion but leads to contrary 
. If '1 336 conclusions, the will does not move Itse necessan y. 
334 Pinckaers, Sources, 186-187. 
335 Aquinas, De Malo Vl.c,(Leo.xXIII, 149), Regan,258. 
336 Aquinas, De Malo Vl.c,(Leo.XXIII, 149), Regan,259. 
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However, this interaction between intellect and will cannot be the subject of an 
infinite regression: 
And since there cannot be an infinite regression, we need to hold that 
regarding the first movement of the will, something external, at whose 
instigation the will would begin to will, moves the will of anyone not always 
actually willing337 ... Therefore, we conclude, as Aristotle concludes338 .. , that 
what first moves the intellect and the will is something superior to them, 
namely, God. And since he moves every kind of thing according to the 
nature of the moveable thing, for example, light things upward, and heavy 
things downward, he also moves the will according to its condition, as 
indeterminately disposed to many things, not in a necessary way. 
Therefore, if we should consider the movement of the will regarding the 
performance of an act, the will is evidently not moved in a necessary 
way.339 
This account of the movement of the human will by God, as in no way 
diminishing the will's own freedom, has its justification, for Thomas, in the divine 
acts of creation and conservation, as cause of the free will's being and nature: 
As Dionysius says340, it belongs to Divine providence, not to destroy but to 
preserve the nature of things. Wherefore it moves all things in accordance 
with their conditions; so that from necessary causes through the Divine 
motion, effects follow of necessity; but from contingent causes, effects 
follow contingently. Since, therefore, the will is an active principle, not 
determinate to one thing, but having an indifferent relation to many things, 
God so moves it that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but 
its movement remains contingent and not necessary, except in those things 
to which it is moved naturally.341 
On the relation between divine providence and human freedom, Brian Davies 
comments that "human actions falling under providence can be free precisely 
because of what providence involves. In his (Thomas's) view, we are not free in 
spite of God, but because of God".342 
337 Thomas here rules out movement of rational wills by heavenly bodies, on grounds of the 
will's immateriality; cf.ST 1-11.9.5c,(Leo. VI.80). 
338 Aristotle, Eud.Ethics VII1.2,(1248a17-32). 
339 Aquinas, De Malo Vl.c,(Leo.xXIII, 149), Regan,259. 
340 Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus.VIII,(PG.3,906). 
341 Aquinas, STI-11.10.4c,(Leo.VI,89). . . 
342 Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, Oxford, Clarendon,1992, 175, emphaSIS In 
original. 
94 
Bernard Lonergan speculates at some length on the metaphysical possibility 
of this compatibility as found in Thomas, and the scope it leaves for divine 
causality: 
Indeed, both above and below, both right and left, the free choice has 
determinants over which it exercises no control. God directly controls the 
orientation of the will to ends; indirectly he controls the situations which 
intellect apprehends and in which will has to choose; indirectly he also 
controls both the higher determinants of intellectual attitude or mental 
pattern and the lower determinants of mood and temperament;343 finally, 
each free choice is free only hic et nunc, for no man can decide today what 
he is to will tomorrow.344 There is no end of room for God to work on the 
free choice without violating it, to govern above its self-governance, to set 
the stage and guide the reactions and give each character its personal role 
in the drama of Iife.345 
At the same time, Lonergan acknowledges that "none of these created 
antecedents can be rigorous determinants of the free choice". That 
determination, which yet does not violate the human agent's freedom, can take 
place only in the hic et nunc, the meeting-point, so to speak, of time and 
eternity. The divine action is not coercion, but co-operation: 
God alone has the property of transcendence. It is only in the logico-
metaphysical simultaneity of the atemporal present that God's knowledge is 
infallible, his will irresistible, his action efficacious. He exercises control 
through the created antecedents - true enough; but that is not the infallible, 
the irresistible, the efficacious, which has its ground not in the creature but 
in the uncreated, which has its moment not in time but in the cooperation of 
eternal uncreated action with created and temporal action.346 
While the antecedents themselves always incline to what is right and good, 
there is no guarantee that the creature's action will be in accordance with them. 
Sinful acts are the sinner's responsibility alone. God is not the cause of sin. 
In the first place, the will is moved naturally of necessity only to "the good in 
general" or the universal good, represented by man's last end: "For that good 
343 Cf.SCG 111.91.2,4,(Leo.XIV,277 -B}, Bourke (1975) trans.,40,41. 
344 Cf.SCG III.155.3,(Leo.XIV,457-B}, Bourke,250. 
345 Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas 
Aquinas, Lonergan, Collected Works,Vo/.1 ,Frederick E.Crowe and Robert M.Doran 
edd .. University of Toronto Press,2000,117. 
346 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom,pp.117-B. 
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which is the last end is the perfect good fulfilling the desire. Now man's appetite, 
otherwise the will, is for the universal good.,,347 The universal good, for Thomas, 
is therefore the good which lacks no essential element of goodness, being the 
goal and perfection of all rational natures. In the realm of the particular, the will 
is moved of necessity to those particular acts to which it has a natural 
disposition, not subject to the will: 
Therefore, if the disposition whereby something seems good and suitable 
to a person is natural and not subject to the will, the will by natural 
necessity will choose it. For example, all human beings desire by nature to 
exist, live, and understand.348 
This does not apply to dispositions under the will's control, e.g., habits. With 
regard to particular goods, the will can only be moved necessarily toward 
something seen to be good in every possible respect, as is the case, for 
instance, with the acts of existing, living and understanding. 349 
Even though happiness in general, especially the universal and perfect good 
which is the happiness of the last end, is willed necessarily, nevertheless, with 
regard to particular acts as means to that end, neither this nor any temporal 
happiness necessitates the will: 
Something active necessarily causes only when it overcomes the power of 
something passive. And since the will is potential regarding good in 
general, only something good in every respect overcomes the power of the 
will so as necessarily to move the will, and the only such good is the perfect 
good which is happiness (beatitudo). And the will cannot not will this good; 
that is, the will cannot will the contrary. Nevertheless, the will is able not 
actually to will happiness, since the will can avoid thinking about happiness 
insofar as the will moves the intellect to its activity. And in this respect, 
neither does the will necessarily will happiness itself.35o 
347 Aquinas, ST.I-11.2.7c,my emphasis,(LeoVI,23). 
348 Aquinas, De Malo Vl.c,(Leo)(XIII, 150), Regan,260; cf.ST.I-11.1 0.2.ad.3,{Leo. VI.86); also 
STI-II.94.2c quote, chapter 1, p.28 above, regarding inclinations and natural law. It seems 
pertinent to note that Thomas is here making the distinction between 'nature' and 'will' upon 
which Scotus will construct his account of freedom. 
349 Aquinas, De Malo Vl.c,(Leo)(XIII, 150), Regan,260. 
350 Aquinas, De Malo Vl.ad. 7,(Leo.XXIII, 151), Regan,261. 
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Consequently, for Thomas, the will as such, in regard to those things subject to 
it, is necessitated in one respect only: in the matter of specification of the 
universal good, happiness, especially that of the last end. This is so, even 
though a person may seldom actually think about happiness, or about the 
ultimate end. In such specification, the intellect tends to play the predominant 
role. The choice of proximate or intermediate ends, whether or not they are 
consciously chosen as means to a further end, or as ends in themselves, is 
never subject to necessity: freedom of specification applies in all such cases. 
Freedom of exercise applies always and in everything, in the absence of 
obstruction by an exterior factor. 
All of this confirms Thomas's statement that, with regard to its own proper act, 
the will, which is the rational appetite, is never subject to violence, nor is it 
subject to coercion, even by God: 
God, who is more powerful than the human will, can move the will of man, 
according to Proverbs 21: 1: The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; 
He shall turn it wherever He wills. But if this were by compulsion, it would 
no longer be by an act of the will, nor would the will itself be moved, but 
something else against the will. 351 
The will's non-susceptibility to compulsion, which can only be from an exterior 
force, is due to the will's very nature as an inclination to the good: it is a matter 
of what the will actually is. It is also because of what the will actually is that 
Thomas can say that "the last end is in no way a matter of choice". 352 It is the 
will's highest good and perfection. 
351 Aquinas, ST 1-11.6.4.ad1 ,(Leo.vI,59-60). 
352 Aquinas, ST 1-11.13.3c,(Leo.vl, 101). 
97 
Is Aquinas a Compatibilist, or an Incompatibilist or Libertarian? 
Recent scholars have frequently chosen to address the question of whether 
Thomas's action theory should be designated 'compatibilist' or 'incompatibilist' 
with reference to natural necessity only, omitting the dimension of divine 
providence and causality. I can offer only a few examples (below, pp.98-100) 
from what is a considerable literature on thomistic free will. 
To appreciate the various viewpoints and verdicts of scholars on this issue, 
one has to be clear about the terms describing different aspects of free will. 
Thomas, following Augustinian practice, uses liberum arbitrium, literally 'free 
decision' or 'free judgment', to describe the action of the intellect that precedes 
the choice of means to an end. For the outcome of deliberation, he sometimes 
uses either sententia, 'decision', or iudicium, 'judgment'. For the will's act of 
choosing he uses e/ectio, 'choice'. He uses vo/untas mainly for the willing of the 
final end, happiness, or 'the good in general'. Also central to the issue is the role 
Thomas ascribes to the intellect in freedom. When he describes the will as the 
'rational appetite', he is acknowledging its dependence on the intellect, not only 
for its objects, but in large measure for its freedom of choice. It is the intellect 
that considers and assesses options, and can always reconsider. 
Scott MacDonald, in assessing Aquinas's status vis-a-vis compatibilism, 
concerns himself specifically with e/ectio. On this basis, he concludes that 
Thomas's account is a "moderate libertarianism", on the grounds that he 
"preserves genuine indeterminacy in human agency while at the same time 
securing a necessary connection between an agent's free choices and her 
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reasons for acting".353 The role of the intellect is decisive: "Intellectively 
cognized good moves the will" .354 On the one hand, 1) Thomas is "committed to 
a thoroughgoing causal theory of free action", which might point to a 
compatibilist account; on the other hand, 2) he describes the will at one point as 
a self-mover355, suggesting a libertarian understanding. However, 1) the will is 
necessitated, not by the intellect, but only by its own inclination to the universal 
good, which is "the very nature of the will as it is created by God",356 and 2) the 
will, though it moves itself, does not do so de novo, without some prior input by 
the intellect. MacDonald ascribes incompatibilism (of a "moderate libertarian" 
variety) to Aquinas on the basis of what he calls 'metajudgement': namely, the 
intellect's ability to judge about its own judgments. He cites Aquinas: 
Now judgment is in the power of the one who judges insofar as the one 
who judges can judge about his own judgment... But judging about one's 
own judgment is something only reason can do: reason is reflexive with 
respect to its own acts and cognizes the relations among the things about 
which and by means of which it judges. Hence, the root of our entire 
freedom is planted in reason. 357 
He therefore concludes that "meta-judgment - the mechanism by which reason 
can be reflexive with respect to its own acts - and not a fully autonomous will" is 
that in which "the root of our entire freedom is planted".358 
Eleonore Stump359 focuses also on liberum arbitrium, whose volitions are 
associated by Aquinas only with electio. She concludes that Aquinas is 
"libertarian in some sense", in maintaining that a) humans have free will, and b) 
353 Scott MacDonald, Aquinas's Libertrarian Account of Free Choice, Revue Internationale de 
Philosophie 52,no.2, 1998,309-328,312. 
354 Aquinas, ST.la.82.3.ad.2,(Leo. V,299). 
355 Aquinas, ST.I-11.9.3c,(Leo.VI,78). 
356 Aquinas, ST.I-11.9.6c,(Leo.VI,82), MacDonald,316. 
357 Aquinas, De Veritate XXIV.2,(Leo.XXII,VoI.3,685), MacDonald trans.,324. 
358 MacDonald,328; 
359 Eleonore Stump, Aquinas's Account of Freedom: Intellect and Will, The Monist, 
80,n.4,1997,576-597. 
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the will's acts are not subject to any causal determinism, which in his case 
means determinism by exterior factors. Freedom must issue entirely from within 
the agent, and is "a property primarily of a human being, not of some particular 
component of a human being". 360 Stump shows how the interaction ("dynamic 
feedback") between intellect and will means that alternative possibilities, though 
an element in freedom, are not necessary to freedom according to Thomas: 
"Freedom is opposed to the necessity of coercion, but not to the necessity of 
inclination".361 The will's necessary inclination, when guided by the intellect's 
free judgment of which particular means to the good is to be chosen, chooses it 
in a way not contrary to freedom. Thus, "one can hold an incompatibilist theory 
of free will, as Aquinas does, ... (i.e.) one can maintain that the will is free in a 
way incompatible with causal determinism without espousing the Franciscan 
version of libertarianism,,362 The latter refers either to Scotus's "synchronic 
contingency" (see p.115 below) or to Ockham's "freedom of indifference" (p.129 
below). 
Aquinas: Evil as Defective Choice. 
In De Veritate XX11.6, Thomas lists three indeterminations of the will involved in 
freedom. The first two concern the freedom of exercise and freedom of 
specification already referred to, involving, respectively, indetermination 
regarding action: to act or not, and indetermination regarding the object: to 
choose this or that. The third concerns finality: 
A third indetermination of the will is found in regard to its ordination to its 
end inasmuch as the will can desire what is in truth directed to its appointed 
end or what is so only in appearance. This indetermination comes from two 
sources: from the indetermination in regard to its object in the case of the 
360 Stump,581. 
361 Aquinas, De Veritate XXI1.5.sc3,(Leo.XXII, VoI.3,623}. 
362 Stump,594. 
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means. And again from the indetermination of our apprehension, which can 
be correct or not. From a given true principle a false conclusion does not 
follow unless it is because of some falsity in the reasoning through a false 
subsumption or the false relating of the principle to the conclusion. In the 
same way from a correct appetite for the last end the inordinate desire for 
something could not follow unless reason were to take as referable to the 
end something which is not so referable. Thus a person who naturally 
desires happiness with a correct appetite would never be led to desire 
fornication except in so far as he apprehends it as a good for man, seeing 
that it is something pleasurable, and as referable to happiness as a sort of 
copy of it. From this there follows the indetermination of the will by which it 
can desire good or evil. 363 
A failure in apprehending the true ordination of an action in relation to the end, 
involving a failure of comparison between the act and the principle, which is the 
ultimate end, and resulting in a false judgment,364 is not compatible with the 
will's freedom: 
Where there is no failure in apprehending and comparing, there can be no 
willing of evil even when there is question of means, as is clear among the 
blessed. For this reason it is said365 that to will evil is not freedom or any 
part of it. 366 
For Thomas, freedom is not just a principle of imputability or responsibility, as it 
would later come to be considered (the forensic account): it is also, and 
indefectibly, a principle of perfectibility, grounded in the human desire for 
happiness: that is to say, in the very essence of man as rational creature. 
Aquinas: Freedom for Excellence 
The term, "freedom for excellence" does not appear in Aquinas's writings: it is of 
more recent provenance, and is advanced by Pinckaers in The Sources of 
Christian Ethics367 . However, it seems reasonable to assume that Thomas 
would have expected his readers to be perfectly familiar with the Johannine 
363 Aquinas, De Veritate XXI 1.6c,(LeoJ<XI 1.627-8), Schmidt trans.,Hackett,Vol.Ill,58. 
364 Cf.Aquinas, ST la.83.1 c,(Leo.V,307). 
365 Anselm, De Libera Arbitrio 1,(PL.158,490). 
366 Aquinas, De Veritate XXI1.6c,(Leo.XXII,627-8), Schmidt, Hackett,Vol.IlI,59. 
367 Pinckaers, Sources,ch.15,354-378. 
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passages cited above (p.85), equating sin with slavery and, by inference, 
sanctification and salvation with the liberation presaged by Moses and Exodus. 
For Thomas, freedom is the outcome of the mind's inclination to truth and the 
will's inclination to goodness: 
The root of liberty is the will as the subject thereof; but it is the reason as its 
cause. For the will can tend freely towards various objects, precisely 
because the reason can have various perceptions of good. Hence 
philosophers define the free-will as being a free judgment arising from 
reason, implying that reason is the root of liberty.368 
Here, all three types of freedom are implied and associated: freedom of 
exercise, freedom of specification, and the "freedom for excellence" involved in 
an unobstructed and rightly-directed ordination to truth and goodness. It is the 
latter, especially, that is lost through sin: 
Man is said to have lost free-will by falling into sin, not as to natural liberty, 
which is freedom from coercion, but as regards freedom from fault and 
unhappiness.369 
Freedom is a capacity for truth and goodness, therefore for happiness. This 
capacity, the natural inclination to virtue, in accordance with the nature in which 
it inheres, is diminished by sin: 
.. the natural inclination to virtue is diminished by sin, because human acts 
produce an inclination to like acts.370 Now from the very fact that a thing 
becomes inclined to one of two contraries, its inclination to the other 
contrary must needs be diminished. Wherefore, as sin is opposed to virtue, 
from the very fact that a man sins, there results a diminution of that good of 
nature which is the inclination to virtue .... in so far as an obstacle is placed 
against its attaining its term".371 
The natural inclination to virtue "is befitting to man from the very fact that he is a 
rational being: 
for it is due to this that he performs actions in accord with reason, which is 
to act virtuously. Now sin cannot entirely take away from man the .fact that 
he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be capable of Sin. 
368 Aquinas, ST.I-11.17.1.ad.2,(Leo.VI, 118). 
369 Aquinas, STla.83.2.ad.3,(Leo.V.309). 
370 Aquinas, Cf.STI-11.50.1 c,(Leo.VI,317) regarding habit or disposition. 
371 Aquinas, STI-11.85.1c,(Leo.VII.110). 
102 
Wherefore it is not possible for the good of nature to be destroyed 
entirely.372 
Reason and will are both intimately involved in the damage done to human 
nature by sin, just as they are intimately involved in the life of virtue: 
.. through sin, the reason is obscured, especially in practical matters, the will 
hardened to evil, good actions become more difficult, and concupiscence 
more impetuous.373 
Reason and will find their perfection and fullness in the life of grace: therefore 
freedom does too. "Freedom for excellence" involves not only liberation from 
sinful habits and their harmful effects, but also from attachments to earthly 
goods of all sorts that impede progress in spiritual life. Thomas's exegesis of 
the Sermon on the Mount addresses the issue of the 'evangelical counsels' of 
poverty, chastity and obedience: 
The difference between a counsel and a commandment is that a 
commandment implies obligation, whereas a counsel is left to the option of 
the one to whom it is given. Consequently, in the New Law, which is the law 
of liberty, counsels are added to the commandments, and not in the Old 
Law which is the law of bondage.374 
Commandments concern what is necessary to gain "the end of eternal bliss"; 
counsels concern matters which "render the gaining of this end more assured 
and expeditious". 
Aquinas: Freedom and Beatitude 
Richard Cross, writing on Scotus, raises the problem of freedom in patria. 
Catholic doctrine, he says, holds that the saints enjoy the beatific vision for 
ever, and cannot lose it. This must entail impeccability, since, by sinning, they 
would lose it. He then raises the objection that if the saints are impeccable, "it 
372 Aquinas, ST.I-11.85.2c,(Leo.VII.111). 
373 Aquinas, ST.I-II.85.3c,(Leo.VII.113) . 
374 Aquinas, ST.I-II.108.4c,(Leo.VII,288). 
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looks as if they cannot be free". Among the solutions proposed by the 
schoolmen, 
Aquinas is happy to concede that we will not be free in heaven. It is central 
to Aquinas's action theory that our will responds automatically to whatever 
we perceive will make us happy .... Our lack of freedom in heaven coincides 
exactly with the general contours of Aquinas's action theory.375 
Aquinas actually (and happily) concedes that we will not be free to sin in 
heaven. The saints in heaven are not only free, but their freedom has attained 
perfection, as it is a share in God's own freedom, just as their human nature has 
attained perfection because, sharing in divine life, it shares in the divine nature. 
For Thomas, the ability to sin is the defect of freedom, not a constituent of it: 
.. since man, by his natural reason, is inclined to justice, while sin is contrary 
to natural reason, it follows that freedom from sin is true freedom, which is 
united to the servitude of justice, since they both incline man to that which 
is becoming to him. In like manner, true servitude is the servitude of sin, 
which is connected with freedom from justice, because man is thereby 
hindered from attaining that which is proper to him. That a man become the 
servant of justice or sin results from his efforts .... 376 
Unless the appropriate effort (repentance) is made, sin leads to further sin, and 
further unhappiness. Moreover, unrepented, habitual sin damages human 
nature by diminishing the natural inclination to virtue,377 and causing spiritual 
blindness.378 What Thomas calls true freedom is a gift of grace, something to 
be received, which re-orients us and sets us on the road to our final end, 
beatitude. 
In Thomas's account, both 'freedom of exercise' and 'freedom of 
specification', involving a choice between contraries, exist in patria, in the saints 
as in the angels; but the contraries in question do not include the contraries of 
good and evil, virtue and sin. They are always, and in everything, referred to 
375 Richard Cross, Duns Scotus, Great Medieval Thinkers, OUP, 1999, 150. 
376 Aquinas, ST.II-11.183.4c,(Leo.X,449). 
377 Aquinas, ST.I-11.85.1 c,(Leo.VII, 11 0). 
378 Aquinas, ST.II-11.15.1-3,(Leo.VIII,118-120). 
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God. The soul of the blessed is as naturally ordained to the good, as the 
intellect to first principles, and not to contraries in respect of those: 
For the intellect cannot but assent to naturally known principles; in the 
same way the will cannot help clinging to good, formally as good; because 
the will is naturally ordained to good as to its proper object. Consequently 
the will of the angels is referred to opposites, as to doing many things, or 
not doing them. But they have no tendency to opposites with regard to God 
Himself, whom they see to be the very nature of goodness; but in all things 
their aim is towards God, whichever alternative they choose, that is not 
sinful.379 
Eleonore Stump gives a concise explanation of this in terms of the will's 
dependence on the intellect: the intellects of the Blessed "can no longer find 
descriptions under which to present as good things that are really evil. And so, 
although the blessed cannot will evil, they nonetheless will freely whatever they 
will".380 For Aquinas, freedom is not only compatible with the life of the blessed 
in patria, it reaches its perfection and fulfilment there. This accords perfectly 
with the status of freedom as a gift of grace from the Holy Spirit, which grows 
and is perfected with the virtues. 
BONAVENTURE ON FREEDOM 
The idea of free-will as a faculty distinct from will, representing the Father, in the 
soul as imago Dei, was current in some Franciscan circles in Bonaventure's 
time. It may have been especially attractive to Bonaventure in view of his 
frequent use of Trinitarian imagery. Nevertheless, after examining the reasons 
for and against it, he rejects any basis for it in reality, or in "what is really there". 
However, he does allow it some validity "according to the way we perceive 
things": 
I grant that as far as what is there is concerned, liberum arbitrium does not 
mean a power distinct from reason or will. Nevertheless, I grant that a 
379 Aquinas, ST.la.62.8.ad 2,(Leo. V,118). 
380 Stump,590. 
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distinction can be drawn from the point of view of how we perceive things, 
and from this point of view it can be called "a faculty of both" [i.e., of reason 
and will] ... For the moment, it's enough to say that there is not so great a 
distinction that liberum arbitrium is another power within the class of 
powers, really distinct from reason and will. 381 
Bonaventure's account of freedom is largely found in his treatment of the 
relationship between free will and grace. It is explicitly based on Augustine, 
regarding divine gratuity and liberality, and the role of free will in receptiveness 
and co-operation with the gifts of grace: 
It is true, as Augustine says, that "He who created you without your 
assistance will not justify you without your consent".382 Yet it is also true 
that There is a question not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of 
God showing mercy. Once more it is true that no man may take pride in his 
own merits, for God crowns within us nothing but His own gifts:383 reserving 
to Himself the generous distribution of the favours of grace, teaching man 
not to be an ingrate, nor to glory in himself as if he had not received, 
instead of glorying in the Lord.384 
Bonaventure shares with Thomas an exalted view of the essential nature of free 
will,385 with complete clarity as to its current state, and its total dependence on 
grace: 
In regard to grace as a remedy for sin, the following must be held. Although 
free will is "the greatest power next to God", it is by nature liable to rush 
headlong into sin, out of which it is completely unable to rise without the 
divine assistance called sanctifying grace. Such grace, in itself a fully 
sufficient remedy for sin, is not poured into the soul of an adult person 
without the consent of his free will. 386 
God re-creates the soul of the contrite sinner by the infusion of the gifts of 
grace, but always and only with the free consent and co-operation of the sinner, 
whose nature is never suppressed or overruled: 
.. God effects this reformation in such a way as not to impair the laws 
implanted in nature: granting grace to man's free will, but without forcing it, 
so that freedom of choice remains. Hence, for the expUlsion of sin, not only 
must grace be introduced, but free will itself must consent to the expUlsion 
through that detestation of all sin which we call contrition .... In addition, free 
381 Bonaventure, In Sent.lI,d.25,p.1 ,a.1 ,q.2,(Quar.II,596). 
382 Augustine, Sermo.169.11.13,(PL.38,922). 
383 Augustine, Enarr.in psalmos,Ps. 70,c.2:5,(PL.36,895); PS.1 02,c. 7,(PL.37, 132); 
Sermo.170.1 0.1 0,(PL.38,932); De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio,6.15,(PL.44,890). 
384 Bonaventure, Breviloquium, V.3.6,( Quar. V,255),de Vinck trans., 191-2. 
385 Above, p.97. 
386 Bonaventure, Breviloquium, V.3.1 ,( Quar. V,254 ),de Vinck,189. 
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~ill. mus~ consent to the infusion of grace by approving and accepting the 
divine gift through what we call an act of volition. 387 
Bonaventure leaves us with a very strong sense of God's generosity in pouring 
out the gifts of grace on those open to receive them; divine liberality, and not 
just divine liberty, is Bonaventure's emphasis. Everything comes through the 
first and principal gift, the 'Gift' Himself of the Holy Spirit: 
The Holy Spirit is the first Gift. Whatever comes afterwards must be 
referred to what is prior. Consequently, every gift is reduced to the gift that 
is the Holy Spirit. Hence in every gift the reason of its donation is the Holy 
Spirit. 388 
At the same time, the Holy Spirit never usurps or trespasses on the legitimate 
freedom necessary for the soul's co-operation with grace and progress in 
perfection. 
Freedom and Necessity: The 1270 and 1277 Condemnations 
In 1268, Bonaventure himself draws attention to three errors he sees arising 
from contemporary misinterpretation and misuse of Aristotle, and constituting a 
danger to Christian faith. The erroneous doctrines in question posit 1) eternity of 
the world, i.e. as not created in time or having a beginning; 2) the 'necessitas 
fatalis', the determining of the will by the stars, and 3) the unicity of the 
intellectual soul for all men, also now called 'Averroist monopsychism'. He sees 
the latter as the worst, since it contains the other twO. 389 What concerns us here 
is the implication of Aquinas in some of the 13 articles condemned in 1270, 
when Thomas himself was alive and teaching in Paris, and in the 219 articles 
condemned in 1277. The 1270 condemnation included the three cited by 
Bonaventure above. 
387 Bonaventure, Brevi/oquium,V.3.4,( Quar.V,255),de Vinck,190. 
388 Bonaventure, Senf.l,d.18,q.1 ,f.3,( Quar.I,323), Charles Carpenter trans., Theology as the 
Road to Holiness in Sf. Bonaventure, NY,Paulist Press, 1999, 137. 
389 Bonaventure, Collationes de septem donis Spiritus Saneti, VII,nn.16-19,( Quar. V,495-6). 
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On the subject of determinism of the will by the stars, Thomas gives a 
succinct answer in a short letter from around the same period, addressed to an 
enquirer, concerning the licitness of astrology: 
The will of man is not subject to the necessity of the stars, for if free will 
were to disappear, we would no longer be able to impute merit to good 
works, nor fault to evil ones. The Christian must therefore hold as very 
certain that what depends on the will - for example, human acts - is not 
subject to the stars by necessity.390 
Thomas concludes that astrology is seriously sinful. 391 The same subject is 
covered at much greater length in the two Summas. Thomas allows that 
heavenly bodies produce the non-rational movements of bodies on earth, 
mediating divine primary causality,392 but have no influence on human actions 
produced by free will. 393 The question of free choice is also dealt with in De 
Malo, chapter VI, which Torrell dates to just before or just after the Paris 
condemnations of 1270. He also notes that it "breaks the regular flow of the De 
Malo", being inserted between chapters on original sin and actual sin, as if to 
"update" the subject in view of the controversy reigning at the time. Perhaps 
significantly, it places more emphasis on the role of the will than Thomas's 
earlier writings on free choice. 
Henry of Ghent: The Superiority of the Will 
Henry's account of the operation and status of the will stands at the opposite 
pole from the 'necessitatrianism' condemned in the articles. For Henry, the 
radical freedom, or spontaneity, of the will is such that the known object does 
not move it in any way at all: "Simply speaking, it must be said that the will in 
390 Aquinas, De iudiciis astrorum,lines28-35,(Leo.XLlII,201), Torrell trans.,215. 
391 Torrell ,Vol. 1 ,356. 
392 Aquinas, ST.la.115.3,(Leo. V,541-2); SCG.III,82,(Leo.XIV,243). 
393 Aquinas, ST.la.115.4,(Leo.V,544); SCG.1I1.84-87,(Leo.XIV,248-267). 
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the act of willing is moved by no other, but by itself alone". 394 The object is 
merely a sine qua non without which no act of volition could take place. Even 
Scotus, whose 'voluntarist' credentials were never in doubt, is not entirely happy 
with this almost total redundancy, so to speak, of the object. He rejects what he 
calls Henry's "opinio extrema", as well as its opposite, the opinion that the 
object or phantasm alone is the effective cause of the act of the will (a position 
also condemned in article 191 of Bishop Tempier's 219 articles), and adopts a 
via media on the cause of volitions: 
Therefore I hold an intermediate position, that will as well as object concur 
in causing the act of willing, in such a way that the act of willing is from the 
will and from the known object as effective cause. 395 
For Henry, the will itself, as a spiritual power is a "first mover" of the intellect, 
as well as of every other power. In his Quodlibets, Henry explains in some detail 
why freedom requires the will to be a self-moved first mover, and how this is 
metaphysically possible.396 Likewise - and this places him in radical opposition 
to Thomas - Henry holds that sinful acts result firstly from a disorder of the will, 
not of reason. 397 For this reason, he also places all the moral virtues in the 
will. 398 Macken399 summarizes his position as follows: the object of the will is the 
good simpliciter. This good is for the will the ultimate end. The object of the 
intelligence is the true, which is the good of a particular thing, namely, the 
intellect. It is therefore an end subordinate to, and directed to, the other as to its 
394 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet,IX.5c, quoted in loannis Duns Scoti, Opera Omnia,(Vatican, 
VoI.XIX,246,note F),my translation. . . 
395 Scotus, Lectura II,d.25,q.unica,(Vatican,XIX,253) my translation: Ideo teneo vlam medlam, 
quod tam voluntas quam obiectum concurrant ad causandum actum vo/endi, ita quod actus 
vo/endi est a voluntate et ab obiecto cognito ut a causa effectiva. 
396 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet, IX.5; X11.26; X1.6; XIII.11. (Hoffmann, Intellectua/ism,419). 
397 Henry, Quodlibet,1.17. 
398 Henry, Quodlibet,IV.22. . 
399 R.Macken, La volonte humaine, faculte plus e/evee que /'intelligence se/on Hen" de Gand, 
Recherches de Theologie Ancienne et Medievale,XLII, 1975,5-51,12. 
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ultimate end. Therefore, the will is the superior faculty. Scotus, however, will 
reject this argument, on the grounds that the objects of the faculties can tell us 
nothing about the hierarchy of the faculties.4oo 
For Henry, the acts of the two faculties can be compared a) as they are in 
themselves, and b) in so far as they perfect their subject. In themselves, the will 
is always more noble (nobilior) than the intellect, as its act is to will, that is, to 
love. In addition, the total impress, or ascendancy, of the intellect is far less than 
that of the will over the intellect. Macken comments on this denial of equality of 
influence of the two faculties: c'est la Ie point de rupture entre volontaristes et 
intellectualistes.401 
Aquinas: The Faculties of the Soul 
Henry's system tends to "establish", so to speak, the rupture, by ranging itself in 
opposition to other, underlying aspects of Thomas's account, such as the 
distinction between being and essence in creatures, and their identity in God. 
This was a concept Thomas had considered absolutely necessary for a sound 
metaphysical grasp of the relationship between realities, natural and 
supernatural. The issue concerns us here only because it underlies the 
distinction Thomas also makes between the essence of the soul and its 
faculties, and between the faculties themselves. The distinction in creatures 
between essence (as potency) and being (as act), has a 'parallel' in the 
distinction between faculty or power (potency) and operation (act). But, whereas 
whatever creaturely essence exists is always in the act of being, the faculties or 
400 Scotus, Ordinatio IV,d.49,q.ex latere (Olms-Wadding,X.396) 
401 Macken, La volonte,9 
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powers, of intellect and will for instance, are not always operative, therefore not 
always in act. Therefore they must be distinct from the essence. 
For the soul by its very essence is an act. Therefore if the very essence of 
the soul were the immediate principle of operation, whatever has a soul 
would always have actual vital actions, as that which has a soul is always 
an actually living thing ... Now we observe that what has a soul is not always 
actual with respect to its vital operations ... Therefore it follows that the 
essence of the soul is not its power. For nothing is in potentiality by reason 
of an act, as act.402 
Only in God, whose being is both his essence and his operation, is this not 403 
the case: 
But in God alone his action of understanding is his very being. Wherefore in 
God alone is his intellect his essence: while in intellectual creatures, the 
intellect is a power.404 
The powers of the soul are, therefore, not the essence, but accidents of the 
soul, though not in the primary sense of accident, but the secondary: that of 
quality. As such, they are natural properties (propria), of the soul, which "flow 
from the essence of the soul as from their principle".405 As the soul is uniquely 
the form of the body, there are five genera of powers in the soul: vegetative, 
sensitive, appetitive, locomotive and intellectual.406 All are concerned with 
perfective action, the latter especially with the ultimate perfection, beatitude. 
Man, as the lowest of the creatures capable of attaining the "universal and 
perfect goodness of beatitude", needs a greater variety of operations and 
powers: also because "it is on the confines of spiritual and corporeal creatures; 
and therefore the powers of both meet together in the soul" .407 
Thomas has associated what he calls "true freedom" with the perfecting 
action of the soul's powers or faculties, in which the virtues are located. He 
402 Aquinas, STla.77.1c,(Leo.V,236-7). 
403 Aquinas, STla.77.1.ad.5,(Leo.V,237). 
404 Aquinas, STla. 79.1 c,(Leo. V,258). 
405 Aquinas, STla.77.6c,(Leo.V,246). 
406 Aquinas, STla. 78.1 sC,(Leo. V,250). 
407 Aquinas, STla. 77.2c,(Leo. V,240). 
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has also, in the course of distinguishing the soul's faculties from each 
other and from the essence of the soul, made a connection between the 
essence-being distinction and the power-operation distinction in the soul. 
Each of these distinctions, as potency and act, is intimately concerned 
with the perfecting of the soul in Thomas's account. As to whether they are 
to be regarded as "real", we can presumably take it that, in Thomas's 
mind, they are as real as the soul's capacity for being perfected. Likewise, 
the essence of the soul, which is the source and cause of the faculties, as 
well as true freedom in action, are the principles of the soul's perfectibility. 
We will see what becomes of this account when the essence-being 
distinction is rejected in favour of a univocal concept of being as between 
God and creatures. 
SCOTUS ON FREEDOM 
The Priority of Acts of Willing 
Scotus rejects Thomas's 'interactive' account of the roles of intellect and will. 
Concerning acts as the standard of comparison, he quotes from the place 
where Thomas gives the terms according to which each faculty in turn can be 
considered the superior: 
From this we can easily understand why these powers include one another 
in their acts, because the intellect understands that the will wills, and the 
will wills the intellect to understand. 408 
Scotus replies that each is only a partial, not a total cause of the act of the 
other. The act of the intellect, as characteristically with Scotus, is placed under 
the heading of "nature" - and natural causes operate by necessity. If the 
intellect was the total cause of the will's act, there would be no free will: 
408 Aquinas, ST la.B2.4.ad.1 ,(Leo. V.303). 
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However, it is clear that intellection is not the total cause of volition , 
because, since the first intellection is caused by a merely natural cause, 
and the intellection is not free, ultimately whatever is caused is similarly 
caused of necessity, and thus whatever interaction there may be in acts of 
in~el~ect and will, the whole process must be mere natural necessity; and as 
this IS not adequate to preserve liberty in man, it must be said that 
intellection is not the total cause of volition, but that the will, which alone is 
free, has the ascendancy over it. 409 
In addition, the intellect is only a causa subserviens voluntati, in view of the 
will's essential freedom. The will, for its part, is only a partial cause of the 
intellect's act: it is, after all, the intellect's own act that it commands. However: 
Even if only partial, it will be a cause of a higher order, thus the will's 
command of the intellect is a higher cause with respect to its act. The 
intellect, however, if it is a cause of volition, is a cause subservient to the 
will, despite having the primary act in the order of generation.41o 
Intellect and will can be compared either with the proper act each elicits, or 
with regard to the causality they exercise over other subordinate powers, in our 
case mainly of the body, "the intellect by showing and directing; the will by 
inclining and commanding". In this respect, the intellect comes under the 
heading of "nature" as it is determined to the act of understanding. It does not 
have it in its power to both understand and not understand (at any given 
moment), or to both assent and dissent. The will, on the other hand, can elicit 
opposite acts.411 Scotus had earlier pointed out that there is only a twofold 
generic way in which an operation proper to a potency can be elicited: either 1) 
the potency of itself is determined in its action, or 2) it is not of itself determined 
409 Scotus, Ordinatio IV,d.49,q.ex latere,n.16,(Vives XXI, 152), my translation: Quod autem 
intel/ectio non sit totalis causa volitionis, patet, quia cum prima intel/ectio causetur a causa mere 
naturali, et intellectio sit non libera, ulterius simili necessitate causaret quidquid causaret, et sic 
quomodocumque circuli fierent in actibus intellectus et voluntatis, totus processus esset mere 
necessitate naturali; quod cum sit inconveniens, ut salvetur libertas in homine, oportet dicere, 
posita intellectione, non habere causam totalem volitionis, sed principaliorem respectu eius 
esse voluntatem quae sola libera est. 
410 Scotus, Ordinatio IV,d.49,q.ex latere,n.16,(Vives,XXI, 151 ),my translation: Et si partiali, hoc 
erit de causa superioris ordinis, et hoc modo voluntas imperans intellectui est causa superior 
respectu actus eius. Intel/ectus autem, si est causa volition is, est causa subserviens voluntati, 
tamquam habens actionem primam ordine generationis. 
411 Scotus, In Metaph.IX,q.15,(Olms-Wad.IV, 796): text and translation, Allan B.Wolter, Duns 
Scotus on the Will and Morality, Washington,DC,CUA Press, 1986, 154, 155. 
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but can perform opposite acts, or not act at all. Taking his cue from Aristotle,412 
he calls the first sort "nature", and the second sort "will". Hence the primary 
division of active potencies is into nature and will. 
The will is the potentia rationalis, which is not of itself determined to anyone 
of a choice of opposites. Through its elicited act, the will determines the intellect 
with respect to causality ad extra. Aristotle, he pOints out, had called this 
function of the will "desire (appetitum) , or prohaeresis, i.e., choice", but had not 
called it "will", i.e., a potency. Scotus counters that, if the intellect is to be called 
a "rational potency", it can only be in virtue of its subordinate concurrence with 
the will, not with other subordinate powers, and not in itself. In the latter two 
cases it comes under the heading of "nature", and not of "will".413 The will, on 
the other hand, is properly "rational", as it has to do with opposites, not in the 
determined way of a nature, but as freely self-determined: 
But if "rational" is understood to mean "with reason", then the will is properly 
rational, and it has to do with opposites, both as regards its own act and as 
regards the acts it controls (actus inferiorum). And it has to do with 
opposites not in the way that a nature, like the intellect, acts, which has no 
power to determine itself in any other way. But the will acts freely, for it has 
the power of self-determination.414 
Unsurprisingly, he is in agreement with Thomas that the will, by its very nature, 
cannot be coerced, "for it is a contradiction for the will to be simply forced to 
will".415 
·112 Aristotle, Physics.11. 
413 Scotus, In Mefaph.IX,q.15,(Olms-Wad.IV,796-802), Wolter, Duns Scotus, Latin text and 
trans.,157. 7 
414 Scotus, In Mefaph.IX,q.15,(Olms-Wad.IV, 796-802), Wolter trans.,Duns Scotus,15 . 
·115 Scotus, Ordinatio,IV,d.29,q.un.,n.6,(Olms-Wad.,IX,618),Wolter, 175. 
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Scotus: Synchronic Contingency 
It is possible to observe, at this point, that the "anti-necessitarian" agenda which 
forms the background and context to much (if not all) of Scotus's whole opus, is 
already giving rise, where freedom is concerned, to a preoccupation with 
freedom as a bare and unimpeded choice of contraries. In this respect, the 
"Condemnations" of 1277 would indeed seem to be a major turning-point. "For 
who would deny", says Scotus, "that an agent is more perfect the less it is 
determined, dependent, and limited in its action or effect?,,416 For Scotus, the 
conventional, "diachronic" or successive notion of contingency did not 
adequately safeguard the distinction between "nature" and "will", that is, 
between determinism or necessity, and indeterminism or freedom, especially 
free-willing. Neither did an account such as Thomas's, which describes the will 
as the "rational appetite",417 but in a sense that sometimes subordinates it to the 
intellect. For Scotus, the will is a rational potency in its own right, and in a 
manner in which "rational" is equated with "free" and "indetermined". 
The synchronicity Scotus has in mind, however, turns out to concern instants 
of time only in terms of logical potency. In terms of real contingency, or 
possibility, it is a matter of "instants of nature", based on the distinction between 
the act itself and the faculty or potency for the act: 
This logical possibility [of willing different objects] does not exist according 
as the will has acts successively [Le. diachronically], but in the same 
instant. For in the same instant in which the will has one act of willing, it can 
have an opposite act of willing in and for that very same instant... . 
Corresponding to this logical potency is a real potency, for every cause IS 
prior in understanding with respect to its effect. Thus, the will, in the instant 
416 Scotus, In Metaph.IX,q.15,(Olms-Wad.IV, 796-B02); Wolter trans.,Duns ScotuS,159. 
417 Cf.Aquinas, ST.I-II.B.1 c,(Leo. VI,6B); la.B2.aa.3,4,(Leo.V,29B-304). 
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in which it elicits an act of willing ... has a contingent relation to the act, so 
that what is willing a can will against a.418 
Clearly, this could not be the case if the will were dependent on the intellect's 
deliberation and judgment. The freedom that Scotus is so concerned to 
safeguard here quite clearly comprises Thomas's categories of "freedom of 
exercise" (to do or not to do) and "freedom of specification" (to do this or that). 
Equally clearly it does not include what Thomas calls "true freedom": that is, 
freedom from the slavery of sin, or freedom of self-possession; this does not 
involve a bare choice between contraries, but only the ability to make the right 
choice. Scotus classifies this sort of freedom as an 'a ffectio , or tendency of the 
will associated with virtue, but ascribes it strictly to the rationality he attributes to 
the will rather than to the intellect. 
Scotus: The Formal Distinction and the Faculties of the Soul 
Aquinas' account of the soul and its faculties is conducive, as we have seen, to 
considerations of perfectibility, and therefore of finality, based on potency and 
act, and the different relations to being of the soul's essence and its powers. 
Scotus's metaphysical approach to that distinction is based on what he calls 
"unitive containment" of the powers by the essence.419 He is clear that the 
distinction is not real, but merely formal, which means that the definition of the 
essence does not include the faculties, nor vice-versa, even though the faculties 
are not really distinct from it or from each other. He agrees with Thomas that 
they are 'propria' of the soul (p.111 above), and that the essence of the soul is 
418 Scotus, Lectura l,d.39,qq.1-5,nn.50-51,( Vat.XVII,495), trans.,Thomas Williams, The 
Libertarian Foundations of Scotus's Moral Philosophy, The Thomist,62, 1998, 193-215, 196-7. 
419 Scotus, Ordinatio.lI,d.16,q.un .. n.17,(Olms-Wadding,VI,pt.2, 772). 
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· I . II . h 420 In some way oglca y prior to t em. However, propria are inseparable 
properties, and real distinction requires separability.421 
The 'formal distinction' makes it possible to speak, effectively, of the 
distinction between the soul's essence and its powers in the same terms as are 
applied to the distinction between the divine essence and its attributes, the 
divine intellect and will included. Richard Cross notes that "Scotus's God is 
clearly far less simple than Aquinas's",422 because his univocity theory of 
religious language is based on the metaphysical presupposition that, even in 
God, there must be some sort of distinction between his essential attributes. 
This would not be possible on the basis of Aquinas's absolute divine simplicity 
and the essence-being distinction in creatures. For Scotus, divine being differs 
essentially from creaturely being by its infinity, as opposed to divine simplicity in 
Thomas's account. 
We have seen that Thomas's essence-being distinction, as potency and act, 
accords well with the soul's capacity for being perfected, and the realisation of 
its capacitas Dei. Scotus's nearest equivalent, the common nature's 'formal 
distinction' from its individual instantiations as actualized by haecceity, seems to 
carry no such implication for the soul's perfectibility, even though only singulars 
can in fact be perfected. The locus of the soul's perfectibility for Scotus has to 
be somewhere else. It is not in the nature or essence as such, but in the will as 
free. 
420 Scotus, Ordinatio.ll,d.16,q.un.,n.12,(Olms-Wadding,VI,pt.2, 768). 
421 Scotus, Ordinatio.ll,d.16,q.un.,nn.15-17,(Olms-Wadding,VI,pt.2, 770). 
422 Richard Cross, Duns Scotus, Great Medieval Thinkers, OUP,1999,45. 
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Scotus: The Two Affections of the Will. 
Regarding the will as an indeterminate active potency, Scotus raises the 
question how a potency undetermined to acting or not acting can be reduced to 
act. He answers as follows: 
I reply: there is a certain indeterminacy of insufficiency, based on 
potentiality and a defect of actuality, in the way, for instance, that matter 
without a form would be indeterminate as regards the actuation given by 
the form. There is another indeterminacy, however, that of a superabundant 
sufficiency, based on unlimited actuality, either in an unqualified or in a 
qualified sense ... Something indeterminate in the second sense can 
determine itself. If this can occur where some limited actuality exists, how 
much more where the actuality is unlimited! '" Otherwise God, who, in 
virtue of his indeterminacy of unlimited actuality, is supremely 
undetermined in regard to any action whatsoever, would be unable to do 
anything of himself, which is false. 423 
This "indeterminacy of superabundant sufficiency", based on unlimited actuality, 
is found simpliciter in God, and quodammodo (i.e. in a qualified sense) in 
human beings. However, this absolute power of self-determination is not found 
with Scotus in a completely unspecified, or untrammelled, sense. Rather, it is 
found in the will as embodying the soul's natural appetite or desire. Basing 
himself on Anselm,424 Scotus divides the natural appetite into two "affections" or 
inclinations: firstly, the affection for the bonum sibi, i.e., for what is 
advantageous or beneficial to the self, called the affectio commodi; secondly, 
the affection for the bonum in se, i.e, for what is due to God, called the affection 
for justice, or affectio iustitiae - also called 'right reason' (recta ratio). The latter 
approximates to the natural and eternal law, inscribed in the human heart. 
Scotus describes the relationship between the two affections: 
.. this affection for justice ... is the first moderator of the affection for the 
beneficial (moderatrix affectionis commodl) , inasmuch as we need not 
actually seek that towards which the latter affection inclines us, nor must 
we seek it above all else (namely, to the extent to which we are inclined by 
this affection for the advantageous). This affection for what is just is the 
liberty innate to the will, since it represents the first moderator of the 
423 Scotus, In Metaph.IX,q.15,n.5,(Olms-Wad.IV, 798), Wolter trans., Duns ScotuS,153-4. 
424 Anselm, The Fall of the Devil,ch.4,(PL.158.332-3). 
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affec.tion for the advantageous ... Anselm ... makes these aspects out to be 
nothm~ other than the will itself insofar as it is an intellective appetite 
[affectlo commodl] and insofar as it is free [affectio iustitiae].425 
Scotus's affectio iustitiae echoes the will as the subject of liberty in Thomas,426 
including explicitly that liberty which Thomas refers to as "freedom from fault 
and unhappiness".427 However, there is one important difference: there is no 
mention now of the intellect as cause of this liberty. The will alone has become 
the locus of freedom in the human rational soul. 
Besides "intellective appetite", Scotus also calls the affectio commodi the 
"natural will", and the affectio iustitiae the "will as free", underlining the fact that 
it is not a separate faculty, only a distinct tendency or aspect. Neither, it needs 
to be emphasized, is the "superabundant sufficiency", which is the principle of 
self-determination, either a separate faculty of the soul, or even the specific 
principle of freedom in the will for Scotus. The principle of the will's freedom is 
the affectio iustitiae, called the "innate liberty" of the will. It is the ability to 
moderate what would otherwise be the unmoderated natural and determined 
desires of the affectio commodi. Scotus explains: 
.. the natural will is not actually immoderate through an elicited act. For the 
inclination of a natural appetite is not an elicited act, but resembles the first 
perfection [Le. something identical with the substance or being of the will]. 
And this is no more immoderate than is the nature to which it belongs. 
However, that nature is so inclined towards its object by this affection for 
the advantageous that if it had of itself an elicited act, it could not help 
eliciting it with no moderation in the most forceful way possible. But the 
natural will, as having only the affection for the beneficial, is not the cause 
of any elicited act; only the will as free can cause such, and therefore, qua 
eliciting act, the will does have what is required to moderate passion. 428 
A sinful act, therefore, involves a failure, by means of the affectio iustitiae in 
eliciting an act, to moderate the inclination of the affectio commodi with regard 
425 Scotus, Ordinatio lI,d.6,q.2,(Vat.VIII,49-50), Wolter trans., pp.469,471; my emphases. 
426 Aquinas, ST.I-11.17.1.ad.2,(Leo.VI.118). 
427 Aquinas, ST.la.83.2.ad.3,(Leo.V,309). 
428 Scotus, Ordinatio, lI,d.6,q.2,( Vat. VIII,53). Wolter trans., Duns Scotus,473. 
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to that act. Scotus illustrates the opposite act (freedom being also a power of 
opposites) by the example of the good angels in not falling: 
But in eliciting an act the good did not use the will as a mere intellective 
appetite,429 by wanting happiness in the way such an appetite would want 
it, but made use of the will's more perfect aspect (which is liberty), by acting 
in a way befitting a free agent as acting freely. But this means they acted in 
a manner ordained by a higher will, and hence they acted justly.43o 
To act freely is, therefore, and inseparably, to act justly, i.e. to act perfectly, or 
"more perfectly", because "in a manner ordained by a higher will". It is also to 
act rationally.431 Scotus's "voluntarism", at least in the moral context, is clearly a 
far cry from some later, more relativist understandings of the word. It is, 
however, entirely in accord with Anselm's teaching that "to be able to sin does 
not belong in the definition of free will", while the perfect definition is "the power 
of preserving the rectitude of will for its own sake" .432 Freedom therefore retains 
its character as a principle of the soul's perfectibility, as in Thomas's account. 
Scotus: Moral Freedom 
Scotus shares the common notion of evil as essentially a privation or deficiency 
of good: evil, in other words, has no being of its own. "There is no evil thing", 
says Thomas, "that is not in a condition of potency falling short of its act 
(deficiente ab actu)".433 Furthermore: 
"The good is what all things desire" 434 ... But all things, each according to its 
mode, desire to be in act ... To be in act, therefore, constitutes the nature of 
the good. Hence it is that evil, which is opposed to the good, follows when 
potency is deprived of act. .. God is being in act without potency. Therefore, 
He is truly good.435 
429 Contra Thomas, e.g.ST.la.83.4c,(Leo. V.311). 
430 Scotus, Ordinatio.lI,d.6,q.2,(Vat.VIII,ptbi), Wolter trans., Duns Scotus,475. 
431 Scotus, In Metaph. IX,q.15,(Olms-Wad.IV,796-802), Wolter trans., Duns ScotuS,157. 
432 Anselm, De Ub.Arbit.,ch.13,(PL.158.505). 
433 Aquinas, SCG,111.3.6, my emphasiS (Leo.XIV.9). 
434 Aristotle, Nic.Eth.1.1. 
435 Aquinas, SCG 1.37.4 (Leo.XIII, 111). 
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In the Thomist perspective, the deficiency in act which constitutes evil can be 
understood ultimately as a failure of desire in one of its modes of being. The 
natural desire of a rational being is for happiness, that is, for its true good, its 
last end in God. As we have already seen,436 for Thomas, a free choice of a 
lesser good, not ordered in some way to the last end, as with the pleasure 
involved in an act of adultery for instance, constitutes "a privation of good 
according to reason", consequently, "the result is a moral evil".437 Thomas sees 
all evil in the perspective of nature failing to attain its term, a short-fall in active 
desire for the true good.438 In the case of moral evil, this normally involves an 
unwarranted diversion to a choice of some lesser good, not ordered to the 
greater. 
Scotus sees moral evil in terms of a failure on the part of the affectio iustitiae 
to curb the immoderate desires of the affectio commodi. What in Thomas is a 
failure in ordination, or orderedness, to the good, becomes in Scotus a failure in 
moderation. This is, perhaps, exactly what might be expected in the case of a 
doctrine (Scotus's) based on the absolute priority of the appetitive power over 
the apprehensive. Such an act is also contrary to the perfective action of the 
affectio iustitiae, the innate liberty and rational principle of the soul: it is 
therefore disconsonant with true freedom. 
Thomas and Scotus are both compatibilists in relation to divine causality, i.e., 
they posit no contradiction or incompatibility between freedom in human acts 
and the necessary divine causality involved in God being the first and 
436 Chapter1,p.21. 
437 Aquinas, SCG.1I1.6.7,(Leo.XIV.15). 
438 Aquinas, SCG, 111.6.1 ,(Leo.XIV.14). 
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concurrent cause of those acts. The same is true of Bonaventure and Henry of 
Ghent. Neither in Thomas nor in Scotus, for instance, does the action of divine 
grace in any way threaten or cancel the soul's freedom, but enhances it. This is, 
in the first place, to be deduced from their accounts of the freedom of the 
blessed in patria.439 As we have seen in Thomas, God's universal primary 
causality in no way detracts from the creature's efficacy as secondary cause: 
Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man 
moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what 
is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be 
cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first 
cause, who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by 
moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by 
moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being 
voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He 
operates in each thing according to its own nature.440 
The sphere of activity or efficacy of grace in human nature is the perfectibility of 
that nature by the infused habitus of the virtues. As with Thomas, "perfection" 
and "perfectibility" of nature are perhaps the key to understanding Scotus on 
freedom. The habitus of charity, already the highest on earth, is to become, by 
dint of its perfectibility, the highest and most perfect in heaven.441 The most 
perfect act elicited by the will, as free, is frui, which, in this context, means the 
'fruition' or enjoyment of God. Scotus lists four actions involving frui and its 
opposite, uti, based on Augustine's dictum, Omnis perversitas, quae vitium 
nominatur, est uti fruendis et frui utendis:442 
.. an act assenting to the good for its own sake is a perfect act; however, a 
perfect act is followed by delight. .. therefore an act willing the good for its 
own sake is followed by some delight. Therefore we have ... four distinct 
things: an imperfect act willing the good for the sake of something else, 
which is called 'use', and a perfect act willing the good for its own sake, 
439 Aquinas: above,pp.1 03-5, cf.159; Scotus, below,pp.123-4. 
440 Aquinas, ST.la.83.1.ad.3,(Leo. V.30?). 
441 Scotus, Ordinatio,IV,d.49,q.ex latere,n.14,(Vives,XXI,141). 
442 Augustine, 83 Quaestiones,q.30,(PL.40, 19). 
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which is called 'fruition', and a neutral act, and the delight following an 
act. 443 
In this case, the act of usus, i.e. uti, represents the affectio commodi 
unmoderated by the affectio iustitiae, therefore not ordered to the last end. The 
act of fruitio is both a perfect act and the delight which flows from it.444 
De/ectatio is the fulfilment of inclination or desire. Calling on Augustine again, 
Scotus445 says that "Fruition is to inhere in something for its own sake by 
love" ,446 and that "the fullness of joy is fruition of the Trinity".447 
Scotus: Freedom and Beatitude 
In the matter of willing happiness, or its opposite, in via (in this life), Scotus 
rejects Thomas's natural determination to happiness and against unhappiness 
in general, while evidently accepting it in practice and in particular: 
I admit, then, that the will is determined to will (volendum) happiness and to 
nill (nolendum: will-against) misery to this extent, that if it should elicit some 
act with respect to these objects, it is limited and has to elicit an act of 
willing in regard to happiness and an act of nilling as regards misery. 
Nevertheless, it is not absolutely determined to elicit either the one act or 
the other. 448 
The contraries of necessity and freedom can be understood as resolved, in his 
own particular way, by Scotus in the life of the blessed in God. His paramount 
concern for indeterminacy in the will resolves itself into the perfection of the 
affectio iustitiae, the innate desire for the last end and highest happiness, in 
which God is given what is due to Him in justice, as bonum propter se. He 
cannot be said to have departed in any serious or significant way from 
443 Scotus, Ordinatio,l,d.1 ,p.2,q.1 ,(Vatican,II,51), my translation: actus assensus bono propter 
se est actus perfectus; actum autem perfectum consequitur de/ectatio ... ergo actum va/endi 
bonum propter se consequitur a/iqua de/ectatio. Habemus igitur ... quattuar distincta: act~m 
imperfectum vo/endi bonum propter a/iud, qui vacatur usus, et actum perfectum va/endl bonum 
propter se, qui vocatur fruitio. et actum neutrum, et de/ectatianem consequentem actum. 
444 Scotus, Ordinatio,l,d.1 ,p.2,q.1 ,(Vat,II,52). 
445 Scotus, Ordinatio.l,d.1 ,p.2,q.1 ,(Vat.II,53-4). 
446 Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana I, ch.1 ,(PL.34,20). 
447 Augustine, De Trinitate l,ch.1 O,(PL.42, 751) 
448 Scotus, Ordinatio,IV,d.49,q.1 O,(Olms-Wadding,X,514), Wolter, 192,193. 
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Thomas's vision of the last end, though he presents it rather in terms of affectio 
than of visio, and the route he takes is conceptually very different. 
Their accounts of the freedom of the blessed in patria demonstrate the 
essential difference between the respective understandings of freedom in 
Thomas and Scotus. What looks to Scotus like entirely inadmissible natural 
necessity in Thomas's account of 'natural desire' for the last end, resolves itself 
in patria into participation in the unchanging divine nature and the immutability 
of eternity: 
.. whoever has happiness has it altogether unchangeably: this is done by 
the Divine power, which raises man to the participation of eternity which 
transcends all change.449 
Also, it is by the very nature of beatitude that the soul can never lose it or not 
will it: 
Now it is impossible for anyone seeing the Divine Essence to wish not to 
see it.. .. (8ecause) ... the vision of the Divine Essence fills the soul with all 
good things, since it unites it to the source of all goodness ... Moreover, 
neither can he lose Happiness through God taking it away from him ... for 
some fault...(since) he that sees God cannot fall into a fault, since rectitude 
of the will of necessity results from that vision ... 8ecause the mind that is 
united to God is raised above all other things: and consequently no other 
agent can sever the mind from that union.45o 
For Thomas, the safeguard and guarantee of beatitude is the nature itself of 
beatitude, of divinity, of eternity and of true freedom, which precludes all 
possibility of the intellect presenting as good something that is evil. Scotus's 
attitude to "the nature of things" in relation to freedom will not permit him to 
accept any such guarantee. For him, the soul retains its freedom for contraries, 
including the contraries of good and evil, virtue and sin, even in the state of 
beatitiude. The sole guarantee of not losing beatitude is the free action of God 
in eternally removing the opportunity for sin and evil. This is the only sense in 
449 Aquinas, ST.I-11.5.4.ad.1 ,(Leo.VI,50). 
450 Aquinas, ST.I-II .5.4c,(Leo. VI,50). 
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which Scotus allows freedom to co-exist with determinism. He justifies it on the 
grounds that the determination of an agent by a metaphysically superior agent 
does not cancel the freedom of the inferior agent.451 Even the beatific vision of 
the divine essence as such is not sufficient to cancel the soul's freedom to not-
will (non velie) it. 
Scotus also rejects Thomas's argument that the soul cannot fail to will to see 
the divine essence when it sees it, because it lacks nothing of goodness: 
As for the reason given to support the other view, namely, that the will must 
necessarily love whatever possesses no aspect of evil or lack of good, I say 
that this is false, for the will is free with respect to any act of volition or 
nolition, and no object necessitates it.452 
At the same time, because of its natural inclination to goodness and happiness, 
the soul cannot actually refuse or will-against (nolle) the beatific vision, but it 
can simply not-will (non velie) to see it.453 Scotus's concept of liberty clearly 
demands this inalienable freedom for opposites, even in patria; whereas 
Thomas's identification of the beatific vision with true and perfect freedom rules 
it out altogether in the matter of sin: when a soul is engaged in the activity (or 
actuality) for which it was created in the first place, it lacks nothing of the 
perfection of freedom. With Scotus, on the other hand, a significant step has 
been taken towards a re-definition of freedom as essentially and predominantly 
a bare and unspecified choice of contraries. 
451 Scotus, Ordinatio,IV,d.49,q.6,(Olms-Wadding,X,428-478) 
452 Scotus, Ordinatio.IV,d.49,q.1 O,(Olms-Wad.X,514), Wolter, text and trans., 192-5. 
453 Scotus, Ordinatio.IV,d.49,q.1 O,(Olms-Wad.X,514), Wolter, 194, 195. 
125 
Scotus: Divine Freedom 
At the beginning of Quodlibet 16,454 Scotus comments on two passages from 
Augustine, firstly: 
It was shown to our satisfaction that a mind becomes a slave of sinful 
desire only by its own will. .. if this movement is looked upon as 
culpable ... then it is not determined by nature but is voluntary.455 
If it were not voluntary, it could not be the subject of either praise or blame. 
Secondly: 
We do not put the life of God and the foreknowledge of God under any 
necessity when we say that God must live an eternal life and must know all 
things ... When we say we must choose freely when we choose at all, what 
we say is true; yet we do not subject free choice to any necessity which 
destroys our liberty.456 
The tension between freedom and necessity therefore finds its ultimate 
resolution in the Godhead, where the faculties of intellect ("nature") and will 
("freedom") coexist in infinite perfection. The resolution itself finds its locus and 
'rationale', so to speak, in the mystery of the Trinity, specifically in the two 
processions: 
Thus the Son in the divine Trinity is produced by way of nature, although 
the productive principle be "memory" [The Father who speaks the Word]. 
The will, on the other hand, [Spiration of the Holy Spirit by Father And Son], 
always functions in its own peculiar way, viz., freely. That is why when it 
concurs with the intellect, as in the production of artifacts, the whole effect 
is said to be produced freely and intentionally, or with deliberation ... 
[Creation is the work of all three Persons ad extra, and is contingent].457 
Each of the intra-Trinitarian acts of generation and spiration is at the same time 
necessary and free. Of the perfect, because perfectly free, act of will by which 
God loves Himself, Scotus says: 
454 Alluntis & Wolter,trans.,Scotus, Quodlibetal Questions,369-70. 
455 Augustine, De Lib. Arbit. III,c.1 ,nn.2-3,(PL.32, 1271). 
456 Augustine, De Civ.Dei,c.1 O,n.1. 
457 Scotus, Quod/ibet.16.41 ,(Olms-Wad.xll,457), Alluntis and Wolter,383,my parentheses; 
Cf.lbid.,16.37. 
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It is not self-contradictory that an infinite will have an infinite act, and hence 
a necessary act elicited necessarily with respect to an infinite object. Were 
it lacking such, it would not be supremely perfect.458 
Infinite perfection involves both perfect freedom, and, necessarily, perfect 
Love-the Holy Spirit. At the same time, Scotus acknowledges the mystery: 
If you ask how does freedom coexist with necessity, I answer with the 
Philosopher: 459 Do not seek a reason for things for which no reason can be 
given: for there is no demonstration of the starting-point of demonstration. 
Scotus's univocal concept of the relation between the divine and human 
modes of being perhaps facilitates the conclusion to be drawn from the divine 
perfection to the fully perfected being of man in the state of Beatitude. Here, 
Scotus draws on both Augustine and Anselm: 
In the afterlife he will not be able to will evil, and yet he will not be deprived 
of his free will. In fact his will will be much more free in that it will in no way 
be subject to sin ... For the will is not to be blamed nor should we say that it 
was no will or that it was not free, when we so will to be happy that we not 
only do not want to be miserable, but are quite unable to will this. Just as 
our soul is at present unwilling to be unhappy, so then it will forever be 
unwilling to be wicked.46o 
A passage of similar import from Anselm follows: 
Whoever has what is appropriate and advantageous in such a way that it 
cannot be lost is freer than he who has this in such a way that it can be 
lost .... The will, then, which cannot cease to be upright is freer.461 
This reflects Anselm's teaching in the same chapter of De Libera Arbitria that, 
"to be able to sin does not belong in the definition of free will", and his 
conclusion in chapter 13 of the same work that, "the power of preserving the 
rectitude of will for its own sake is a perfect definition of free will". Clearly, 
Anselm's understanding of free will does not stem from a preoccupation with 
458 Scotus, Quodlibef.16.6,(Olms-Wad.XII,446), Alluntis and Wolter,371. 
459 Aristotle, Metaph.IV.6,(1011a12-13). 
460 Augustine, Enchiridion,28,n.105, quoted in Scotus, Quodlibet,16.30,(Olms-Wad.xII,454), 
Alluntis and Wolter,377-8. 
461 Anselm, De Ub.Arbit.1; quoted Alluntis and Wolter,378 .. 
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freedom in the purely uncommitted sense, i.e., of an indeterminate power of 
choice between contraries. 
OCKHAM ON FREEDOM 
Intellect and Will 
Ockham, in the first place, rejects Scotus' 'formal distinction' between the 
intellect and the will as powers of the soul (pp.56-7 above). The soul and its 
faculties are one and the same thing: the only difference lies in the connotations 
of the terms used to describe the actions concerned.462 He also rejects the 
radical distinction of functions insisted on by Scotus regarding necessity (the 
intellect) and contingency (the will) in actions. In the first place, nothing can be 
willed that has not first been thought about.463 Secondly, acts of prudence, 
which are intellectual acts, are related to (other) virtuous acts as partial causes: 
If you ask in what genus of cause the act of prudence stands with regard to 
a virtuous act. .. 1 reply that it is the efficient cause necessarily required for a 
virtuous act, without which it is impossible for an act to be virtuous, as long 
as the present divine dispensation stands,464 because the action of 
prudence and the action of the will are necessarily required for a virtuous 
act. Consequently, both of those are partial causes, together with God, of 
virtuous acts.465 
If the causal connection with the prudential act of the intellect were to be 
suspended by God, the act of the will would no longer be morally 
appraisable.466 As it is, the intellect's causal contribution as partial cause of 
virtue or its opposite, in acts, is clear from Ockham's account of the relationship 
462 Ockham, Sent.lI,q.20,( Theol.V,435); Ordinatio,d.1 ,q.2,( Theol.I,402). 
463 Quaestiones Variae,q.8,(TheoI.VIII,425): ... nihil est actualiter volitum nisi actua/iter 
apprehensum ab intellectu, et facta apprehensione statim intellectus natura/iter assentit. Cf. 
Sent.lIl,q.11 ,( Theol. VI,364); Quod/.III,q.20,( Theo/.IX,283-4). . . 
464 The qualification, "as long as the present divine dispensation stands" (~t~nte or~matlOn~ 
divina quae nunc est), reflects Ockham's radically contingent account of divine ordinance, In 
morals as in all else. 
465 Ockham, Q. Var,q.7,a.3,(TheoI.VIII,363); Rega Wood, Ockham on t~e Vi~ues (Q. Variae.7, 
with translation and commentary), West Lafayette, Indiana, Purdue University Press, 1997, 
p.122,lines 510-518. 
·166 Ockham, Q. Var.,q,8,(Theo/.vIlI,416,418). 
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between erroneous conscience, or error in the intellect, and culpability.467 The 
agent is obliged to be in possession of an informed conscience, and to exercise 
'right reason' in moral choices, to the extent of his or her capability. 
Nevertheless, Ockham is in accord with Scotus, and, in fact, with Aquinas (p.90 
above), that no contribution of the intellect actually determines the will, as then 
the will's action would not be in the agent's power, so would not be 
imputable.468 Also, determination of the will by the intellect would make the will 
a passive power. It is, after all, the will that makes the act of choice, and in the 
last analysis: 
In producing an act of will, the will no more depends on the intellect than 
the sensitive appetite depends on the cognitive faculty; but the sensitive 
appetite need only be shown an object in order to produce an act; it can act 
without any judgment or dictate [of reason]; therefore, so much more the 
will. 469 
Ockham ascribes no freedom to the intellect itself, even though it is not 
coerced: 
Because freedom is distinguished in one way from coercion, and in this 
way it is understood improperly, because in this way freedom can be 
attributed to the intellect.470 
Ockham: Freedom of Indifference 
Ockham's understanding of freedom can be gauged from his interpretation of 
Anselm's account in De Libero Arbitrio. As noted by Thomas (p.1 01 above) and 
Scotus (p.120 above), for Anselm, the ability to sin does not enter into the 
definition of freedom. Ockham adverts to this in a question concerning freedom 
467 Ockham, Q. Var.,q.8,(Theol.VIII,409-411 ,429-30). 
468 Ockham, Q. Var.,q. 7,a.3,( Theol.VIII,369); Wood, Virtues,123-5. 
469 Ockham, Q. Var.,q.7,a.3,( Theol.VIII,368); Wood, Virtues,131. ., . 
470 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.1 ,q.6,( Theol.I,501 ),my trans.: Quia libertas uno mo~o dlstmg.Ultur a 
coactione. et sic accipitur impropriissime, quia isto modo potest competere mtellectUl. 
129 
in the Trinity, 471 and in opposition to Scotus,472 who had quoted Anselm as 
follows: 
"Whoever has what is appropriate and advantageous in such a way that it 
cannot be lost is freer than he who has this in such a way that it can be 
lost". From this he concludes: "The will then which cannot cease to be 
upright is freer".473 
Scotus is quoting Anselm here in connection with the freedom of the blessed in 
patria. Ockham in his reply distinguishes the servitus culpae et poenae, whose 
existence he has acknowledged,474 from freedom of indifference: 
I say that he (Anselm) does not mean that he who wills necessarily wills 
freely what he wills, but that the will which can never depart from rectitude 
is freer, because it cannot now serve sin ... And therefore the one who is 
more free from the servitude of sin is also freer from coercion with respect 
to other acts arising from acts of willing and nilling (nollendi). And on 
account of this to be able to sin is neither freedom (libertas) nor part of 
freedom, but rather diminishes freedom; it does not, however, diminish 
freedom from coercion with respect to interior acts of willing and nilling; 
therefore it diminishes the other freedom of which Anselm speaks in the 
same place.475 
Ockham interprets Anselm as meaning that it is the freedom from the servitus 
culpae et poenae alone that is diminished by the power to sin, and into whose 
definition the power to sin does not enter:476 
From this it follows that, according to Anselm's way of speaking, the 
freedom of the will can be diminished. And yet neither the interior state of 
the will nor the will itself can be diminished, just as it cannot be increased. 
Therefore he understands this of a freedom other than that by which the will 
wills whatever it wills voluntarily.477 
471 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.1 0,q.2,( Theol. I 11,330-344). 
472 Scotus, Quodlibet.16.8,(Olms-Wadding,XII,454), Alluntis,378. 
473 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.1 0,q.2,( Theol.III,331-2); Anselm, De Libero Arbitrio,c.1 ,(PL.158,491). 
474 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.1 ,q.6,( Theol.I,501). 
475 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.1 0,q.2,(Theol.III,342-3),my trans.: .. ad Anselmum dico quod non 
intelligit quod libere velit iIIud quod necessario vult, sed quod voluntas quae a rectitudine 
declinare nequit est liberior, quia iam non potest servire peccato ... Et ideo eo ipso quod a 
servitute peccati est liberior, est etiam a coactione, quantum ad actus alios ab actibus volendi et 
nolendi, liberior. Et propter hoc posse peccare nec est libertas nec pars libertatis, sed magis 
minuit libertatem; non tamen minuit libertatem a coactione quantum ad actus intrinsecos volendi 
et nolendi; ergo minuit aliam libertatem de qua loquitur Anselmus ibidem. 
476 Anselm, De Lib.Arbit.,c.1 
477 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.1 0,q.2,( Theol.III,343),my trans.: Ex isto sequitur quod libertas 
voluntatis secundum modum loquendi Anselmi, potest minui. Et tamen condicio intrinseca 
voluntati ~ec voluntas ipsa potest minui sicut nec potest augeri. Igitur intelligit de alia libertate 
quam de ilia qua voluntas quidquid vult voluntarie vult. 
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The "freedom by which the will wills whatever it wills voluntarily", which by its 
very nature excludes necessity, corresponds to what is Ockham's definition of 
freedom: a bare, unspecified and uncoerced choice between contraries. He 
makes no reference here to what is actually Anselm's definition of freedom: "the 
power to preserve justice, or 'rectitude of will', for its own sake" .478 While this is 
certainly implied in 'freedom from the servitus culpae et poenae', it also signifies 
far more, namely, the action of grace and the virtues. This was the major 
element in Thomas's account of freedom and finality, without which it would be 
incoherent. Scotus, too, had embraced it, in a rather more circumscribed form, 
in his account of the affectio iustitiae. 
Marilyn Adams observes that "Ockham does not follow Scotus' lead in trying 
to construct the will's freedom out of its two-fold inclination for good and against 
evil".479 He does, however, agree with Scotus that the will has non-necessitating 
inclinations which can be called "natural" in the Ockhamist sense that they 
pertain to the individual will itself as individual.48o Therefore the will is not 
subject to coercion, which would entail being forced to act contrary to its natural 
inclinations.481 Ockham does acknowledge that the inclinations to pleasure and 
against its opposite can be so strong as to require a heroic choice against 
them.482 However, as Adams observes, "he barely mentions the Anselmian 
double affections for the advantageous and for justice,,483 adopted by Scotus, 
and then only to point out that corresponding to each velie is a disinclination 
478 Anselm, De Ub.Arbit.cc.3, 13. . . 
479 Marilyn McCord Adams, The Structure of Ockham's Moral Theory, FranCiscan Studies 
46,1986,1-35,13. . . 
480 Ockham, Sent.II,q.15,{ Theol.V,351 );Sent.IV,q.16,{ The 01. VII,353);Ordmatlo,d.1 ,q.3, 
[[he a/. 1,41 0). 
1 Ockham, Sent.II,q.15,{ Thea/. V,351 ,355). 
482 Ockham, Q. Var. 7,a.2,{ Theol. VIII,pp.336-7); Wood, Virfues,82-5. 
483 Adams, Structure,13. 
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(nolle) to its opposite, and that the will acts in accord with these two affections 
(the one tempered by the other, so to speak) when it follows the dictates of right 
reason. 
On the other hand, Ockham decisively rejects Scotus's identification of the 
affectio iustitiae with the liberty of the will. It does not accord with the notion of 
freedom as essentially 'indifferent'. Neither does any form of natural teleology 
accord with freedom. Here, he does accept Scotus's radical disjunction between 
'nature' and will. Anything suggesting natural necessity threatens the 
imputability of acts, an issue that looms very large in Ockham's moral doctrine. 
Ockham rejects Aristotle's theory of natural inclinations, because of the element 
of necessity it attributes to them. He believes himself to be following 
philosophical tradition when he contends that the will's liberty is that of 
indifference and contingency: 
And thus freedom is a certain indifference and contingency, and is 
distinguished from a natural active principle. And in this way the 
philosophers speak of freedom and will, .. and ... those who have free will 
have dominion and power over their acts, but this is not without indifference 
and contingency.484 
The word 'indifference' (indifferentia) occurs seldom in Thomas, and not at all in 
connection with free will or freedom.485 Since Ockham's particular concerns are 
unlikely to have been those of Aristotle or Plato, Avicenna or Averroes, his 
claimed support from "the philosophers" also looks tenuous. 
Ockham enlarges the definitive realm of freedom to embrace the possibility to 
act contrary to the dictates of right reason, consciously and deliberately, in 
484 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.1 ,q.6,( Theol.I,501-2),my trans.: Et sic libertas .est quaedarr: indiff~rentia 
et contingentia, et distinguitur contra principium activum naturale. Et SIC ~t~ntur phllosophl 
libertate et voluntate ... et ... illa quae habent liberum arbitrium habent dominIUm et potestatem 
super actus suos; sed hoc non est sine indifferentia et contingentia. . 
485 Index Thomisticus and Roy J.Deferrari, Lexicon of St.Thomas AqUinas, Loreto,NH,2004. 
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virtually all circumstances. Freedom becomes, in essence, the experience of 
possibility, regardless of the nature of the possible. Some interesting 
consequences flow from this. For one thing, Scotus's metaphysical concept of 
'instants of nature' or 'synchronic contingency', which was designed precisely to 
eliminate every trace of perceived necessity in acts of the will, is easily 
dismissed by Ockham as logically contradictory, and outside the possibility of 
actual experience.486 
Ockham: Freedom and Finality 
Ockham takes up Scotus's principle of the "superabundant sufficiency" of the 
will as a power for opposites. He then transforms it into his own doctrine of 
"freedom of indifference": "the will can by its liberty - apart from any other 
determination by act or habit - elicit or not elicit that act or its opposite". 487 That 
is, it can elect to do it, or not to do it, or to 'nill' it, which is to do the opposite. He 
also takes up, to be interpreted in his own way, the Anselmian object 
tendencies (affectio commodi and affectio iustitiae) in the will,488 as well as the 
tendencies evoked by sensory pleasure and acquired habits.489 However, as 
Adams explains, 
He denies that any inclination is natural, either in the sense of defining the 
will's scope or in the sense of causally determining its actions. Where 
others (including Anselm, Aquinas, and even Scotus) allow the will's object 
tendencies to define the proper object of willing as good and of nilling as 
bad or evil, Ockham lets the will's self-determining power plus the agent's 
intellectual capacities define the will's scope ... For created wills, the scope 
of each willing and nilling is delineated by what the agent's intellect can 
486 Tractatus de Praedestinatiane et de Praescientia Dei et de Futuris Cantingentibus, q.3 
~Philas.II,535); Also, Franciscan Institute Publications no.2, 1945,32-36. 
87 Ockham, Sent.IV,q.16,( Theal. VII,359). 
488 Ockham, Ordinatia,d.1 ,q.6 (Theal.l,502). 
489 Ockham, Sent.lIl,q. 7,( Theal. VI,209-1 0). 
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conceive of. Moreover, no matter how strong, none causally determines the 
will's choice.490 In these twin senses, willpower is a neutral potency.491 
We choose our own ends. Nature no longer has anything to tell us of a final end 
in God. 
Ockham's dismissal of purposiveness or teleology in nature rests essentially 
on 1) his radical singularism, which I venture to call his "metaphysics of 
separation and isolation". This in turn forms an essential plank in 2) his account 
of the potentia absoluta Dei. Ockham clearly associates causal connections 
with necessity. In a question as to whether practical and speculative knowledge 
are to be distinguished by ends or means, Ockham criticizes Henry of Ghent for 
characterizing practical and speculative statements in terms of their distinctive 
final causes. This is to posit an unwarranted causal connection or 
determination, in Ockham's view.492 Ockham's "metaphysics of separation" 
extends also to propositions. He even claims that acts of intellect and will can 
exist without a subject, by God's absolute power: 
.. it is no more a contradiction that an absolute spiritual accident should be 
without a subject by the power of God than in the case of a corporeal 
accident, because one is no more dependent on a subject than the other.493 
and that acts of will could take place without a person knowing the objects of 
those acts: 
.. delight (di/ectio) is related (only) contingently to knowledge in general, 
because it can exist without any knowledge, albeit by the power of God, not 
naturally.494 
490 Ockham, Ordinatia,d.1 ,q.2,( Theal.l,399): .. quia valuntas nan patest necessitari respectus 
cuiuscumque. 
491 Ockham, Sent.llI,q.6,(Theal.VI, 174-6);cf.Quadl.IV,q.1 ,(Theal.IX,300). . 
492 Ockham, Ordinatia,Pral.,q.11 ,(Theal.I,321-22); Henry af Ghent, Summa QuaestlOnum 
Ordinarum,a.36,q.4.ad.2. 
493 Ockham, Sent.IV,q.9,( Theal. VII, 155). 
494 Ockham, Sent.IV,q.6,( Theal. VII,91). 
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The same principle applies to the final end itself; the Beatific Vision could be 
without fruitio, since the one is logically prior to the other.495 Furthermore, a 
person in this situation, 
.. seei~g the divi~e es~ence and lacking beatific fruition can 'nill' (potest 
nolle, I.e. can will-against) that fruition ... [and] ... can 'nil!' God.496 
Finally, in accordance with the potentia absoluta Dei, the Blessed could also 
hate God, because: 
.. whatever can be a rightful act in this world, can also be one in the next (in 
patria). But to hate God can be a rightful act in this world, albeit if God 
commands it, therefore also in patria.497 
Ockham's account of God's absolute power to alter the moral status of actions 
without altering the actions themselves rests on his understanding of the 
distinction between the act itself and the moral value of the act: 
God can cause any absolute thing without anything else which is not 
identical with that absolute thing. But the act of hating God, in respect of 
anything absolute in it, is not identical with the deformity and malice in the 
act, therefore God can cause whatever is absolute in the act of hating or 
not-willing God, without causing any deformity or malice in the act. 498 
The implications of the potentia absoluta Dei, as described by Ockham, for 
the teleological account of nature, and indeed for nature in general, are fatal. 
David Clark summarizes the situation as follows: 
His arguments about the causal classification of propositions show his 
systematic effort to eradicate natural and intrinsic finality from non-rational 
beings. It is appropriate to ask "why" people act in a certain manner 
but. .. The natures of impersonal entities do not contain their ends; they 
simply reveal a regularity and pattern of function. Ockham's approach to 
physics is somewhat mechanistic. As a moralist, consequently, he refuses 
to make a priori judgments about the goals or ends served by certain 
actions. As Ockham turns his back on "Nature which acts like an intelligent 
495 Ockham, Sent, IV,q.16,( Theol. VII,351). 
496 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.1,q.6,(Theol.I,505). 
497 Ockham, Sent.IV,q.16,( Theo/. VII,352). 
498 Ockham, Sent.lI,q.15,( Theol. V,342),my trans.: Deus potest omne absolutum causare sine 
omni alio quod non est idem cum iIIo absoluto. Sed actus odiendi Deum quantum ad omne 
absolutum in eo non est idem cum deformitate et malitia in actu, igitur Deus potest causare 
quidquid absolutum est in actu odiendi Deum vel nolendi, non causando a/iquam deformitatem 
vel malitiam in actu. 
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craftsman" he also closes the door to moral theories based upon the 
teleological organisation and connection of nature.499 
All finality in rational creatures is merely a matter of the individual's own chosen 
purpose at the time in taking any action: nothing more. We choose our own 
ends, including the final end in God - or not, or the opposite. Freedom of 
indifference is indifferent to all ends whatever; it does not allow for a 'natural' 
finality in the AristotelianlThomist sense. Ockham argues that if the human will 
were inclined by nature to some object, or some mode of conceiving objects, 
then the opposite mode or object would be unnatural for the will, in the sense of 
doing violence to its nature.500 The only determining factor Ockham will accept 
in the will is the one that is already, itself, primarily in the power of the will, 
namely the will's own anterior habit-forming acts or decisions.501 
Aquinas claims that the will is determined by the ultimate end, a determination 
which manifests itself in the natural inclination to the good in general (the 
bonum in commune), but free in its choice of means. Scotus teaches that both 
the end and the means are freely elicited by a contingent principle, whose 
liberty he identifies with the affectio iustitiae. Scotus's 'freedom' is not 
indifferent. He upholds the Anselmian principle that freedom is the ability to 
maintain justice, and does not include the ability to sin. Ockham agrees with 
Scotus that freedom and necessity are "opposite modes of originating", but 
applies the principle in his own way, attributing some necessity even to the will, 
and re-interpreting freedom as indifferent to all considerations whatever of 
'good' or 'evil'. For the first time ever, a choice of good and a choice of evil are 
placed on an identical footing vis-a-vis freedom. 
499 David W.Clark, William ofOckham on Right Reason, Speculum,48,no.1,1973,13-36, 20,n.17. 
500 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.1 ,q.6,( Theol.I,S07). 
501 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.1 ,q.6,( Theol.I,494). 
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To be fair to Ockham, it is necessary to point out that there is no question of 
his having regarded the freedom to sin as something to be taken advantage of. 
His basic theological project is to delineate the (all but unlimited) scope of divine 
freedom. With regard to human beings, what today would be called freedom 
Ockham describes as the liberty of mutability. It is no great advantage. It does 
not give us a licence to surrender to concupiscence whenever it suits us. 
Neither does it free us from the possibility of coercion. Rather it exposes us to 
sin and misery.502 
Ockham: Freedom and Beatitude 
God, whose concurrence is active in all causality whatever, can dispense with 
secondary causality, in volitions as well as all else. He can intervene to be the 
total efficient cause of a creature's volition. In a question concerning the eternal 
disposition of the fallen angels, Ockham says: 
I say that God can be the total cause of acts of the will, for example with 
regard to love of God, and hatred, just as he can be a total cause in the 
case of a stone or of a man, because anything of which he can be a partial 
cause, he can also be a total cause.503 
And this is so in the case of the blessed in eternity: 
For in the blessed the acts of seeing as much as of loving God are caused 
solely by God as total cause, and in no way by the intellect or will as partial 
causes. And this act of love is formally opposed to every sinful act ... And for 
as long as this act is totally conserved by God - just as it is caused by God 
- so long is it confirmed, so that in no way, even by the absolute power of 
the created will, can it yield to a sinful act. .. But the will cannot be said to be 
502 See Sent.lI,q.15,(Theol.V,354-6). lowe this observation to Rega Wood, Ockham on the 
Virtues. West Lafayette, Purdue University Press,1997,35. 
503 Ockham, Sent.lI,q.15,( The 01. V,350),my translation: .. dico quod Deus potest esse causa 
totalis respectu actus in voluntate, puta respectu dilectionis Dei et odii, sicut P?t~st esse causa 
totalis respectu lapidis vel hominis, quia cuiuscumque potest esse causa partlalls, potest esse 
totalis. 
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forced in this, because the will formally wills and delights in that act, even 
though it does not cause it. 504 
While denying the presence of any force or coercion, Ockham will not - indeed 
cannot - go so far as to allow 'freedom' to be ascribed to the state of beatitude, 
except in the sense of freedom from the servitus culpae, miseriae et poenae, 
the triple punishment of the reprobate: "And in this way the blessed are more 
free than viatores".505 Yet, while inability to sin rules out freedom of indifference 
in the sense defined by Ockham in via, it does not rule out the kind of 
'indifference' involved in freedom of exercise, as between one good act and 
another, or acting as opposed to not acting. 506 Ockham clarifies this in the case 
of good angels, and its opposite in the wicked angels.50? However, in contrast to 
Thomas and Scotus, Ockham allows that the will can both not-will and will-
against beatitude, in patria as well as in via, although willing-against in patria 
evidently depends on God "suspending the will's activity with respect to willing 
(volitio)", so that the beatific act can become an object of willing-against 
(nolitio).508 
In the case of the fallen angels (and the damned), they are not free from the 
servitus culpae et poenae, but they are "free" from the divine coactio and 
immutabilitas involved in the life of the Blessed. Consequently, the demons are 
free to tempt human beings. 
504 Sent.lI,q, 15 (Theo/.V,p.341 ),my translation: Nam in beatis causatur tam actus videndi Oeum 
quam di/igendi eum a solo Oeo tanquam a totali causa et nullo modo ab intellectu vel vo/untate 
sicut a causis partialibus. Et iste actus dilectionis forma/iter opponitur omni actui peccati ... Et 
ideo quamdiu iste actus conservatur tota/iter a Oeo - sicut ab ipso causatur - tamdiu est 
confirmatus, ita quod nullo modo, etiam de potentia abso/uta vo/untatis creatae, potest in actum 
peccati ... Sed ex hoc non dicitur vo/untas cogi, quia vo/untas forma/iter vult et di/igit iIIo actu, /icet 
non causetur ab eo. 
505 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.1 ,q.6,( The 0/. 1,501 ). 
506 Cf. Aquinas, ST.la.62.B.ad2,(p.105 above). 
507 Ockham, Sent.lI,q.15,(Theo/.V,345). 
508 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.1 ,q.6,( Theol.l,506-7). 
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Ockham: Divine Freedom and Potentia Absoluta 
Ockham's insistence on the divine power to cause intuition of non-existents509 is 
actually central to his ontology, as it involves separation of ontological absolutes 
such as the individual character of both the mental act and the object of 
knowledge. Intuitive vision, whether sensitive or intellectual, is distinct from its 
object as to subject and place. Consequently, by the potentia absoluta Dei, one 
thing can exist, be conserved, or be destroyed, without affecting the other. It 
can be seen that, in the process of justifying his premise concerning the intuition 
of non-existents, Ockham introduces another theological principle regarding 
divine omnipotence. He declares that God knows intuitively both creatures that 
exist and those that do not yet exist - that is to say, he knows each individually, 
as a singular. M.Pernoud describes this, justifiably I think, as 
.. a reciprocal insuring of both God's freedom and ontological individualism. 
The fact that God is free demands absolute singularity ... In this way, a 
metaphysics of the absolutely singular individual could apply to any states 
of affairs God might possibly choose to create, and no theories of causal 
relations need hamper either God's freedom or man's certainty.510 
In concert with this is Ockham's insistence on the singularity of both the mental 
act and the object known. He attributes abstractive cognition to a habitus, not to 
species, and asserts that species are superfluous.511 All that is necessary for 
both intuitive and abstractive cognition is the object and the act: 
There is no need to posit species for the purpose of representation: 
because in intuitive knowledge, no representation is required other than the 
object and the act ... therefore neither in abstractive knowledge, which 
follows immediately on intuitive, is there required anything other than the 
object and the act.512 
509 Ordinatio, Pro I. 1 ,q.1 ,(Theol.I,39), Boehner,trans.,Ockham,24; Quodlibet,VI,q.6, 
~ Theol.IX,604-607), Freddoso,506-8. 
10 Mary Anne Pernoud, Innovation in William of Ockham's References to the "Potentia Dei", 
Antonianum 45,1970,65-97,84. 
511 Sent.lI,q.13 (Theol.V,272): Omnia ilia, quae possunt salvari per speciem, possunt salvari per 
habitum; ergo habitus requiritur et species superfuit. . 
512 Sent.ll,q.13 (Theol.V,273-4),my trans.: Nec debet species poni prop~er repraesentatl.onem, 
quia in notitia intuitiva non requiritur aliquod repraesentans, aliud ab oblecto et actu ... Igltur nec 
in abstractiva quae immediate sequitur intuitivam requiritur aliud praeter obiectum et actum. 
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And between those two ontological absolutes there is no necessary connection, 
as God, by his potentia absoluta, can even produce the act without the object. 
Ockham is far indeed from sharing Scotus's concern about the connection 
between being and thought. 
Conclusion to Chapter 2 
The concept of human freedom as essentially a bare, unspecified and 
unimpeded choice between contraries, in which the element of imputability or 
accountability for one's actions is seen as the principle of main concern, clearly 
sits uncomfortably with an idea of freedom understood as primarily a 
possession of a soul as sanctified, and a principle of the soul's perfectibility. The 
former can conceivably be appropriated or contrived by man, the latter has to 
be received from God. In the case of Bonaventure, the latter account, 
Thomas's, clearly presents little problem for his understanding of the 
relationship between free will and grace (p.1 05 above). Bonaventure also 
retains the emphasis on inclination or desire, especially in the ltinerarium, 
though stressing the will and affectivity rather than nature as such. 
Scotus's Anselmian concept of the will as affectio iustitiae, and as the 'innate 
liberty' of the soul (pp.118-9 above), and his association of perfection with 
indeterminism and the complete independence of the will (p.117 above), can be 
held to go some way toward accommodating both these 'paradigms' of 
freedom. For Ockham, however, it is clear that the notion of freedom as a 
principle of perfectibility presents him with insurmountable problems, firstly 
because of the dignity and finality it accords to nature, secondly because it 
cannot be squared with an account which places sinful acts and virtuous acts 
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on an identical basis vis-a-vis freedom (p.136 above). The latter has been 
achieved, firstly, by his establishment of divine freedom of indifference, and 
secondly, by attributing the same mode of freedom to human beings. 
In virtue of the potentia absoluta Dei, and in the interests of maximizing divine 
freedom, Ockham has posited radical separations between objects that 
normally exist in conjunction as pairs: for instance, between acts of intellect and 
will and their subjects and objects (p.134 above), between acts or statements 
and their final causes (p.134 above), between acts and the moral value of acts 
(p.135 above), between the Beatific Vision and fruition, or enjoyment of God 
(p.138 above), and in fact between cause and effect wherever he finds it. In 
each case, God can create the one without the other, or annihilate one without 
in any way affecting the other. In the next chapter, we will see how this 
"metaphysic of separation" affects his account of grace. Ockham's earthly 
freedom of indifference, which can have no place in Beatitude (p.138 above), as 
it has no intrinsic connection with the soul's perfectibility, must raise serious 
doubts concerning the nature and working of grace in the human soul. 
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Chapter Three 
Freedom and Grace: Grace as Principle of the Operation of Finality 
Introduction 
As long as free will is admitted, and utilitarianism excluded, two great lines of 
thought present themselves from which moral principles can be deduced: the 
teleological, based on the idea of the ultimate end or good of the moral subject, 
and the deontological, based on the natural law and divine command, seen 
predominently in terms of justice, or what is due to another, especially to God. 
These two approaches are by no means mutually exclusive. However, the 
theological 'watershed' represented by the Paris 'Condemnations' of 1270 and 
1277, seems in practice to have brought about a decisive swing from an 
emphasis on the teleological, epitomised by Aquinas, to a newer and much 
enlarged emphasis on the deontological, as manifested by Scotus and Ockham. 
As already pointed out in chapter 2, what is at issue is the very source itself of 
human flourishing, of which Aquinas's perception leads him to speak in terms of 
inclination and connaturality, virtue and happiness, rather than in terms of 
commandments or precepts. The difference between the two perceptions, 
though each is valid in its own terms, is bound to affect understanding of the 
way grace works. 
In Aristotelian philosophy, as we have seen (Chapter 1), the "nature" of a 
thing, the kind of thing it is, is determined by the end or goal of its existence. It is 
the essence of a thing precisely as in motion towards its final end, which is its 
perfection. Therefore, "nature" is inseparable from "finality". Every action of a 
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living being has an end or goal perceived as "good" to be attained. Aristotle 
identifies as the ultimate good for rational beings something chosen for its own 
sake, and not for the sake of something else. Only "happiness" meets this 
criterion.513 
Similarly, the link between nature and happiness/finality gave rise to another 
tenet of the ancient Greek schools: that which translates into Latin as 'sequi 
naturam': the invariable laws or actions of a nature, as such, are seen as 
reliable guides to that nature's perfection, and in the case of rational natures, to 
the fulfilment which terminates in happiness, which all desire. In this common 
agreement of otherwise very diverse schools of thought, the "natural law" bears 
witness to itself. st. Paul clearly recognized it present there in the pagan world 
in his letter to the Romans; 
So, when gentiles, not having the Law, still through their own innate sense 
behave as the Law commands, then, even though they have no Law, they 
are a law for themselves. They can demonstrate the effect of the Law 
engraved on their hearts, to which their own conscience bears witness; 
since they are aware of various considerations, some of which accuse 
them, while others provide them with a defence ... {Romans 2:14-15). 
This passage, which equates the Law "engraved in the hearts" of all men with 
the Decalogue, thus identifies the Decalogue as natural law in its fullest 
expression. One can go further, and say that, in virtue of the context in which 
the Decalogue was given to Israel - the sealing of a unique familial covenant 
with God - this passage from Paul identifies the natural law engraved in their 
hearts as the sign of a supernatural call and finality for all men, involving 
intimacy with the divine. 
513 Aristotle, Nic. Ethics, I. 7. 
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AQUINAS ON GRACE 
In Scripture, the end or goal of man is that direct relationship between God and 
His people given expression in Covenant and Law. Therefore, natural law, the 
"law of our nature", is ordered to salvation, even though the attainment of 
salvation requires the additional aid of divine revelation and grace. All creatures 
give glory to God by acting in accordance with their own natures, towards their 
purposed goal. Man alone, being rational, has the capability to reflect upon his 
own nature and to share in a far greater manner in divine providence by being 
himself a provider: 
Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to divine providence 
in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, 
by being provident both for itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share of 
the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act 
and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is 
called the naturallaw.514 
For Thomas, there is no reason to suppose, as a much later age (under 
Lutheran and Calvinist influence) would suppose, that the "evangelical law" of 
the Gospel, summed up in the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5-7), somehow 
dispenses man from the requirement to reflect upon his own nature in relation to 
God. The Apostles and Fathers of the Church certainly supposed no such thing 
- quite the reverse, as that nature has been raised to an incomparable dignity 
by the Incarnation. 
Aquinas: Friendship with God 
The classical tenet sequi nafuram, referred to above, finds its true significance 
for Christian faith in the Incarnation. In a chapter concerning the 'suitability' 
(convenienfia) of the Incarnation, Thomas points out that, for a creature with 
natural finality for a beatitude beyond its natural capacity to attain, the infinite 
514 Aquinas, ST.I-11.91.2c,(Leo. VII, 154}. 
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distance between the divine and human natures must lead to despair, if it were 
not for the Incarnation and what it tells us of human dignity: 
For, since the perfect beatitude of man consists in the enjoyment of God 
alone, ... necessarily every man is kept from participation in the true 
beatitude who cleaves as to an end to those things which are less than 
God. But man was able to be misled into this clinging as to an end to things 
less than God in existence by his ignorance of the worthiness of his nature. 
Thus it happens with some. They look on themselves in their bodily and 
sentient nature - which they have in common with other animals - and in 
bodily things and fleshly pleasures they seek out a kind of animal 
beatitude.515 
Others, he tells us, adopt the opposite attitude and worship things they perceive 
to be greater than themselves: "the universe and its parts ... ( or) angels and 
demons". Whereas, in fact, in the order of ends, nothing stands higher than man 
except God, "in whom alone man's perfect beatitude is to be found," in the 
immediate vision of God.516 This superlative dignity of man was "most suitably 
(convenientissime) manifested by God by his own immediate assumption of 
human nature".517 A result of the Incarnation is also the real possibility of human 
friendship and intimacy with God: 
Furthermore, since friendship consists in a certain equality, things greatly 
unequal seem unable to be coupled in friendship. Therefore, to get greater 
familiarity in friendship between man and God it was helpful for man that 
God became man, since even by nature man is man's friend; and so in this 
way, while we know God visibly, we may be borne to love of things 
invisible. 518 
We can deduce from this that, since friendship with God is made possible by a 
certain identity of nature, or connaturality, with God-made-man, resulting from 
the Incarnation, anything that destroys this friendship must have implications for 
human nature too. Since the virtues dispose us for beatitude, to which natural 
desire inclines us, sin must have the opposite effect: 
515 Aquinas, SCG.IV,54.3,(Leo.XV, 173), O'Neil trans.,228, m~ emphasis: 
516 Concerning the angels, Thomas says that "although superior to ma~ .In the or~.er of nature, 
(they) are not superior in the order of end, because the same end beatifies them. 
SCG.IV.54.9,(Leo.XV, 175), O'Neil,232. 
517 Aquinas SCG.IV.54.3,(Leo.XV,173). 
518 Aquinas: SCG.IV.54.6,(Leo.XV, 174), O'Neil,231. 
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.. it not only induces a kind of disorder in the soul by seducing it from its due 
end, but it also offends God to whom we look for the reward of beatitude ... 
What is more, man, being aware of this offence, loses by sin that 
confidence in approaching God which is necessary to achieve beatitude.519 
Divine intimacy is restored only by grace-making-pleasing (gratia gratum 
faciens) , assimilating the soul to the divine likeness revealed in the Son. 
Aquinas: The Operations of Grace 
Adam and Eve, even before sin and its resulting loss of grace, were viatores; 
that is to say, although created in a state of friendship with God, they still had to 
attain, by co-operation with the resplendent graces received, their ultimate 
perfection and glorification in the Beatific Vision. This 'incompleteness' of the 
state of original holiness and justice is given expression by Aquinas, quoting 
Augustine, in a text concerning the grace of perseverance: 
As Augustine says,520 in the original state man received a gift whereby he 
could persevere, but to persevere was not given him. But now, by the grace 
of Christ, many receive both the gift of grace whereby they may persevere, 
and the further gift of persevering, and thus Christ's gift is greater than 
Adam's fault. Nevertheless it was easier for man to persevere with the gift 
of grace in the state of innocence in which the flesh was not rebellious 
against the spirit, than it is now. For the restoration by Christ's grace, 
although it is already begun in the mind, is not yet completed in the flesh, 
as it will be in heaven, where man will not merely be able to persevere but 
will be unable to sin.521 
Man before the Fall still needed grace to obtain eternal life. This is gratia 
e/evans, the grace which 'raises up' to attain what is beyond the power of 
unaided human nature. The need for gratia e/evans was no less in the "state of 
perfect nature" (as Thomas calls original holiness) than in the "state of 
corrupted nature" after the Fall. Only now, after the Fall, grace is also needed to 
bring forgiveness and healing (gratia sanans): 
519 Aquinas, SCG.IV.54.8,(Leo.XV, 174), O'Neil,231. 
520 Augustine, De Natura et Gratia XLIII. 
521 Aquinas, ST.I-II.1 09.1 0 ad.3,( Leo.VII,309). 
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After sin man requires grace for more things than before sin; but he does 
not ~eed grace more: forasmuch as man even before sin required grace to 
o.btaln eterna.1 life, which is the chief reason for the need of grace. But after 
Sin man required grace also for the remission of sin, and for the support of 
his weakness. 522 
Concupiscence (as fomes peccatl) remains for us to wrestle with and gain 
merit,523 in co-operation with gratia sanans. Thomas adopts Augustine's 
distinction between gratia operans and gratia co-operans,524 as well as the 
gratuity of the initial, operative, grace (gratia praeveniens): 
As grace is divided into operating and co-operating, with regard to its 
diverse effects, so also is it divided into prevenient and subsequent, 
howsoever we consider grace. Now there are five effects of grace in us: of 
these, the first is to heal the soul; the second, to desire good; the third, to 
carry into effect the good proposed; the fourth, to persevere in good; the 
fifth, to reach glory ... And this is what Augustine says525: It is prevenient, 
inasmuch as it heals, and subsequent, inasmuch as, being healed, we are 
strengthened; it is prevenient, inasmuch as we are called, and subsequent, 
inasmuch as we are glorified. 526 
Similarly significant is the distinction between the grace of justification (gratia 
iustificans) , which comes to us in the first place at baptism, and the grace of 
sanctification (gratia gratum faciens). The first restores us to friendship with 
God, and is instantaneous527; the second, also called habitual grace, prepares 
us for the lumen gloriae, and is on-going through life. Thomas regards the 
justification of the sinner as God's greatest work, greater even than the act of 
creation ex nihilo.528 The immediate effect of justification on the soul, Thomas 
describes as "a sort of spiritual enlightenment", 529 and 
.. by Baptism man is born again unto the spiritual life (and) ... incorporated in 
Christ, as one of His members. - Again, just as the members derive sense 
and movement from the material head, so from their spiritual Head, Christ, 
do His members derive spiritual sense consisting in the knowledge of truth, 
and spiritual movement which results from the instinct of grace. Hence it is 
522 Aquinas, ST.la.95.4 ad.1 ,(Leo. V,424); cf.Sent. II,d.29,q.1 ,a.4,(Mandonnet 11,750). 
523 Aquinas, ST.la.95.4.ad.2,(Leo.V,425); cf.obj.2 and 2 Tim.2:5. 
524 Aquinas,ST.I-II.111.2c,(Leo.VII,318); De Veritate,)(XVII.5.ad 1 ,(Leo.XXII,VoI.3,81 0). 
525 Augustine, De Natura et Gratia,XXXI,(PL.44.264). 
526 Aquinas, ST.I-II.111.3c,(Leo.VII,320); cf.Sent.II,d.26,q.1 ,a.5 + a.6 ad 2.(Mandonnet.680-
1,685). 
527 Aquinas, ST.I-II.113. 7c,(Leo.VII,338); De Veritate XXVIII.9c.(Leo.XXII,VoI.3.846). 
528 Aquinas, ST.I-II.113.9c.(Leo.VII,341). 
529 Aquinas, De Veritate XXVIII.9sc.(Leo.XII,VoI.3,845),Hackett trans.,VoLlII.398. 
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written (John 1: 14, 16): We have seen Him .. .full of grace and truth; and of 
His fullness we have all received. And it follows from this that the baptized 
a~e en.lightened .by Christ as to the knowledge of truth, and made fruitful by 
Him with the fruitfulness of good works by the infusion of grace.530 
Incorporation into Christ as a member into the Head marks the beginning of a 
new creation with a new finality: transformation of the image into the perfect 
likeness of the Head by gratia gratum faciens, grace-making-pleasing, 
disposing the soul for the lumen g/oriae. 
In contrast to non-rational creatures, the human soul is capable, with the help 
of divine action and grace (gratia e/evans), of being raised to a condition and an 
end beyond the reach of its natural capacity. In this sense, it is capax Oei531 and 
capax vitae aeternae. This capacity of the human soul to receive from God what 
is above and beyond human nature as such, Thomas also calls an 'obediential 
potency' (potentia oboedientialis); he sets no limits to it: 
Now the potency of a creature to receive is of two kinds. One is natural; 
and this can be entirely fulfilled, because it extends only to natural 
perfections. The other is obediential potency, inasmuch as it can receive 
something from God; and such a capacity cannot be filled, because 
whatever God does with a creature, it still remains in potency to receive 
from God. Now a measure which increases when goodness increases is 
determined by the amount of perfection received rather than by that of the 
capacity to receive. 532 
This has particular significance with regard to reception of the virtues: 
For this reason we say that in every creature there is an obediential 
potency, insofar as every creature obeys God in receiving whatever God 
wills. There is in the soul a potency fashioned to be actuated only by a 
connatural agent, and in this way it is in potency to acquired virtues. In 
another way there is a potency in the soul which is fashioned to be 
actuated only by the divine power, and in this way the infused virtues are 
potentially in the soul. 533 
530 Aquinas, ST.llla.69.5c,(Leo.XII, 110). 
531 Aquinas, ST.llla.6.2c,(Leo.XI,96); Sent.llI,d.2,q.2,a.1,q 1,(Mandonnet,lIl, 71). 
532 Aquinas, De Veritate XXIX.3.ad .3,(Leo.XXII,VoI.3,856), Hackett trans.,Vol.lIl.,414; Ct. De 
Veritate, VIII.4.ad.13,(Leo.XXII, VoI.2,233-4), Hackett,VoLl,337. . 
533 Aquinas, De Virtute 1.1 0.ad.13, Ralph Mcinerny trans., Thomas Aquinas, Disputed QuestIOns 
on Virtue, South Bend,lndiana, St.Augustine's Press, 1999, 71. 
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In a question, arising from the terminology of grace, as to whether there is 
really a multiplicity of different graces in the soul, Thomas ascribes the terms to 
different effects of the one grace, and not to different graces: 
The division into prevenient and subsequent grace does not divide grace in 
its essence, but only in its effects, as was already said of operating and co-
operating grace. For subsequent grace, inasmuch as it pertains to glory, is 
not numerically distinct from prevenient grace whereby we are at present 
justified.534 
The different terms describe the different effects of God acting as efficient and 
final cause: 
In so far, then, as grace is a habitual gift within us, it is only one; but in so 
far as it refers to an effect of God within us destined for our salvation, there 
can be said to be many graces in US.535 
Under the headings of 'prevenient' grace (gratia praeveniens) and 'operative' 
grace (gratia operans) are other divine actions expressed variously as grace 
justifying (iustificans) , healing (sanans), making reparation (reparans) and 
raising up (elevans). Sanctifying or habitual grace (gratia gratum faciens) 
comprises 'co-operative' or 'subsequent' grace, which bestows merit and 
perfects the soul. All of these have their source in Augustinian usage. Thomas 
quotes Augustine: "He operates that we may will; and when we will, he co-
operates that we may perfect".536 The sanctifying gifts, beatitudes and fruits of 
the Holy Spirit are all included under the one grace. Sanctifying grace is 
essentially the offer of divine intimacy and a call to share in divine life. However 
Thomas does not explicitly include 'gratuitous' grace (gratia gratis data), which 
includes the 'charismatic' gifts, under the one grace, perhaps because it is 
given, only occasionally, for the conversion and benefit of others, and not for the 
sanctification of the recipient. 
534 Aquinas, ST.I-11.111.3.ad.2,(Leo.VII,320); cf.Sent.lI,d.26,q.1 ,a.6.ad.2,(Mandonnet,II,685). 
535 Aquinas, De Veritate,XXVII,5c,(Leo,XXII, Vo1.3,81 0), Hackett, V~1.3,Schm.id~,trans.,340. 
536 Aquinas, STI-11.111.2c,(Leo.VII,318); Augustine, De Gratia et Llbero Arblfno,XVII, 
(PL.44,901 ). 
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Aquinas: Illumination and the Lumen Gloriae 
(i) Illumination in Augustine 
The power of truth to attract and hold the intellect was described by Augustine 
as a major factor in his own intellectual conversion. 53? For Augustine, the 
objects of true knowledge are unchanging. The rational soul of man only 
possesses true knowledge and attains true certainty when it contemplates 
eternal truths in and through itself. But the human mind is changeable and 
temporal also. How is it to attain knowledge of necessary, immutable and 
eternal truths? Augustine's solution is his doctrine of divine illumination, which 
"makes use of a neo-Platonic theme which goes back to Plato's comparison of 
the Idea of the Good with the sun, irradiating the subordinate intelligible objects 
or Ideas".538 In this case, the divine light, which illumines the mind, comes from 
God, who is "the Intelligible Light, in, by and through whom all intelligible things 
are illumined".539 Augustine draws a parallel with the "bodily light" by which the 
eyes see: 
.. the nature of the intellectual mind has been so established by the 
disposition of its creator that it is subjoined to intelligible things in the order 
of nature, and so it sees such truths in a kind of non-bodily light that is sui 
generis, just as our eyes of flesh see all these things that lie around us in 
this bodily light, a light they were created to be receptive of and to match.540 
So the human soul is created to be receptive of the Intelligible Light in which 
eternal truth is seen. This light may be mediated to the soul by angels: 
God is light, and of himself he illuminates faithful souls, imparting to them 
understanding of what is divinely revealed or said to them. If he chooses to 
537 See the account of his reaction on first reading Cicero's Hortensius, in Confessions,1I1.4. 
538 Frederick Copleston,SJ, A Historyof Philosophy, Vol. 2, A u.gustine to. Scotus, London, Burns & 
Oates, 1999,62. The reference is to the allegory of the cave In Republic ~14-518.. . . 
539 Augustine, Soliloquium,l.1.3,(PL.32,870); J.H.Burleigh trans., Augustme: EarlIer Wntmgs, 
Library of Christian Classics,VoI.VI,London,SCM Press,1953,24. . 
540 Augustine, De Trinitate,XII.15.24,(PL.42, 1 011); Edmund Hill,OP,trans.,N.Y.,New City 
Press, 1991,336. 
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use an angel as his minister, the angel can produce an effect in the human 
mind, enabling it to receive God's light and so to understand.541 
The manner in which this intellectual light is bestowed is explained by 
Augustine's theory of 'seminal reasons' (rationes seminales), drawn from 
Plotinus, but having an affinity with Aristotle's 'natural potency'. These are the 
germs or seeds of things which develop in time, enabling form to actualise 
matter in corporeal things. As applied to the intellectual soul, they are called 
'eternal reasons' (rationes aeternae), the seeds of intelligible light and eternal 
truth. They are both implanted by God and informed by God, so that causality is 
attributed exclusively to God. Augustine is not entirely clear as to whether the 
rationes aeternae are to be regarded as 'innate' in the human soul, though it is 
certain that their 'in-forming', like the action of grace, takes place (or not) over 
time, in accordance with the soul's response and receptivity. Just as the will 
needs the grace of God, the supreme good, to attain virtue, so the 
understanding needs the light of God, its 'sun', to attain truth. Thomas, quoting 
Augustine, notes the inseparability of capacitas and imago Dei in man, being 
"the image of God by the very fact of having a capacity for Him".542 
(ii) Aquinas: The Agent and Passive Intellects 
Unlike the Franciscan School in his time, Thomas does not adopt the 
intellectual 'innatism' of Augustine, based on the 'seminal reasons' (rationes 
seminales) , and ultimately on the divine ideas or 'eternal reasons' (rationes 
aeternae). He does allow, however, that knowledge of the existence of God is 
implanted in us by nature "in a general and confused way ... inasmuch as God is 
541 Augustine, Enarratio in Psalm 118,(PL.37, 1553), Maria Boulding,OSB,trans., N.Y"New City 
Press,2003,427. A 'D 
542 Aquinas, De Veritate,XXI1.2.obj.5,(Leo.XXII,616); Hackett, Vol. II 1,41 ; ugustlne, e 
Trinitate,XIV.8,(PL.42,1 044). 
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man's beatitude" 543 Also implanted in us by nature is what Thomas calls the 
"habitual light" of "the agent intellect, through which first principles in speculative 
and practical matters are made known to US".544 He still treats of the illumination 
of the mind in Aristotelian terms of potentiality and act, but it is the intellect itself, 
as 'possible' (i.e. the 'possible' or 'passive' as opposed to the 'agent' intellect), 
which "is in man from the beginning as part of himself',545 which has the 
potentiality for receiving light. In the beginning, however, as "Aristotle ... says, it 
is like a tablet on which nothing is written,,:546 The role of 'innate light' is taken 
by the 'agent intellect' itself: 
Accordingly, it is true that our mind receives knowledge from sensible 
things; nevertheless, the soul itself forms in itself likenesses of things, 
inasmuch as through the light of the agent intellect the forms abstracted 
from sensible things are made actually intelligible so that they may be 
received in the possible intellect. And in this way all knowledge is in a 
certain sense implanted in us from the beginning (since we have the light of 
the agent intellect) through the medium of universal conceptions which are 
immediately known by the light of the agent intellect. These serve as 
universal principles through which we judge about other things, and in 
which we foreknow these others. In this respect, that opinion is true which 
holds that we previously had in our knowledge those things which we 
learn.54? 
Thomas says in the same article that "This light of the agent intellect comes to 
the soul from the separated substances [angels548] and especially from God as 
from its first source". This, however, is the 'natural light' of the intellect, to which 
the supernatural light of grace will be added: 
The knowledge which we have by natural reason contains two things: 
images derived from the sensible objects; and the natural intelligible light, 
enabling us to abstract from them intelligible conceptions. Now in both of 
543 Aquinas, STla.2.1.ad.1 ,(Leo.IV,28). " . 
544 Aquinas, De Veritate XVI.3c,(Leo.XXII ,VoI.2,51 0); ct. below under synderesls . 
545 Aquinas, SCG.11.60.6,(Leo.XIII,421). . 
546 Aquinas, STla.84.3sc and c,(Leo.V,318); Aristotle, De Antma 111.4. 
547 Aquinas, De Veritate,X.6c,(Leo.XXII,VoI.2,313), Hackett trans.,VoI.2,28. . 
548 Aquinas, De Veritate,X.6c,(Leo.XXII,VoI.2,313), Hackett,trans.,VoI.2,2~; c~. De ~entate 
XVI.1c,(Leo.XXII,VoI.2,503-5), Hackett,Vol.ll,p.3?4 on t.he hierar~h~ of be~ng In whlc~ human. 
nature ranks immediately below the angelic, but IS contiguous wlth.lt and Insofar as It comes In 
contact with the angeliC nature, must both in speculative and practical matters know truth 
without investigation. 
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these, human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of grace. For the 
intellect's natural light is strengthened by the infusion of gratuitous light.549 
The intellective power of the rational creature is called an 'intelligible light', after 
God, who, as pure act, is pure intelligibility. This can be understood of the 
natural power of the intellect, or of "some perfection superadded of grace or 
glory". In order to see God, "there is required some similitude in the visual 
faculty, namely the light of glory strengthening the intellect to see God".550 God 
being the Intelligible Light, and infinite, the closer things are to Him, the more 
intelligible they are in themselves, because "a thing is intelligible from the very 
fact that it is immaterial". 551 Conversely, the nearer and more accessible to our 
senses, the less intelligible in themselves. It is our senses that give us access to 
intelligibility, but only with the aid of an intelligible light, the agent intellect, which 
is part of the soul, and "which is like a habit", according to Aristotle: 
Aristotle explains what he means by calling the agent intellect a habit, when 
he goes on to speak of it as a kind of light, for "in a certain way light makes 
potential colours to be colours actually", that is to say, so far as it makes 
them actually visible. And this function in regard to intelligibles is attributed 
to the agent intellect.552 
As light makes colours visible, so the agent intellect abstracts the intelligible 
from the phantasm,553 making it 'visible' to the soul, represented by the possible 
or passive intellect: 
Now our passive intellect has the same relation to intelligible objects as 
primary matter has to natural things; for it is in potentiality as regards 
intelligible objects, just as primary matter is to natural things.554 
The passive intellect has the vital role of transforming the intelligible species 
abstracted into a word, which is the basis for making all-important judgments 
about external things: 
549 Aquinas, ST.la.12.13c,(Leo.IV, 137). 
550 Aquinas, ST.la.12.2c,(Leo.IV, 116-7); Sent.III,d.14,a.1 ,q. la 3,(Mandonnet,III,430). 
551 Aquinas, ST.la. 79.3c,(Leo. V,264). 
552 Aquinas, SCG.II.78.2,(Leo.XIII,493), Anderson,trans.,249. 
553 Aquinas, SCG. 11.78. 7,(Leo.XIII,494), Anderson,250. 
554 Aquinas, ST.la.14.2.ad.3,(Leo.IV,169). 
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the passive intellect thus informed forms a definition, or a division or a 
comp?s.ition, ~xp.ressed by a word. Wherefore the concept conveyed by a 
word IS ItS definition; and a proposition conveys the intellect's division or 
composition. Words do not therefore signify the intelligible species 
themselves, but that which the intellect forms for itself for the purpose of 
judging of external things.555 
The universal gives access to extra-mental reality by way of an act of judgment. 
In the light of Thomas's account of the agent intellect, and its relation to 
universals, the question might be asked whether creaturely being and 
goodness, which participate in the eternal divine being and goodness in virtue 
of divine efficient and final (not formal) causality, have any title to extra-mental 
reality as universals, in view of that participation in the universal divine being 
and reality. Thomas, who has stressed that God is "not that universal being by 
which things formally exist" (pantheism),556 clearly cannot attribute extra-mental 
reality to the transcendental attributes of creaturely being. And yet creaturely 
being and goodness, truth and beauty, are themselves universals which 
participate, in virtue of creation, in their divine counterparts and have to be 
revealed to us through an 'intelligible light' (the agent intellect) received directly 
from angels. Thomas has said that all knowledge is "in a certain sense 
implanted in us from the beginning ... through the medium of universal 
conceptions which are immediately known by the light of the agent intellect". 557 
All of this, it has to be said, applies prior to any contribution from divine 
revelation and grace. The latter context is the only one in which Thomas speaks 
of 'divine illumination', and concerns transmission, by angels to human beings, 
of universal knowledge beyond the capacity of the unaided intellect to grasp.558 
555 Aquinas, ST./a.85.2.ad.3,(Leo. V,334-5). 
556 See chapter 1, p.13 above. 
557 De Veritate,X.6c; Cf. ST./a.106.1c,(Leo.V,481-2). 
558 Aquinas, ST./a.111.1 c,(Leo.V,515). 
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In either case, we are clearly not dealing here with universals as mere 
conventional signs instituted for semantic convenience. 
Thomas's account of the illumination of the intellect is essentially teleological, 
in that its rationale and goal is always the lumen gloriae, which is the ultimate 
happiness and perfection of the rational soul, since "a thing is perfect so far as it 
attains to its principle". 559 Thomas refers to the Beatific Vision as "the vision of 
God through his essence". However, attainment of vision "is made actual only 
when the thing seen is in a certain way in the seer,,,560 just as the thing known is 
in the knower. But the way in which the thing known is in the knower is 
dependent on the mode or nature of the knower. 561 
By the infusion of habitual grace, and by its obediential potency, the soul is 
gradually disposed for the 'light of glory': 
Everything which is raised up to what exceeds its nature, must be prepared 
by some disposition above its nature ... e.g. air receiving the form of 
fire ... But when any created intellect sees the essence of God, the essence 
of God itself becomes the intelligible form of the intellect. Hence it is 
necessary that some supernatural disposition should be added to the 
intellect in order that it may be raised up to such a great and sublime 
height. .. to see the essence of God ... it is necessary that the power of 
understanding should be added by divine grace. Now this increase of the 
intellectual powers is called the illumination of the intellect, as we also call 
the intelligible object itself by the name of light of illumination ... Apocalypse 
21 :23: For the glory of God has enlightened it - viz., the society of the 
blessed who see God. By this light the blessed are made deiform - that is, 
like to God, according to the saying: When He shall appear we shall be like 
Him, because we shall see Him as He is (1 John 2:2).562 
In the same article, Thomas draws the important parallel between illumination of 
the intellect with regard to understanding and the infusion of virtue with regard 
to habit: 
559 Aquinas, ST.la.12.1c,(Leo.IV,115). 
560 Aquinas, ST.la.12.2c,(Leo.IV,116). 
561 Aquinas, ST.la.12.4c,(Leo.IV, 120); Sent.II,d.4.a.1,(Mandonnet.II,133); d.23,q.2,a.1,(11.572-3). 
562 Aquiinas, ST.la.12.5c,(Leo.IV, 123); Sent. III,d.14,a.1,q.la 3.(Mandonnet.III,430). 
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The created light is necessary to see the essence of God, not in order to 
make the essence of God intelligible, which is of itself intelligible, but in 
order to enable the intellect to understand in the same way as a habit 
makes a power abler to act.563 
Likewise, in the following article, it is asked whether some will see the essence 
of God more perfectly than others. In his answer, Thomas makes clear the 
inseparable connection between the 'light of glory' in the intellect and charity in 
the will, which involves desire: 
Hence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God the 
more perfectly; and he will have a fuller participation of the light of glory 
who has more charity; because where there is the greater charity, there is 
the more desire; and desire in a certain degree makes the one desiring apt 
and prepared to receive the object desired. Hence he who possesses the 
more charity will see God the more perfectly, and will be the more 
beatified.564 
Aquinas: Synderesis and Conscience 
Besides the inclination or tendency to the good of its own perfection, the human 
soul has a corresponding tendency against evil. This is the element called 
'synderesis', "whose task it is to warn against evil and incline to good", 565 and 
which Thomas describes as "a natural habit of first principles of action": 
.. just as there is a natural habit of the human soul through which it knows 
principles of the speculative sciences, which we call understanding of 
principles, so, too, there is in the soul a natural habit of first principles of 
action, which are the universal principles of the natural law. This habit 
pertains to synderesis. This habit exists in no other power than reason ... [or] 
understanding ... 566 
Synderesis is absolutely reliable and unfailing in its judgments. 
The term, 'synderesis' has vanished from modern parlance, along with 
awareness of the distinct psychological reality it represents in the human soul. It 
563 Aquinas, ST.la.12.5.ad.1,(Leo.IV,123). 
564 Aquinas, ST.la.12.6c,(Leo.IV,126),my emphasiS. 
565 Aquinas De Veritate XVI.2c,(Leo.XXII,VoI.2,508), Hackett trans . .voI.2,1 O. 
566 Aquinas: De Veritate, XV I. 1 c,(Leo.xXII,VoI.2,504), Hackett, trans.VoI.2,304. 
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has for long been confused or conflated with 'conscience', in the sense of "a 
nagging conscience". The confusion was evidently not unfamiliar to Thomas: 
Now all the habits from which conscience is formed, although many, 
nevertheless have their efficacy from one first habit, the habit of first 
principles, which is called synderesis. And for this specific reason, this habit 
is sometimes called conscience .. 56? 
Also, 'synderesis' is derived from the Greek for 'conscience': auv£io~al~. 
Conscience, however, is an activity to which Thomas assigns an entirely 
distinct, though complementary, role. Conscience is essentially the act of 
deliberation or investigation by which we judge particular actions, or inactions, 
to be, or to have been, right or wrong. 
Aquinas: The Virtues 
The unity of the virtues, in the Aristotelian perspective, derives from the unity 
and necessity of prudence, which "counsels, judges and commands in those 
things that are directed to the end". 568 In the view of the Fathers, the virtues 
derive their unity from the unity of charity, which is, above all, love of God. 
Thomas adds this, and ties it in with the Aristotelian perspective, but this time in 
relation to the ultimate end. In doing so he clearly assigns humanly "acquired" 
virtue - acquired by habituation - to the rank of "imperfect" virtue, as incapable 
in itself of ordering man to his true last end. 569 For Thomas, the moral and 
intellectual virtues, i.e. the four cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, temperance 
and fortitude, can be humanly acquired, but as ordained to the supernatural last 
end, they can only be infused directly by God together with the theological virtue 
of charity: 
567 Aquinas, STla.79.13.ad.3,(Leo.V,281). 
568 Aquinas, STI-11.65.1 c,(Leo.V,419). 
569 Aquinas, STI-II,65,2c,(Leo. VI,423). 
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Now for prudence to proceed aright, it is much more necessary that man be 
well disposed towards his ultimate end, which is the effect of charity, than 
that he be well disposed in respect of other ends, which is the effect of 
moral virtue: just as in speculative matters right reason has greatest need 
of the first indemonstrable principle, that contradictories cannot both be true 
at the same time. It is therefore evident that neither can infused prudence 
be without charity; nor, consequently, the other moral virtues, since they 
cannot be without prudence.57o 
Faith and hope, according to Thomas, can exist without charity, but only "in an 
inchoate state" and not as "complete virtues". 571 The possession of charity, by 
its very nature, entails faith and hope in God's promise of eternal life in 
communion of love and friendship with Him. Therefore, neither can charity exist 
alone in us, as its orientation to the final end involves also faith and hope: 
Charity signifies not only the love of God, but also a certain friendship with 
Him; which implies, besides love, a certain mutual return of love, together 
with mutual communion ... Now this fellowship of man with God, which 
consists in a certain familiar colloquy with Him, is begun here in this life, by 
grace, but will be perfected in the future life, by glory; each of which things 
we hold by faith and hope ... Therefore charity is quite impossible without 
faith and hope.572 
Unlike Scotus and Ockham, Thomas does not speak of 'acquired' faith, hope 
and charity. As theological, therefore supernatural, virtues they are ordained 
entirely to an end man cannot attain by his own powers. They are infused only. 
This account, however, rests on an aspect of Thomas's teleology, natural 
inclination to a supernatural end, which Ockham will reject, root and branch. 
Thomas in De Caritate replies to a claim that "the charity in us, by which we 
love God and our neighbour, is nothing other than the Holy Spirit". Such an act 
would not be voluntary on our part: 
.. even God cannot bring it about that a human movement that (whether 
interior or exterior itself) derives from an external principle is voluntary. That 
is why all the acts of the will ultimately derive as from their fundamental root 
570 Aquinas, ST.I-II.65.2c,(Leo.VI,423); Cf.65.4.obj.1 ,(Leo. VI,425); Q.D.de Virtutibus 
Cardinalibus, 2c, Mclnerny,118-9. .' 
571 Aquinas, ST.I-II,65,4c,(Leo. VI,425); Q.D.de Vlrt. Cardm.2c, Mclnerny,118-9. 
572 Aquinas, ST.I-II,65,5c,(Leo.VI,427). 
158 
from the thing that human beings want by nature, which is their ultimate 
end. As for the things that contribute to the end, we want these for the sake 
of the end. Consequently, such acts as exceed the entire natural abilities of 
human nature can only be voluntary if something interior is added to human 
nature that can complete the will in such a way that an act of this sort may 
arise from an interior principle.573 
Thomas adds that if an act of charity were to derive from an exterior principle, -
even the Holy Spirit acting alone - not being voluntary, it would not be 
meritorious. He concludes: 
The only possibility remaining ... is that we must possess a created 
disposition of charity which can be the formal principle of an action of love. 
This does not prevent the Holy Spirit, who is uncreated charity, from 
dwelling in someone who possesses created charity, moving the soul to a 
loving action in the way that God moves each thing to those of its actions to 
which its own form makes it tend. That is how he organises everything in a 
way that gives delight, since he provides everything with the forms and the 
powers that make it tend towards the things to which he himself moves it, 
so that it inclines towards them of its own accord, rather than under 
compulsion.574 
The opposite of compulsion here is not the will exercising freedom-of-
indifference, but rather the reality which provides the context for sanctifying 
grace as gratia cooperans: a nature, already created with an inclination, a 
'natural desire' for its own ultimate end in God, liberated by grace to pursue its 
perfection and fulfilment in that end by cooperation with grace moving it. The 
'delight' to which Thomas refers arises precisely from this 'coming-together' of 
natural inclination and the movement of grace: grace creating and enhancing 
freedom, not diminishing or threatening it. The outcome, as Thomas indicates 
elsewhere,575 is a growing and developing graced 'connaturality' with the divine, 
in which the 'old man', the 'old nature', dies, and the new creation is born. 
However, only the concept of freedom as principle of perfectibility can 
accommodate this account of the working of grace. Ockham's cannot. 
573 Aquinas, De Caritate, 1c, E.M.Atkins and Thoma~ Williams eds. (Ma~garet Atkin.s trans.), 
Aquinas: Disputed Questions on the Virtues, Cambridge Texts In the History of Philosophy, 
CUP,200S, 110 
574 Aquinas, De Caritate 1 c, Atkins trans., 111. . .' 
575 Aquinas, ST.II-11.4S.2,(Leo. VIII,341); For the implications of thiS for the relationship between 
intellect and will, see also 1-11.14.1.(Leo. VI, 1 05). 
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In Thomas's account, the seeds, so to speak, of the virtues are implanted in 
us by nature in the natural desire for happiness. The virtues are, in fact, an 
extension of natural desire, in that they prepare the soul for its consummation. 
The desire expresses itself most efficaciously in charity: 
... where there is the greater charity, there is the more desire; and desire in 
a certain degree makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the 
object desired.576 
Charity, in turn, is "the form of all the virtues": 
... in morals, that which gives an act its order to the end, must needs give 
the act its form. Now it is evident, from what has been said577 ... that it is 
charity which directs the acts of all other virtues to the last end, and which, 
consequently, also gives the form to all other acts of virtue .. .for these are 
called virtues in relation to "informed" acts.578 
Thomas's account of the virtues is also, therefore, essentially teleological. The 
charity spoken of here is not the ordinary human love which is not dependent on 
grace, but the supernatural 'infused' gift which orients a person's whole life 
towards God, and affects every action and relationship. It is worth quoting at 
this point an observation of Ralph Mcinerny, which seems entirely accurate, on 
the relationship in Thomas between the different types of moral maxim or 
precept and the 'appetite for the good': 
It is the genius of Thomas's moral thought that it combines the 
exception less norms of natural law, the moral maxims which are true only 
by and large, and the singular judgment made here and now which brings 
all this universal knowledge into play but which has its certainty and truth 
from appetite's firm adherence to the good. The truth of practice lies in the 
judgment's conformity with rectified appetite.579 
Charity as supernatural virtue cannot exist in a disordered appetite, because it 
cannot exist in the soul except in company with all the other infused virtues: 
576 Aquinas, STla.12.6c,(Leo.IV,126). 
577 Aquinas, STII-11.23.7c,(Leo.VIII, 171): The ultimate and principal good of man is the 
erj0yment of God ... and to this good man is ordered by charity. 
57 Aquinas, STII-11.23.8c,(Leo.VIII,172); Sent.II,d.26,a.4 ad.5,(Mandonnet,II,679). 
579 Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Virtue, Ralph Mcinerny trans., South Bend, St. 
Augustine's Press,1999,xviii-xix. 
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Now it is evident that charity, inasmuch as it directs man to his last end, is 
the principle of all the other good works that are referable to his last end. 
Wherefore all the moral virtues must needs be infused together with charity, 
since it is through them that man performs each different kind of good 
work.58o 
Similarly, with respect to the other theological virtues: 
Charity is not any kind of love of God, but that love of God by which He is 
loved as the object of bliss, to which object we are directed by faith and 
hope.581 
Conversely, the loss of charity, through mortal sin, entails the loss of all the 
other infused virtues.582 This is so because all of them are ordered to the 
service and increase of charity, and the essence of charity is participation in 
divine life. Sin, because of its ego-centric nature, makes such participation 
impossible, until healing grace restores the soul's thea-centricity. 
Aquinas: The Gifts of the Holy Spirit and Graced Connaturality 
The gifts of the Holy Spirit play an important role in disposing mind and heart to 
the action of the Holy Spirit: 
.. it is manifest that human virtues perfect man according as it is natural for 
him to be moved by his reason in his interior and exterior actions. 
Consequently, man needs yet higher perfections, whereby to be disposed 
to be moved by God. These perfections are called gifts, not only because 
they are infused by God, but also because by them man is disposed to 
become amenable to the Divine inspiration.583 
In this and the subsequent article, Thomas makes a distinction, not only 
between different types of virtue, as such, but in the manner in which they are 
held, corresponding to the two different ways in which man's reason is 
perfected by God. The first is by its natural perfection, the natural light of 
reason. The acquired virtues, concerned with man's connatural end alone, are 
held "in a more perfect manner ... because man has (them) in his full 
580 Aquinas, ST.I-11.65.3c,(Leo.VI,424}. 
581 Aquinas, ST.I-11.65.5.ad.1 ,(Leo. VI,427). 
582 Aquinas, ST.I-11.65.2c,4c,(Leo.VI,423,425-6}. 
583 Aquinas, ST.I-11.68.1c,(Leo.VI,447). 
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possession". 584 Secondly, man's reason is perfected by a supernatural 
perfection, the theological virtues: 
And, though this latter perfection is greater than the former, yet ... he 
possesses the latter imperfectly, since we love and know God imperfectly ... 
(Therefore) in matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man's 
reason moves him ... in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the 
theological virtues, the motion of reason does not suffice, unless it receive 
in addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Spirit (instinctus et motio 
Spiritus Sanctl).585 
Consequently, Thomas considers the gifts to be necessary to man for his 
salvation. 
Aquinas is not at all averse to using the word 'instinct' (instinctus) to describe 
not only natural impulses in animals (and man),586 but also rational and spiritual 
impulses of the Holy Spirit in the human soul, termed instinctus divinus587 or 
instinctus Spiritus Sanctl-588. He also speaks of the 'instinct of grace' (instinctus 
gratiae)589. Elsewhere, in connection with the gift of wisdom, he speaks of 
"sympathy or connaturality for Divine things", which "is the result of charity, 
which unites us to God": 
Thus, about matters of chastity, a man after inquiring with his reason forms 
a right judgment, if he has learnt the science of morals, while he who has 
the habit of chastity judges of such matters by a kind of connaturality. 
Accordingly, it belongs to the wisdom that is an intellectual virtue to 
pronounce right judgment about Divine things after reason has made its 
inquiry, but it belongs to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Spirit to judge aright 
about them on account of connaturality with them.590 
The teleological notion of a growing and developing graced connaturality with 
the divine, made possible by the Incarnation, seems to find a parallel in 
Bonaventure's account of the "spiritual senses" in his Itinerarium Mentis in 
584 Aquinas, STI-11.68.2c,(Leo.vI,449). 
585 Aquinas, STI-11.68.2c,(Leo.VI,449). 
586 Cf.STI-11.15.2c,(Leo.VI, 111). 
587 Aquinas, STI-11.68.1 c,2c,(Leo. VI,447,449); 11-II,171.5c,(Leo.X,373). 
588 As above; cf.I-11.68.5.ad.1,(Leo. VI,452). 
589 E.g., STllla.69.5c,(Leo.XII, 11 0). 
590 Aquinas, ST.II-11.45.2c,(Leo. VIII,341). 
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Deum591 . Both seem to accord well with the ultimate "deiformity" of the soul 
enjoying the lumen g/oriae, in patria592 . However, both were to suffer increasing 
neglect and obscurity as a result of the rise and dominance of deontology after 
1277. 
Aquinas: Merit and the Beatitudes and Fruits of the Holy Spirit 
In the treatise on grace in the Summa, Thomas twice asks whether man can 
merit eternal life without grace. In the question on the necessity of grace593 , he 
answers mainly in terms of the disproportion between the powers of the soul 
and the attainment of eternal life: 
Acts conducing to an end must be proportioned to the end ... in natural 
things, nothing can by its operation bring about an effect which exceeds its 
active force, but only such as is proportionate to its power ... Hence man, by 
his natural endowments, cannot produce meritorious works proportionate to 
everlasting life ... And thus without grace man cannot merit everlasting 
Iife.594 
In the question on merit595 , he applies this argument concerning man's "natural 
endowmnents" to the "state of perfect nature", pre-Fall, also. Here, it is the 
disproportion alone that disqualifies created nature from meriting eternal life 
without grace, "since it exceeds its knowledge and desire, according to 1 Cor. 
2:9: Eye has not seen, nor ear heard, neither has it entered into the heart of 
man". In the "state of corrupt nature", post-Fall, "a second reason is added to 
this, viz., the impediment of sin": 
.. no one existing in a state of mortal sin can merit eternal life unless first he 
be reconciled to God, through his sin being forgiven, which is brought 
about by grace.596 
591 See below, p.172. 
592 Aquinas, ST.la.12.5c,(Leo.IV, 123). 
593 Aquinas, ST.I-II.1 09,(Leo. VII,289-309). 
594 Aquinas, ST.I-II.1 09.5c,(Leo.vll,298). 
595 Aquinas, ST.I-II.114,(Leo. VII,344-355). 
596 Aquinas, ST.I-11.114.2c,(Leo.VII,346). 
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Once reconciled to God by the grace of forgiveness and healing, one can begin 
to merit eternal life from God, not by a relationship of equality, but either de 
congruo: "as it proceeds from free-will", or de condigno: "as it proceeds from 
the grace of the Holy Spirit". 597 
If it is considered as regards the substance of the work, and inasmuch as it 
springs from free-will, there can be no condignity because of the very great 
inequality. But there is congruity, on account of an equality of proportion: for 
it would seem congruous that, if a man does what he can, God should 
reward him according to the excellence of his power. However ... inasmuch 
as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit moving us to everlasting life, 
it is meritorious of life everlasting condignly ... And the worth of the work 
depends on the dignity of grace, whereby a man, being made a partaker of 
the Divine Nature, is adopted as a son of God, to whom the inheritance is 
due by right of adoption, according to Romans 8: 17: If sons, heirs also. 
The role of charity is paramount in meritorious acts, regarding both "that good to 
which man is divinely ordained", and the use of free-will. Regarding Divine 
ordination: 
.. we must first bear in mind that everlasting life consists in the enjoyment of 
God. Now the human mind's movement to the fruition of the Divine good is 
the proper act of charity, whereby all the acts of the other virtues are 
ordained to this end, since all the other virtues are commanded by 
charity.5g8 
Regarding the use of free-will, "it is manifest that what we do out of love we do 
most willingly". 599 In this way, the action of grace disposes the soul for the 
reward of an increase of grace. 
The beatitudes and fruits of the Holy Spirit mark the soul's progress towards 
its goal and reward, the Beatific Vision. Whereas the virtues describe habits, 
and the gifts the perfecting of the habits, the beatitudes describe the perfect 
acts resulting from the virtues and gifts, and the fruits of the Holy Spirit are the 
delightful and delight-giving outcome of the virtues, gifts and beatitudes. 
597 Aquinas, ST.I-11.114.3c,(Leo.VII,347). 
598 Aquinas, ST.I-11.114.4c,(Leo. VII ,349). 
599 Aquinas, ST.I-11.114.4c,(Leo. VII,349). 
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Thomas's description of the beatitudes and fruits conveys very strongly the 
idea that for those who have faith, and make appropriate use of the virtues and 
gifts, the fulfilment of hope, and of our nature's natural finality, has its 
beginnings in via. Heaven begins on earth, even if very inchoately: 
Accordingly, those things which are set down as merits in the beatitudes 
are a kind of preparation for, or disposition to happiness, either perfect or 
inchoate: while those that are assigned as rewards, may be either perfect 
happiness, so as to refer to the future life, or some beginning of happiness, 
such as is found in those who have attained perfection, in which case they 
refer to the present life. Because when a man begins to make progress in 
the acts of the virtues and gifts, it is to be hoped that he will arrive at 
perfection, both as a wayfarer, and as a citizen of the heavenly kingdom.6oo 
The relationship between the beatitudes and the virtues and gifts is set out 
systematically, and rather impressively, in Prima Secundae 69 of the Summa. 
The hope of future happiness which they embody springs firstly from the 
disposition or preparation for it represented by the virtues and merit, and 
secondly from its inchoate anticipation "in holy men". The virtues move the soul 
towards beatitude, and the gifts perfect the movement. Thomas enumerates 
three different kinds of happiness (beatitudo) experienced in via, and three 
different relations to the future happiness of final beatitude: [1] sensual 
happiness, which is "false and contrary to reason", therefore an obstacle to it; 
[2] active happiness, which represents hope and is "a disposition of future 
beatitude," and [3] contemplative happiness, which, "if perfect, is the very 
essence of future beatitude, and if imperfect, is a beginning thereof'. Certain 
beatitudes remove the obstacle of sensual happiness, which may be a matter of 
[1 a] riches and external goods, or [1 b] "following the bent of one's passions", 
whether these be [1 ba] irascible, or [1 bb] concupiscible. In the case of [1 a], the 
virtue causes moderation in use, and the gift, which perfects the virtue's act, 
600 Aquinas, ST.I-II.69.2c,(Leo. VI,45?). 
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causes contempt for the riches and goods: thus Blessed are the poor in spirit. In 
the case of [1 ba], the irascible passions are kept within moderate bounds by the 
virtue of recta ratio, and by the perfecting gift they cease to disturb the soul 
altogether, thus: Blessed are the meek. In the case of [1 bb], the concupiscible 
passions are moderated by virtue, and cast aside altogether by the perfecting 
gift, even to the point of making "a deliberate choice of sorrow", thus: Blessed 
are they that mourn, chiefly for their sins.601 
The happiness of an active life [2] concerns mainly man's relations with his 
neighbour, either by way of [2a] duty, or [2b] spontaneous gratuity. [2a] is 
disposed by virtue (justice) not to refuse such a duty, and perfected by a gift to 
do so "more heartily" (abundantion) , and even with ardent desire, thus: Blessed 
are they that hunger and thirst after justice. [2b] involves the virtue of liberality, 
giving, where reason dictates, to "friends or others united to us", perfected by a 
gift, reverence for God (piety), to give to the poor, the maimed etc, who cannot 
repay, thus: Blessed are the merciful. 
Contemplative happiness [3] concerns final beatitude or some beginning of it, 
and therefore has the character of reward, rather than of merit; the two rewards 
concerned are those of the active life of virtue. This has two effects: [3a] the 
cleansing of man's heart, hence: Blessed are the clean of heart, and [3b], in 
relation to his neighbour, the effect is peace, thus: Blessed are the 
peacemakers. Thomas calls the eighth beatitude a "confirmation and 
declaration" of all the others, on the grounds that anyone confirmed in the 
601 The rationale behind "a deliberate choice of sorrow" is clarified in I-II.3S.3.ad.1 .(Leo.VI.242). 
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others will never renounce them even under persecution, hence: Blessed are 
you when men hate you and persecute you. 
The following article in the Summa602 deals with the rewards of the beatitudes. 
These are arranged in ascending order, each representing a restitution, in terms 
of glory, of those goods of which the soul was deprived, or else renounced, or 
despised, for the sake of the kingdom, when on earth, and beginning with those 
pertaining to the sensual life: 
For the first three beatitudes concerned the withdrawal of man from those 
things in which sensual happiness consists: which happiness man desires 
by seeking the objects of natural desire (id quod naturaliter desideratur) not 
where he should seek it, viz. in God, but in temporal and perishable things. 
Wherefore the rewards of the first three beatitudes correspond to these 
things which some men seek to find in earthly happiness.603 
Consequently, "excellence and abundance of good things in God" - the 
kingdom of heaven - is promised to the poor in spirit. A "secure and peaceful 
possession of the land of the living, whereby the solid reality of eternal goods is 
denoted" is promised to the meek, etc.604 The fruits of the Holy Spirit, love, joy, 
peace etc, represent the delights produced by the beatitudes, both in final glory 
and in its beginnings in via.605 
Thomas incorporates a reference to "natural desire", in the foregoing quote, at 
a point where natural finality, the natural inclination to ultimate beatitude, can be 
seen to playa foundational role in the whole life of grace represented by the 
relationship between the virtues, gifts, beatitudes, fruits and rewards. Take 
away natural desire for a supernatural end involving the soul's inherent 
602 STI-11.69.4. 
603 Aquinas, STI-II.69.4c,(Leo.VI,460), my emphasiS. 
604 . . d 6 The ascending nature of the rewards IS shown In a . 
605 Aquinas, STI-II. 70,(Leo. VI,461-4). 
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orientation to its own perfection and ultimate happiness, and the whole structure 
starts to become incoherent. This may possibly account, at least in part, for the 
fact that Ockham, who dismisses natural finality altogether, seems not have 
treated specifically of the beatitudes and fruits of the Holy Spirit at all. His 
"metaphysics of separation" would render an account like Thomas's effectively 
untenable. 
Aquinas: Created and Uncreated Grace 
Thomas assigns a certain priority to created grace in the soul as creating the 
disposition and preparing the way for uncreated grace: the indwelling of the 
Divine Persons. On the subject of charity, he quotes Augustine606 : 
By charity I mean the movement of the soul towards the enjoyment of God 
for His own sake. But a movement of the soul is something created in the 
soul. Therefore charity is something created in the soul.607 
In De Veritate, Thomas speaks of both habitual or sanctifying grace (gratia 
gratum faciens) , such as charity, and gratuitous grace (gratia gratis data), under 
the heading of created grace. The latter concerns "the gift of prophecy and of 
wisdom and the like", and "it is evident that such gifts are something created in 
the soul". Of habitual or sanctifying grace, however, 
.. some asserted that this kind of grace was nothing created in the soul, but 
was only in God. But this cannot stand. For God's accepting or loving 
someone ... is nothing else but His willing him some good.60B 
However, habitual or sanctifying grace is not only created. It also comprises 
uncreated grace, the indwelling of the Persons of the Trinity. This requires a 
prior change in the creature. The change that is necessary for the creature to be 
indwelt is 
606 Augustine De Doctrina Christiana 111.1 O,(PL.34, 72). 
607 ' Aquinas, ST.II-11.23.2sc,(Leo.VIII,164). 
608 Aquinas, De Veritate XXVI1.1c,(Leo.XXII,VoI.3,790-1), Hackett trans.,VoI.3,309. 
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.. a likening of the soul to the. ~i~ine person who is sent, by some gift of 
gr~~e. Becau~e the Hal? Splnt IS Love, the soul is assimilated to the Holy 
Splnt by the gift of chanty. Whereas the Son is the Word, not any sort of 
word, ~ut one wh~ bre~th~s fort~ Love ... Thus the Son is sent. .. according 
to the Intellectual Illumination which breaks forth into the affection of 
love .. 609 
The indwelling of a Person (or Persons) of the Trinity in the soul is altogether 
different from the mode in which God is in all things by His "essence, power and 
presence" as the first Cause of all things. His special presence in the rational 
soul is "as the object known is in the knower, and the beloved in the lover". 610 
For Thomas, the rational creature images the Trinity by acts of knowledge and 
love (not just by the faculties of intellect and will as such), just as Word and 
Spirit proceed by knowledge and love, and as the Trinity dwells in the soul "as 
the object known in the knower, and the beloved in the lover". Thomas's 
account of the procession and mission of the divine Persons echoes 
Bonaventure's account of creation and redemption in terms of "emanation, 
exemplarism, and return to the Source by way of illumination"611 : 
Just as in the going forth of all things from their source the divine goodness 
is said to proceed upon creatures, in that a received likeness to it 
represents that goodness, so too in the bringing back of the rational 
creature to God the meaning of the processions of the divine persons is 
present. This is called a sending in that some received likeness has its 
pattern and origin in the relations proper to the person and thus represents 
them, i.e. as the proper way of the Holy Spirit's relation to the Father is one 
of Love and of the Son's that of Word expressing the Father. Hence just as 
the Holy Spirit proceeds invisibly into the soul through the gift of love, so 
does the Son through the gift of wisdom; and thereby there is a 
manifestation of the Father, who is the ultimate to whom we return. 
Because, then, in accord with these gifts, a likeness to what is proper to the 
persons comes to be in us in that we are made like them in a new way. 
Both processions, then, are called missions ... Thus in the recei~i~g of 
these gifts the divine persons are possessed as leading the.rec~plent back 
to or conjoining him with the end (term). Thus each procession IS called a 
giving, in that it means a new way of having.612 
609 Aquinas, ST.la.43.5 ad.2,(Leo.IV,450). 
610 Aquinas, ST.la.43.3c,(Leo.IV,447). 
611 See p.40 above , . . 
612 A · S tld15 4 1 (Mandonnet,I,350-1),quotedOBnen,BlackfnarsSumma,Vol.7, qUlnas, en.,. ,q. ,a. , 
260, my emphases. 
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"The entire Trinity dwells in the mind (inhabitat mentem) by sanctifying 
,,613· I d' th F h grace, Inc u Ing e at er, who, though not 'sent', also gives Himself to us 
and "abides in us through grace even as do the Son and Holy Spirit",614 to 
whom the indwelling is appropriated through knowledge and love. Love is the 
medium and rule of all the virtues, without which none of them could be 
operative in us. Bonaventure and his predecessors had stressed love by itself 
as the formal reason of the indwelling. Thomas perceived that the missing 
element was knowledge or wisdom in the sense of notitia experimentalis, which 
"tastes" God by way of perception and, by the operation of the virtues - which 
involves "using" the gifts of grace - "takes hold" of the indwelling Persons, so as 
to rest in them and, by possessing them, to "enjoy" them. It is the graced 
"operation" by the creature which completes the picture of the 'term' of the 
divine missions. It comes about by operative and co-operative grace. Thomas 
writes: 
God is in all things through his own action, namely conjoining himself to 
them as the cause creating and conserving them in being. But he is in the 
sanctified through their own acts, whereby they reach God and in a certain 
sense take hold of him, i.e. they love him and know him, and one who loves 
and knows has what he loves and knows within him.615 
This 'operation', or active response to the 'offer' of divine self-communication 
entails a priority of created effects of grace eliciting the response. The 
sanctifying gifts of the Holy Spirit are also, in this respect, necessary for 
salvation according to St. Thomas. This is because "the gifts of the Holy Spirit 
dispose all the powers of the soul to be amenable to the Divine motion".616 They 
supplement, complement and encourage the virtues because, 
613 Aquinas, STla.43.5c,(Leo.IV,450). 
614 Aquinas, STla.43.4.ad.2,(Leo.IV,449). 
615 Aquinas, In II Cor.6, lect.3, quoted O'Brien,260. 
616 Aquinas, STI-11.68.8c,(Leo. VI,455). 
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.. w~. need dispositions, strengthening us readily to obey the Holy 
Splnt. .. (who) moves men in such a way that they themselves act freely and 
so have need of such dispositions.617 
The end and accompaniment of this activity, which comes under the heading of 
uti, the use of the gifts, is frui, the possession and enjoyment of the Persons. 
"To enjoy is to cleave by love to something for its own sake", says Augustine.618 
Likewise, Thomas says, "To have the power to rest joyfully in a divine Person is 
ours by sanctifying grace alone".619 
BONAVENTURE ON GRACE 
Illumination: Christ the Metaphysical Centre 
The importance of illumination in Bonaventure's account of grace - and indeed 
in his whole theology - can hardly be overstated. It lies at the heart of his 
concern to preserve the unity of theology with its 'handmaid', philosophy. 
Without the divine light of revelation, philosophy and the sciences cannot attain 
to the Source of wisdom and truth: this is especially so without knowledge of the 
Incarnate Word, the Exemplar of all creation: 
Although the metaphysician is able to rise from the consideration of created 
and particular substance to that of the universal and uncreated and to the 
very notion of being, so that he reaches the ideas of beginning, centre and 
final end, yet he does not attain the notions of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 
For the metaphysician rises to the notion of this being by seeing it in the 
light of the original principle of all things, and in this he meets physical 
science that studies the origin of things. He also rises to the notion of this 
being in the light of the final end, and in this he meets moral philosophy, or 
ethics, which leads all things back to the one supreme good as to the final 
end by considering either practical or speculative happiness. But when he 
considers this being in the light of that principle which is the exemplar of all 
things [i.e., Christ], he meets no other science, but is a true 
meta physician. 620 
617 Aquinas, ST.I-11.68.3 ad.2,(Leo.VI,450): McDermott trans.,247. 
618 Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana 1.4,(PL.34,20). 
619 Aquinas, ST.la.43.3c,(Leo.IV,447). . 
620 Bonaventure, In Hexaemeron 1.13,(Quar.V,331), my parenthesIs. 
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The reference here to "practical or speculative happiness" indicates 
Bonaventure's acceptance of the eudaemonistic element in moral philosophy, 
while emphasising that it finds its resolution and goal only in the light of Christ, 
the one eternal exemplar cause of salvation: 
Such is the metaphysical Centre that leads us back, and this is the sum 
total of our metaphysics: concerned with emanation, exemplarity, and 
consummation, that is, illumination through spiritual radiations and return to 
the Supreme Being. And in this you will be a true metaphysician.621 
As already noted in chapter 1,622 this cycle of redemption, emanation of the soul 
from the Father, sanctification in the likeness of the Son, the Exemplar, and 
return to the Father by the illumination of the Holy Spirit expresses the context 
for the soul's finality in Bonaventure's favoured perspective. It does, however, 
find a parallel in Thomas, as we have seen.623 Bonaventure also expresses 
what amounts to the same thing in terms of 'ascent': 
.. the universe is like a book reflecting, representing and describing its 
Maker, the Trinity, at three different levels of expression: as a trace, an 
image, and a likeness. The aspect of trace is found in every creature; the 
aspect of image, in the intellectual creatures or rational spirits; the aspect of 
likeness, only in those who are God-conformed. Through these successive 
levels, comparable to the rungs of a ladder, the human mind is designed to 
ascend gradually to the supreme Principle who is God.624 
The 'ascent' in question is the subject of his treatise, The Mind's Journey Into 
God (ltinerarium Mentis In Deum). The ascent is by means of the recovery of 
the "spiritual senses": in the first place those lost by the Fall, followed by the 
attainment of more elevated ones made accessible by Christ. The imago Dei in 
the soul also plays a major role in the ascent. 
Christ is therefore the centre of everything. As the Word in whom the Father 
expresses Himself fully, 
621 Bonaventure, In Hexaemeron 1.17,( Quar. V,332). 
622 Chapter 1, p.40. 
623 Above, p.169, Sent.I,d.15,q.4,a.1,(Mandonnet,350-1). 172 
624 Bonaventure, Brev;loqu;um ".12.1,(Quar.V,230); cf.Sent.l,d.3,p.1,q.2,(Quar., ). 
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This Centre is Tr~th ... nor can any truth be known in any way whatsoever 
except through this Truth. For the same is the principle both of being and of 
knowing. If, then, as the Philosopher says625, the knowable is eternal as 
such, it necessarily follows that nothing can be known except through a 
truth that is immutable, undisturbed and unconfined.626 
As the human intellect is unstable, it cannot find certitude in itself. It needs 
access to a stable and unchanging truth. However, "it cannot see that truth 
shining forth unchangeably except by some light shining without change in any 
way".627 This reflects one of Bonaventure's most often quoted Scriptural texts, 
from the Letter of James: All that is good, all that is perfect, is given us from 
above; it comes down from the Father of all light; with him there is no such thing 
as alteration, no shadow caused by change (James 1 :17).628 For Bonaventure, 
intellectual illumination is only one aspect of illumination in general, which 
includes the gifts of grace with their virtues and fruits. Bonaventure's account of 
the cosmic hierarchy, based on Pseudo-Dionysius, is rather more closely 
concerned with illumination-as-grace than Thomas's. 
Bonaventure: Natural Law, Synderesis and Conscience 
As for Thomas (p.156 above), so for Bonaventure, synderesis is the natural 
desire against evil. In Bonaventure's account, synderesis and conscience, like 
the natural law, are elements of the innate "natural light" bestowed on the soul 
by God from its origin, by which the soul knows God as its beatitude and goal. 
Synderesis, conscience and natural law always incline reason and will towards 
the good, whereas free choice inclines them sometimes towards evil.629 As with 
Thomas, synderesis is a natural habit, the ability of the will to desire and to tend 
toward the good, and, unlike conscience, it cannot be set aside. It is an intrinsic 
625 Aristotle, Ethics VI.3. 
626 Bonaventure, In Hexaemeron 1.13,(Quar. V,331). 
627 Bonaventure Itinerarium, 1I1.3,(Quar. V,304). 
628 ' Ct. De Reductione 1,(Quar.V,319). 
629 Bonaventure, Sent.lI,d.39,a.2,q.1 ,cond .. ad.1 ,(Quar.II,91 0). 
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aspect of the soul's finality, or natural desire, as it affects the will, which is the 
'rational appetite'. Bonaventure divides the latter into 'natural appetite', which 
orders the will to its end, beatitude, and 'deliberative appetite', which orders it to 
the means necessary to attain beatitude. The deliberative appetite, alone, can 
incline toward contrary things, those conducive to beatitude, or the contrary. 
Synderesis, being the natural rectitude of the will, cannot err, so cannot be 
corrupted by sin, which comes only from a deliberative movement of the will. 
While synderesis is a natural habitus of the will, sometimes called the "spark 
of conscience",63o conscience is a habitus of the intellect, directing it under the 
guidance of synderesis. The intellect, as for Thomas,631 has two essential 
functions, speculative and practical. In Bonaventure's account, the speculative 
intellect consists in an innate natural light which engenders the habit of the 
principles of knowledge. The same intellect, as practical, engenders the habit of 
principles of action. At the same time, the habit of speculative principles 
engenders the habit of science, while that of the principles of action engenders 
the habit of conscience. (conscientia = the accompaniment of science): 
conscience, as with Thomas, is concerned with deliberation and judgment. 
In both Thomas (p.1S6 above) and Bonaventure, synderesis, as a habitus 
associated with the natural law, is an aspect of natural inclination towards the 
goal of beatitude, therefore of natural finality. Likewise conscience, whether 
defined as an act applying knowledge drawn partly from synderesis (Aquinas), 
or as a habitus of knowledge concerning the natural law, applied under the 
630 Bonaventure, Sent.lI,d.39,a.2,q.1 ,concl.,ad.1 ,(Quar.II,909-1 0); cf.Aquinas, ST.la.79.12, 
~Leo. V,279-BO). 
31 Cf.Aquinas, ST.la.79.11 ,(Leo.V,27B-9). 
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guidance of synderesis (Bonaventure), cannot be separated from natural finality 
in either account. 
Bonaventure: The Operations of Grace 
Bonaventure's account of the order and operation of grace is constructed 
entirely around the two schemes of finality mentioned above: 1) emanation, re-
creation in the image and likeness of the divine Exemplar, and return to the 
Source by illumination,632 and 2) the ascent of the mind to God and recovery of 
the "spiritual senses".633 He refers to two 'creations': in the first, man was 
created in the divine image according to the three powers of memory, intellect 
and will; in the second, more glorious, re-creation, he begins to be conformed to 
the Godhead in a far more exalted fashion by the graces purchased by Christ 
the Redeemer in the form of the three theological virtues of faith, hope and love 
[caritas] , and to be made able to share in the life of the Trinity: 
Now eternal beatitude consists in possessing God, the supreme Good, a 
Good immeasurably surpassing anything man's service could 
merit. .. (Therefore) the soul. .. is lifted up through a God-conforming 
disposition. 
If, then, the rational soul is to become worthy of eternal beatitude, it must 
partake of the God-likening flow. Because this inpouring, rendering the soul 
deiform, comes from God, conforms to God, and leads to God as an end, it 
restores our spirit as the image of the most blessed Trinity.634 
Grace, in whatever form, is always a free gift, but requiring the active consent 
and co-operation of the recipient. If it is appropriate to speak of a 'purchase 
price', it consists mainly in desire of the final end, and active and prayerful 
seeking, asking, and receiving with gratitude (the appropriate response to 
gratia). As with Thomas (and Augustine), co-operation with the gifts of grace 
merits further grace. Grace in the 'general' sense is God's guiding and 
632 Chapter 1,p.39, In Hexaemeron,1.17. 
633 Chapter 1,p.4D, Itinerarium,4.4. 
634 Bonaventure, Breviloquium V.1.3,( Quar. V,252), de Vinck,182. 
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preserving presence and concurrence; grace in the 'special sense' concerns 
"that particular assistance which helps the soul prepare itself for receiving the 
gift of the Holy Spirit".635 This is gratia gratis data, later called 'actual' grace, 
which is given for particular acts, but does not remain in the soul.636 The grace 
which remains is habitual or sanctifying grace, which Bonaventure calls grace in 
the 'proper' sense: 
without which no one may acquire merit, advance in good, or attain eternal 
salvation. This grace, the root of all meriting, precedes any actual merit ... 
No one has a strict right to such grace, "yet in itself it deserves to be 
increased by God here on earth, so that, having been increased, it may 
deserve also to be perfected,,637 in the fatherland (in patria) and in eternal 
glory by this same God; for He alone has the power to infuse, augment, 
and complete our grace in the measure of the co-operation of our will, and 
in accord with the intent and good measure of His eternal decrees.638 
Bonaventure, like Thomas,639 is a compatibilist regarding the relation between 
free will and the action of divine grace. The "co-operation of our will" is entirely 
free and compatible with divine concurrence.640 Free will, in this context, is an 
active factor in the growth of grace in the soul: 
But once sanctifying grace is received , if good use is made of it, it merits 
its own increase in the present life. For as regards the influx of grace, God 
alone is its fontal source; but as regards the increase of grace, God is the 
source of its growth through infusion, while grace itself is the source of its 
own growth through merit and worth, and free will is the source of the 
growth of grace through the co-operating and meriting soul, in that free will, 
by working with grace, makes what belongs to grace its own.641 
The last statement here is of prime significance for the relationship between 
free will and grace. The will is not forced by grace, but, in "making what belongs 
635 Bonaventure, Breviloquium V.2.2,(Quar.V,253}, de Vinck,185. 
636 Bonaventure wrote the Breviloquium c.1256-7 (Hayes, 16-17). Until Thomas wrote the Prima 
Secundae (1271) of the Summa, after which its meaning was generally confined to the 
'charismatic' gifts of prophecy, miracles, etc., gratia gratis data had a very wide and 
indeterminate meaning. Lonergan calls it 'ambiguous': see his Grace and Freedom,24. 
637 A t' L ugus Ine, etter 186, 3: 10. 
638 Bonaventure, Breviloquium,V.2.2,( Quar.V,253}, de Vinck,185-6. 
639 See chapter 2,pp.98-1 00 above. 
640 Bonaventure, Sent.llI,d.31 ,a.1 ,q.2.ad.3,(Quar.III,677}; Sent.lI,d.26,a.un., 
Cl.6.ad.1,4,5,(Quar.II,646}. 
641 Bonaventure, Breviloquium,V.2.4,(Quar.V,254}, de Vinck,187. 
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to grace its own", it is enlightened, and strengthened towards the true good and 
final end. It is clear that the attraction of grace and the happiness of the desired 
end are both involved. 
It is 'gratuitous grace' (gratia gratis data) that turns the free will away from evil 
and prompts it towards good, but not without the consent of free will. In order to 
receive sanctifying grace, the will must first consent to the expulsion of sin by 
grace, and to the infusion of grace. Bonaventure at one paint speaks of the 
relationship between gratuitous [actual] grace and sanctifying grace in terms of 
the "in-forming" of the intellectual seminal principles by the rationes aeternae: 
.. because predisposition toward a perfective form must itself be in the 
likeness of that form: if free will is to open itself to sanctifying grace, it 
needs the help of actual grace. And because grace by its very nature does 
not force free will but solicits it, and also because both grace and will by 
their very nature pass into act: therefore, in our justification, the acts of free 
will and grace concur in a harmonious and orderly manner. Actual grace 
arouses free will, and free will must either give or refuse consent to such 
arousal. When it consents, it prepares itself for the reception of sanctifying 
grace, and that is the meaning of "the will doing all that it can".642 
The final reference here is clearly to Augustine's dictum that "God does not 
command the impossible, but bids you to do what you can, and ask for what 
you cannot".643 It is significant that Bonaventure refers to it here in the context of 
the will's openness to receive grace, both actual and habitual. Elsewhere, he 
writes, "For when the soul does what it can, grace lifts it up easily and God 
works in it..,,644 In order to receive salvation, the will must then co-operate with 
the sanctifying grace bestowed.645 
642 Bonaventure Breviloquium V 3.5,(Quar.V,255), de Vinck,191. 643 ' , • 
Augustine, De Natura et Gratia,c.43,(PL.44,271). 
644 Bonaventure In Hexaemeron XXI1.39,(Quar.V,443), de Vinck,360. 
645 ' , . 
Bonaventure, Breviloquium,V.3.1 ,(Quar.V,254), de Vlnck,189. 
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The seriousness of sin, and the destruction wrought in the soul by sin, are 
associated with the defacing of the divine image in the soul. This begins to be 
restored and healed by the infusion of the habits of the virtues: 
.. sin ... distorts free will, destroys the gift of grace, and imposes the 
obligation of eternal suffering. Since the defacing of God's image and the 
destruction of grace are, as it were, an annihilation of moral being and of 
the life of grace ... It is impossible for man to rise from sin unless he is 
created anew in the life of grace, iniquity is forgiven, and the eternal penalty 
remitted. He alone ... who was the Principle of creation is also the Principle 
of re-creation: He who is the Word of the eternal Father, Jesus Christ.. 
What was deformed through the evil of sin, He re-creates by reforming it 
through the habits of grace and righteousness.646 
In Bonaventure's division of the graces, as in Thomas's, it is the one grace 
which informs the three God-conforming theological virtues, as well as the other 
infused moral and intellectual virtues and gifts.647 Created grace is prior to the 
reception of uncreated grace, in the sense of providing the context or 
disposition for it: 
For truly, together with grace, and by means of grace, we receive the Holy 
Spirit, the uncreated Gift, the good and perfect Gift, coming down from the 
Father of Lights (James 1 :17) through the Word made flesh ... 648 
Similarly, the one (sanctifying) grace branches out into three different habits: the 
habits of the virtues, of the gifts, and of the beatitudes. The virtues are seven in 
number, three theological and four cardinal; all are freely given and infused. 
With the exception of charity, "all virtues dependent upon grace are 
interrelated649 and equal in their meriting power". 650 The reference to 
'dependence upon grace' here implies that not all the moral and intellectual 
virtues are infused by God: some (as with Thomas651 ) are acquired by natural 
646 Bonaventure, Breviloquium,V.3.2-3,(Quar.V,255), de Vinck,189-90. . 
647 Bonaventure, Breviloquium, VA.6,( Quar. V,257), de Vinck,p.196; Ct. Aquinas, ST.I-
!~111.3.ad.2,(Leo. VII,320); Scotus, Ord.lI,d.27,q.un.,n.1 ~,(Vat.vIlI,288-9). 
649 Bonaventure, Breviloquium,V.1.2,(Quar.V,252), de Vlnck,181. 
Ct. Aquinas, ST.I-11.65,(Leo.VI,418-27). 
650 Bonaventure Breviloquium VA.6 (Quar.V,257), de Vinck,195. 
651 ' " Ct. Aquinas, ST.I-11.63 and 68.5,(Leo.VI,406-11 ,452). 
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means on the Aristotelian pattern. However, when a mortal sin is committed, all 
except charity are reduced to a formless existence. Charity is "the form of all the 
virtues", so cannot exist without a form, and disappears altogether. All may be 
re-informed by penance on the return of grace. Grace is the origin, the end, and 
the form of the virtues. 
Bonaventure: The Virtues, Beatitudes, Gifts and Fruits of the Holy Spirit 
The result of this is an account of the relationship between the virtues, gifts and 
beatitudes with some similarity to Thomas's (pp.164-7 above): 
Now, some of the moral acts are original, as believing; others are 
intermediate, as understanding what is believed; others again are final, as 
attaining the vision of what is understood. Through the first, the soul is set 
aright, through the second it is urged on, through the third it is brought to 
full perfection. Hence sanctifying grace branches out into the habits of the 
virtues, that set the soul aright, those of the gifts, that urge it on, and those 
of the beatitudes that lead it to perfection.652 
For perfect rectitude, the soul must be set aright in respect of both the final end 
and the means of attaining it. In view of the end, the Trinitarian image in the 
soul is set aright by the three theological virtues: 
Faith, through belief and assent, leads to the supreme Truth (the Son); 
hope, through trust and expectation, to the loftiest Height (the Father); 
charity, through desire and love, to the greatest Good (the Holy Spirit).653 
In view of the means to the end, the soul is set aright by the four cardinal 
virtues: 
Prudence rectifies the rational faculties, fortitude the irascible appetite, 
temperance the concupiscible appetite, while justice directs all of these 
powers in their relation to a given person ... That is why it uustice] is called 
not only a cardinal virtue, but also a general virtue that comprehends the 
rectitude of the whole soul; wherefore it may be defined as "rectitude of the 
will".654 Justice is not limited to those virtues which concern the neighbour 
alone - for instance, equity and generosity; it applies also to those which 
652 Bonaventure, Breviloquium,V.4.3,(Quar.V,256), de Vinck, 194; Sent.lll,d.34,p.1 ,a.1 ,q.1, 
~Quar."I, 736-8). 6: Bonaventure, Breviloquium,V.4.4,(Quar.V,256), de Vinck,194 (my parentheses). 
Cf.Anselm, De Veritate,12, Davies,166-171. 
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concern oneself - for instance, repentance and innocence - and to those 
which refer to God - for instance, adoration, dutiful love, and obedience.655 
Hence, the term "justification" is used to signify the making-righteous of the 
soul, especially in God's eyes. 
While the habits of the virtues are given to set the soul aright and "to correct 
the deviations of the vices", the habits of the gifts are given to urge us on, and 
to "deliver us from the difficulties of the after-effects" of the vices.656 
Bonaventure goes on to justify the number of the gifts (seven) by describing 
seven "instances" in which the soul needs help: each instance, as to be 
expected, involving seven different needs. To give two examples, in the first 
instance, in "repelling ... the deviations of the vices: 
Fear (of the Lord) helps against pride, piety against envy, knowledge 
against anger which is a kind of insanity, fortitude against sloth which 
destroys the soul's power for good, counsel against covetousness, 
understanding against gluttony, and wisdom against lust. 
Second, the gifts are properly seven to assist the natural powers. The 
irascible power needs help toward good in both happiness and misfortune: 
in happiness it is helped by fear (of the Lord), in misfortune by fortitude. 
The concupiscible power needs help in loving the neighbour, and finds it in 
piety; in loving God, and finds it in wisdom. The rational power needs help 
in considering, choosing, and following the truth: understanding is a help in 
considering the truth, counsel in its choosing, and knowledge in its 
following. 65? 
The other five "instances" of need are, third, " to help the seven virtues"; fourth, 
to help us "to suffer in the same spirit as Christ"; fifth, "to help us act effectively"; 
sixth, "to help us contemplate"; seventh, "to facilitate both action and 
contemplation". Among the gifts, wisdom takes the place occupied by charity 
among the virtues: "And, as charity is the origin and consummation of every 
655 Bonaventure, Brev;loqu;um,VA.5,(Quar.V,256), de Vinck,195. 
656 Bonaventure, Brev;loqu;um,V.5.2,(Quar.V,257), de Vinck,198. 
657 Bonaventure, Brev;loqu;um, V.5.3-4,( Quar. V,257), de Vinck,198-9. 
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'/1 658 . . d f ·ft" 659 I . VI ue , SO IS WIS om 0 every gl. n his (early) Commentary on the 
Sentences, Bonaventure writes that the word wisdom 
designates an experiential knowledge of God; and in this sense it is one of 
the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. The act of this gift consists in tasting the 
divine sweetness ... The act of the gift of wisdom is partly cognitive and 
partly affective. It begins in knowledge and is consummated in affection. 
The taste or savouring is an experiential knowledge of that which is good 
and sweet.. 660 
Bonaventure's whole cosmos, as already noted, is structured on the pattern 
of emanation, exemplarity, and return by illumination to the Source. The sense 
of a creation ordered by 'desire' for its final end comes across, if anything, even 
more strongly than in St. Thomas. To this end, all the divinely-infused habits of 
the soul are a preparation, at different levels, for the next stage of the soul's 
'ascent': 
Assuredly, then, the main task of the habits of the virtues is to prepare man 
for the labours of his active life; that of the habits of the gifts, to prepare him 
for the repose of contemplation; that of the habits of the beatitudes, to 
prepare him for the perfection of both.661 
The gifts are 'preliminary dispositions' for reception of the habits of the 
beatitudes. The beatitudes themselves are concerned with the perfection of the 
soul, with its virtues and gifts. Here, the gift of wisdom is associated with the 
beatitude of the making of peace, "because wisdom unites us to the supremely 
True and Good in whom all our rational desires find their end and their 
repose".662 The beatitudes, in turn, are the fertile ground for the appearance of 
the twelve 'fruits' of the Holy Spirit (GaI.5:22-24; 1 Cor.13:4-7): 
This peace, once attained, is necessarily followed by the overflowing 
spiritual delight of the twelve fruits that imply the excess of joy ... Then is 
658 
6 Jerome, Letter82.11,(PL.22.742). 
59 Bonaventure, Brev;/oqu;um,V.5.5,(Quar.V,257), de Vinck,199. ::~ Bonaventure, Sent.lIl,d.35,a.un.c,( Quar.lIl, 774); cf.A~uinas, ST.la.43.5.ad.2,(Leo.IV,450). 
662 Bonaventure, Brev;/oqu;um,V.6.6,(Quar.V,259), de V~nck,205. 
Bonaventure, Brevi/oquium,V.6.5,(Quar.V,259), de Vlnck,205. 
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m~n apt .for contemplation and for the vision and embrace of Spouse and 
bride which come about through the spiritual senses.663 
Bonaventure himself, inspired by the experience of his spiritual master, St. 
Francis, is not at all reticent about the experiential nature of the later stages of 
the ascent. He himself is clearly 'on fire', so to speak, with desire for the 
consummation of the soul's union with the Beloved in patria, and clearly invites 
his readers to follow the same path, motivated by the same desire. The 
necessary desire is kindled by prayer, and by the intellect turning to the light: 
For one is not disposed to contemplation which leads to mental elevation 
unless one be with Daniel a man of desires (Dan.9:23). But desires are 
kindled in us in two ways: by the cry of prayer, which makes one groan 
with the murmuring of one's heart, and by a flash of apprehension by which 
the mind turns most directly and intensely to the rays of light (Ps.36:9).664 
DUNS SCOTUS ON GRACE 
Natural Law and Divine Absolute Power 
In contrast to Aquinas's account of naturallaw,665 based on the eternal law and 
natural finality, and comprising all the precepts of the Decalogue, Scotus's 
account of natural law concerns itself with his understanding of God's ability to 
revoke the precepts which he himself has laid down: 
In every agent acting intelligently and voluntarily that can act in conformity 
with an upright or just law but does not have to do so of necessity, one can 
distinguish between its ordained power (potentia ordinata) and its absolute 
power (potentia absoluta) ... And therefore it is not only in God, but in every 
free agent that can either act in accord with the dictates of a just law or go 
beyond or against the law, that one distinguishes between absolute and 
ordained power.666 
However, for the rational creature, subject to that law, the exercise of its 
potentia absoluta, beyond its ordained power, can never be legitimate: 
::: Bonaventure, Breviloquium,V.6.5,(Quar.V, 259), de Vinck,205. 
665 Bonaventure, Itinerarium, Prologue,3,( Quar. V,296), Boas,4. 
Chapter 2,pp.89-90. 
666 Scotus, Ordinatio,l,d.44,q.un.,(Vat.VI,363), trans.,Allan B.Wolter,O.F.M .. , Duns Scotus on the 
Will and Morality, Washington D.C., CUA Press, bilingual edition,1986,255. 
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But when that upright law ... is not in the power of that agent, then its 
absolute power cannot exceed its ordained power in regard to any object 
without it acting disorderly or inordinately.66? 
The exercise of the divine potentia absoluta is seen in the Old Testament 
"exceptions" to the usual order, in which actions clearly contrary to the natural 
law as normally understood, and as decreed by the Decalogue, are carried out 
by divine command. The examples most commonly given are, the command to 
Abraham to sacrifice Isaac (Genesis 22)668, the command to the Israelites to 
despoil the Egyptians (Exodus 12:35-6) 669, and the command to Hosea to 
"Go ... love a woman who loves another man, an adulteress .. " (Hosea 3:1 ).670 
Scotus sees these as "exceptions" or dispensations from the precepts 
enshrined in the Decalogue. As such, they provide the rationale for Scotus's 
reconfiguring of the whole basis of his ethics, away from the teleological 
account espoused by Thomas and Bonaventure. For Thomas, the natural law 
receives its unchanging and unchangeable character from its participation in the 
eternal law, as manifested in the act of creation. The natural law encompasses 
the whole of the Decalogue. Its precepts concern that which is fitting to 
teleologically-oriented rational natures, 
Hence, what is commanded there is not good merely because it is 
commanded, but commanded because it is good in itself. Likewise, what is 
prohibited there is not evil merely because it is prohibited, but forbidden 
because it is evil.6?1 
667 Scotus, Ordinatio, l,d.44,q.un.,(Vat. VI,363), Wolter,255. .' 
668 Cf.Aquinas,STI-11.1 00.8.ad.3,(Leo. VII,215): Thomas denies that this was a dlspens~tlon to 
do what the Decalogue forbids, as "God, Who is Lord of life and death ... inflicts the punlsh,ment 
of death on all men, both godly and ungodly, on account of the sin of our first parent, and If a 
man be the executor of that sentence by Divine authority, he will be no murderer any more than 
God would be". 
669 Cf.Aquinas,STII-11.66.5.ad.1 ,(Leo.IX,90): Thomas denies that this was theft, as "the , 
Lord ... ordered this to be done on account of the ill-treatment accorded to them by the Egyptians 
without any cause: wherefore ... The just took the spoils of the wicked" (Wisdom 10: 19). , 
670 Cf.Aquinas,STI-11.1 00.8.ad.3,(Leo. VII,215): Again, this is not an infringement ,of t~e .slxth 
commandment, because carried out "by command of God, Who is Author of the Institution of 
marriage". 
671 Scotus, Ordinatio,lIl,d.37,q.un.,(Olms-Wadding, VII,pt.2,878), Wolter,1986,272. 
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If this were true, Scotus replies, there would be no possibility of revocation or 
dispensation, even by God, from any of the precepts. The Old Testament 
exceptions show that this is not so for precepts 4 - 10. Therefore those 
precepts cannot, unlike 1 to 3, be absolutely necessary with regard to bringing 
man to his final end. Furthermore, they cannot be said to be willed by God on 
account of their goodness. On the contrary, they can be said to be good 
because, and only because, God has commanded them. For the same reason , 
the things they prohibit can be said to be evil in all circumstances, barring divine 
dispensation. 
Departing from Thomas's view, which assigns all the Decalogue precepts, 
without differentiation, to the naturallaw,672 Scotus makes a distinction between 
the two 'tables' of the law, as each relates to natural necessity. The first table, 
precepts 1 to 3, he assigns to natural law "strictly speaking". There can be no 
exceptions to laws seen to be necessary in themselves, and from which even 
the divine potentia absoluta cannot dispense. These precepts draw their 
obligatory force from the intra-divine necessity and the "first law" which it entails: 
"God is to be loved above all, and for Himself'. Therefore, natural law in the 
strictest sense comprises only moral truths known to be true in virtue of their 
terms (per se notum ex terminis) and therefore accessible to natural reason, i.e. 
those which "regard God immediately as their object".673 This means the first 
two commandments, as well as (with some reservations674) the third. 
672 A' S 67 qUlnas, T.1-11.100.1c,(Leo.VII,206). 
67: Scotus, Ordinafio,lIl,d.37,q.un.,(Olms-Wadding,VII,pt.2,898), Wolter,1986,277. 
Scotus, Ordinafio,III,d.37,q.un.,(Olms-Wadding,VII,pt.2,898), Wolter,277-279. 
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For Aquinas, the whole issue of dispensability hinges on "the intention of the 
lawgiver". The second table, as much as the first, embodies that intention, 
.. which includes "that nothing undue be done to anyone, and that each be 
given his due; for it is in this sense that we are to take the precepts of the 
Decalogue. Consequently, the precepts of the Decalogue admit of no 
dispensation whatever. 675 
The New Law, one could say, in a real sense, eliminates any supposed 
distinction between those precepts "having God as their object" and those not. 
Now, "God is among us", the commandment to love one's neighbour - which 
comes from the first table in any case - can be seen to have God as its object 
also: "Whatever you did to the least of these ... " Far from being dispensable, the 
moral precepts are made more stringent in the light of the Sermon on the 
Mount. 
With Scotus, the central issue becomes the free exercise of recta ratio in 
applying whatever is apprehended in natural law as a 'practical' truth (i.e., 'to be 
done' or 'not to be done'). Scotus's over-riding concern with divine freedom as 
opposed to necessity is focused here on the possibility of revocation of precepts 
of natural law, or dispensation from their observance. Scotus in fact makes the 
possibility of dispensation a basis for redefining natural law itself, in its essence 
and not just in its scope, in a manner designed to eliminate natural necessity or 
teleology. The possibility of revocation could hardly apply to a law founded on 
human nature in its essential immutability: that is, the kind of immutability that 
would place God under necessity in its regard. Therefore Scotus rejects any 
basis for the second table in human nature. The element of unchangeability is 
confined to the first table, which is founded on the immutable divine nature 
(Ockham will sever even this connection to nature and immutability). 
675 Aquinas,ST.I-11.1 OO.8c,(Leo. VII,215). 
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Scotus: The Role of Recta Ratio 
Scotus tells us that "The moral goodness of an act consists in its having all that 
the agent's right reason declares must pertain to the act or the agent in 
acting.,,676 Scotus's account of the "naturalness" of the natural law in terms of 
human nature is centred very much on recta ratio, as opposed to natural 
teleology in the case of Thomas. Likewise, moral goodness in action is 
discerned by recta ratio.677 Scotus does, in fact, acknowledge an intrinsic 
connection between the nature of the agent and the moral law: 
[Rational agents] ... act by virtue of intellectual knowledge, which alone is 
able to pass judgment, properly speaking, upon the appropriateness of the 
action. Such agents are suited by nature to have an intrinsic rule of 
rectitude for their actions. Only they can have an act whose goodness is 
moral. But for this it is not enough that the agent have the ability to 
adjudicate the appropriateness of his acts. He must actually pass judgment 
upon the act and carry it out in accord with that judgment.678 
In addition, of the three items of knowledge Scotus considers sufficient for the 
correct discernment of "all that must pertain to the act" for moral goodness, two 
concern the nature of the agent: 
Every judgment begins with something certain ... Hence it presupposes 
something certain but judged by this intellect, namely: the nature of the 
agent and the power [faculty] by which he acts together with the essential 
notion of the act. If these three notions are given, no other knowledge is 
needed to judge whether or not this particular act is suited to this agent and 
this faculty. For instance, if one knows what man is, what his intellectual 
powers are, and what an act of understanding is, then it is clear to him that 
it befits man to understand with his intellect. 679 
As with moral goodness, so with Scotus's account of the teleological orientation 
of the human being. The ruling principle regarding merit and the virtues is God's 
free acceptance of the acts concerned. However, the teleological orientation is 
itself a matter of God's active ordering: 
I say that the meritorious act is one acceptable to God in a special way, 
viz., as worthy of a reward. I say "in a special way" because God accepts 
676 Scotus, Quodlibet,XVII1.3,(Olms-Wadding,XII,475), Alluntis, 1975,400, 18.8. 
:;: Scotus, Ordinatio,lIl,d.37 (Olms-Wadding,VII,pt.2,878), ~olter,1986,269-287. 
679 Scotus, Quodlibet,XVII1.4,(Olms-Wadding,XII,4 76), Allunt~s,402, 18.11-12. 
Scotus, Quodlibet,XVII1.5,(Olms-Wadding,XII,476), Alluntls,402-3,18.13. 
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all acts with a general acceptation. He loves them according to the 
measure of their goodness and orders them to himself as their last end. A 
meritorious act, however, he accepts with reference to some good which 
ought to be justly awarded it.680 
As the teleological orientation of the will is not safeguarded by natural pOints of 
reference, reason working discursively becomes a partial cause, together with 
the object, of volition: 
Augustine wants will to have a memory; but this can only be if it concurs 
with will in the act of willing, for otherwise free will would be blind (because 
willing freely, as such, would be blind); therefore free will includes not only 
will, but also cognition. And this is clear from the Master (Lombard), who 
says "free will is the faculty of will and reason" etc. Whence, according to 
Augustine, 'the will, when it is upright, knows what it desires'. Therefore 
'nature freely understanding' is in this way the cause of the act of willing .. , 
thus free will comprises those two powers, namely, intellect and wil1. 681 
Intellect as "reason working discursively", and free will, together inform the 
natural appetite, which Scotus identifies as the affectio iustitiae - the desire to 
"render to each what is his due". In this way, the teleological orientation of the 
soul is preserved and promoted. Scotus maintains the inseparable connection 
between right reason and virtuous acts. 
Scotus: Original Holiness and Grace 
Just as the will, for Scotus, is the seat of the virtues, so it becomes the locus of 
the encounter between nature and grace. Unlike Thomas, Scotus recognizes 
only the three theological virtues as being divinely infused. He sees no reason 
to extend this to the moral virtues or prudence.682 This is in keeping with a more 
exalted view of human natural capabilities in general, as compared to most of 
::~ Scotus, Quodlibet,XVII.16,(Olms-Wadding,XII,461), Alluntis,389,17.6. 
Scotus, Lectura, lI,d.25,n. 78,(Vaf.XIX,255-6), my trans.: .. vult Augustinus quod voluntas 
habet memoriam; sed hoc non potest esse nisi quia cum voluntate concurrit ad causandu"! 
actum volendi aliter enim liberum arbitrium esset caecum (quia libere volens, in quantum Ilbere 
volens est, es~et caecus); et ideo liberum arbitrium non tantum includit voluntatem, sed etiam . 
cognitionem. Et hoc patet per Magistrum, qui dicit quod "liberum arbitrium est.fac~ltas vo/~~tatls 
et rationis" etc. Unde secundum Augustinum 'voluntas, quando recta est, nov/~ qUid appe.fIt .. 
'Natura igitur intelligens libera' est huiusmodi causa actus volendi ... , ita quod liberum arbltnum 
complectitur iIIas duas potentias, scilicet intellectum et voluntatem. 
682 Scotus, Ordinatio,lIl,d.34,(Olms-Wadding,VII,pt.2, 722,729), Wolter,1986,355. 
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his contemporaries. In keeping with the absolute priority of the human will, the 
encounter with grace takes place through its mediacy, so to speak. The two 
'affections' of the will are central to Scotus's account: 
.. just as the affections are distinct in the will, so also the habits inclining one 
to these acts will be distinct. That is why I say that charity perfects the will 
insofar as it is inclined to, or subject to, the affection for justice, whereas 
hope perfects the will insofar as it is inclined to, or subject to, the affection 
for what is advantageous. And so charity and hope will be distinct virtues, 
not only by reason of their acts, which are to love and to desire 
respectively, but also by reason of what receives these acts, namely, the 
will insofar as it has an affection both for justice and for what is 
advantageous.683 
His account of grace and the virtues reflects the separation he makes between 
free will and nature. His exalted view of the will's propensities in man, even in 
his fallen state, inevitably entails a correspondingly 'minimizing' account of the 
state of human nature before the Fall. By labelling that minimizing state 
"supernatural", he can call our post-Fall state merely natural, in contrast to the 
Augustinian view, adopted by Henry of Ghent, which sees our present state as 
"sub-natural". Scotus's account of original justice entails that it could, though it 
did not in fact, have existed without sanctifying grace.684 Similarly, it did not 
preclude corruption or mortality, though in fact it may have experienced 
neither.685 According to Cross, "Scotus's Adam was spiritually undeveloped, 
unable to produce meritorious actions".686 This seems inconsistent with Adam's 
ability to commit such a demeritorious action as the original disobedience. 
However, "Scotus often assumes unfallen humanity [i.e. Adam's descendants 
without the Fall] would have been capable of meritorious actions".687 
683 Scotus Ordinatio III d.26 (Olms-Wadding,VII,pt.2,635), Wolter, 1986, 179, 181. 
684 ' ", 
Scotus, Ordinatio,II,dd.30-32,qq.1-4,n.19,(VatVIII,357). 
685 Scotus, Ordinatio,II,d.18,q.un.,(Olms-Wadding,VI,784-7). 
::~ Richard Cross, Duns Scotus,1999,99. '. . . 
Cross,99; Scotus, Ordinatio,II,d.19,q.un.,n.5,(Olms-Waddlng,VI,812), Ordmatlo,II,d,29, 
q.un,n. 7,( Vat. VIII,317). 
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Scotus's 'developed' account of original sin in the later Ordinatio is forensic in 
nature, though based on Anselm. Original justice was given to Adam by God 
together with a command not to lose it. By sinning, Adam failed in his obligation, 
and earned punishment, which, by God's decision, extended to his 
descendants. By the divine decision, Adam's sin is sufficient for our not having 
original justice. Although concupiscence results from the absence of original 
justice, original sin is, in essence, failure in the obligation to possess that 
justice.688 
Scotus: Augustinian Illumination Banished 
From the mid 1270s onwards, some scholars, notably Peter John Olivi (c.1248-
1298), had voiced difficulties concerning the interaction of divine light and the 
ordinary human intellect prior to grace: how can it be said to know eternal 
truth?689 In response, Henry of Ghent re-formulated the argument for the 
account of divine illumination derived from Augustine and championed by 
Bonaventure. However, he did so by presenting it "in a particularly vulnerable 
form, since it included the Aristotelian theory of abstraction as well [as the 
Augustinian]".69o Concepts abstracted from sense knowledge via phantasms 
would still remain without form and less than fully certain if not for the fact that 
"the natural light of reason ascends to the eternal light itself' and forms "an 
irreducibly simple concept proper to God", but one that is "only analogous to the 
concept that we abstract from creatures".691 Scotus was concerned that this 
concept of analogy, because of its dependence on Augustinian illumination 
688 Scotus, Ordinatio II,dd.30-32,qq.1-4,n.11 ,(Vat.vIlI,319-358). . . 
689 See Timothy Noone, "Divine Illumination" in Cambridge History of MedIeval PhIlosophy, 
~~1.1, CUP,201 O,chapter 27,369-383,380-1. . . .' 
William A.Frank and Alan B.Wolter, Duns Scotus, MetaphysIcIan, Purdue University Press, 
1995,138, my emphasis and parenthesis. 
691 Frank and Wolter,136-7. 
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theory, "placed an unbridgeable logical chasm between ordinary language and 
meaningful talk about God", without some univocal concept to clarify it. 
Consequently, "Scotus's devastating critique of Henry692 had the practical effect 
of eliminating the Augustinian as a distinct alternative to the Aristotelian theory 
of abstraction from that time onward". 693 
Scotus shares Thomas's Aristotelian view of the human passive intellect as a 
tabula rasa from birth, and of the agent intellect as 'natural light' ,694 but goes 
further than Thomas towards naturalism in deducing unaided ability to form true 
univocal concepts, including even natural knowledge of God, if only in the form 
of "general (Le. universal) notions" (in generalibus rationibus).695 Thus, Scotus 
eliminates Augustine's Neoplatonic concept of illumination by means of his own 
univocal concept of being. One modern scholar, Robert Pasnau, sees Aquinas 
as one of the last representatives of the old tradition, and Scotus as the 
innovator: 
Scotus, of course believes that the human mind is created by God, but he 
differs from Aquinas in putting no weight on any kind of illumination, innate 
or acquired. It is not that we are illuminated by the divine light, as Aquinas 
joined the Augustinian tradition in believing, but that the truth we grasp is 
illuminated. Thanks to God, our world is intelligible. Scotus's thoroughly 
naturalistic account of the human intellect represents a turning-point in the 
history of philosophy. Viewed from this perspective, Aquinas marks the end 
of the first chapter in the history of the philosophy of mind.696 
Timothy Noone, on the other hand, regards Aquinas as the real innovator: 
.. historically speaking there can be no doubt that the non-illuminationist 
account of mind, first advanced by Aquinas and then developed into a 
thoroughgoing theory by Scotus, displaced illuminationism. The focus of 
epistemology shifted from the problem of eternal truth and certainty to the 
692 Found in Scotus, Ordinatio,l,d.3,p.1,qA,(Vat.III,123-171). 
693 Frank and Wolter,138. 
694 See e.g. Scotus, Ordinatio,lI,d.27,q.un.,(Vat. VIII,289). 
:: Scotus, Ordinatio,l,d.3,q.2,n.57,( Vat.III,39), Frank and Wolter,116-7. 
Pasnau, Aquinas,310. 
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topic of universal knowledge analyzed through competing versions of 
intuitive and abstractive cognition. 59? 
Neither of the scholars cited, in the works referred to here, makes any mention 
of the distinction, which is clear enough in Thomas, between (1) illumination 
understood as some special divine assistance (beyond concurrence) for even 
the ordinary acts of apprehension and comprehension for which every human 
being is normally equipped, and (2) illumination by divine revelation and 
redeeming grace, designed to draw human beings toward God and salvation. 
This is the subject of the 'six stages of illumination' described by Bonaventure in 
his 'Ascent' of the mind to God. 
Belief in the direct involvement of the angelic hierarchy in illuminating and 
perfecting human beings also declines rapidly after Scotus. For him, God has 
sufficiently illuminated created things themselves for us not to need any 
additional supernatural assistance to grasp their truth, and the truth of the terms 
we use about them.698 However, he is speaking only of naturally-acquired 
knowledge, including natural knowledge of God,699 which pagans also share. 
Bonaventure had said something similar about creation itself, that it was God's 
first 'word' to man, that it was created to communicate knowledge of God's 
existence, glory and power, and his providence and love for his creatures. But 
Bonaventure had also said that, since the Fall, man had become incapable of 
reading it correctly without additional supernatural assistance. 700 
697 Noone, Illumination, 382. 
698 Scotus, Ordinatio,l,d.3,p.1 ,q.4,nn.267-9,(Vat.lIl, 163-5). 
699 Ct. Romans 1 :20. 
700 Bonaventure, Brevi/oquium,11.12.4,(Quar.V,230), de Vinck,105; see chapter 1,p.44 above. 
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However, according to Noone, "80th modern scholars and their Renaissance 
predecessors have questioned whether this [dismissal of divine illumination] 
ought to have occurred''.701 Their questioning seems to me justified, if one 
makes a comparison between Bonaventure's account and Scotus's. 
Bonaventure's 'six stages of illumination' in The Ascent of the Mind to God take 
in, as the first rung of the ladder, both earthly and heavenly creation as vestige 
and sign of the Trinity, and of God's plan of salvation. The visible creation was 
God's first 'word' to man, which, through sin, he became incapable of reading 
and understanding. In this sense, there is continuity, not a radical discontinuity, 
between the natural and supernatural worlds. Both are God's work. Both are 
signs of God's intention to save. For Bonaventure and Thomas, illumination, or 
sight, is a metaphor for the intellect and understanding (We still say "I see" 
when we understand). The aural sense is, rather a metaphor for the will and 
assent (as in the Gospel admonition, "He who hears you hears me": Luke 
10:16). 
What is happening with Scotus, I suggest, is that a 'divine illumination' 
paradigm of sight and understanding is being replaced, or substituted, by a 
'divine command' paradigm of hearing and assent. Each of these is perfectly 
valid as far as it goes, and indeed they are perfectly complementary. Yet there 
seems no reason to believe that either one is an adequate substitute for the 
other, any more than the ears are an adequate substitute for the eyes - or the 
will for the intellect. The danger must be that, from now on, spiritual blindness, 
the wound inflicted on nature by sin,702 will no longer be recognized for what it 
701 Noone, Illumination, 382. 
702 For Thomas, it is, rather, a deprivation of something for which the soul has a natural 
capacity, see Aquinas ST.II-11.1S.1 c,(Leo.VIII, 118). Bonaventure is quite clear that human 
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is. Both Thomas and Bonaventure see spiritual blindness as something that can 
only be cured by the grace of Christ. 703 
In order to place Scotus's handling of grace in context, it is useful, first of all, 
to look at Thomas's account of the relationship between grace and finality in 
respect of Divine providence. His account, characteristically for Thomas, takes 
its cue from God's provision for non-rational creatures, on the grounds that 
.. it is not fitting that God should provide less for those He loves, that they 
may acquire supernatural good, than for creatures, whom He loves, that 
they may acquire natural good. Now He so provides for natural creatures, 
that not merely does He move them to their natural acts, but He bestows 
upon them certain forms and powers, which are the principles of acts, in 
order that they may of themselves be inclined to these movements, and 
thus the movements whereby they are moved by God become natural and 
easy to creatures, according to Wisdom 8:1: "She ... orders all things 
sweetly". Much more therefore does He infuse into such as He moves 
towards the acquisition of supernatural good, certain forms or supernatural 
qualities, whereby they may be moved by Him sweetly and promptly to 
acquire eternal good; and thus the gift of grace is a quality.704 
This passage from Thomas is cited by de Lubac in one of his seminal works 
aimed at dispelling certain very long-standing confusions concerning the 
relationship between nature and grace.705 The point at issue is that grace, 
though supernatural, is neither "super-added" to the soul in the manner of 
something essentially alien to it; nor is the soul subsumed or absorbed by it, so 
as to lose its natural identity and integrity; nor yet is grace "naturalizable", thus 
losing its essentially supernatural, divine character. Thomas describes it as a 
quality, or "accidental form,,706 infused into the soul: an accident in that, being 
nature is wounded by sin: Deum enim offendit et naturam laedit; et offendendo Deum hominem 
watia exspoliat, et laedendo naturam vulnerat naturalia (Sent.IV,Prol.,Quar.IV, 1). 
03 Aquinas, STII-11.118.4.obj.3,(Leo.IX,458-9); Bonaventure, Sent.IV,d.15,p.2,dub.9, 
~Quar.IV,379). 
04 Aquinas, STI-11.11 O.2c,(Leo.VII,312). . . 
705 Henri de Lubac, S.J., A Brief Catechesis on Nature and Grace, San FranCISco, IgnatiUs 
Press, 1984,41. 
706 Aquinas, STI-11.11 O.2.ad.2,(Leo.VII,313). 
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divine, it cannot become the sUbstance of the soul: a form in that, being infused, 
it belongs inalienably to the soul. De Lubac describes the relationship: 
The supernatural, one might say, is that divine element which man's effort 
cannot reach (no self-divinization!) but which unites itself to man, 
"elevating" him,707 ... penetrating him in order to divinize him, and thus, 
becoming as it were an attribute of the "new man" described by St. Pau1708. 
While it remains forever "un-naturalizable", it profoundly penetrates the 
depths of man's being ... Call it an accident, or call it a habitus, or "created 
grace": these are all different ways of saying (even if one thinks they need 
various correctives or precisions) that man becomes in truth a sharer in the 
divine nature (divinae consories naturae: 2 Peter 1 :4).709 
De Lubac goes on to say that St. Thomas speaks of a "connaturality" 
established between God and man. He quotes von Balthasar on the meaning of 
this connaturality: in classical theological language it has two names: 
One is an objective name and denotes the reality in itself, and this is grace, 
which is a sharing in God's own intimate reality; as "sanctifying grace" it 
gives us objectively a share in God's being; as "actual grace" it enables us 
to live this reality and act with it. The other name is subjective and shows 
our consciousness of its presence; it is divine virtue (Le., an aptitude, a 
capacity to turn ourselves towards God) and is thus the triad: faith, hope 
and charity.710 
'Grace' and 'virtue are here seen as two names for the one divinizing reality of 
grace, which Thomas calls 'connaturality for Divine things', i.e. a participation in 
Divine being and life: 
Now this sympathy or connaturality for Divine things is the result of charity, 
which unites us to God, according to 1 Cor.6: 17: "He who is joined to the 
Lord is one spirit".711 
Connaturality is here associated with the indwelling Holy Spirit and the gift of 
wisdom, which enables us "to judge aright about Divine things on account of 
connaturality with them". 712 
707 Cf.Vatican II, Lumen Gentium 2. 
708 Cf.2.Cor.S:17. 
709 De Lubac, Catechesis,41-2. . . 
710 Hans Urs von Balthasar, De /,integration: aspects d'une theologie de I'hlstof(e, Brussels and 
Paris, DDB, 1970, 106; de Lubac, Catechesis,42-3. 
711 Aquinas, ST.II-IIAS.2c,cfAc,(Leo.VIII,341 ,342). 
712 Aquinas, ST.II-IIAS.2c,(Leo.VIII,341). 
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Scotus: Human Nature, Sin and the Necessity of Grace 
Scotus asks "whether human nature alone is sufficient to love God above all? 
His answer is perhaps surprising in the context of a question on the need for the 
infused virtue of charity: 
.. natural reason dictates that the infinite good be loved above all. 
Consequently, the will can do this by its purely natural endowments, for the 
intellect could not rightly dictate something to the will that the natural will 
could not tend towards or carry out naturally.713 
Scotus gives his conclusion, conceding that "by purely natural means any will 
could love God above all", but then adds the qualification, "at least (saltern), as 
human nature existed in the state in which it was instituted", i.e. in the state of 
original holiness and justice. This is, in fact, in accordance with Thomas, whose 
view of the state of man in the earthly paradise is generally more "elevated" 
than Scotus'S.714 Thomas concludes: 
Hence in the state of perfect nature man referred the love of himself and of 
all other things to the love of God as to its end; and thus he loved God 
more than himself and above all things. But in the state of corrupt nature 
man falls short of this in the appetite of his rational will, which, unless it is 
cured by God's grace, follows its private good, on account of the corruption 
of nature.715 
Regarding the state of nature in via, Scotus says that "this precept. .. can be 
fulfilled in this life, but not as to all the conditions which are implied by the 
words, "with your whole heart, your whole soul", etc., because of impediments 
to the will caused by the lack of recollection and unity among the faculties. He 
cites Augustine and Lombard here in support.716 
The respective answers of Thomas and Scotus to the question, "whether man 
without grace (Scotus: "the free will of man without grace") can avoid all mortal 
713 Scotus, Ordinatio III,suppl.,d.27,q.un.,(Olms-Wadding,VII,pt.2,656); Wolter,1986,435. 
714 See p.188 above. 
715 Aquinas, ST.I-11.1 09.3c,cfAc,(Leo. VII,295,297). 
716 Scotus, Ordinatio III,suppl.,d.27,q.un,(Olms-Wadding, VII,pt.2,654-5), Wolter,1986,441. 
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sin", are characteristic of the preoccupations of each, though they arrive at the 
same basic answer to the question. Thomas focuses on the need for healing 
grace (gratia sanans), Scotus on the entirely free divine decision to justify the 
repentant sinner, or not, and subsequently to impart sanctifying grace, or not. 
However, he does acknowledge that God, by His potentia ordinata, has in fact 
committed Himself to reward the repentant sinner with justification, i.e. habitual 
or sanctifying grace. Both of them give their answers with reference to the 
original state of man, Thomas as follows: 
Now in the state of perfect nature, man, without habitual grace, could avoid 
sinning either mortally or venially; since to sin is nothing else than to stray 
from what is according to our nature, - and in the state of perfect nature 
man could avoid this [but with the help of divine concurrence] ... But in the 
state of corrupt nature man needs grace to heal his nature in order that he 
may entirely abstain from sin. And in the present life this healing is wrought 
in the mind, - the carnal appetite being not yet restored (reparato).717 
Scotus's answer is consistent with his view of sin as essentially a deficiency in 
the act, vis-a-vis recta ratio, incurring guilt (culpa) and a stain (macula) on the 
soul, but having no particular implications in the form of damage or wounds to 
person or nature, as "pure nature". God removes the 'stain' on the repentant 
sinner's soul by his free will and potentia ordinata, and, likewise, imparts 
justification in the form of gratia gratum faciens. Scotus's concern for divine free 
will leads him to deny any necessity in the act of justification by separating the 
remission of guilt from the infusion of grace.718 
Scotus: The Virtue of Charity 
In Ordinatio III, d.27, Scotus addresses the question "whether there is some 
theological virtue inclining one to love God above all?" He sets out three ways in 
717 Aquinas, STI-11.109.8c,(Leo.VII,303). 
718 Scotus, Ordinatio,lI,d.28,q.un.,n.24,( Vaf.VIII,301); Ordinatio,IV,d.16,q.2,n.4,(Olms-
Wadding,IX,252). 
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which the objective basis or formal object of such a habitus might be 
understood:719 
1) "as that which is suited by its very nature (secundum se nata) to be the 
essential reason why an act tends towards it and rests with attaining it". 
God alone, as "the objective ground or object of charity", fulfils this criterion. 
God alone, in his unique essence, can be "the formal object or end towards 
which every theological act or habit inclines". Scotus offers this proof: 
A power [of the soul] that regards something as an adequate motive or 
terminal object can only be perfectly satisfied in something in which that 
common feature is most perfectly realized. Now every intellective or 
volitional power has as its motive and terminal adequate object the whole of 
being. In no being, then, whether created or uncreated, can such a power 
be satisfied save in that in which the aspect of "being" is to be found most 
perfectly. But only this First Being is this sort of thing.72o 
Thomas, for his part, specifies the object of the theological virtues, but with 
reference to happiness: 
Man is perfected by virtue for those actions whereby he is directed to 
happiness ... it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional 
principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness ... Such 
like principles are called theological virtues: first because their object is 
God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God.721 
2) Scotus ascribes his second objective basis for the habitus of charity in 
relational terms, as "some aspect of the object, prior to the act, which makes it 
appropriate for an act to be directed towards that object". The aspect in 
question is God's "amiability", attracting and deserving our love because of His 
actions towards us: 
Not only does God's infinite goodness, or his nature as this unique nature 
in its uniqueness, draw us to love such, but because this "Goodness" loves 
me, sharing itself with me, therefore I elicit an act of love towards it. And 
under this aspect of amiability one can include everything about God .that 
proves his love for us, whether it be creation or redemption or preparing us 
for beatitude in heaven.722 
;:: Scotus, Ordinatio,llI,d.27,q.un.,(Olms-Wadding,VII,pt.2,644), Wolter,1986,427. 
721 Scotus, Ordinatio, III,d.27,q.un.,(Olmas-Wadding,VII,pt.2,648), Wolter,1986,427. 
722 Aquinas, ST.I-II.62.1 c,(Leo.VI,401). 
Scotus, Ordinatio,lIl,d.27,q.un.,(Olms-Wadding,VII,pt.2,648), Wolter,1986,429. 
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3) The third objective basis is "not properly speaking a formal objective reason, 
since it is a natural consequence of the elicited act of loving him". 723 
Scotus: Created and Uncreated Grace, Gratia Co-operans 
Having established that grace is in a faculty or power of the soul, and that an 
infused theological virtue of charity is necessary in via, post-Fall, Scotus asks 
whether it is necessary to posit 'created grace' in the soul as well as the Holy 
Spirit. Lombard had concluded that the presence of the Holy Spirit alone is 
needed for the soul to love God as it ought. 724 Scotus poses two main contrary 
arguments to this, the first being as follows: 
.. the sinner before penitence is unjustified, after penitence is justified, ... 
from this it is argued that unjustness, as it is formally privation, cannot be 
taken away from anyone unless they are given an opposite habitus, 
because 'to deprive of privation' is to give a habitus ... the soul ... receives a 
habitus opposite to that privation.725 
This habitus has to be charity. It cannot be faith or hope as these remain, 
though 'unformed', in the sinner. It is charity that is lost by sin, and which, being 
'the form of the virtues', 'informs' the other virtues on its return. 
The second main argument for the existence in the soul of created grace is 
based on the ratio of the meritorious act: 
Nothing is said formally to carry out any action unless the principle of the 
action is the form of the agent: this is found in (Aristotle) De Anima II: that 
because the soul is "that by which we live and feel", etc., therefore the soul 
is the act and form of the agent; therefore since meritorious action is of the 
will, or of the man acting through the will, it follows that that by which he 
acts meritoriously is his form. But that by which he acts meritoriously 
cannot be pure nature, because then he could act meritoriously by his 
natural powers alone, which seems to be the error of Pelagius; therefore 
;~! Scotus, Ordinatio, III,d.27,q.un.,(Olms-Wadding,VII,pt.2,648), Wolter,1986,429. 
72 Lombard, Sent.I,d.17,c.6,n.159,(I,116); Scotus, Ordinatio,I,d.17,q.2,(Vat.V,190).. . 
5 Scotus, Ordinatio,I,d.17,q.2,n.114,( Vat.V, 195-6). My trans.: .. pecca~or ante ~aent~ent~am est 
iniustus post paenitentiam est iustus, ... Ex hoc arguitur: iniustitia, cum SIt formallter pnvatlo. non 
potest auferri ab a/iquo nisi detur ei habitus oppositus, quia 'privare privationem' est ponere 
habitum ... anima ... recipit habitum oppositum illi privationi. 
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something supernatural is required: not faith or hope, which remain in the 
sinner; - therefore charity.726 
An argument in support of Lombard's position points out that a sinner, even 
after justification, still has to struggle to avoid reverting, and to acquire the habit 
of loving God de/ectabiliter and faciliter. No such difficulty would be experienced 
if the habitus in question was infused rather than acquired.727 Scotus replies 
that this supernatural grace renders the soul's actions acceptable to God and 
gives them some extra impetus in the manner of a secondary cause. It does not 
confer delightfulness and ease, which are fitting only to an acquired habitus 
which comes from repeated acts (frequenter agere).728 So the infused habitus of 
created grace justifies and supports, but does not give de/ectatio and fa cilitatio. 
The same is found in Thomas: "A habit of virtue cannot be caused by one act, 
but only by manY",729 and "Acts produced by an infused habit do not cause a 
habit, but strengthen the already existing habit". 730 
To an argument that the will needs no infused habitus to love the supernatural 
good, when it is shown it, as it has no difficulty loving even a lesser good when 
it is shown it, Scotus replies that that kind of natural response, even to a 
supernatural good revealed through an act of faith, "would not be meritorious, 
726 Scotus, Ordinatio,l,d.17,q.2,n.121,( Vat.V, 198-9), my trans.: Nihil dicitur formaliter ~gere . 
aliqua actione nisi principium iIIius actionis sit forma agentis: hoc accipitur ex " De amma, U~I ex 
hoc quod anima est "quo vivimus et sentimus" etc., concluditur anima esse actus et for:na SIC 
agentis; igitur cum operatio meritoria sit voluntatis, vel hominis per volun.tat~m o~erantls, 
sequitur quod iIIud quo meritorie agit sit forma eius. Hoc autem quo mentone a~/t, non potest 
esse pura natura, quia tunc ex solis naturalibus posset meritorie agere, q~od vldetur. esse error 
Pelagii; ergo requiritur aliquid supernaturale: non fides vel spes, patet, qUIa manent In 
~eccatore;- ergo caritas. 
27 ScotU5, Ordinatio, l,d.17,q.2,n.1 04,( Vat.V, 191). 
728 ScotU5, Ordinatio,l,d.17,q.2,n.179,( Vat. V,224). 
729 Aquinas, ST.I-II.S1.3c,(Leo.VI,328). 
730 Aquinas, ST.I-II.S1.4.ad.3,(Leo.VI,329). 
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because it would not be in accordance with the inclination of that (infused) 
habitus whose act alone God is disposed to accept".731 
Another contrary argument, on the grounds that a habitus is an extrinsic 
cause of acts in a composite being, says that whatever the Holy Spirit can 
cause in association with a habitus, He can cause without such a habitus , 
therefore, as "plurality should not be posited without necessity", 732 there is no 
need to posit a habitus of created grace as well as the Holy Spirit. Scotus 
replies: 
I concede that the Holy Spirit can cause an act immediately in the will, and 
can accept that act, although caused by Himself, as worthy of eternal life: 
but then that act would neither be of the will nor in the power of the will; so 
we do not believe He actually would accept such an act, but rather is 
disposed to accept an act of the free will, which is in the soul's power.733 
Another contra, - one which effectively denies the possibility of gratia co-
operans - states that if the Holy Spirit were to co-operate with a habitus that 
was under the will's control, the Holy Spirit would effectively become the 
secondary cause, which is not fitting. 734 Scotus replies: 
I say that that the Holy Spirit co-operates with a will having charity, but not 
because it has charity, as though its charity was the prior cause, moving 
the Holy Spirit to co-operate, but because the Holy Spirit generally co-
operates with a secondary cause in acts to which that cause is ordained by 
its form, which in a habituated will is the act of loving. Since you say that 
the Holy Spirit co-operates before the will has charity, this is false, unless 
understood as a priority of nature, as a superior cause.735 
731 S t 't' . cotus, Ordinatio,l,d.17,q.2,n.180,( Vat.V,224), my trans.: non esse men onus, qUIa non 
esset secundum inclinationem iIIius habitus, secundum quem solum Deus disponit acceptare 
actum. 
732 0 kh "S t' I" This pluralitas sine necessitate non ponenda was known before c am as co us s ru e , 
according to Bonnie Kent, Ch.12, "Scotus on the Virtues" in Cambridge Companion to Duns 
Scotus, CUP,2003,354. 
733 Scotus, Ordinatio,l,d.17,q.2,n.190,(Vat.V,228-9), my trans.: .. concedo quod Spiritus Sanctus 
posit actum causare immediate in voluntate, et posset ilium actum - tamquam a se ca~satum -
acceptare tamquam dignum vita aeterna: sed tunc nec iste actus esset voluntatis, n~c m. .. 
potestate eius; nec credimus ipsum talem actum acceptare, sed disponit actum liben arbltm -
~ui est in potestate eius - acceptare. 
73: Scotus, Ord~natio,l,d.17,q.2"n.11 0,( Vat. V, 193-4). . .. 
Scotus, Ordmatio,l,d.17,q.2,n.191,( Vat.,229), my trans.: Dlco ... quod SPIf~tUS S~nct~s 
cooperatur voluntati habenti caritatem; non quidem quia habet, ita quod cantas e/Us Sit causa 
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Scotus: The Gifts, Beatitudes and Fruits of the Holy Spirit 
The description of the seven gifts, the eight beatitudes and the twelve fruits of 
the Holy Spirit in Ordinatio III, d.34 is devoted largely to grouping all of them 
under the headings of the four cardinal and three theological virtues. Where 
Bonaventure looks to see correspondences, Scotus seeks to subsume all under 
these seven: 
Another explanation (Bonaventure's) is that the virtues enable one to act 
rightly; the gifts to act perfectly; and the beatitudes, to act quickly. On the 
contrary: by the same virtue I act rightly (because virtue is rectitude in the 
faculty) and quickly (because virtue is a habit making the operation quick 
and easy) and perfectly (because virtue is a perfection in the one who has it 
and is that whereby the action is rendered perfect).736 
Further on, he argues that: 
We ought to postulate only such habits in a person in the present life as 
perfect such a one in regard to every object that one can be perfected by at 
present. Such are the seven virtues in general - I am not concerned here 
with the acquired theoretical virtues. Apart from such acquired theoretical 
sciences, then, no habit ought to be assumed in the pilgrim besides these 
seven.737 
The three theological virtues perfect the soul "where God is concerned", and are 
able to perfect it "in the highest measure possible", where the soul is so 
disposed. The four cardinal virtues perfect the soul "where creatures are 
concerned". Similarly, depending on the individual's disposition, they are 
capable of perfecting "in the highest measure ... because they have to do with all 
that can be sought for others as well as what is needed and is desirable for 
oneself'. Although he does not say so specifically, it would seem that the 
influence of the infused theological virtues, just as it perfects their non-infused 
prior, movens scilicet Spiritum Sanctum ad cooperandum,- sed quia Spiritus Sanctus cum 
causa secunda generaliter cooperatur ad actum ilium ad quem secundum formam. suam 
ordinatur, quomodo est de diligere in voluntate habituata. Cum ergo dicis quod 'pn~s cooperatur 
quam vo/untas habet caritatem', fa/sum est, nisi intelligatur de prioritate naturae, Slcut causa 
superior. 
;~~ Scotus, Ordinatio,llI,suppl.,d.34,q.un,(Olms-Wadding, VII,pt.2, 718), Wolter,1986,353 
Scotus, Ordinatio,llI,suppl.,d.34,q.un.,(Olms-Wadding,VII,pt.2, 722), Wolter,1986,355. 
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counterparts, also trickles down to all the other acquired virtues by way of the 
four cardinal virtues. About the latter, he makes the following comment: 
And when I speak of the four cardinal virtues, I do not understand each of 
these four to be a numerically single habit in anyone, as if there were a 
universal temperance or a universal justice which extended to everything. 
Rather there are single species of justice in an individual, each concerned 
with its own proper subject matter.738 
Each of the seven genera of virtues is then divided into species and sub-
species embracing every aspect of human perfectibility: 
The beatitudes which our Saviour speaks of in Matthew 5 are the same 
habits which make up the virtues, although at times they name more 
specific species of the seven virtues previously enumerated739 .... Among 
the gifts, the four cardinal virtues and two infused virtues (charity and faith) 
are expressed740 ... As for the fruits, I say certain of these are virtues falling 
under our sevenfold classification; others are species of those listed there; 
and still others are neither the one nor the other, but rather delights that 
follow as a consequence of virtuous acts.741 
Scotus: Sin 
Whereas Thomas742 sees the essence of a sinful act in terms of a deficiency, or 
(free) "falling short" in orderedness to the good, i.e., in the actuality of an act, 
Scotus sees the same in terms of a deficiency in liberty, i.e., as the (free) result 
of the presence in us in a limited way of a pure perfection, the capacity to 
choose well, that exists in God in an unlimited way. The ability to sin, i.e., the 
capacity to choose badly, does not pertain to our freedom by reason of its pure 
perfection (univocal in God and creatures), but by reason of its limitedness in 
US.743 
738 Scotus, Ordinatio,lIl,suppl.,d.34,q.un,(Olms-Wadding,VII,pt.2, 722), Wolter,1986,355. 
739 Scotus, Ordinatio,llI,suppl.,d.34,q.un.,(Olms-Wadding,VII,pt.2, 744), Wolter,1986,369. 
740 Scotus, Ordinatio, III,suppl.,d.34,q.un.,(Olms-Wadding,VII,pt.2, 755, Wolter,1986,373. 
741 Scotus, Ordinatio,III,suppl.,d.34,q.un.,(Olms-Wadding,VII,pt.2, 769), Wolter,1986,375. 
742 Aquinas, SCG.III,3-6,(Leo.XIV,9-15). 
743 Scotus, Ordinatio, lI,d.44,(Vat.VIII,493), Wolter,1989,461. 
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Scotus's account of sin is in many ways a "mirror image" of his account of the 
virtues. He regards sin as a lack of rectitude in an act, not in a person. The lack 
of rectitude comes from a wrongful use of reason, as opposed to recta ratio. 
Contrary to Thomas and Bonaventure,744 a sinful habit or vice does not damage 
or diminish the nature of a person as such, nor even the rectitude of a person's 
soul: "Now the badness of an act is a privation in a contingent effect of the will. 
Therefore, it does not diminish anything pertaining to the will itself' ?45 It attracts 
punishment by being contrary to the behaviour God has commanded. 
The damage that is done by (mortally) sinful acts amounts to the removal of 
any supernatural habitual grace that may have been in the soul. However, 
(not) every sin removes this; the second sin does not, for the first already 
destroyed it. .. But the second sin is sometimes more serious than the first 
and is by nature apt to take away even more. What it does take away 
essentially [per se] is actual goodness [Le., goodness in the act], and it 
would also remove the habitual or gratuitous goodness if it were present. 
What sin in general destroys, then, is something that should have been 
there. 746 
Just as "actual justice", for instance, is distinguished act by act, so with the 
privation of good that characterizes evil acts: 
For privations are distinguished in terms of the corresponding habits that 
might have been there ... it is the proper nature of the privation which 
provides the formal grounds for distinguishing privatively, just as it is the 
proper nature of the corresponding virtue that is the basis for positive 
distinctions.747 
Scotus's "formal distinction" comes into play here to distinguish the common 
nature of badness in individual sinful acts, as with the common nature of each 
virtue in individual virtuous acts. This makes possible the distinction of degrees 
of goodness and badness in different acts: 
744 Aquinas,p.1 04 above, Bonaventure,p.192-3,n.702. 
745 Scotus Quodlibet XVII1.18 (Olms-Wadding,XII,489), Alluntis,414,18.49. 746 ' , , . 
Scotus Quodlibet XVII1.18 (Olms-Wadding,XII,490), Alluntls,414,18.50. ~7 ' , , . 6 Scotus, Quodlibet,XVII1.17,(Olms-Wadding,XII,489), Alluntls,413, 18.45- . 
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It is also clear why one sin is more grievous than another, whether their 
differences in gravity be specific or within the same species. For the 
greater, specifically or intensively, the goodness that should be there, the 
worse the act that lacks it. If it is a simple lack, the act is privatively worse; if 
something positively incompatible be present, the act is contrarily worse. 748 
Scotus's contention that sin does not inhere in the nature, or the soul, of the 
sinner, but only in the sinful acts committed by the sinner, would appear to be a 
serious departure from the perspective of his predecessors. It seems likely to 
have contributed to the rise of legalism and the purely forensic approach to sin 
in succeeding centuries. However, it does enable Scotus to explain why 
the damned can continue to sin ad infinitum and still their nature is not 
consumed, nor is any natural aptitude or anything else in their nature. For 
nothing created can cause an intellectual nature or anything in it to perish, 
and if it could diminish such a nature, it could eventually destroy it 
completely.749 
OCKHAM ON GRACE 
The Moral Status of Acts and Habits 
Ockham's account of the virtues and their relationship to grace tends to lean 
heavily on his doctrines of divine freedom and potentia absoluta, as well as on 
what Courtenay calls "his adoption of Scotus's theory of divine acceptation".750 
All of these, taken together, provide the ultimate guarantee of the moral 
neutrality of acts-in-themselves. No act or habit is intrinsically virtuous. 
But even in human beings, appearances of virtue can be deceptive: "given the 
same habit and act, in no way varied, they can incline to a meritorious and a 
748 Scotus, Quodlibet,XVII1.18,(Olms-Wadding,XII,489), Alluntis,413-4, 18.47. 
749 Scotus Quodlibet XVII1.18 (Olms-Wadding,XII,489), Alluntis,414, 18.48. . 
750 William' J.Courten~y, "The Academic and Intellectual Worlds of Ockham" in Cambridge 
Companion to Ockham': CUP,1999,24. 
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d 't' t 751 I thO h h h emen onous ac . n IS e s ares t e common perception of the primacy of 
the interior act: 
Therefore no act or habit of the sensitive part is called virtuous or vicious , 
except by some extrinsic denomination. For if someone prays or sings on 
his knees, and at first wishes to do it for the honour of God, and then 
standing for the same act of praying and singing changes his will out of 
vainglory, or for the sake of a good reputation, numerically the same act of 
the sensitive part which before was called virtuous is now called vicious , 
and this is only by some extrinsic denomination.752 
The extrinsic denomination is an act of the will. The moral neutrality of acts-in-
themselves ensures that most actions are only contingently virtuous, and it is 
the interior act, rather than its corresponding exterior act, that determines the 
moral status of the act. The interior act alone provides the motive and intention 
of the exterior act. In these circumstances, while the exterior act remains the 
same act, the interior act does not. The change of circumstances, i.e. of 
intention, from good to evil, entails a numerically distinct act. A single act of the 
will cannot change from good to evil. 753 
In the same question in Sent.lIl, it is asked whether virtuous habits, including 
those of the senses, are situated in the intellect. Ockham is concerned to 
dissociate habits of intellect and will from any natural desire or inclination of 
intellect to truth, or of will to the good, 
751 
I say that it cannot be proved that a habit is to be posited in the intellect 
because it inclines to truth, but because the intellect, after being shown an 
object, the object being removed or destroyed, can perform some acts it 
Ockham, Sent.lIl,q.11 ,(Theol.VI,362). . . 
752 Ockham, Sent.lll,q.11 ,(TheoI.VI,360-1 ),my trans.: Igitur nul/us actus nec habltu~ p~rtIS. . 
sensitivae dicitur virtuosus nec vitiosus nisi quadam denominatione extrinseca. SI entm allqUls. 
genu flexo oret vel cantet, et primo velit iIIud propter honorem Dei, et st~nte eodem actu orandl 
et cantandi mutet voluntatem quod velit iIIud facere propter vanam glonam, vel vu~t ?onu.s. 
reputari, idem actus numero partis sensitivae qui prius dicebatur virtuosus nunc dlcltur VltIOSUS, 
et hoc solum est quadam denominatione extrinseca. 
753 Ockham, Sent.III,q.11,( Theol. VI,383). 
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could not before the object was present, neither is the presence of the 
object always required when the intellect understands it. 754 
The same applies to the will regarding the good, which is to be attained through 
the formation of habits by acts. Habits, for their part, are concerned not only with 
the generation of acts, but also with their increase and perfection: 
Therefore I say that a habit is to be posited in the will on account of greater 
perfection in acts and greater inclination and facility in eliciting an act, all 
other things being equal. And then it can be argued: any potency, other 
things being equal in everything else, more inclines after an act than 
before, and to a more intense act, and acquires a habit from them. But the 
will is like this, because everything being equal in the sensitive part, it more 
inclines to an act now than before. This is clear with a continent person who 
has depraved leanings and does not follow them, whereas before he 
followed them.755 
Habits are not innate, although a distinction is drawn "between habits on the 
one hand and instincts, appetites and inclinations, which may be considered 
inborn on the other". 756 
Ockham calls on Aristotle to confirm that the will alone meets the 
requirements for the presence of virtue in an act: 
.... only that habit is properly a virtue whose act alone is virtuous; but only 
an act of the will is virtuous. This is proved: because only an act of the will 
is praiseworthy or reprehensible; therefore that alone is virtuous. Therefore 
only a habit generated from such an act is a virtue. This is confirmed by the 
Philosopher in Ethics 111,757 where he says that no act is reprehensible 
754 Ockham, Sent. III, q.11 ,(TheoI.VI,363-4): Dico quod non potest probari quod habitus sit 
ponendus in intel/ectu per hoc quod inclinatur ad verum, sed propter hoc intellectus post 
ostensionem obiecti, ipso amoto vel destructo, potest in aliquos actus in quos non potuit ante 
praesentiam, nec semper requiritur praesentia obiecti quando intellectus intelligit. 
755 Ockham, Sentlll,q.11 ,(TheoI.VI,365): Ideo dico quod habitus est ponendus in voluntate 
propter maiorem perfectionem actus et maiorem inclinationem et facilitatem ad eliciendum 
actum, ceteris paribus. Et tunc potest sic argui: quaecumque potentia, ceteris paribus in 
omnibus a/iis, magis inclinatur post actum quam ante et ad intensiorem actum, ex illis adquirit 
habitum. Sed voluntas est huiusmodi, quia omnibus exsistentibus paribus in parte sensitiva, 
magis inclinatur ad actum nunc quam prius. Patet de continente qui habet pravas 
concupiscentias et non sequitur eas, prius tamen sequebatur eas. 
756 Oswald Fuchs,O.F.M., The Psychology of Habit According to William Ockham, St. 
Bonaventure,N.Y.,Franciscan Institute, 1952,5. 
757 Aristotle, Ethics.lIl,c.1, 11 09b30-31 and c.6,1114a26-27. 
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unless it is within our power. For no one born blind is culpable because he 
is blind. But if he is blind because of his own sin, he is culpable. 758 
Just as only acts of the will can be virtuous, so only habits of the will can be 
virtuous. An act which is virtuous contingently can only be virtuous at all by 
being in conformity with an act which is necessarily virtuous. But Ockham offers 
two senses in which no act is necessarily virtuous: the first is that no act 
necessarily exists, the second that any action of a creature can be brought 
about by God acting alone without the creature's will being involved.759 The 
conditions for a necessarily virtuous act on the part of a creature are: 1) that it 
cannot be vicious as long as the relevant divine precept remains in force, and 2) 
that it cannot be caused by a created will without being virtuous: 
Therefore I hold that some primary, necessarily virtuous act must be 
granted: a primary, praiseworthy act in perfect circumstances, an act so 
virtuous that it cannot be rendered vicious. Willing to do something because 
it is divinely commanded is such an act; it is virtuous in such a way that it 
cannot be rendered vicious, given divine precept. The saints are speaking 
of the virtue generated by this kind of act when they speak of the virtue that 
no one can abuse.76o 
And "an act by which God is loved above all things and for his own sake is an 
act of this sort". 761 Only an act or habit of the will can be intrinsically and 
perfectly virtuous in this way, since any other act or habit "can be praiseworthy 
or blameworthy indifferently". 762 
758 Ockham, Sent.lIl,q.11 ,(Theol.VI,366): .. habitus iIIe proprie est solum virtus cuius actus es~ 
solum virtuosus' sed solus actus voluntatis est virtuosus. Probatur: quia solus actus voluntatls 
est laudabilis v~1 vituperabilis; igitur solus iIIe est virtuosus. Igitur solus habitus generatus ex tali 
actu est virtus. Confirmatur per Philosophum, 11/ Ethicorum, ubi dicit quod nul!us actus est 
vituperabilis nisi sit in potestate nostra. Nul/us enim culpat caecum natum qUia est caecus. Sed 
si sit caecus per peccatum proprium, tunc est culpabilis. 
759 Ockham, Quodlibet, III, 14,( Theol.IX,254-5}, Freddoso,212; ct.Sent.lIl,q.11,( Theo/. VI,389). 
760 Ockham, Q. Variae,7,a.1 ,(Theol.VIII,328},Wood,71; ct. Augustine,DLA,II,c.19,n.50, 
~PL.32, 1268) 
61 Ockham, Quodlibet,III,14,(Theol.IX,255},Freddoso,213. 
762 Ockham, Q. Variae, 7,a.1 ,(Theol.VIII,329},Wood,73. 
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Ockham's contemporary, the Franciscan regent master at Paris, Peter Aureol, 
produced an account of the requirements for divine acceptance763 which tends 
to imply necessity on God's part. Ockham responded with a counter-thesis , 
which he divides into three parts: 1) The first concerns logical insufficiency for 
divine acceptance in created forms or dispositions which mayor may not be 
actually inhering in the soul. 2) The second concerns logical non-necessity for 
divine acceptance in such forms or dispositions. 3) The third maintains the 
particular unsuitability of Aureol's choice of infused habits as fulfilling this role. 
1) Insufficiency for divine acceptance 
Ockham, characteristically, requires permanent alertness on the reader's part 
as to whether at any particular moment he is speaking in terms of God's 
potentia ordinata or of his potentia absoluta. In the following passage, the 
references to "God disposing a person for eternal life", and someone having 
"the requisite form", can both be taken as referring to infusion of supernatural 
virtue(s): 
Because I ask: What is required for someone to be worthy of eternal life? 
Either it is required and sufficient that God dispose the person for eternal 
life according to his present state, and in this way such a person would be 
worthy of eternal life. Or else that God cannot, without injustice, not confer 
eternal life, and in this way no one, having any form whatever, is worthy of 
eternal life. Because just as God can, in time, not confer eternal life on 
someone, however much he may have the requisite form, so by his 
absolute power He can eternally not confer it.764 
God is under no necessity to confer eternal life even where He prepares a 
person for it, and the person places no impediment by reverting to sin: 
763 Set out by Ockham in Ordinatio,d.17,q.1,( Theo/.111,441-44S). 
7640ckham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.1 ,(Theo/.1I1,446): Quia quaero: quid requiritur ad hoc quod aliquis 
sit dignus vita aeterna? Aut requiritur et sufficit quod Deus secundum statum praes~ntem . 
disponat eum ad vitam aeternam, et isto modo ta/is esset dignus vita aeterna, Aut SIC quod sme 
iniustitia non potest non conferri vita aeterna, et isto modo nul/us habens qua~~umque formam 
est dignus vita aeterna. Quia sicut potest Deus ad tempus non conferre allcUi vitam aeter~~m. 
quantumcumque habeat ta/em formam, ita de potentia sua absoluta posset pro semper sib I non 
conferre. 
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Seco~dly .1 show that whatever merely supernatural form formally inhering 
be posited In the soul, it is still in the absolute power of God to accept or not 
accept that soul. And I speak of that acceptance by which someone is 
accepted and prepared for eternal life. 765 
This clearly applies even where the soul in question is faithful to the end. 
The 'metaphysic of separation and isolation' (my phrase) to which Ockham 
frequently resorts to emphasise and safeguard divine freedom is used here to 
separate virtue in via from the reward it might normally expect in patria 
according to God's potentia ordinata: 
.. whenever some absolute quality stands temporally in some subject with 
the lack of some other absolute thing, it can by divine absolute power stand 
with the lack of that thing in perpetuity; but temporally this form [for instance 
a supernatural form of infused charity] stands with the lack of the beatific 
act; therefore by God's absolute power He can conserve that form 
perpetually without the beatific act. But whatever God can do He can 
dispose and ordain. Therefore God can ordain that this person have such a 
form yet never have eternal life, and consequently such a person would not 
be dear and accepted by God - with the acceptation of which we are 
speaking, by which someone is accepted as if he will have eternal life as 
long as he places no impediment to it. 766 
Likewise, in the same context, Ockham makes use of his "divine annihilation 
principle" to emphasize the radical contingency and insufficiency of the state of 
grace of the viator. 
.. whatever form is posited in the soul, God can will to annihilate the soul 
before giving it eternal life ... because whatever God contingently creates, he 
can contingently annihilate it whenever he pleases; but he created this soul 
contingently; therefore he can annihilate it.767 
765 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.1,(Theol.III,449): Secundo ostendo quod quacumque forma mere 
supernaturaJi formaliter inhaerente posita in anima, adhuc est in potentia Dei absoluta 
acceptare illam animam vel non acceptare. Et loquor de acceptatione qua aliquis acceptatur et 
waeparatur ad vitam aeternam: ct.Quodl.VI,q.2,(Theol.IX,590-591 ),Freddoso,495 
66 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.1,( Theol.III,453),my parenthesis:.quandocumque aJiqua quaJitas 
absoluta stat per tempus in aJiquo subiecto cum carentia alterius rei absolutae, potest per 
divinam potentiam absolutam stare in perpetuum cum carentia eiusdem; sed per tempus stat 
ista forma cum carentia actus beatifici; ergo de potentia Dei absoluta posset Deus in perpetuum 
conservare istam formam sine actu beatifico. Sed quidquid potest Deus facere, potest 
disponere et ordinare. Igitur potest Deus ordinare quod iste habeat talem formam et tamen 
quod numquam habeat vitam aeternam, et per consequens talis non esset carus et acceptus 
Deo - acceptatione tali de qua loquimur, qua a/iquis acceptatur tamquam habiturus vitam 
aeternam nisi ipsemet impediat. 
767 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.1 ,(Theol.III,453-4): .. quacumque forma posita in anima, potest 
Deus velie animam adnihilare antequam det sibi vitam aeternam ... quia quidqui? ~eus . 
contingenter creat, potest contingenter iIIud adnihilare quandocumque placet slbl; sed Istam 
animam contingenter creavit; ergo ipsam potest adnihilare; ct. Q. Variae 1,( The 01. VIII, 19). 
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Annihilation might be thought preferable to eternal punishment, but the state of 
grace of the viator is not of itself sufficient to merit exclusion from that either: 
For just as if someo~e. alwa~s lo~ed God and did all the works accepted by 
God, God could annihilate him without any injury, so after such works God 
can give him, not eternal life, but eternal punishment without injury. And the 
reason is because God is debtor to no one, but whatever He does to us He 
?~e~ purely gra~~~touSI'y-. Therefore from the fact that God does something 
It IS Justly done. For It IS clear that Christ never sinned, and yet He was 
gravely punished unto death.769 
Conversely, God is not necessitated to confer eternal punishment on anyone 
with an evil form or privation inhering.77o 
Neither is the fact that an act is performed in accordance with right reason or 
prudence sufficient of itself to make it virtuous: 
Likewise it is no more a virtuous act on account of right reason, than on 
account of the end or another circumstance, because just as right reason is 
a partial object of a virtuous or a vicious act, so also with the end and the 
time whenever. Yet no one posits that the primary goodness of an act is 
from the end or from the time, but only from an act of the will which is 
primarily imputable and primarily morally good or evil. 771 
In the Ordina tio , whose revision (1322-24) dates later than Sentences II to IV 
(1317-18), Ockham stresses his concern for divine gratuity, as well as his anti-
Pelagian credentials. It is evident that by this time accusations of Pelagianism772 
were causing him concern: 
.. whatever is posited in the soul, God by his absolute power is able not to 
accept it. In this way, God always beatifies anyone contingently and freely 
and mercifully and out of his graciousness; so that by purely natural means 
no one can merit eternal life, nor even by any gifts given by God, unless 
768 Cf. Aquinas, ST.la,25,5,ad.2,(Leo.IV,297). 
769 Ockham, Sent.IV,q.5,(Theol.VII,55): Sicut enim si aliquis semper diligeret Deum et faceret 
omnia opera Deo accepta, posset eum Deus adnihilare sine aliqua iniuria, ita sibi post talia 
opera potest non dare vitam aeternam sed poenam aeternam sine iniuria. Et ratio est quia Deus 
nullius est debitor, sed quidquid nobis facit, ex mera gratia fa cit. Et ideo e? ipso quod D.eus . 
a/iquid facit, iuste factum est. Patet enim quod Christus nunquam peccavlt, et tamen fUlt punttus 
aravissime usque ad mortem. 
'170 Ockham, Sent.IV,q.11 ,(Theol.VII,209). . 
771 Ockham, Sent.lIl,q.11 ,(TheoIVI,389-90): Similiter, non plus est actus virtuosus propter 
rectam rationem quam propter finem vel aliam circumstantiam. quia sicut recta ratIo est . 
obiectum partiale actus virtuosi vel vitiosi, ita finis et tempus aliquando. Et ta.men.nu~/us POntt 
quod prima bonitas actus est a fine vel a tempore, sed solum actus voluntatls qUI pnmo est 
imputabilis est primo bonus vel malus mora liter. 
772 See pp.232-238 below. 
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God c~ntingently ~nd freely ~nd mercifully ordains that someone having 
such ~lftS can ment eternal life; so that God cannot be necessitated by 
anyt~lng to confer eternal life on someone. And thus this opinion is 
maximally far from the error of Pelagius.773 
2) Non-necessity for divine acceptance 
Similarly, divine freedom and power are not necessitated to require the 
presence of any form inhering in the soul in order to accept the soul for eternal 
life. Created charity is a secondary cause, and as such can be bypassed by 
God acting alone: 
I claim ... that a human being is able, by the absolute power of God to be 
saved without created charity ... Whatever God is able to do by the 
mediation of a secondary cause in the genus of efficient or final causality, 
he is able to do immediately by himself. But created charity, whether it be 
an effective cause [of eternal life] or a dispositive cause that disposes one 
toward eternal life, will be an efficient or a final secondary cause. Therefore 
God is able to give someone eternal life in its absence.774 
Merit, too, ultimately depends solely on God's free and gracious decision to 
accept an act as meritorious: 
Therefore I say ... that it does not involve a contradiction for some act to be 
meritorious without any such supernatural habit formally informing it. 
Because no act by purely natural powers, nor from any created cause, can 
be meritorious, but from the graciousness of God willingly and freely 
accepting. And therefore just as God freely accepts a good movement of 
the will as meritorious when it is elicited by someone having charity, so by 
His absolute power He can accept the same movement of the will even if 
He does not infuse charity. 775 
773 0 ) 't' . t t ckham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.1 ,(Theol.llI,454-5 , my trans.: .. quacumque POSt a In amma, po es 
Deus de potentia Dei absoluta iIIam non acceptare; ut sic semper contingenter Deus et libere et 
misericorditer et ex gratia sua beatificat quemcumque; ut ex puris naturalibus nemo possit 
mereri vitam aeternam, nec etiam ex quibuscumque donis col/a tis a Deo, nisi quia Deus 
contingenter et lib ere et misericorditer ordinavit quod habens talia dona possit mereri vitam 
aeternam; ut Deus per nul/am rem possit necessitari ad conferendum cuicumque vitam 
aeternam. Et sic ista opinio maxime recedit ab errore Pelagii. 
774 Ockham, Quodlibet,VI,q.1 ,(Theol.IX,587),Freddoso,492. 
775 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.2,(Theol.III,471-2): Ideo dico ... quod non includit contradictionem 
aliquem actum esse meritorium sine omni tali habitu supernaturali formaliter informante. Quia 
nul/us actus ex puris naturalibus, nec ex quacumque causa creata, potest esse meritorius , sed 
ex gratia Dei voluntarie et libere acceptante. Et ideo sicut Deus libere acceptat bonum motum 
voluntatis tamquam meritorium quando elicitur ab habente caritatem, ita de potentia sua 
absoluta posset acceptare eundem motum voluntatis etiam si non infunderet caritatem; 
cf.Ordinatio,d.17,q.1,( Theol.III,452). 
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Conversely, non-necessity applies to the presence of an evil form or privation 
for reprobation: 
But someone can be detested or hated by God without any detestable form 
formally i~hering. Therefore likewi~e someone can be dear and accepted 
by God Without any form formally Inhering. 776 
3) Unsuitability of habits for divine acceptance 
Aureol had been putting forward the case for rationality, that is, for accessibility 
to human reason, of the kind of acts of divine salvific acceptance whose 
absolute gratuity and non-necessity Ockham has been stressing. Ockham 
reads necessity into Aureol's portrayal, particularly in the case of the 
acceptability of divinely-infused habits. He says that "the ratio of merit lies 
principally within the will, insofar as it elicits freely. Therefore a habit is not 
required for an act to be meritorious"?77 Not every act, in fact, is produced with 
the aid of a habit. Ockham's response posits two properties of an infused habit 
that might be held to necessitate divine acceptance: either natural goodness or 
moral goodness, but rejects both: 
This is confirmed, because nothing is acceptable from its nature unless it is 
in the power of the possessor. Therefore since such a supernatural form is 
not in the power of the possessor, it will not be acceptable from its nature, -
except in the way that every creature is acceptable -, but it will only be 
acceptable by a specific acceptability out of the divine benevolence and 
ordinance. 778 
The mere possession of a supernaturally infused habit contributes nothing to 
the soul's acceptability for eternal life, because it is "not in the power of the 
possessor", i.e. the will is not involved in its possession. It almost seems that 
776 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.1 ,(Theol.III,447): Sed aliquis potest esse oditus a Oeo.et. 
detestatus sine omni forma detestabili formaliter inhaerente. Igitur similiter potest a/tqws esse 
carus et acceptus Oeo sine omni forma formaliter inhaerente. 
777 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.2,(Theol.III,470). . 
778 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.1,( Theol.III,462): Confirmatur, quia nihil est acceptablle ex natura 
sua nisi sit in potestate habentis. Igitur cum talis forma supernaturalis non sit in potes~~te 
habentis, non erit ex natura sua acceptabilis, - nisi sicut omnis creatura est acc~~tabllls, - sed 
tantum acceptabilitate speciali erit acceptabilis ex benevolentia et ordinatione d,vma. 
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Ockham views habits - and especially supernaturally infused habits - as in 
some way detrimental to the operation of free will, and in that way actually 
diminishing or compromising the soul's acceptability to God who infuses the 
habits in the first place. If this is not Ockham's intention, it can still be asked 
what role, if any, grace actually plays in the making-acceptable of the 
possessor, apart from being what God has decided, by his entirely inscrutable 
potentia abso/uta, to accept. 
On the other hand, if it is moral goodness that makes the soul necessarily 
acceptable to God, then it must be something producible by the agent's free 
will, since, for Ockham, 
.. nothing is meritorious unless it is voluntary, and this unless it is freely 
elicited or carried out, because nothing is meritorious unless it is in us, that 
is, within our power. But nothing is in our power to act or not to act unless it 
is from the will as from a moving principle, and not from a habit.779 
Ockham regards even acquired habits, produced by freely elicited acts on the 
purely natural level as not being of themselves either praiseworthy or 
blameworthy. Much less does he regard supernaturally-infused habits, whose 
acquisition is entirely outside the scope of the agent's free will, as being, of 
themselves, meritorious of divine acceptance and eternal life: 
Besides, the act of loving God above all, with the circumstances he wills to 
be pleasing to him, even to undergo death and every peril and injury, 
comes more from the nature of something which does something freely and 
spontaneously eliciting such an act as acceptable to God, than [from] some 
form which does not have it in its power but only receives it. But, that act 
remaining in the will, God can [still] not accept that act as worthy of eternal 
life. Therefore in the case of some merely supernatural form which is not in 
, 780 
the power of the possessor, He can [still] not accept the possessor. 
779 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.2,(Theol.III,470): .. nihil est meritorium nisi quia voluntarium, et hoc 
nisi quia libere elicitum vel factum, quia nihil est meritorium nisi quod est in nobis, hoc est in 
nostra potestate. Sed nihil est in nostra potestate ut possimus agere et non agere nisi quia est a 
voluntate tamquam a principio movente, et non ab habitu. 
780 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.1 ,(Theol.111.451 ),my emphasis: Praeterea, actus diligendi Oeum 
super omnia, cum circumstantiis quod vellet quidquid placeret, etiam subire mortem et omne 
periculum et damnum, magis ex natura sua habet quod faciat aliquem libere et sponte 
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None of this could be admitted without the concept of the divine potentia 
absoluta, which Ockham uses as the master-key to his whole account of grace 
and the virtues. I would contend that he uses it rather in the manner of a 
shibboleth, to disqualify the perspective of theologians, like Thomas, who work 
within the paradigm of the potentia ordinata, and whose interest lies entirely 
with what God actually does. The concept of the "absolute power" of God is 
actually found in its basic features in Thomas,781 though he never emphasised it 
or used it in the service of a personal agenda, as Ockham does vis-a-vis divine 
freedom. Scotus made rather more of it, and it is likely that Ockham derived it 
from him; but it seems unlikely that either Thomas or Scotus would have 
envisaged, or even countenanced, the sort of use to which Ockham puts it. 
Ockham: The Expansion of the Role of Acquired Virtues 
In Q. Variae 7, Ockham implies that the function of infused theological virtues 
is merely to 'concur' with the action of acquired theological virtues, as the 
acquired virtues alone incline us to act: 
.. theological virtues do not necessarily require all other moral virtues. 
Nonetheless it is by means of moral acts that theological virtues sufficiently 
cause a morally virtuous act, when accompanied by right reason, if the 
subject matter of moral virtue occurs. Here both acquired and infused 
theological virtues concur, because in the absence of acquired virtues, 
infused virtues do not incline us to perform any act. 782 
This complete dependence of infused virtues on acquired is explained as 
follows regarding faith: 
.. infused faith so inclines to an elicited act of faith concerning specific 
articles [of faith] that neither a habit nor an act of infused faith can with the 
elicientem talem actum esse acceptum Deo, quam quaecumque forma quae non est in 
potestate habentis sed tantum recipit eam. Sed stante tali actu in voluntate, potest Deus non . 
acceptare ilium actum dignum vita aeterna. Igitur posita quacumque forma mere supernaturall 
~uae non est in potestate habentis, potest non acceptare habentem. . . 
81 Aquinas, ST,la,25,5,(Leo.IV,296-7); cf.la,19,3,(Leo.IV235); De Potentia 1,5,ad.5; De Ventate 
XXIII,8,ad.2,(Leo.XXII,VOI.3,675). 
782 Ockham, Q. Variae, 7,a.3,(Theol.VIII,357),Wood, 115. 
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intellect be a sufficient principle eliciting an act of believing concerning any 
specific article.783 
He gives the example of a boy who has received infused faith at baptism, but is 
brought up in isolation and never instructed in the articles of faith. He has the 
use of reason, but "cannot elicit any act of believing concerning any article". 
Faith first has to be acquired by hearing or by reading. In the same question, his 
positing of acquired faith, hope and charity is justified in terms of experience, 
and applied particularly to charity: 
.. just as nothing should be posited except when supported by experience or 
demonstration or authority, so nothing should be denied being posited 
when supported by certain experience. But the positing of acquired faith, 
hope and charity is supported by certain experience ... It is likewise with 
acquired charity, because one instructed infidel among pagans can through 
teaching love God above all purely naturally. He can also praise God, sing 
and pray. Therefore he has non-infused, therefore it is acquired.784 
Aquinas, in De Caritate, deals with the necessity of interior motivation for acts 
to be meritorious, and concludes that 
.. such acts as exceed the entire natural abilities of human nature can only 
be voluntary if something interior is added to human nature that can 
complete the will in such a way that an act of this sort may arise from an 
interior principle.785 
The only possibility is that "we must possess a created disposition of charity", 
i.e. an infused habitus, "which can be the formal principle of an action of 
love".786 Ockham's response, in Ordinatio,d.17,q.2, to what Aquinas says here 
in De Caritate begins by denying the necessity of any such connection between 
nature and grace for merit and divine acceptance. At the same time, it has to be 
783 Ockham, Sent.III,q.9,(Theol.VI,290),my trans.: .. fides infusa sic inclinat ad actum fi~ei 
elicitum circa articulos in speciali quod nec habitus fidei infusae nec actus ~otest ~um Int~lI~ctu 
esse principium sufficiens ad eliciendum actum credendi circa articulum a/iquem In speclall. 
784 Ockham, Sent.III,q.9,(Theol.VI,281); cf.Scotus,Ordinatio,III,d.23,q.un.,nA,(Olms-
Wadding,VII,460). 
785 Aquinas, De Caritate,I.1 c, Atkins trans.,11 O. 
786 Aquinas, De Caritate, I. 1 C, Atkins,111. 
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appreciated that it is precisely the necessity, and that on God's part, not the 
connection itself, that Ockham is objecting to: 
.. because a good movement of the will elicited by purely natural means 
God can accept from his graciousness, and consequently such an act will 
be meritorious from the gracious acceptance of God. Therefore insofar as 
such an act is meritorious the habit in question is not required 
necessa ri Iy. 787 
The critical edition788 notes that Ockham's text from here, and for the ensuing 
four pages, was cited by the magistri in the proceedings instituted against him 
at the papal court at Avignon by the Chancellor of Oxford University, John 
Lutterell, in 1324. The magistri "deemed William's doctrine suspect of the 
Pelagian heresy". As Ockham's denial of any Pelagian doctrine on his part is 
already contained in the previous question (d.17,q.1), they cannot have been 
the first to construe (or misconstrue) his teaching on merit as Pelagian. I return 
to the subject below. 
Ockham's purpose here, contra Thomas, is evidently to minimize the 
difference between acts of charity produced purely naturally, by 'acquired 
charity', and those produced with the help of the infused virtue of charity. He 
does not consider acts of charity to "exceed the whole faculty of human nature", 
the position he (correctly) attributes to Thomas: 
In reply to the first ratio of the other opinion [Thomas's] I say: that neither a 
meritorious act, nor even an act of charity, exceeds the whole faculty of 
human nature. Because every act of charity we perform in the common 
course of things in this life, is of the same ratio as an act possible to our 
purely natural powers, and thus that act does not exceed the faculty of our 
human nature. 789 
787 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.2,( Theol.llI,469),my trans.: .. quia bonum motum voluntatis ex puris 
naturalibus elicitum potest Deus acceptare de gratia sua, et per consequens lalis actus ex 
gratuita Dei acceptatione erit meritorius. Igitur ad hoc quod talis actus sit meritorius non 
requiritur talis habitus necessaria. 
788 Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera Theologica, VoLIII, NY, St Bonaventure University,.1977,~~9 .. 
789 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.2,(Theol.III,472),my trans.: Ad primam rationem altenus optmoms 
dico: primo, quod nec actus meritorius, nec etiam actus carita tis, excedit totam (acultatem . 
naturae humanae. Quia omnis actus carita tis quem secundum communem cursum habemus In 
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Human nature of itself needs no assistance to perform demeritorious acts, 
therefore neither does it, of necessity, need assistance to perform meritorious 
acts: 
Besides, everything that ca~ of itself. (b~) in a demeritorious act, can by the 
absolute power of God (be) In a mentonous act. Because, since 
demeritorious and meritorious acts are contraries, a meritorious act is no 
more repugnant to nature constituted of purely natural powers than is a 
demeritorious act to nature constituted of purely natural powers. But the will 
can of itself be in a demeritorious act, therefore it does not involve a 
contradiction for the will to be placed in a meritorious act by purely natural 
powers. However, that ~ct will not be meritorious by purely natural powers, 
but solely from the gracIousness of God; not formally informing the will, but 
gratuitously accepting that act elicited purely by natural means. 790 
It needs to be kept in mind, in clarifying Ockham's meaning here, that this is 
primarily a statement about divine freedom from necessity. The phrase, 'by the 
absolute power of God', does not apply to any action of God in the soul, but 
purely to a divine decision to 'accept' an act as meritorious, undetermined by 
anything in, or not in, the soul itself. In view of the tacit and extremely infrequent 
nature of Ockham's admissions that God never in fact resorts to his potentia 
absoluta in his dealings with creatures,791 it is hardly surprising that he leaves 
himself open to misunderstanding, especially when he devotes so much space 
to describing situations that could exist only if God did so act. 
via, est eiusdem rationis cum actu ex puris naturalibus possibili, et ita ille actus non excedit 
facultatem naturae humanae. 
790 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.2,(Theol.III,469-70): Praeterea, omne iIIud quod potest ex se 
sufficienter in actum demeritorium, potest de potentia Dei absoluta in actum meritorium ex se. 
Quia cum actus demeritorius et meritorius sint contrarii, non est maior repugnantia actus 
meritorii ad naturam in solis naturalibus constitutam quam sit actus demeritorii ad naturam in 
solis naturalibus constitutam. Sed voluntas potest ex se in actum demeritorium, ergo non 
includit contradictionem voluntatem ex puris naturalibus ferri in actum meritorium. Non tamen 
erit iIIe actus meritorius ex puris naturalibus, sed ex sola gratia Dei; non form a liter voluntatem 
informante, sed ilium actum ex puris naturalibus elicitum gratuite acceptante. 
791 In Sent.lI,q.4,(Theol.V,51), he says, "God can do many things that he does not do" (Deus 
potest multa facere quae non facit);cf.Ordinatio,d.43,q. 1 ,( TheoI.IV,636). In Quodlibet, VI,q.1, 
(TheoI.IX,586), he says, "God can do many things that he does not wish to do" (multa potest 
Deus facere quae non vult facere): and in the latter he is quoting Lombard, Sent.l,d.43. I have 
not been able to find, from the indexes of Ockham's Opera Theologica, any other statements of 
a similar, or more explicit, nature on the non-use in practice of divine potentia absoluta. 
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Secondarily, this statement is about human freedom-of-indifference, the 
criterion of bare and undetermined choice between contraries that Ockham 
insists on as the absolute pre-requisite for the correct moral evaluation of acts. 
The meritorious or non-meritorious status of acts can only be threatened or 
compromised by anything in human nature which might 'favour' one or the other 
in its naturally-determined acts. 
It is clear from Ockham's next paragraph that habits, too, present him with a 
problem here, notwithstanding their long-established association with virtue: 
Besides, nothing is meritorious unless it is voluntary, and this unless it is 
freely elicited or carried out, because nothing is meritorious unless it is in 
us, that is, within our power. But nothing is in our power to act or not to act 
unless it is from the will as from a moving principle, and not from a habit. 
Because as a habit is a natural cause, nothing is indifferent on account of a 
habit. Therefore the ratio of merit lies principally within the will, insofar as it 
elicits freely. Therefore a habit is not required for an act to be 
meritorious.792 
Although he says "not required", he has in fact, in the preceding three 
sentences, disqualified habits completely from having any role in the 
meritoriousness of acts. The verdict of the magistri at Avignon on this 
paragraph, given in the critical edition, concludes: 
.. therefore the whole merit, insofar as it is possible to man in this life, is 
attributed to the freedom of the will and nothing to charity or any other 
habit. 793 
Although in this question Ockham is arguing explicitly against Aquinas, he 
seems also here to have in mind the arguments of Peter Aureol, which he 
792 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.2,(Theol.III,470): requiritur habitus. Praeterea, nihil ~st.merit?r~um 
nisi quia voluntarium, et hoc nisi quia lib ere elicitum vel factum. quia nihil est mentonu'!1 niSI 
quod est in nobis, hoc est in nostra potestate. Sed nihil est in nostra potestate ut posslmu.s 
agere et non agere nisi quia est a voluntate tamquam a principio mo~ente, e~ non ~b habltu. 
Quia cum habitus sit causa naturalis, nihil est indifferens propter habtfum. Igltur ratio '!7entl 
principaliter consistit penes voluntatem, et hoc quod ipsa libere elicit. Igitur ut actus Sit 
meritorius non requiritur habitus. 
793 Theol.III,470,n.1. 
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answered in the previous question794 , which affirm the loving approbation of 
God for virtuous habits and those who possess them, but tend to suggest that 
God is necessitated by the habits in question, charity above all, to grant a 
reward, namely, eternal life. Ockham here replies that habits in themselves, as 
such, good and bad, are neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy, and he includes 
in the non-praiseworthiness habits infused by God: 
.. that charity is not in itself praiseworthy I prove, because no habit is in itself 
praiseworthy or blameworthy. Because just as an acquired habit is not of 
itself either praiseworthy or blameworthy, therefore neither is another, since 
any other, precisely infused by God, is less in the power of the possessor 
than a habit acquired by freely elicited acts.795 
The critical edition also gives the verdict of the magistri on this passage: 
... And he assumes that charity of itself is not praiseworthy, which is not only 
contrary to moral philosophy, which says that praise is owed to the virtues, 
but against Sacred Scripture (1 Cor.13), where charity is praised many 
times by the Apostle ... 796 
The last paragraph of the text from this question (Ord.,d.17,q.2) examined at 
Avignon re-asserts divine freedom and potentia absoluta: 
.. whether charity is in the soul or not, and the act elicited, it is still in the 
power of God to accept that act as meritorious or not. Therefore the same 
act which in one way is elicited by someone having charity and is 
meritorious, God can by his absolute power not accept it, and then it would 
not be meritorious, and yet it would be the same act and the same 
charity.797 
Ockham: The Nature of Sin 
For Ockham, as for Aquinas, sin or evil has no real being of its own. However, 
while for Thomas it represents a privation of ordered ness to the good in an act, 
794 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.1 ,(Theol.III,440-466); see also Adams, Ockham, Vo1.2, 126.~-1273. 
795 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.2,( The 01. 111,471 ): Quod autem caritas non sit de se laudabills 
probo, quia nul/us habitus est de se laudabilis. Quia sicut habitus adquisitus non est d~ se . . 
laudabiJis nec vitup era bilis, ita nec alius, cum quilibet alius, praecise infusus a Deo, mmus SIt m 
ootestate habentis quam habitus adquisitus ex actibus libere elicitis. ~96 Theol.III,471,n.2. . 
7970ckham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.2,(Theol.III,472-3), my trans.: sive caritas insit animae.s/~e non 
insit, et actu elicito, adhuc est in potestate Dei acceptare ilium actum tamquam me~/to~/um vel 
non acceptare. Unde idem actus qui modo elicitur ab habente caritatem et est m~nt~nus, 
posset Deus de potentia Dei absoluta non acceptare eum, et tunc non esset mentonus, et 
tamen esset idem actus et caritas eadem. 
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naturally, not only supernaturally, affecting the agent, for Ockham it is a word 
signifying an act of commission or omission, being a failure in obligation, 
entailing forfeiture and privation of some future blessing or reward only: 
I say that sin is not privation of some good actually inhering, or which at 
some time was inhering. But it is a privation of a future good which ought to 
have inhered if he had not sinned .. 798 
This assignment of the consequences of sin entirely to future retribution 
parallels the corresponding assignment of the consequences of virtue solely 
and entirely to future reward, with no implications for human nature now. He 
sets the seal on it by means of his semantics: 
I say that sin is not a real being or a being of reason. But as has been said 
elsewhere of goodness, truth and other connotative concepts799 which have 
only a nominal, and not a real definition, or a definition of reason, because 
such things do not signify some one thing or some one reason, but signify 
many things, one in the nominative case and others in an oblique case, 
therefore of such things taken in the abstract no one real thing is 
predicated ... Therefore I say of sin that it is not called some one real thing 
or being of reason, but it signifies and stands for (importat) just this: a 
previous act of commission or omission, concerning which someone has an 
obligation, on account of which the person is ordained to eternal 
punishment. Therefore when it is asked, what is sin? it must be said that it 
has no real definition, but only a nominal definition. And therefore it should 
not be conceded that it is a real being or a being of reason, but many real 
things are truly posited in its nominal definition. Therefore it can be 
conceded in some way that it is nothing, because it is not some one thing 
precisely, nor many things simultaneously, but it is one name or concept 
signifying and standing for a number of things.8oo 
798 Ockham, Sent.IV,q.11 ,(Theol.VII,223-4): .. dico quod peccatum non est privatio alicuius boni 
inhaerentis actualiter, vel quod aliquando infuit. Sed est privatio boni futuri quod deberet inesse 
si non pecasset .. 
799 Absolute and connotative terms, see p.247 below. 
800 Ockham, Sent.IV,q.11 ,(Theol.VII,224-5),my trans.: dico quod peccatum non est ens reale 
nec rationis. Sed sicut alias dictum est de bono, vero et aliis conceptibus connotativis quae 
tantum habent quid nominis et non quid rei nec rationis, quia talia non significant aliquam ~nam 
rem nec aliquam unam rationem, sed significant multa, unum in recto et alia in obliquo, et Ide.o. 
de talibus in abstracto sumptis nihil unum reale praedicatur ... Ita dico de peccato qU,od non diCit 
aliquam unam rem realem vel ration is, sed significat et importat totum istud: actum In , 
praeteritum commissum, vel omissionem actus ad quem aliquis obligatur, propter quem taIlS 
ordinatur ad poenam aeternam. Et ideo quando quaeritur, quid est peccatum, dicendum est 
quod non habet quid rei sed tan tum quid nominis. Et ideo nec debet concedi quod est ens ,reale 
nec ens rationis, sed bene in definitione exprimente quid nominis eius ponuntur mult~ realla. Et 
ideo potest sic aliquo modo concedi quod est nihil, quia non est aliqua res una praeclse nec 
multae res simul, sed est unum nomen vel conceptus significans et importans plures res. 
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Consequently, in an account of the nature of sin and forgiveness which 
unmistakeably presages the Lutheran account to come, Ockham describes the 
removal of sin as follows: 
.. 1 say that for sin to be removed (de/en) is not for some absolute or relative 
(respectivum) thing to be removed or separated from the sinner, but it is an 
act committed or omitted, not to be imputed to eternal punishment.801 
While this account of sin as having only forensic significance derived from 
obligation certainly finds strong support in Scotus (p.203 above), the same can 
hardly be said for Aquinas and Bonaventure. Both might agree that sin and evil 
are literally nothing, in the sense in which a privation is nothing, but Thomas's 
account of natural finality, and growth, by the practice of virtue, in graced 
connaturality with the divine, and Bonaventure's account of the 'spiritual senses' 
and the soul's journey into God clearly belong to an entirely different 
anthropology and soteriology. 
Ockham's account of sin emphasises the moral neutrality of acts-in-
themselves. He most often resorts to the example described above of someone 
who goes to church at one time from an intention to love and honour God, and 
later out of vainglory, for the sake of appearances. The outward act is identical, 
but the act of will giving it its moral value now makes it evil. Similarly, no act has 
moral value unless it is voluntary. Another example he gives more than once is 
of someone who 
voluntarily throws himself off a cliff and then repents and has a meritorious. 
act of willing against his fall for the sake of God. But during the fa.1I the act IS 
not within the power of his will. Therefore, the fall is not necessarily 
vicious. 802 
801 Ockham, Sent.IV,q.11 ,(Theol.VII,202): .. dico quod peccatum deleri non est aliqu~m rem I 
absolutam vel respectivam a peccatore removeri vel separari, sed est actum commIssum ve 
omissum ad poenam aeternam non imp u tari. 
802 Ockham, QuodJibet,lIl,q.14,( Theol.IX,254),Freddoso,212. 
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The New Dictionary of Theology, in the entry under 'Grace', describes the fate 
that befell the doctrine of grace from the fourteenth century onwards as follows: 
In pla~e o~ appre.ciative. attentio.n ~o the gifts of divine intimacy, theology 
occupied Itself with testing the limits of divine power in improbable limit-
cases. 803 
Such an 'improbable limit-case' may well be represented by Ockham's 
speculations concerning a possible command by God to hate Him: 
.. every will can conform itself to a divine precept. But God can command 
(praecipere) that the created will hate him, therefore the created will can do 
this. Besides, everything that can be a righteous act in via, can be a 
righteous act in patria. But to hate God can be a righteous act in via, if 
commanded by God, therefore likewise in patria.804 
Boehner describes this as being, if taken in the ethical realm, "the only real 
antinomy in Ockham's philosophy", in that, even a command by God 'not to love 
Him' could not be obeyed, since in obeying one would be loving Him. He 
accounts for this passage in Ockham as follows: 
It is important to note that this possibility is admitted in the purely 
ontological and logical realm. For in this realm there cannot be a 
contradiction, since it is a fact that creatures can command others to hate 
God; the command, therefore, is a reality, considered as a mental or 
spoken sentence, and every reality has God as its primary cause.805 
If this is how Ockham intends it to be taken, he does not say so; and as this 
occurs in an article about human freedom-of-indifference in the matter of willing 
or 'nilling' beatitude, it would be entirely in keeping with Ockham's usual 
practice to complement it with a reminder of God's indifferent freedom de 
potentia absoluta. In addition, any such command issued by a human being 
would not entail an obligation to obey it, but the opposite. However, the 
insuperable problem (in any sense) of how such a divine command could be 
803 Q.Quesnell, in New Dictionary of Theology, Komonchak, Collins and Lane eds., Gill & 
Macmillan, Dublin, 1990,441. 
804 Ockham, Sent.IV,q.16,(Theol.VII,352),my trans.: omnis voluntas pot~st se c~n~ormare 
praecepto divino. Sed Deus potest praecipere quod voluntas creata odlat eum, Iglt~r volu~tas 
creata potest hoc facere. Praeterea, omne quod potest esse actus rect~s. in ~ia, et In patna. Sed 
odire Deum potest esse actus rectus in via, puta si praecipiatur a Oeo, Igltur In patr~a. 
805 Philotheus Boehner, OFM, Ockham, Philosophical Writings, Hackett, Indianapolls,1990, 
Introduction, xlix-I. 
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obeyed without loving and hating God at the same time remains. As Ockham 
himself says elsewhere: "No one can hate God by his ordained will". 806 
Ockham: The Holy Spirit and Created Grace 
Ockham argues at length (see also pp.208-11 above) that God's freedom and 
sovereignty over the redemptive process demand that by his potentia absoluta 
He is not bound to bestow eternal life on anyone, no matter what graces he may 
possess, or to reject anyone even if not in possession of any: 
,. 
Therefore I say ... that neither charity, nor any other habit, necessitates God 
to giving someone eternal life. Indeed by his absolute power He can confer 
charity on someone and afterwards annihilate him, and likewise preserve 
someone perpetually in charity and never be disposed to give him eternal 
life. The second conclusion is that God can, by his absolute power, accept 
someone without any such form in-forming him.BO? 
Ockham frequently uses the terms 'dear' (carus) and 'accepted' (acceptus) to 
describe someone whom God deems fit for eternal life, and relates this to 
charity in such a way as to emphasise the divine subjectivity: 
Whence 'charity' is taken in two ways. In one way precisely for a certain 
absolute habit infused, and in this sense it is not a connotative name.BOB 
The other way, 'charity' is understood as being abstracted with respect to 
this concrete term 'dear', connoting someone [God in this case] to whom 
the person is dear. Without charity someone can in the first way be dear [to 
God] by the absolute power of God, but not without charity in the second 
way mentioned.BOg 
By his potentia ordinata, God wills to perfect and save the rational creature, but 
not without charity: 
806 Ockham, Ordinatio,l,d.1 ,(Theol.l,375): .. nul/us potest ordinate odire Deum. 
807 Ockham, Q. Variae,I,(Theol.VIII, 19): Ideo dico ... quod caritas, nec quicumque alius habitus, 
necessitat Deum ad dandum alicui vitam aeternam. Immo de potentia absoluta potest conferre 
alicui caritatem et eum post adnihi/are, et similiter in perpetuum in caritate custodire et 
numquam disponere [sibil dare vitam aeternam. Secunda conclusio est quod Deus potest de 
fc0tentia sua absoluta aliquem acceptare sine omni tali forma informante. 
08 For absolute and connotative terms and concepts, see p.247 below. 
8090ckham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.1 ,(Theol.llI,466): Unde 'caritas' dupliciter accipitur. Un~ modo .. 
praecise pro quodam habitu absolute infuso, et sic non est nomen conno~ativum. ~/!ter acclpltur 
'caritas' ut est abstractum respectu istius concreti 'carum', connotando allquem cUl."'e est. caruso 
Sine caritate primo modo potest aliquis de potentia Dei absoluta esse carus, non sme cantate 
secundo modo dicta. 
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I s~y that the Holy Spirit cannot by the ordained power of God be given to a 
rational creature as being accepted as worthy of eternal life without the 
habit of charity.810 ' 
In the same question, Ockham specifies "without charity and other gifts",811 
meaning evidently the other gifts without which charity is not infused, namely 
infused faith and hope. Likewise, the soul's perfection does not take place 
without the concurrent role of the acquired virtues: 
Because just as the will, insofar as it is naturally perfectible, is not denied 
its natural perfection as a cause .. , and consequently neither is the natural 
habit nor the act elicited by the habit mediating denied to it, so neither is 
supernatural perfection denied to the same will insofar as it is 
supernaturally perfectible, and consequently insofar as it has a 
supernatural habit and act. Therefore, since the will is thus accepted by 
God, it follows that it will have such a habit.812 
By God's potentia ordinata, infused charity is also necessary for producing 
meritorious acts: 
.. some created [i.e. infused] charity ... is presupposed by every meritorious 
act. Neither does anyone in fact elicit a meritorious act without such charity 
formally informing him. And this should be held on account of the authority 
of the Saints, who say this.813 
However, the supernatural element in the act that attains beatitude is 
evidently, for Ockham, merely the sine qua non, according to God's ordained 
power, for that attainment. This is because the act involved, of loving God 
above all and for his own sake, does not of itself (as noted above, p.216) 
"exceed the whole faculty of human nature". In the same question, where he is 
810 Ockham, Q. Variae,I,(Theo/.VIII,23): .. dico quod Spiritus Sanctus non potest dari creaturae 
rationali de potentia Dei ordinata sic quod acceptatur tamquam digna vita aeterna sine habitu 
carita tis. 
:11 Ockham, Q. Variae,I,(Theo/.VIII, 16). . .. 
12 Ockham, Q. Variae,I,(Theo/.VIII,23-4): Quia sicut vo/untati, quantum est perfectlbllts 
natura/iter, non negatur perfectio sua naturalis tamquam causa .. , et per consequens nO.n. 
negatur sibi habitus naturalis nec actus elicitus mediante habitu, ita nec eidem vo/untatl, In 
quantum est perfectibilis supernatura/iter, negatur perfectio supernatura/is, et per consequens 
ut sic habebit habitum supernatura/em et actum. Cum igitur vo/untas sic sit accepta oeo, 
sequitur ut sic habebit ta/em habitum. . . 
813 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.3,( Theo/.11I,477-8): .. caritas aliqua creata ... praesupp~mtur omm 
actui meritorio. Nec aliquis de facto actum meritorium elicit sine tali caritate formaltter 
informante. Et hoc tenendum est propter auctoritates Sanctorum, quae hoc sonant. 
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asking "whether an act of the will can be meritorious without charity formally 
informing the soul", Ockham answers in the affirmative, but, on this occasion, 
without indicating that his answer is based on the potentia absoluta Dei: 
Wh~ev~r can be accepted by God without charity, can without charity do a 
meritoriouS work; but It was proved earlie~14 that someone can be 
accepted by God without charity.815 
This is followed by a rebuttal of Aquinas's argument on the same topic, but (as 
ever in such cases) without mentioning that for Aquinas the normative context 
for arguments concerning the dealings of God with creatures is the potentia 
ordinata Dei, or what one scholar calls "conditional necessity".816 Aquinas's 
argument817 is on the basis that "an act of charity exceeds the whole faculty of 
human nature", and is therefore from some principle superior to human nature, 
i.e. "some habit superadded to the will".818 Ockham replies: 
This I call simply false, because a good movement of the will by purely 
natural means God can accept from his graciousness, and consequently 
such an act will be meritorious from the gracious acceptance of God. 
Therefore insofar as such an act is meritorious the [supernatural] habit in 
question is not required necessarily.819 
It is clear from this that Ockham takes a reply based on the potentia absoluta 
Dei to be decisive in response to an argument based on the normative status of 
the potentia ordinata Dei. Add to this the very different view he takes of the 
capabilities of human nature (taking his cue from Scotus), and it appears that 
divine/human relations vis-a-vis redeeming grace have taken on a character 
814 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.1 ,(Theol.III,445f,452f): on these two occasions, Ockham does 
make it clear that the potentia absoluta Dei is the context. 
815 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.2,( The 01. 111,467-8): Qui potest sine caritate esse acceptus Deo, 
potest sine caritate facere opus meritorium; sed probatum est prius quod aliquis potest sine 
caritate esse acceptus Deo. 
816 Lucan Freppert, The Basis of Morality According to William Ockham, Chicago, Franciscan 
Herald Press, 1988,111. 
817 Aquinas, Q.D.de Caritate,q.un.,a.1c,(Leo,[pp.t.b.i.]),E.Atkins and T.Williams,trans.109-111. 
818 Ockham,Ordinatio,d.17,q.2,( Theol.III,468}. . 
819 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.2,( Theol.III,469}: Istud reputo simpliciter falsum,. qUIa bonum 
motum voluntatis ex puris naturalibus elicitum potest Deus acceptare de gratIa sua, et per, 
consequens talis actus ex gratuita Dei acceptatione erit meritorious. Igitur ad hoc quod talts 
actus sit meritorius non requiritur talis habitus necessario. 
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significantly different from the account given of them by Aquinas and 
Bonaventure. Here no transformation and elevation of human nature is taking 
place: nature is in any case intrinsically capable of producing by itself the 
actions deemed necessary. What is left for God to do? Prevenient grace (gratia 
praeveniens) , by which God first moves the soul to repentance and conversion, 
healing grace (gratia sanans), by which sin is forgiven and the soul 
strengthened, and elevating grace (gratia elevans), by which the soul is made 
capable of divine intimacy and participation in divine life, to none of which 
Ockham makes any reference in his treatise on grace, seem to have been 
replaced by what might be called 'gratia con currens , - that is, by a sort of 
intensification of general divine concurrence. 
This leaves the question of the three categories of grace which together 
comprise all of the above, namely, operative grace (gratia operans) , which 
describes all of the transforming action performed by God alone in the soul, and 
co-operative grace (gratia co-operans) , by which, once the soul becomes 
sufficiently responsive and God-orientated, God co-operates with its actions, 
and thirdly, habitual or sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faciens), a category 
which includes all of the above, and a term which Ockham (probably because of 
its inclusive nature) does use.820 In his account of the gift of the Holy Spirit as 
indwelling, he occasionally says something that might pass for a reference to 
the reality represented by gratia co-operans. In the performance of meritorious 
acts, created charity and the Holy Spirit as gift have distinct causal roles: 
820 
.. whatever distinct habits are possessed, are given to rational creatures as 
distinct gifts. But the Holy Spirit and charity are possessed by the ra~ional 
creature by distinct habits ... because charity is possessed by th~ .r~tlonal 
creature as a form existing subjectively in the soul. The Holy Splnt IS 
See below, p.236-7,Sent.IV,q.11. 
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possess~d by the rati?nal. creatu~e as partial cause - according to that way 
of speaking - concurnng In causing a meritorious act. These however are 
[the acts] of distinct habits.821 
However, neither charity as 'a form existing subjectively' nor the Holy Spirit as 
partial cause is sufficient for the production of meritorious acts, as neither 
provides the voluntary element: 
.. just as no act is voluntary which is from an exterior principle [such as the 
Holy Spirit], so no act is voluntary - as voluntary is distinguished from 
natural - which is entirely from a principle acting naturally. Therefore if an 
act of charity was from charity and not from the will, it would not be a 
voluntary act. .. since charity itself does naturally whatever it does. But for 
the will itself to act concordantly with charity is a voluntary act, not because 
it is from charity, but because it is from the will. Thus if the Holy Spirit and 
not the will were to cause an act of charity it would not be a voluntary act, 
that is, the will would not be willing freely. But the same [act] moved by the 
will [together] with the Holy Spirit will be voluntary, because it is freely 
elicited by the will. 822 
Therefore it is the action of the will, concurrently with created grace and the 
Holy Spirit, that makes acts meritorious. 
In Q. Variae I, in an article concerning the Holy Spirit as gift, Ockham raises a 
doubt as to whether the name 'gift' is given as being proper to the Holy Spirit 
personally. He answers that 
.. any gift can be understood in two ways. In one way (1) for something 
freely produced in the manner of the will and liberty ... This is [said] properly 
of the Holy Spirit because it is produced in the manner of a gift and of 
821 Ockham, Q. Variae, I,(VIII, 16): quaecumque distinctis habitibus habentur, distinctis 
donationibus donantur creaturae rationali. Sed Spiritus Sanctus et caritas distinctis habitibus 
habentur a creatura rationali ... quia caritas habetur a creatura rationali ut forma exsistens 
subiective in anima. Spiritus Sanctus habetur a creatura rationali ut causa partialis - secundum 
ilium modum loquendi - concurrens ad causandum actum meritorium. Istae autem sunt 
distinctae habitiones. 
822 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.2,( Theol.III,473),my parentheses: .. sicut nul/us actus est 
voluntarius qui est totaliter a principio exteriori, ita nul/us actus est voluntarius - secundum quod 
voluntarium distinguitur contra naturale - qui est totaliter a principio naturaliter agente. Igitur si 
actus carita tis esset a caritate et non a voluntate, non esset actus voluntarius ... cum ipsa caritas 
agat naturaliter quidquid agit. Sed ipsa voluntate concorditer movente cum caritate est actus 
voluntarius, non quia est a caritate sed quia est a voluntate. Ita si Spiritus Sanctus causaret 
actum caritatis et non voluntas, non esset actus voluntarius, hoc est, ilia voluntas non libere 
vel/et. Sed ipsa voluntate movente cum Spiritu Sancto erit voluntarius, quia libere elicitur a 
voluntate. 
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~reedom and not in ~he manner of a likeness ... the Son of God is produced 
In the manner of a likeness and the Holy Spirit is not.823 
Ockham is clearly making a distinction here between the divine processions ad 
intra, taken together, which take place of necessity, and the procession of the 
Holy Spirit as Gift, taken individually (but also ad intra), which he calls "in the 
manner of the will and liberty" to differentiate it from the generation of the Son 
as likeness. Then he points out that the gift given to souls ad extra is not the 
Holy Spirit individually: 
In another way (2) it is something united to someone as existing and co-
operating with him in his freedom and in his possession of all his actions ... 
In [this] second way it is not properly a gift of the Holy Spirit because in this 
way it is fitting to three persons and [three] free gifts, because all three 
persons are thus given to a rational nature. Because in this way it is given 
only to co-operate with a rational creature in eliciting every act he rightly 
wishes to elicit in the manner in which one is given to the other, because he 
wills whatever the other wills ... But three persons, and free gifts, co-exist 
and co-operate in the action of a creature rightly elicited.824 
This fits the description of Augustinian gratia co-operans, even if Ockham does 
not refer to it as such. 
In the Ordinatio, he establishes that "By the ordained power of God the Holy 
Spirit cannot be given without charity", but does not establish the precise 
relationship between the Holy Spirit and charity. Also in the Ordinatio he 
identifies the Holy Spirit with charity: 
823 Ockham, Q. Variae,l,a.2,(VIII,22): .. dupliciter accipitur aliquod donum. Uno modo aliquid 
liberaliter et per modum voluntatis et libertatis ... (Hic) est proprium Spiritui Sancto quia pro~uci~ur 
per modum doni et libertatis et non per modum similis ... Filius Dei producitur per modum simi/Is 
et Spiritus Sanctus non. 
824 Ockham, Q. Variae,l,a.2,(Theol.VIII, 22-3): Alio modo est aliquid col/atum ut sit exsistens cum 
aliquo et coagens ut sit in libertate et in possessione sua in omni actione sua ... ~ecund~ f!10do. 
non est donum proprium Spiritui Sancto quia sic competit tribus personis et doms gratUltls, qUia 
sic omnes personae dantur naturae rationali. Quia sic dari non est nisi coagere creaturae . 
rationali ad eliciendum omnem actum quem vult recte elicere ad modum quo unus datur altefl .. 
quia vult quidquid ipse vult ... Sed tres personae et etiam dona gratuita coexsistunt et coagunt In 
actione creaturae recte elicita. 
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.. it is rather to be conceded that charity is the Holy Spirit, because the 
name of charity principally signifies the Holy Spirit directly (et in recto) but 
the creature indirectly (in obliquo).825 ' 
In the same question he distinguishes "charity which is the Holy Spirit" from 
"created charity", but seems to identify the former more closely with 
acceptability for salvation: 
.. it is clear that charity which is the Holy Spirit necessarily distinguishes 
between the sons of the kingdom and the sons of perdition. Created 
charity, however, distinguishes in practice, in its own way, but not 
necessarily.826 
Ockham: Grace and the Sacraments 
Ockham's failure to mention grace under the names of its various roles, as 
sanans, elevans, preveniens, co-operans etc. turns out to be part of a project to 
subsume all of them under the single term 'grace'. In his account of grace in the 
sacrament of penance, he uses his 'razor' to eliminate the others, leaving a two-
fold remnant: 
Therefore I say that grace is twofold: one is an absolute quality informing 
the soul, the other is gratuitous by the will of God. Speaking of grace in the 
first way, I say that gratum faciens [habitual] grace and the grace of the 
virtues and the sacramental grace of any sacrament is the same ... This is 
clear, because plurality is not to be posited without necessity. But all of 
them can equally well be preserved by positing one grace only as by 
positing many, therefore only one is to be posited, and especially because 
that [i.e. positin~ many] is supported neither by authority nor by reason nor 
by experience.8 7 
The latter statement must be highly questionable, as the division among the 
graces, established to specify and illuminate the many different ways God 
works in the soul, has its origin firmly among the Fathers, notably Augustine. 
825 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.3,( Theol.III,478). 
826 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.3,( Theol.III,479). 
827 Ockham, Sent.IV,q.11 ,( Theol. VII,213): Ideo dico quod duplex est gratia: una est qualitas 
absoluta informans animam, alia est gratuita Dei voluntas. Primo modo loquendo de gratia, dico 
quod eadem est gratia gratum faciens et gratia virtutum et gratia sacramentalis cuiuscumque 
sacramenti. Hoc patet, quia pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate. Sed omnia possunt 
salvari aeque bene ponendo unam gratiam tantum sicut ponendo plures, igitur est tan tum 
ponenda una, et maxime ex quo nec est ad hoc auctoritas nec ratio nec experientia. 
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Aquinas makes abundant use of it. Ockham considers it sufficient that one 
grace be divided among the different virtues: 
.. because ~very g~ac~ is posited either to render man worthy of eternal life, 
or for working meritoriously, or for removing defects inclining to sin and 
drawing man away from the good. But all these are preserved by one grace 
with various virtues. 828 
It is noticeable that the grace-terms Ockham seeks to dispense with are all 
descriptions of divine action in the soul. Apart from divine concurrence, the 
virtues are descriptions of what we do - not of what God does. We are left with 
no terms to describe the latter. Aquinas also acknowledges one grace 
performing many different functions, as does Bonaventure, and Scotus to a 
lesser extent, but all retain the language of divine action in the soul as well. 829 
Ockham's account of the relationship of grace to the sacraments is of a 
decidedly 'occasionalist' nature, as this comment by Marilyn Adams shows: 
Since, for Ockham, God is utterly free in the redemptive process, God is 
not bound by sacraments any more than He is bound by anything else. Not 
only are sacraments not logically necessary or sufficient for the infusion of 
charity or grace, Ockham denies that they are its efficient causes either. He 
agrees with his opponents that the sacraments are not natural causes of 
infused grace. But he contends further that they cannot be instrumental 
causes. Rather they are causes sine quibus non. By divine ordinance there 
is a constant conjunction between someone's receiving the sacrament of 
baptism under certain circumstances and his being infused with grace. But 
this constant conjunction holds, not because of any power (virtus) -
whether natural or supernatural - inhering in the sacrament, but because 
God wills to produce grace in the soul whenever the sacrament is thus 
received. 830 
828 Ockham, Sent.IV,q.11,( Theol. VII,213-14): .. quia omnis gratia ponitur vel u~ re~dat hominem 
dignum vita aeterna, vel ad meritorie operandum, vel ad tollendum defectus tncltna~tes ad .. 
peccatum et retrahentes hominem a bono. Sed omnia ista salvantur per unam gratlam cum alliS 
virtutibus. 
829 E.g. Aquinas, De Caritate, 1.1; Bonaventure, Breviloquium, VA.6,(de Vinck, 196); Scotus, 
Ordinatio,lI,d.27,q.un,n.12,( Vat. VIII,288-9). 
830 Adams, Ockham, Vo1.2, 1278. 
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Ockham: The Gifts of the Holy Spirit 
As already noted (p.168 above), no account of the beatitudes and fruits of the 
Holy Spirit, if one ever existed, appears in Ockham's extant works. In any case, 
they would not be susceptible of the treatment he gives to the gifts of the Holy 
Spirit. His main concern is to pose the logical question as to whether the gifts 
are necessary at all. For this purpose, he uses the same argument that he does 
regarding the acquired and infused theological virtues831 : that, since they refer 
to actions of the same ratio, infused virtues cannot logically be said to confer 
anything which is entirely above and beyond the capabilities of human nature. 
Here he uses faith, rather than charity, as the comparison. As with the infused 
virtue of faith, the gifts of the Holy Spirit cannot function without the prior 
disposition and assistance provided by their acquired counterparts: 
.. just as someone can never elicit an act of believing, regarding any article 
[of faith], mediated by infused faith, unless he has acquired faith, which is of 
a different ratio to infused faith ... it is not possible for someone to have the 
aforesaid habits called gifts and to elicit any act regarding the objects of 
those habits, unless besides the said infused habits he has other acquired 
habits regarding the same objects, as is clear from experience. And this is 
proved similarly as regarding infused and acquired faith.832 
Ockham goes on to ask whether it is necessary to posit infused gifts at all. It 
can be said that they are not always infused habits, because, "plurality is not to 
be posited without necessity"; neither does he find any demonstrable reason, or 
experience, or even "the authority of Sacred Scripture" to justify positing 
them,833 and, besides, they "can always be acquired naturally". Here again, 
Ockham's purpose is not to dismiss the infusion of gifts altogether, but to 
831 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.2,( Theol.lIl,472),p.216 above. 
832 Ockham, Q. Variae,Vl.a.8,(Theol.VIII,244): .. sicut numquam a/iq~is potest ~/~cere actum 
credendi circa a/iquem articulum mediante fide infusa nisi habeat fidem adqu~sltam qu~e est. 
alterius rationis a fide infusa ... ita non est possibile quod a/iquis habeat praedlctos habitus qu~ 
dicuntur dona et eliciat aliquem actum circa obiecta iIIorum habituum, nisi ~raeter dictos habitus 
infusos habeat alios habitus adquisitos respectu eorumdem obiectorum, S/CUt ~a.tet per 
experientiam. Et consimiliter probatur hoc sicut probatur de fide infusa et adqUlslta. 
833 Ockham, Q. Variae,VI,a.8,(Theol.VIII,245). 
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minimise the necessity of their being posited. Even the gift of languages given 
to the Apostles at Pentecost (Acts 2:3-11), he says, was not something that 
cannot be acquired naturally. Infused and acquired habits also have the same 
objects (although he expresses a doubt, without answering it, as to what the 
objects of the infused gifts might be), and are therefore of the same species or 
ratio. He mentions by name understanding (intel/ectus) and knowledge 
(scientia) , and says of the latter: 
For acquired knowledge sufficiently inclines the intellect to knowing any 
conclusion without any infused knowledge. Thus if knowledge were in fact 
infused, it would sufficiently incline the same intellect to knowing the same 
conclusion without any acquired knowledge.834 
He sees no evident reason to posit infused habits apart from the authority of 
Sacred Scripture, and accepts that this is found for infused faith; but as he 
speaks only of faith for the rest of the article, a doubt is implied concerning the 
positing of infused gifts; neither does he resolve it elsewhere. 
Ockham: The Charge of Pelagianism 
Ockham was summoned to the papal court, then in Avignon, in 1324, while a 
body of his work, submitted by John Lutterell, was examined for heresy by a 
commission of six Masters of theology, including Lutterell. The commission was 
charged by Pope John XXII with examining 51 articles drawn from his 
commentary on the Sentences. The magistri delivered their report in 1326, and 
subsequently, according to Pelzer,835 "attainted the principal theological work of 
the innovator, and reproved 50 of his affirmations, mostly on a charge of error 
834 Ockham, Q. Variae,VI,a.8,(Theo/.vIIl,245-6): Nam scientia adquisita sufficiente~ in~lin~t 
intellectum ad sciendum aliquam conclusion em absque omni scientia infusa. Ita Sl sClentla de 
facto infunderetur, inclinaret sufficienter eundem intellectum ad sciendum eandem 
conclusionem sine omni scientia adquisita. 
835 A.Pelzer, Les 51 articles de Guillaume Occam censures en Avignon, en 1326, Revue 
d'histoire ecclesiastique, 18, 1922,240-270,248. 
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and heresy". Pelzer, writing in 1922,836 expresses some surprise at the outcome 
for Ockham, as no formal conviction for heresy was ever brought. 837 
The charge of Pelagianism was certainly one of the most weighty and detailed 
brought against Ockham, and took its cue from his rebuttal of Aquinas in 
Ordina tio , d.17. Ockham here quotes a passage from Aquinas's De Caritate: 
An act of charity exceeds the whole faculty of human nature, therefore it 
follows that it is from some principle that is not interior to human nature. But 
it cannot precisely be from some exterior principle, namely the Holy Spirit. 
Therefore it must be from some habit superadded to the will. The minor is 
clear, that just as natural movement is from some intrinsic principle, so the 
movement of the will is from something intrinsic. Therefore if the act of 
charity was entirely from some exterior mover, it would not be voluntary. It 
follows similarly that it would not be meritorious, because those things are 
meritorious which are in some way in us; but if it were entirely from an 
exterior mover, it would not be in us to act or not to act.838 
Ockham opposes this on several points, all of them connected to his over-riding 
concern for divine gratuity. Firstly, 
This I call simply false, because a good movement of the will elicited by 
purely natural means God can accept from his graciousness, and 
consequently such an act will be meritorious from the gracious acceptance 
of God. Therefore insofar as such an act is meritorious the habit [of charity] 
in question is not required necessarily.839 
Where Thomas's account of divine gratuity involves the incapability of unaided 
human powers to act meritoriously, for Ockham, nature, as such, is irrelevant 
836 Pelzer's account, together with that of J.Koch, 1935-6 (see below), is still the most detailed. 
837 Ockham's subsequent excommunication in 1328, following his flight from Avignon in 
company with Michael of Cesena, Minister General of the Franciscans, and Bonagrazio of 
Bergamo, had nothing at all to do with the writings for which he was summoned to Avignon in 
the first place. The Franciscan order at the time was in contention with John XXII over a ma~ter 
concerning the poverty of Christ and the Apostles, and the Franciscan poverty modelled on It. 
On this count Ockham had convinced himself that the Pope was a heretic and his holding of 
the office the;efore null and void. He was to spend the rest of his life under the protection of the 
Emperor (who was also in frequent contention with the papacy), mainly in Munich, writing . 
polemics against John XXII, and aspects of papal authority. Whether significant or not. thiS IS 
also the Pope who had been instrumental in bringing about the canonisation of Aquinas In 1323. 
838 Ockham, Ordinatia,d.17,q.2,( Thea/.11I,468), quoting Aquinas, De Caritate, 1 c, A~kins.11 O. 
839 Ockham, Ordinatia, d.17,q.2,( Thea/.1I1,469): /stud reputa simpliciter fa/sum" qUia bonum 
motum va/untatis ex puris naturalibus elicitum patest Deus acceptare de gratia sua, et p~r 
consequens ta/is actus ex gratuita Dei acceptatiane erit meritarius. /gitur ad hoc quod talts actus 
sit meritarius non requiritur talis habitus necessaria. 
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either way, and his comparatively exalted (Scotistic) view of human natural 
ability only serves to emphasise the irrelevance: 
Besides, everything [someone] can do sufficiently of himself in a 
de~eri~orious act, ~e can by t~e ~bsolute power of God do of himself in a 
mentonous act. .. since dementonous and meritorious acts are 
contraries84o ... But the will can of itself be in demeritorious act therefore it 
does not involve a contradiction for the will to be placed in me'ritorious act 
by purely natural powers. However, that act will not be meritorious by 
purely.natural p.owers, but ~olely from th~ graciousness of God; not formally 
Informing the Will, but gratuitously accepting that act elicited purely by 
natural means.841 
Secondly, as divine gratuity, and not natural capability or incapability, is the 
principal issue at stake: 
Because no act by purely natural powers, nor from any created cause, can 
be meritorious, but from the graciousness of God willingly and freely 
accepting. And therefore just as God willingly and freely accepts a good 
movement of the will as meritorious when it is elicited by someone having 
charity, so by his absolute power He can accept the same movement of the 
will even if He does not infuse charity.842 
It may be that the magistri at Avignon failed to grasp the full significance of 
Ockham's use of the potentia absoluta Dei, never having encountered the 
routine use of such a device before. The same may have applied to Ockham's 
over-riding concern for divine freedom and gratuity. William Courtenay tells us 
that, of the six members of the examining commission, five were "wedded to 
late thirteenth century realism", being of basically Thomist formation and 
840 Here he makes use of the scholastic distinction between contraries (which are not mutually 
exclusive) and contradictories (which are) to delineate human natural capabilities vis-a-vis merit 
and demerit. 
841 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.2,( Theol.III,469-70): Praeterea, omne iIIud quod potest ex se 
sufficienter in actum demeritorium, potest de potentia Dei absoluta in actum meritorium ex se ... 
cum actus demeritorius et meritorius sint contrarii ... Sed voluntas potest ex se in actum 
demeritorium, ergo non includit contradictionem voluntatem ex puris naturalibus ferri .in ac~um 
meritorium. Non tamen erit iIIe actus meritorius ex puris naturalibus, sed ex sola gratia Del; non 
formaliter voluntatem informante, sed ilium actum ex puris naturalibus elicitum gratuite 
acceptante. 
842 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.2,( Theol.III,471-2): Quia nul/us actus ex puris naturalibus, nec ex 
quacumque causa creata, potest esse meritorius, sed ex gratia Dei voluntarie et libere. . 
acceptante. Et ideo sicut Deus libere acceptat bonum motum voluntatis tamquam merttortum 
quando elicitur ab habente caritatem, ita de potentia sua absoluta posset acceptare eundem 
motum voluntatis etiam si non infunderet caritatem. 
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background. The only one who was "somewhat sympathetic to Scotistic 
theology" was Durand of St. Pourcain, "a Dominican theologian and bishop of 
Meaux, whose un-Thomistic views had earlier brought him into conflict with 
theologians in his order". 843 
It did not escape the commission's notice that, on the face of it at least, the 
gifts of grace are being devalued. Although Ockham agrees that "nothing is 
meritorious unless it is voluntary", he excludes habits altogether from the sphere 
of the voluntary: 
But nothing is in our power to act or not to act unless it is from the will as 
from a moving principle, and not from a habit. Because as a habit is a 
natural cause, nothing is indifferent [i.e. free] on account of a habit. 
Therefore the ratio of merit lies principally in the power of the will, insofar as 
it elicits freely. Therefore an act does not require a habit in order to be 
meritorious.844 
Clearly, the idea of a habit actually producing, or enhancing, freedom is very far 
from Ockham's thinking. The magistri, however, are concerned at the 
separation being effected between merit and habit, especially that of charity: 
.. and thus the whole merit, insofar as it is possible to man in this life, is 
attributed [by Ockham] to the freedom of the will and nothing to charity or 
any other habit.845 
At the same time, Ockham's exaltation of free will leads him to value acquired 
over infused habits in this respect, while claiming that neither is praiseworthy in 
itself: 
843 William J.Courtenay, The Academic and Intellectual Worlds of Ockham, Cambridge 
Companion to Ockham,25. . 
844 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.2,(Theol.III,470): Sed nihil est in nostra potestate ut posslm~s 
agere et non agere nisi quia est a voluntate tamquam a principio movente, e~ non ~b habltu. 
Quia cum habitus sit causa naturalis, nihil est indifferens propter habitum. Igltur ratio ':Ientl 
principaliter consistit penes voluntatem, ex hoc quod ipsa libere elicit. Igitur ut actus Sit 
meritorius non requiritur habitus. . 
845845 Report of the Magistri, 1326; A. Pelzer, Les 51 articles, 252: .. et sic totu"! ment~m, . . 
quantum est possibile homini via tori, attribuit /ibertati voluntatis et nihil ?aritatl vel. alII habltUl; 
also J. Koch, Neue Aktenstilcke zu dem gegen Wilhelm Ockham in AVlgnon gefuhrten Prozess. 
Recherches de ThEwlogie Ancienne et Mediewale VII, 1935,353-380 and V1I1.1936, 79-93,168-
197,86. 
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.. b~t the act o~ lovin~ G?d above all, with charity which is not in itself 
prals~worthy, IS meritorious; therefore it can be meritorious without that 
[charlt~] .. H?~ever, th~t charity is not in itself praiseworthy I prove, because 
~o ha~lt IS In It~elf praiseworthy. Because just as an acquired habit is not of 
Itself either pral.sewo.rthy or blameworthy, therefore neither is another, since 
any other, precls~ly Infused by G.o?, is less in the power of the possessor 
than a habit acquired by freely eliCited acts. But no acquired habit is 
praiseworthy or blameworthy of itself.846 
Perhaps nowhere else in Ockham's opus does the sense of divine grace 
apparently threatening, if not actually cancelling, human freedom come across 
as strongly as it does in this question of the Ordinatio. It can hardly be 
surprising that the magistri 'scent' Pelagianism. At this point they are concerned 
mainly with the implications for charity: 
We say that this long process [argument] contained in the preceding article 
is erroneous and smacks (sapit) of the Pelagian heresy or worse. For, 
regarding the ratio of merit possible to us in the present life, he is equating 
a work carried out without charity with a work carried out with charity. And 
through the whole deduction, it appears that he intends that a habit of 
charity is nothing, or, if it is [something], it is in vain, because it does 
nothing at all to merit [a reward], which is expressly contrary to what the 
Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 13 .. 847 
The accusation of Pelagianism focuses also on Ordinatio,d.17,q.1, the 
question preceding the one quoted above. Ockham is here engaged in refuting 
the arguments of Peter Aureol concerning the action and necessity of grace in 
the soul for salvation. Aureol's method of exposition tends to imply a certain 
necessity in the way God acts towards the soul. Ockham quotes him as follows, 
846 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.2,( The 01. 111,471 ): .. sed actus diligendi Deum super omnia cum 
caritate quae non est de se laudabilis est meritorius; ergo sine ea potest esse meritorius. Quod 
autem caritas non sit de se laudabilis probo, quia nul/us habitus est de se laudabilis. Quia sicut 
habitus adquisitus non est de se laudabilis nec vituperabilis, ita nec alius, cum quilibet ~/ius, 
praecise infusus a Deo, minus sit in potestate habentis quam habitus adquisitus ex actlbus 
lib ere elicitis. Sed nul/us habitus adquisitus est de se laudabilis nec vifup era bilis. 
847 Magistri report, Pelzer, 51 Articles,251: Dicimus quod iste processus in p~edicto articulo 
contentus est erroneus et sapit haeresim Pelagianam vel peius. Adequat emm quantum ad 
rationem meriti nobis in presenti vita possibilis, opus factum sine caritate operi facto ?um . . 
caritate. Et per totam deductionem apparet quod ipse et intendit quod nul/us est hab/~us cantatls 
aut, si est, frustra est, quia nihil penitus facit ad meritum. quod est expresse contra dictum 
Apostoli prima ad Corinthios 13 .. 
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concerning the necessity for salvation of a 'created form' of grace inhering in the 
soul: 
Concerning this question there is one opinion [Aureol's] that in order for the 
soul to be gracious, dear and accepted by God, such a created and 
absolute form is necessarily required by someone, so that [even] by God's 
absolute power, without such a form it cannot be dear to God. And such a 
form is necessarily dear to God; and likewise the soul informed by that 
form. So that possessing that form, [even] by God's absolute power [the 
soul] cannot not be dear to God. 848 
The form in question is, of course, an infused habit of created charity. To 
understand Ockham's position, we need to be aware that, although he identifies 
grace, directly, with charity alone, he regards the infused (created) habit of 
charity as only secondary, in terms of both logical priority and importance for 
salvation. Whereas Thomas and Bonaventure attach primary importance for 
salvation (even though posterior in the soul) to uncreated grace in the form of 
the indwelling of the divine Persons, Ockham's focus of interest is almost 
entirely on the free and contingent decision of God to accept a soul for salvation 
(or reject and reprobate the soul for damnation). This, more than anything else, 
is Ockham's understanding of 'gratuitous grace' (gratia gratis data). It is also, in 
his view, the principal source of grace-making-pleasing (gratia gratum faciens), 
though he very rarely uses either of these expressions to describe grace. In 
this, he differs profoundly from Thomas and Bonaventure, though it is not 
difficult to perceive the Scotist influence involved. 
Two modern scholarly accounts of Ockham's defence against the accusation 
of Pelagianism are those by Marilyn Adams849 and Rega Wood.85o Both see this 
848 Ockham, Ordinatio, d .17, q.1 ,( Theol.111 ,441 ): Ad istam quaestionem est una ?pinio quod ad 
hoc quod anima sit Deo grata, cara et accepta, necessario requiritur aliqua tall forma cre~ta et 
absoluta, ita quod de potentia Dei absoluta sine tali forma non potest esse Oeo cara. E.t Ipsa 
forma necessario est Deo cara; et similiter anima, ilia forma informata. Ita quod stante Ilia forma 
non potest de potentia Dei absoluta non esse Oeo cara. 
849 Marilyn McCord Adams, William Ockham,VoI.2,1987,1279-1297. 
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twofold understanding of grace as the key to Ockham's defence. When Ockham 
denies that grace is either logically necessary or logically sufficient for salvation 
, 
he has in mind strictly and only the infused accidental form of grace. It is with 
regard to this that God, by his absolute power, is under no necessity or 
obligation whatever either to accept the soul where it is present, or to reject the 
soul where it is not. God can hold a soul as 'dear' (cara) and acceptable, or 
reprobate and rejected, regardless of the presence or absence of any form, or 
privation of form, in the soul whatever - by his absolute power. 
At the heart of the issue is the question, "Which comes first, the created form 
in the soul, or divine acceptance?" For Aureol, the created form must come first, 
because by it the soul is rendered pleasing to God and acceptable for salvation. 
For Ockham, free and contingent divine acceptance comes first, independently 
of anything created, even created charity in the soul. He quotes Aureol as 
follows: 
.. that form through which by nature the soul is rendered gracious to God, 
does not flow into the soul from divine acceptance. This is proved because 
that through which divine acceptance and love is applied to the soul, and 
participation in which is the formal reason of the acceptance, cannot 
proceed from the love of God passing into the soul, because then the soul 
would be loved - at least in the order of reason - before such a form was in 
it. 851 
For Aureol "God is the most reasonable of lovers". 852 He, in fact, assimilates , 
God's necessary love of Himself and his own justice to God's love of the 
creature accepted for salvation. He must see in the creature the form of justice 
850 Rega Wood, Ockham's Repudiation of Pe/agianism, Cambridge Companion to Ockham, 
1999,ch.15,350-373. . . . 0 
851 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.1,( Theo/.1I1,444): . .illa forma, qua ex natura reI ~e?dltur amma. eo 
grata, non profluit ex divina acceptatione in anima. Probatur, quia iIIud quo d,vma acceptatlo et 
di/ectio app/icatur ad animam, et cuius participatio est ratio forma/i~ ut ac~eptetur, n~n potest 
provenire ex Dei di/ectione super animam transeunte, quia tunc amma pnus esset dtlecta -
sa/tem ordine rationis - quam ta/is forma esset in ea. 
852 Wood, Repudiation, 355. 
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before accepting the creature for salvation. Therefore of necessity the form 
must be infused first. "Contrary to Scotus ... if acceptance were prior, the love 
would be unreasonable for want of the immutable object it requires".853 The 
immutable divine nature requires an immutable object. 
To Aureol's divine "reasonableness", Ockham opposes divine liberality and 
generosity: if God loved us only from necessity, his love would not be generous. 
That God is not necessitated by anything outside Himself was, in fact, an almost 
unanimous view among medieval scholars, though, as Wood observes, it was 
"seldom stressed as much as by Ockham". 854 
The other aspect of Ockham's twofold understanding of grace, divine free and 
gracious acceptance of a soul, which he regards as primary, also comes into 
play in his defence regarding Pelagianism. This grace, 'gratia gratuita', by which 
someone is held dear (carus) and acceptable for eternal life, is both logically 
sufficient and logically necessary. Thus he concludes his foray against Aureol 
with the following statement, in which he a/so brings his semantic armoury of 
absolute and connotative terms855 to bear in support of his distinction between 
two understandings of grace: 
I say that, taking 'charity' for some absolute charity formally inhering, and 
'dear' for all those for whom eternal life is prepared, in this way, by the 
absolute power of God someone can be dear to God without charity. 
Whence 'charity' is understood in two ways. In one way p~ecisely for some 
absolute habit infused, and in this way it is not a connotative name. In 
another way understanding 'charity' as abstracted with respec~ to the 
concrete term 'dear', connoting someone to whom the person IS dear. 
853 Wood, Repudiation, 356. 
854 Wood, Repudiation, 356. 
855 Absolute and connotative terms, see p.247 below. 
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Without charity someone can in the first way be dear [to God] but not 
without charity in the second way mentioned.856 ' 
Adams asks how fair-minded Ockham's opponents were, and whether they 
"simply conflate Ockham's claims regarding God's absolute and ordered power 
respectively?".857 "Not entirely" is her answer, and she gives an account of 
some of both Lutterell's and Chatton's arguments asserting "that Ockham's 
position is inconsistent, threatens divine justice, and/or leads to Pelagian 
heresy".858 Chatton, for example, seeks to nullify Ockham's distinction between 
divine absolute and ordained power by claiming that if something (or someone) 
is meritorious or worthy of divine acceptance because of created grace inhering, 
then created grace is necessarily laudable of itself. Besides this, if divine free 
acceptance is the decisive factor, then, as Adams observes, Chatton might 
have added that if God can accept an act by purely natural powers (as Ockham 
claims), "then some naturally produced features would be laudable of 
themselves - which is the position of Pelagius". 859 Ockham's response to the 
argument is contained in his refutation of Aureol in Ordinatio,d.17,q.1. He does 
not deny that created grace is laudable of itself, but does deny that this 
necessitates God. Here his "metaphysics of separation" comes to his aid. What 
God can separate temporally, He can separate eternally - and absolutes are 
eternally separable: 
856 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.1 ,(Theol.III,466): .. dico quod accipiendo 'c~ritas' pro ali9ua caritate 
absoluta formaliter inhaerente, et 'carum' pro omni iIIo cui praeparatur vIta aete:na, s!c. de 
potentia Dei absoluta potest aliquis esse carus Deo sine caritate. Und~ 'caritas dupllclter 
accipitur. Uno modo praecise pro quodam habitu absoluto infuso, . et. SIC non es~ ,nomen, 
connotativum. Aliter accipitur 'caritas' ut est abstractum respectu ISttuS c~nc~etl carum,. . 
connotando aliquem cui iIIe est caruso Sine caritate primo modo potest allqUls de potentIa Del 
absoluta esse carus non sine caritate secundo modo dicta. 
857 ' Adams, Ockham, Vo1.2, 1280. 
858 Adams, Ockham, Vo1.2, 1280. 
859 Adams, Ockham, Vo1.2, 1286. 
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Bec.ause ~henever some absolute quality stands temporally in some 
subject with th~ lack of some other absolute thing, it can by divine absolute 
power st~nd with the lack of that thing in perpetuity; but temporally this form 
stands with the lack of the beatific act; therefore by God's absolute power 
He can conserve that form perpetually without the beatific act. But whatever 
God can do, He can dispose and ordain. Therefore God can ordain that this 
person have such a form yet never have eternal life, and consequently 
such a person would not be dear and accepted by God ... 860 
Likewise Ockham's "divine annihilation" principle is brought to bear: 
Besides, whatever form is posited in the soul, God can will to annihilate the 
soul before giving it eternal life, and can will never to create it, therefore He 
is able not to accept such a soul. The assumption is clear, because 
whatever God contingently creates, He can contingently annihilate it 
whenever He pleases ... 861 
The whole purpose of such statements, as Rega Wood points out, is not to 
make out that "God is free from what he in fact ordains; it is rather that God 
freely ordains the laws he establishes".862 
Conclusion to Chapter 3 
In this chapter, we have seen clearly the extent to which the issue of divine 
freedom and gratuity preoccupied Ockham, and coloured his account of the 
relationship between human nature and grace. Concern for divine gratuity has, 
in fact, been a perennial issue in Catholic theology throughout the centuries 
covered by de Lubac in his history of nature-grace dualism.863 What, if anything, 
that may owe to Ockham is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the concern for 
860 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.1 ,( Theol.III,453): Quia quandocumque a/iqua qualitas absoluta 
stat per tempus in a/iquo subiecto cum carentia alterius rei absolutae, potest per divinam 
potentiam absolutam stare in perpetuum cum carentia eiusdem; sed per tempus stat ista forma 
cum carentia actus beatifici; ergo de potentia Dei absoluta posset Deus in perpetuum 
conservare istam formam sine actu be a tifico. Sed quidquid potest Deus facere, potest 
disponere et ordinare. Igitur potest Deus ordinare quod iste habeat talem formam et tamen 
quod numquam habeat vitam aeternam, et per consequens talis non esset carus et acceptus 
Deo .. 
861 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.17,q.1 ,( The 01. 111,453-4): Praeterea,quacumque forma posita in anima. 
potest Deus velie animam adnihilare antequam det sibi vitam aeternam, et velie numquam eam 
creare, ergo potest talem animam non acceptare. Assumptum patet, quia quid9u.id Deus 
contingenter creat, potest contingenter iIIud adnihilare quandocumque placet slbl ... 
862 Rega Wood, Repudiation, 356. 
863 De Lubac, Surnaturel. 
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divine gratuity is clearly a legitimate one. In this sense, Ockham is a passionate 
adherent of the post-1277 anti-necessitarian agenda. 
The issue of divine illumination is clearly key to what befell the understanding 
of grace from Thomas to Ockham. While some scholars regard Thomas as 
having pioneered the banishment of divine illumination from the purely natural 
realm (p.190 above), Thomas can still say this concerning matters related to 
man's connatural (this-worldly) end alone: 
Accordingly, in matters subject to human reason, and directed to man's 
connatural end, man can work through the judgment of his reason. 
If, however, even in these things man receive help in the shape of special 
promptings (per specialem instinctum) from God, this will be out of God's 
superabundant goodness ... 864 
This form of divine gratuity is rendered problematic by Scotus's account of 
illumination, confining it to matters concerned with the supernatural end alone. 
While Scotus "closed the door", so to speak, on divine illumination at the purely 
natural level, he retained, from Thomas, the Aristotelian 'agent intellect', which 
abstracts universal notions from sense objects via phantasms at the natural 
level, and mediates them as illumination from angels at the supernatural level 
(p.1S2 above). Ockham dismisses this too,865 thus eliminating the last natural 
and metaphysical channel of supernatural 'light' to the purely natural. A 
question that arises is whether the agent intellect's association with universals 
was a factor in Ockham's dismissal; the question seems important because, in 
its role as mediator of grace to the intellect, the agent intellect is concerned with 
the universals of truth and goodness, which participate in the 'real universals' of 
divine being, truth and goodness as their supernatural source. 
864 h . Aquinas, STI-11.68.2c,(Leo. VI,449), my parent eSls. 
865 Ockham, Sent.lI,q.13,(Theo/'V,304-5). 
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In the next chapter, we will look more closely at the impact of Ockham's 
talents as a logician on his account of human nature, and at the way this affects 
his account of the imago Dei in man. 
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Chapter Four 
The Category of 'Relation' and the Imago Dei 
Introduction 
It is now possible to see that the major influence on Ockham's understanding of 
human nature is constituted not so much by his "nominalism" as by his single-
minded concern for human and divine freedom of indifference, and for divine 
gratuity. In this respect, Ockham is still, 40 or more years after the event, a 
major exponent of the 'anti-necessitarian' agenda resulting from the Paris 
condemnations of 1277. His "nominalism" has served him, in the first place, as 
a tool for eliminating what he interprets as obstacles to divine and human 
freedom, wherever he finds them. Of the forms taken by this "tool", he uses the 
divine annihilation or separation principle far more often than the 'razor' as 
such. Both are utilised to sever connections which look to Ockham like 
obstacles to divine freedom of action, and occasionally its human counterpart 
(see conclusion to chapter 2 above, p.141). In this chapter, after taking stock of 
Ockham's use of logic and semantics in his description of the soul, we will see 
how his "nominalism" affects his accounts of the closely connected issues of 
relation and the image of God in the soul. 
Ockham: The Powers of the Human Soul 
An obvious exception to what I have described as Ockham's "metaphysics of 
separation and isolation" is his account of the soul and its faculties. Here he 
uses his theory of absolute and connotative terms not to separate, but to unify, 
and in fact to identify or 'singularise', the soul together with its faculties. 
Following Scotus, he rejects any real distinction between the soul's faculties, 
but, contrary to Scotus, rejects even his 'formal distinction' between them. The 
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distinction is in the names or concepts used to describe the different actions of 
the soul, and in the acts themselves: 
Therefore I. ~ay ... that the p~wers of the soul of which we are speaking in 
the proposition, namely the Intellect and will ... are the same in reality 
among t.hemselves and as the essence of the soul. But I distinguish 
concerning the ~ower of t~e soul: fO.r the p?~er is understood in one way 
as the total n?mlnal (expnmente qUid nomInis) description of something, in 
another way IS understood as that which is denominated by that name or 
c?n~ept: In the first way.of speaking of intellect and will, I say that they are 
distinguished, for a nominal description of the intellect is that 'intellect is the 
substance of the soul as able to understand'. A nominal description of the 
will is that it is 'the substance of the soul as able to will'. Now however 
these description.s can be un~erstood as meaning 1) words (voces) or 2) 
concepts or 3) things. In the first way 1) they are really distinguished as 
words are really distinguished. In the second way 2) they are distinguished 
in reason as concepts. In the third way 3) they are distinguished in reality, 
though partially, because, although the substance which can understand 
and will is one in number, yet understanding and willing are really distinct 
acts.866 
Ockham expresses agreement in this with Henry of Ghent,867 who distinguishes 
the powers of the soul by relations, understanding by 'power' "the whole thing 
named, which is not only the essence of the soul, but understanding and 
willing". But understanding 'power' in the second way of speaking referred to 
above, as "that which is denominated by the name or concept", i.e. in the sense 
of a real (quid rei), rather than a nominal, definition, is a different matter, 
because: 
then intellect is no more distinguished from will than from intellect, or God 
from God, or Socrates from Socrates, because it is not distinguished from 
will either in reality or in reason. Thus there is one substance of the soul 
able to perform distinct acts, with respect to which it can have different 
866 Ockham, Sent.II,q.20,(Theol.V,435): Ideo dico ... quod potentiae animae, de quibu~ loq~imur 
in proposito, scilicet intel/ectus et voluntas ... sunt idem realiter inter se et cum esse~t/~ ammae. 
Sed distinguo de potentia animae: nam potentia uno modo accipitur pro tot~ descnptlone 
exprimente quid nominis, alio modo accipitur pro iIIo quod denominator ab illo nom me vel 
conceptu. Primo modo loquendo de intel/ectu et voluntate, dico quod distinguuntur,. narn. 
descriptio exprimens quid nominis intellectus est ista quod 'intellectus est substantia ammae 
patens intel/igere '. Descriptio voluntatis est quod est 'substantia animae potens velie '. "!unc 
autem istae descriptiones possunt accipi pro vocibus vel conceptibus vel pro r~b~s. Pnmo 
modo distinguuntur realiter sicut voces distinguuntur realiter. Secunda ,m?do d/~tm~uuntur . 
ratione sicut conceptus. Tertio modo distinguuntur realiter, saltem partlallter, qUia Iicet e~d~m .Slt 
SUbstantia numero quae potest intelligere et velie, tamen intelligere et velie sunt actus dlstmctl 
realiter. 
867 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet,III,q.14,(ed.Paris,1588,ff.66v-71r) 
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denominations. Because as the intellect is said to elicit or to be able to r 't 
the act of understanding; so the will the act of willing. 868 e ICI 
Therefore, the faculties of the soul are distinguished only as words signifying 
the soul itself, and connoting different acts performed by the soul. Ockham 
justifies this by drawing a parallel with the same powers in the divinity, thus 
begging the question of the imago Dei in the human soul: 
This is clear in divinis, because God has the power of governing, of 
restoring, of predestining, of reproving, which do not imply any distinction in 
God, b~t ?ifferent effects follow on God's power as creating, governing, 
predestining, and, on account of different effects, God is variously 
denominated, and that by an extrinsic denomination.86g 
Ockham here seems to be on course for a Sabellian or Modalist (i.e. unitarian) 
image of God in the soul. This is the account which sees God as a monad , 
sometimes identified with the Father, who is merely ascribed different names (or 
concepts) according to his various activities as incarnate Word or as Holy Spirit. 
By giving us to understand that a 'power' merely signifies the essence of the 
soul, while connoting an action, Ockham's account of the soul's powers seems 
tailor-made for such a heterodox imago. Whether and how he avoids this 
remains to be seen. 
Ockham: First and Second Intentions: Absolute and Connotative Terms 
The issue as to whether relation should be held to be secundum esse, a real 
thing outside the soul and distinct from absolute things, or only secundum dici, a 
concept in the mind, was clearly a sensitive one. However, Ockham, 
868 Ockham, Sent.lI,q.20,(Theol.V,436): sic intellectus non plus distinguitur a voluntate quam ab 
intellectu vel quam Deus a Deo vel Sorles a Sorle, quia nec distinguitur a voluntate nec re nec 
ratione. Sed sic est una substantia animae potens habere distinctos actus, res,?ect~ quo~u"! . 
potest habere diversas denominationes. Quia ut elicit vel elicere potest actum Intelllgendl dlcltur 
intellectus; ut actum volendi voluntas. . 
869 Ockham,Sent.lI,q.20,(Theol.V,436): //Iud patet in divinis, nam Deus habe~ p.ote~tlam 
gubernativam, reparativam, praedestinativam, reprobativam, quae nul/am dlstl.nctlOnem ponunt 
in Deo, sed quia alius effectus consequitur potentiam Dei creativam" gu~ernatlva,:" . . 
praedestinativam, et propter diversos effectus denominatur Deus dlversls denomination/bus, et 
hoc denominatione extrinsica. 
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characteristically, keeps the logical and theological aspects firmly apart, by 
means of the semantic distinction between terms of 'first and second intention': 
Still, according to the truth of theology, 'relation' is a name of first intention 
since it signifies not only relative names, but real relations outside the soul' 
viz., the divine relations. And thus it is truly a first intention.87o ' 
"An intention of the soul", Ockham says, "is something in the soul capable of 
signifying something else".871 A name of first intention, in the strict sense, 
signifies in such a way that it is able to supposit in a proposition for its 
significata. This comprises names such as 'man', 'tree', 'stone', which are also 
'absolute' names. In a broad sense, they include anything which is not itself an 
intention of the soul, namely syncategorematic872 terms and expressions, verbs, 
conjunctions and similar terms. A name of second intention, on the other hand, 
"is a sign of first intentions. Examples are 'genus', 'species' and the like". 873 
Absolute things are those signified by absolute names or terms. "Everything 
signified by an absolute name is signified primarily ... it does not signify one thing 
primarily and another thing secondarily". 874 Examples are 'animal', 'man', 'tree' 
etc. Connotative terms, on the other hand, signify one thing directly or primarily 
and in recto (i.e. in the nominative case), and another indirectly or secondarily 
and in obliquo (i.e. in an oblique case). An example is 'father', which signifies 
e.g. 'man' directly, and 'child' or 'offspring' indirectly, i.e. 'a man with a child'. 
Absolute terms have 'real' definitions; connotative terms only 'nominal' 
definitions. Ockham classes all relative terms as second intentions, with the one 
exception, quoted above, of Trinitarian relations which he is obliged, "according 
870 Ockham, Quodlibet VI,27 (Theo/.IX,689), Freddoso,579. 
871 Ockham, SL.1.12,(Philos.I,41), Loux,73. t' t 
872 . . ' • II' 'some' 'excep e c Syncategorematic terms are indeterminate, e.g. every, a " . 
873 Ockham, SL.1.12,(Philos.I,43), Loux,74. 
874 Ockham, SL.1.1 0, (Philos. 1,35) Loux,70. 
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to the truth of theology", to accept as first intentions, the intra-divine relations 
being real and formally distinct. All relative terms, in fact, are connotative. We 
will first take a look at the treatment of 'relation' in Thomas, Bonaventure and 
Scotus. 
Aquinas: Relations in Creatures and in God 
The quantity of literature on the subject of relation in the period from c.1250 to 
1350 is not great. I have found helpful Mark Henninger875 and Beatrice 
Beretta,876 the latter, according to Gilles Emery,877 being the first doctoral 
dissertation on the subject of relation in Ockham. However, the author 
confines her investigation to the philosophical sphere, and, although she refers 
to the doctrine of the Trinity in analysing texts, Emery notes that she 
"methodically excludes it in her 'propos de eette etude". 
For Thomas, the category of 'relation' is the metaphysical/oeus of the 
creature's participation in the divine goodness. Just as the being of creatures is 
esse partieipatum, so with the transcendental attributes of being, unum, bonum, 
and verum. The good of creatures is a participation in the divine goodness: 
Furthermore, what is said essentially is said more truly than what is said by 
participation. But God is good essentially, while other things are goods by 
participation. God is therefore the highest good.878 
Consequently, "The supreme good does not add to good any absolute thing, 
but only a relation". 879 Relation is unique among the nine Aristotelian accidental 
875 Mark G.Henninger,SJ, Relations: Medieval Theories, 1250-1325, Ox~ord, Clar~ndon .. 1 ~~9. 
876 Beatrice Beretta, Ad Aliquid: La relation chez Guillaume d'Occam, Fnbourg SUisse. EditIOns 
Universitaires, 1999 (Doctoral dissertation). 
877 Review in Revue Thomiste, 1 00,no.1, 2000,136-138. 
878 Aquinas, SCG.1.41.3,(Leo.XIII.117), N.Dame,VoI.1,Pegis,157. 
879 A . qUinas 
, ST.la.6.2.ad.1 ,(Leo.IV,67). 
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categories in having a different kind of being, such that it does not adhere in any 
subject: 
... quantity and quality are accidents residing in a subject, whereas relation 
as Boethius says,880 signifies something not as adhering to a subject but a~ 
passing from it to something else .. 881 
In addition, although, as we shall see, it is possible to posit such a thing as a 
"real relation", relation is not a reality in the same mode as the other categories: 
All genera as such, with the exception of relation, posit something in 
reality. For example, quantity, by its very nature posits something. But 
relation, alone, because of what it is, does not posit anything in reality, for 
what it predicates is not 'something' but 'to something' (non aliquid, sed ad 
a/iquid). Hence, there are certain relations which posit nothing in reality, but 
only in reason. 882 
Similarly, in a question concerning the relationship between being and its 
transcendental attributes, one, true and good, Thomas asks whether good adds 
anything to being: 
Good must ... either add nothing to being or add something merely in 
concept. " .it is not nonsense to call a being good. Thus good, by the fact 
of its not limiting being, must add to it something merely conceptuaL .. But 
true and good, being predicated positively, cannot add anything except a 
relation which is merely conceptual. A relation is merely conceptual, 
according to the Philosopher,883 when by it something is said to be related 
which is not dependent on that to which it is referred, but vice-versa; for a 
relation is a sort of dependence.884 
Dependency in a relation need not be reciprocal. This is the case with 
knowledge, which is dependent on its object, but not vice-versa. In the same 
way, reality in a relation coincides with the reality of dependence, as is the case 
between creatures and God. However, the relation is not mutual: 
Now a relation of God to creatures is not a reality in God, but in the 
creature; for it is in God in our idea only: as what is knowable is so called 
with relation to knowledge, not that it depends on knowledge, but because 
d 't 885 knowledge depen s on I . 
880 Boethius, De Trinitate, V,Loeb, 1962,Stewart,25/27. 
881 Aquinas, De Potentia,VII.8c, Dominican,1934 trans.,Vol.IlI,47. . 
882 Aquinas, De Veritate, 1.5.ad.16,(Leo.XXII,VoI.1 ,21), Hackett,Vol.l,Mulllgan,28. 
883 Aristotle, Metaph.V.15 1021a 27. . 
884 Aquinas, De Veritate, XXI. 1 c,(Leo.XXII,VoI.3,593), Hackett,Vol.IlI,Schmldt,6. 
885 Aquinas, ST.la.6.2.ad.1 ,(Leo.IV,67). 
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An example of a real non-mutual relation of dependency is the relationship in 
which creatures are ordered to God, and not vice-versa: 
Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all 
creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that 
creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real 
relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are 
referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent these names [e.g., 'Lord' 
and 'Creator'] which import relation to the creature from being predicated of 
God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason of the 
change of the creature; as a column is on the right of an animal, without 
change in itself, but by change in the animal. 886 
How can any sort of relation ad extra, even in the mind, be legitimately 
attributed to God in view of His immutability and simplicity? Thomas shows that 
relation as such, and indeed action as such, imply neither composition between 
their terms or extremes, nor movement on the part of the relation itself, or the 
action itself, "Hence it is not incompatible with a thing's simplicity to have many 
relations towards other things". 887 This applies also to the relations ad extra, 
albeit only conceptual, between Creator and and creatures: 
Now we must needs admit a relation between a principle and the things 
which proceed from it; and not only a relation of origin inasmuch as a result 
springs from its source, but also a relation of distinction, seeing that an 
effect must needs be distinct from its cause. Accordingly from God's 
supreme simplicity there results an infinite number of respects or relations 
between creatures and him, inasmuch as he produced creatures distinct 
from himself and yet somewhat likened to him.888 
Real relation in creatures is an aspect of finality, as it pertains to the natural 
order: 
... relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what refers to another. 
Such regard to another exists sometimes in the nature of things, as in those 
very things which by their own nature are ordered to each other, .and hav~ 
a mutual inclination· and such relations are necessarily real relations; as In , . 
a heavy body is found an inclination and order to t~e centre ... a ~ertaln 
respect in regard to the centre, and the same ~pp.lI~s to other .thln~s. 
Sometimes, however, this regard to another, Signified by re~atlon, IS to be 
found only in the apprehension of reason comparing one thing to another, 
BB6 h . Aquinas, ST.la.13.7c,(Leo.IV,153),my parent eSls. 
BB7 Aquinas, De Potentia, VII.Bc, Dominican,1934,trans.,Vol.IlI,4B. 
888 Aquinas, De Potentia, VII.Bc, Dominican,1934,trans.,Vol.lIl,4B. 
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and this is a logical relation only; as, for instance, when reason compares 
man to animal as the species to the genus. 889 
Logical relations have to do, in one way or another, with the mind's engagement 
with extramental reality: 
... j~st as a ~eal. relation consists in order between thing and thing, so a 
logical relation IS the order of thought to thought; and this may occur ... when 
the order is discovered by the mind and attributed to that which is 
expressed in a relative term. Such are the relations attributed by the mind 
to the things understood as such, for instance, the relations of genus and 
species. 890 
Whereas real relations to God in creatures result from their being ordered to 
God, this is not, as we have seen, the case conversely. Thomas also 
enunciates the contrast between the divine relations ad extra and ad intra as , 
follows: 
... nor does any relation to the creature arise from His (God's) nature; for He 
does not produce the creature by necessity of His nature, but by His 
intellect and will ... Therefore, there is no real relation in God to the 
creature; whereas in creatures there is a real relation to God, because 
creatures are contained under the divine order, and their very nature entails 
dependence on God. On the other hand, the divine processions are in one 
and the same nature. Hence no parallel exists. 891 
In the body of the same question, he further explains that 
" .when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature, then both 
the one proceeding and the source of procession agree in the same order; 
and then they have real relations to each other. Therefore, the divine 
processions ... are necessarily real relations. 
Here again, the divine simplicity might be thought to rule out the presence of 
real relations in God, and indeed, " .. relation really existing in God has the 
existence of the divine essence in no way distinct therefrom", and "nothing that 
exists in God can have any relation to that wherein it exists or of whom it is 
spoken, except the relation of identity; and this by reason of God's supreme 
simplicity".892 Reality in the divine relations differs from the essence only in what 
889 Aquinas, ST.la.28.1 c,(Leo.IV,318). 
890 Aquinas, De Potentia, V".11 c, Dominican,1934,trans.,VoI.III,63. 
891 Aquinas, ST.la.28.1.ad.3,(Leo.IV,319). 
892 Aquinas, ST.la.28.2c and ad.1,(Leo.IV,321). 
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is meant by 'opposition to a term', i.e, to what terminates the relation regarding 
intelligibility: 
But in so .far ,as .r~lation implies respect to something else, no respect to the 
ess~nce IS slgnlf.le~, b~t rathe!, to its opposite term. Thus it is manifest that 
r~latlo~ r~ally eXlstln~ In ~~d ,I.S reall~ the s~me. as His essence; and only 
differs. In ItS ~o~e of intelligibility; as In relation IS meant that regard to its 
opposite which IS not expressed in the name of essence.893 
Scotus: Relations in Creatures and in God 
Scotus is a realist regarding relations. They are accidents characterizing 
individual subjects, and in some cases are really distinct from their subjects and 
from other relations, 
For a relation is neither a substance nor an absolute ... Here then the 
question is whether it has existence or [and] is a thing having a real entity 
of its own outside the soul. .. To this I answer, it is a thing ... A relationship 
is real if, given real terms that are really distinct, it is there by the very 
nature of things. For its entity, whatever it be, is not just in the soul, and 
consequently it is a thing in its own way and in accord with its own entity. 
But the relation of Father to Son is this sort of thing".894 
In his commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, he argues that in general a 
relation is not the same as its foundation. 895 For instance, the respective 
heights of Socrates and Plato are really distinct from the subjects in which they 
inhere, since Socrates or Plato could grow or shrink in height but remain in 
existence; similarly, the height of either could change with respect to the 
other.896 In the case of Socrates's relation of height with respect to Plato, 
Socrates's height is called the foundation of the relation, and Plato's height the 
terminus, being what Socrates's relation of height is "toward". However, the 
relation itself inheres in Socrates, not in Socrates's height, as accidents do not 
inhere in accidents, Thus Socrates is the subject of the relation, In addition, a 
893 Aquinas, ST.la.28.2c,(Leo.IV,321). 
894 Scotus Quodlibet 111.15-16 (Dims-Wadding XII,68); Alluntis,63. 
895 ' , , Scotus, In Metaph.V,q.11.n.50,(Olms-Wadding,IV,635). 
896 Scotus, Ordinatio, lI,d.1 ,q.5,nn.200-204,(Vat. VII,pp.1 01-3). 
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relation can have its terminus in something absolute.897 A co-relation is 
identified by transposing the foundation and the terminus. 
Major differences in Scotus from Aquinas' account of relation centre on the 
question of real as opposed to rational or conceptual relations. Like Thomas he 
rejects the view that all relations are merely "of reason" and mind-dependent. 
However, he regards as sufficient to constitute a real relation the real extra-
mental existence of its foundation and its terminus.898 He also considers that the 
category of relation ought not to be divided into the real and the merely 
conceptual. As noted by P.King899 , he comments "tartly" that "Rose is not 
divided into real roses and merely conceptual roses, for they are two modes of 
being of the same thing". 900 Scotus's argument rests on the contention that an 
object as considered by the intellect has a special ontological status, a lesser 
kind of being, esse diminutum. 901 In place of the "real as opposed to 
conceptual" scheme, he adopts, though with some qualifications, Aristotle's 3 
modes of relations902 : 1) numerical relations founded on quantity; 2) 
active/passive relations, founded on one of the absolute categories; 3) relations 
of "the measurable to the measure", as knowledge to the knowable, for 
instance, which may be founded on any category. These three are called first-, 
second- and third-mode relations respectively. Third-mode relations903 , which 
figure prominently in Scotus's metaphysics, are characterised by the absence of 
897 Scotus, In Metaph'v,q.11 ,n.66,(Olms-Wadding,IV,636). . 
898 Scotus, Quodlibet,q,V1.33,(Olms-Wadding,XII.166), Alluntls, 156-7,6.8~. 
899 Peter King, Chapter 1, "Scotus on Metaphysics", Cambridge Compamon to Duns Scotus, 
Thomas Williams, ed.,15-68,36. 
900 Scotus, In Metaph.V,q.11 ,n.42,(Olms-Wadding,IV,634). 
901 Scotus, In Metaph.V,q.11 ,n.44,(Olms-Wadding,IV,634). . 
902 Aristotle, Metaphysics, V.15,(1 020b26-32); Scotus, In Metaph.V.qq.12-13,(OlmS-Waddlng,IV. 
643-7). 
903 Based on Metaphysics,V.15,(1 021 a26-1 021 b4). 
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a real co-relation: for instance something can be knowable without actually 
being known; there is dependency or "toward ness" in one direction only. 
The 'nonmutual' relation of creatures to the Creator as held by Thomas and 
others can be recognised here as a third-mode relation. Scotus, however, does 
not accept the "nonmutuality" thesis; he considers it an invalid association or 
conflation of mutuality with dependence. He first points out that, besides the 
'existential' type of dependence (knowledge cannot exist without the knowable) 
which usually characterizes the traditional account, there is a dependence of 
perfection between the measurable and the measure: knowledge must 
"measure up" to the knowable, in terms of accuracy for instance. As far as 
mutuality is concerned, he insists that third-mode relations are mutual, even 
where genuine dependency is involved in one foundation. The difference is 
rather in the relations of act to potency in the respective relata. The relevant co-
relation (or correlative) must be present to denominate the independent 
element. The knowable is only knowable qua the potential relation it may stand 
in to a knower. Nor does mutuality entail mutual dependence.904 
Scotus does not consider the direction of dependence of a third-mode relation 
to be affected by the presence of a co-relation. A relation may be terminated at 
something absolute, which means that a third-mode co-relation may have an 
absolute being as both its subject and foundation-since the foundation need 
not be distinct from the relation or co-relation. In these circumstances, the 
destruction of the co-relation (by change in, or removal of, its terminus) does not 
produce any change in its foundation, the original relation's terminus. This is the 
904 Scotus, In Metaph.V.12-14,nn.1 00-1 04,(Olms-Wadding,IV,643-648) 
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account Scotus gives of the relation between God the Creator and creatures.9OS 
All this points to the fact that, under these conditions, a third-mode co-relation is 
nothing more than an extrinsic denomination of its subject: God is not 
necessarily (or essentially) a Creator, although creatures are necessarily 
creatures. Scotus can therefore deny that the co-relation of a real third-mode 
relation is necessarily a relation "of reason" only. Scotus's analysis of third-
mode relations is applied at many points in his philosophy, especially in his 
definitions of intuitive and abstractive cognition906 and in his analysis of the 
relation between cause and effect as a form of dependence. 
Concerning Trinitarian relations, two passages from Augustine on the 
constitution of the divine Persons are referred to by Scotus in Quodlibet, qq.'" 
and IV, one to the effect that "not everything in God is predicated by way of 
substance or accident", especially with regard to "relational assertions",907 and 
the other that 
Everything in the divine is predicated according to either substance or 
relation, and what is predicated according to substance is common [to all 
three Persons]. Therefore, origin, be it active or passive, is formally a 
relation.90B 
In the Trinity, the Father is the active origin of the Son, and Father and Son 
together the active origin of the Holy Spirit. The respective co-relations are the 
'passive relations of origin' in which receptivity is enshrined at the heart of Being 
(p.23 above). 
905 Scotus, Ordinatio,lI,d.1 ,q.5,nn.261-2,( Vat.vII,129). 
906 Scotus, Quodlibet,XIII,nn.34-37,(0ImS-wadding,XIQI,31 d1-/~b2)i 11118 (0Ims-Wadding,XII,83), 907 Augustine, De Trin.v,c.6,n.6,(PL.42.914); Scotus, uo I e ,q. . , 
Alluntis 76 3.51. . 01 W dd' 9 XII 115) 
908 Aug~sti'ne, De Trin.V.c.5,n.5,(PL.ptbi); Scotus, Quodllbet,q.IV.32,( ms- a In" , 
Alluntis,106,4.68. 
255 
OCKHAM ON RELATION 
The category of 'relation' plays a major role in Ockham's programme of 
ontological parsimony (also called 'ontological reduction'). This programme is 
summarized by Adams as follows: "to eliminate universals other than names or 
concepts and to restrict particular things (res) to the categories of sUbstance 
and quality". 909 All of Aristotle's ten categories or 'most general genera' (genera 
generalissima) are relational terms in one sense or another. The importance of 
the concept of relation for Ockham can be gauged from the number of 
questions dealing directly with it in the Quodlibets (VI, 8-30, mostly associated 
with the categories), the Summa Logicae (I, qq.49-54), the Ordinatio (d.30, 
qq.1-5) and the Exposition on the Categories of Aristotle (Expos. Praed.), 
chapters 12 and 13: and all this does not include his treatment of relations in the 
Trinity, or the many other locations where the concept necessarily figures. 
Ockham: Real Relations 
In his 'Exposition on the Categories of Aristotle' (E.Praed.), chapter 12, Ockham 
introduces the Aristotelian term, lad aliquid' (from Aristotle, ov TTp6( T/910), 
literally 'towards something' or 'in relation to' another thing, to describe the 
category of relation,911 which is used also to describe what is 'of' (or 'than' or 
'as' etc) another thing. Ockham is always careful to lay claim to the support of 
Aristotle in setting out his position on the ontology of relations, in accordance 
. 912· I' 
with his own interpretation of the ontology of the categOries In genera. 
909 Marilyn McCord Adams, Things versus 'Hows', or Ockham on Predication and Ontology. in 
James Bogen and James E.McGuire (edd)., How Things Are, DordrechtiBoston, 1984, 175-
188,175. 
910 Aristotle, Metaphysics V,ch.15,(1 020b26). 
911 Aristotle, Categories Vll,(6a36-6b14). 'I m 
912 i.e. that only substance and quality are categories of the real; the other eight are on Y na es 
or signs. 
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Many things .. can be adduced, and have elsewhere913 been adduced to 
show that in the inte~tion of the Philosopher a relation is not a thing distinct 
from any absolute thing; but they are only relative names, which cannot be 
~ppropriate to something except in respect to something else, or at least it 
IS necessary to add or understand some name in either the genitive dative 
or ablative case.914 ' 
The three oblique cases mentioned, in fact, accord only with names and signs, 
therefore only names and signs are said to be ad a/iquid.915 This applies even 
where the object signified by the relative term is a substance or a quality, and 
thus in Ockham's view a real, extra-mental thing. Thus the name 'father' is just 
as much a relative term as, for instance, 'double' or 'similar' or 'equal'. However, 
"It is not thus with the name 'man'; for if Socrates is a man, it is not implied that 
he is to some man or of some man".916 Therefore 'father' is an ad a/iquid or 
'relative' (re/ativus) term, but not a 'relation' (re/atio) as such. In the following 
question, he says, "a correct description would be: 'relatives (re/ativa) are those 
things which of their very selves are ad a/iquid' ".917 
Aquinas uses the word 'habitude', derived from se habere ad, and 'ad a/iud', 
for the most part, for ad a/iquid: 
Some relative names are imposed to signify the relative habitudes 
themselves, as master and servant, father and son, and the like, and these 
relatives are called secundum esse ('according to being'). But others are 
imposed to signify the things from which ensue certain habitudes, as the 
mover and the thing moved, the head and the thing that has a head, and 
the like: and these relatives are called secundum dici ('according to 
saying,).918 
913 Cf. Ordinatio,d.30,q.3,( Theol.IV,340); SL.I,49,50,(Philos.I,153-162). . . 
914 Oekham, EPraed.,eh.12, (Philos.II,242); my translation: Multa autem p~ssunt addu~/, SICUt 
alibi adduxi, ad ostendendum quod de intentione Philosophi est quod re!~tlo n~n ~st alia res 
distincta ab omni re absoluta' sed tantum sunt nomina relativa, quae sCllice.t all~UI non possunt 
competere nisi respectu alic~ius alterius, vel saltem oportet addere vel submtelligere aliquod 
nomen in aliquo casu, genitiv~ vel dativ~ vel ablativo. 
915 Oekham, EPraed.,eh.12,(Philos.II,240). 
916 Oekham, EPraed.,eh.12,(Philos.II,240). . . . I . 
917 0 kh E P d h 13 (Philos II 265)' my trans.: ista debet esse descnptlo quod re at/va e am, . rae .,e., ., , 
sunt ilia quae hoc ipsum quod sunt, ad aliquid sunt'. 
918 Aquinas, ST.la.13. 7.ad.1 ,(Leo. IV, 163). 
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However, secundum esse and secundum dici do not correspond to 'real' and 'of 
reason', as Thomas explains in De Potentia: 
This distinction between secundum esse and secundum dici relatives does 
not prove the relations in question to be real. Certain secundum esse 
relat!ve terms ~o not signify a real relation, for instance, right and left as 
ascrl,bed to a,plllar: and some secundum dici relative terms signify real 
relations, for Instance knowledge and sensation, Because relatives are said 
to be secundum esse when terms are employed to signify the relations 
themselves, while they are said to be secundum dici when the terms are 
employed to signify qualities or something of the kind primarily, from which 
relations arise,919 
Ockham objects to the terms secundum esse and secundum dici as a division 
of relations, on the grounds that they do not appear in Aristotle,92o For Ockham, 
secundum esse, used to describe a relation, is too liable to serve the notion of a 
relation as a real, extra-mental thing, distinct from absolute things, In this 
respect, he makes a distinction in Quodlibet VI between two ways in common 
usage of referring to a relation as 'real': 
In one way a relation is called real because it signifies some "little thing" 
outside the soul that is distinct from absolute things, In a second way, a 
relation is called real because it signifies absolute things, either outside the 
soul or in the soul, which are said to be such as they are denominated to be 
by means of such a relative [name] in the absence of any operation of the 
intellect. 921 
He rejects any reality for relations in the first sense. Indeed he has already 
devoted twelve questions of Quodlibet VI (8-19) to disproving any reality 
whatever for such "little things". The deciding factor is the non-necessity of an 
act of the intellect for bringing about the existence of the relation: 
God can in reality create a stone whether there is or is not an intellect 
understanding it. Therefore this relation can in some way be called real,. not 
that this relation is some thing, but because it signifies (importat) tr~e things 
which do not require an operation of the intellect for one to ~e creating and 
another to be created. Just as similarity is called a real relation, not 
because it is some one thing distinct from others, but because it signifies 
919 Aquinas, De Potentia, VI I, 1 O.ad.11, Dominican, 1934 trans.,Vol.lIl,62. 
920 Ockham, E.Praed.13,(Philos.II,266:61-267:66). 
921 Ockham, Quodlibet, VI,q.25,( TheoI.IX,679), Freddoso,571-2. 
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true ~hin.g~ concerning which the intellect does nothing to bring it about that 
one IS similar to the other and conversely.922 
Despite his objection to the term secundum esse in the E.Praed., Ockham 
uses the term himself in Quodlibet VI, 21, on the grounds of common usage, in 
distinguishing between relatives according to being, and according to 
predication: 
I understand this distinction as follows: Relatives according to being are 
those that are related to one another in such a way that (i) if existence is 
truly predicated of the one, then it will be truly predicated of the other, and 
(ii) if the one is truly predicated of something, then the other will be truly 
predicated of something. For instance, if 'A master exists' is true, then 'A 
servant exists' is true, and if 'Something is a master' is true, then 
'Something is a servant' is true, and vice versa.923 
Although not posited in terms of 'habitude', but rather in terms of predicability, 
this is virtually identical to Thomas's description of secundum esse or 'according 
to being' relations. 924 Thomas's second type, which he calls secundum dici or 
'according to saying' relations, is described as something "from which a 
habitude ensues". Ockham's corresponding type, which he calls "relatives 
according to predication", is such that: 
.. if existence is truly predicated of the one, it is not necessary that existence 
be truly predicated of the other or that something be added in an oblique 
case to [the first]. For instance, if 'Knowledge exists' is true, it is not 
necessary that 'What is knowable exists' be true, and if 'This is a hand' is 
true, it is not necessary that it be the hand of some human being, since an 
amputated hand is truly a hand and yet is not the hand of any human 
being.925 
922 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.30,q.5,(Theo/.IV,385), my trans.: /mm~ potest ~eali~e.r o.eus creare 
lapidem si intellectus non sit sicut si intellectus sit. Ideo potest Ista re/at,o dlCI allquo modo 
rea/is, non quidem quod ista re/alio sit aJiqua res, sed quia import~t v~ras res qu~e n~n .. 
requirunt operationem intellectus ad hoc quod una sit cr~~ns et a/I~ s~t creata. SICut slmlll~udo 
dicitur re/atio reaJis, non quia sit a/iqua una res alia ab a//I~, sed qUIa Importat veras res ctrca 
~uas nihil facit intellectus ad hoc quod una sit simi/is a/ten et e converso. 
:2: Ockham, QuodJibet,VI,q.21 ,(Theo/.IX,664), Freddoso,560. 
See above, p.257-8. 
925 Ockham, QuodJibet,VI,q.21 ,(Theo/.IX,664), Freddoso,560. 
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Ockham: Three 'Types' of Relation 
Ockham adopts Aristotle's three-fold division of relations taken from 
Metaphysics V:926 1) relations according to number and quantity, e.g. equality, 
similarity, distinctness, identity etc., 2) relations of acting and being acted upon, 
e.g. heating and being heated, and other relations which 'admit of more and 
less', and 3) non-quantitative relations of measuring and being measured, e.g. 
knower and the thing known, image and the thing represented. Each of these 
types can be classed as a relative 'according to being': 
For if something is similar, then it is similar to something white or to 
something black, and if someone is a father, then he is a father of some 
child, and if something is knowledge, it is knowledge of something 
knowable.927 
However, this does not qualify them as "real" in the sense of being "distinct from 
absolute things": 
And so Socrates is similar to Plato because of absolute things only, all else 
excluded - whether in extra-mental reality or in the intellect. And so in 
extra-mental reality there is nothing besides the absolute things.928 
Ockham: Reductive Arguments 
Questions 8 to 16 of Quodlibet VI are devoted to proving this, and questions 17 
to 19 to demonstrating agreement with Aristotle in this regarding all three types. 
Ockham brings to bear a range of argument types characteristic of his 
programme of ontological parsimony: 
1) The 'independent conception' argument, that really distinct things can be 
independently conceived, whereas a relation cannot be conceived 
independently of its foundation and terminus, i.e. of the related objects. Ockham 
extends this, perhaps questionably, to relations of cause and effect. including 
926 Aristotle, Metaphysics,V,15,(1020b26-1021b11). 
927 Ockham, Quodlibet,VI,q.21 ,(Theol.IX,665), Freddoso,5~1. 
9280ckham Ordinatio,d.30,q.1 ,( Theol.IV,316:14-16), Henninger, 1989 trans., 131 . 
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the relation of creature to Creator, where he claims that "a creature can be 
conceived perfectly without God's being conceived".929 It is difficult to see how 
any effect can be conceived perfectly as an effect without its cause being 
conceived: and most especially a creature as a creature; but this does not really 
affect the argument. 
2) The 'absurd (sometimes infinite) number' argument: that if, for instance, God 
were to produce 1000 worlds, each containing something white, then an agent 
producing something white in one of them would cause a similarity in 1000 
worlds. Not only the number, but the distance between the worlds also 
contributes to the absurdity for Ockham.93o Another, still more potent, version of 
this argument points to the universe as containing an infinite number of 
relations, of spatial distance for instance, which must change every time 
anything moves.931 
3) The 'potentia absoluta Dei' argument crops up in many forms: here, in 
connection with relations of natural priority and posteriority: 
.. God can produce any prior absolute thing without producing any posterior 
thing. Therefore, he can produce two absolute white things without 
producing any posterior similarity, and yet the two things will nonetheless 
be similar. Therefore a similarity is not the sort of mediating thing in 
question.932 
The 'razor', which by inference can be applied to all ontologically reductive 
arguments, is used explicitly here: "Likewise, if the things are similar without a 
mediating similarity, then it is pointless to posit any mediating similarity".933 
4) The 'divisibility/indivisibility' argument: if a relation, of similarity in whiteness 
for instance, is a distinct thing, it will be either (a) divisible, in which case it will 
be a quantum, and therefore extended, or (b) indivisible, in which case, 
929 Ockham, Quodlibet, VI,q.8,( Theol.IX,613), Freddoso,S14. 
930 Ockham, Quodlibet, VI,q.8,( Theol.IX,613-4), Freddoso,S14-S. 
931 Ockham, Quodlibet, VII,q.8,( The 01. IX, 728),Freddoso,614. 
932 Ockham, Quodlibet, VI,q.8,( Theol.IX,614), Freddoso,S1S. 
9330ckham, Quodlibet, VI,q.8,( TheoI.IX,614), Freddoso.S1S. 
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if: by ~Od's power, o.ne part ~f the whiteness is annihilated along with its 
slmllanty, then what IS numencally the same similarity will still remain in the 
other part - which [like (a)] is absurd.934 
5) The 'infinite regress' (sometimes called 'infinite progression') argument: This 
is based on the idea that if a relation A is distinct from both its foundation Band 
its terminus C, then there will be similarly distinct relations between A and B 
, 
and between A and C, and so on ad infinitum. Scotus, whose realist ontology 
involves relations as being distinct from absolute things, saw this danger and 
tried to avoid it by positing identity between a relation itself and any relation it 
might bear to its foundation or terminus, thus stopping the regress at the second 
stage [ref. required]. Ockham counters this on the grounds that distinct termini 
entail distinct relations, "since one relation has one primary terminus".935 
Ockham: Foundations and Non-Inherence 
According to Scotus, relations are really distinct from, but inhere in, their 
foundations. 936 Ockham rejects both the distinction and the inherence, and 
resolves the issue in terms of his semantics: 
.. the similarity of one whiteness to another signifies the first whiteness and 
connotes the other, and although they co-exist, they are said and 
denominated as similar without any relation. This is because the name or 
concept 'similarity' signifies the two white things coexisting as a whole 
significate, and signifies one only as coexisting with the other. Therefore if 
one whiteness is destroyed the first white thing is not said to be similar, but 
this only on account of the destruction of the second whiteness which was 
connoted. 937 
934 Ockham, Quodlibet, VI,q.8,( Theol.IX,616), Freddoso,516. 
9350ckham Quodlibet VI q.11 (Theol.IX,626), Freddoso,525. 
936 Scotus, Ordinatio,lI:d.1 ,q.5,'n.200,(Vat.vll, 101-2); Lectura,lI,d.1 ,q.5,n.184,(Vat.XVIII,61). 
937 Ockham, Sent.lI,q.2,( Theol. V,39), my translation: .. similitudo uniu~ albedi~is ad aliam 
significat primam albedinam et connotat aliam, et quamdiu simul exslstunt, dlcunt~~ e~ . , 
denominantur similia sine aliqua relatione. Et hoc quia hoc nomen vel c~nc~ptus slmlltt~~o 
significat ista duo alba quo ad totale significatum coexsistentia, et non slg~/f/~~t unam niSI 
coexsistat alteri. Et ideo destructa una albedine non dicitur prima albedo slml/ts, sed hoc propter 
solam destructionem secundae albedinis connotatae. Cf. Ordinatio,d.30,q.3 (Theol.IV,351-
365);Sent.lI,q.1,( Theol. V,8-11); Quodlibet,V,q.25,( TheoI.IX,582-4): Quodlibet, VI,q.16, 
Theol.IX,642-3). 
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In other words, a relation, such as 'similarity' (as opposed to a relative, such as 
'similar') can signify or supposit for more than one thing: 
;.i~ i~ i~p?ssible f~r two white. things t? exist without a similarity, since 
,similarity SUppOSltS for two simple things taken together, just as the name 
number does. And .so even though a whiteness is not per se a similarity, 
nonetheless two whltenesses are a similarity as long as 'similarity' is 
standing significatively.938 
Non-inherence in absolutes implies disqualification for the term 'foundation' as 
applied to a relation: 
Likewise, I claim that a relation does not have a foundation; nor does one 
find the expression 'foundation of a relation' in Aristotle's philosophy; nor is 
it a philosophical term.939 
What Scotus calls the 'foundation' of a relation becomes for Ockham merely 
one of the two correlative terms or 'extremes' of the relation; because the 
relation not only does not inhere in an absolute: it is not identical with one 
either: 
.. therefore I do not posit that a relation is the same in reality as a 
foundation, but I say that a relation either is not a foundation but only an 
intention and concept in the soul signifying several absolutes, or else it is 
many absolutes, as a people is many men and no man is a people.94o 
A plurality can be the term of a relation; consequently, as he says elsewhere, it 
is true to say "Plato and Socrates are a similarity" (both being white), as long as 
'similarity' is standing significatively.941 
The terminus of a relation, Ockham says, can be taken in a proper or an 
improper sense. Properly, it is taken for the correlative of the relation 
"predicated according to complementarity" and "added to it in an oblique case 
938 Ockham, Quodlibet,VI,q.8,(Theol.IX,616-7), Freddoso,517; cf.Ordinatio,d.30,q.1, 
~TheoI.IV,314). 
39 Ockham, Quodlibet, VI,q.1 0,( Theol.IX,624), Freddoso,524. . . 
940 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.30,q.1,( Theol.IV,314),my trans.: . .ideo non pono quod re/atlO .est Id.em 
realiter cum fundamento, sed dico quod vel relatio non est fundamentum s~d tantum mtentlo et 
conceptus in anima importans plura absoluta, sicut populus est plures hommes et nul/us homo 
est populus. Cf. Ordinatio,d.30,q.3 (Theol.IV,355). 
941 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.30,q.1 ,( Theol.IV,316). 
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when the relation is truly predicated of something".942 He gives it as Aristotle's 
view that: 
In this sense a relation is always terminated in something relative, since a 
relative is predicated according to complementarity with respect to another 
relative and not with respect to anything absolute ... And therefore I claim 
that, properly speaking, one relative name is terminated in another relative 
name - and not in either an absolute name or a thing outside the soul.943 
He gives the example of the relative term 'father' having 'son', and not the 
absolute terms 'man' or 'animal', as its correlative terminus; each correlative 
being in the definition of the other. In an improper sense, however, an absolute 
term can be taken as terminus of a relative, provided "its existence is 
denominated by the terminus, properly speaking, of the relation". The only 
example he gives is the relative name 'creature', whose proper terminus is 
'creator', "yet that which is really a creator is not a relative thing but an absolute 
thing, viz., God himself,.944 Thus it is legitimate to speak of a real relation of 
creatures to God. 
Ockham: The Relation of God to Creatures 
Ockham disagrees also with Scotus and Thomas concerning reality in relations 
between God and creatures. Both had posited a real relation of dependence of 
creatures to God, but, in Thomas's words, God does not create by necessity of 
his nature, but by his intellect and will: 
Therefore there is no real relation in God to the creature; whereas in . 
creatures there is a real relation to God; because ... their very nature entails 
dependence on God.945 
942 Ockham, Quodlibet,VI,q.24,(Theol.IX,673), Freddoso,567. 
943 Ockham, Quodlibet,VI,q.24,(Theol.IX,673-4), Freddoso,568. 
9440ckham Quodlibet VI 24 (Theol.IX,674), Freddoso,568. . . 
945 Aquinas,' ST.la.28.1'.ad.3,'(Leo.IV,319); ct. De Potentia,VII.11.ad.3,Domlnlcan,1934 
trans., VoLlII,65; SCG.,11.12,(Leo.XIII,290). 
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Thomas bases his argument on Aristotle's third type of relation, non-quantitative 
relations of measuring and being measured (above p.260). This type of relation 
can be non-mutual, as for example that between the knower and the thing 
known: 
.. th~s k~o~ledge has a relation to the thing known, because the knower by 
an intelligible act has an order to the thing known which is outside the soul. 
Whereas the thing itself which is outside the soul is not touched by that act, 
inasmuch as the act of the intellect does not pass into exterior matter by 
changing it ... For this reason the relation which arises from the act of the 
mind cannot be in that thing.946 
Mutuality demands foundations of the same general type, in this case action 
and passion, which are lacking between the knower and the thing known. 
Likewise in the case of God and creatures: 
Now God does not work by an intermediary action to be regarded as 
issuing from God and terminating in the creature: but his action is his 
substance and is wholly outside the genus of created being whereby the 
creature is related to him. Nor again does any good accrue to the Creator 
from the production of the creature ... It follows then that there is no real 
relation in him to creatures, although creatures are really related to him as 
effects to their cause.947 
However, while real relations to creatures are inadmissible, Thomas says 
elsewhere that "there is no reason against our admitting in God many logical 
relations",948 including his relation to creatures, which "in him is merely 
logical".949 Scotus's argument, similarly, is based on the eternal and immutable 
divine nature: 
.. relations of creatures to God are new and temporal, but it is not 
necessary, insofar as they are to God as to a terminus, to posit temporal 
relations in God terminating them.950 
946 Aquinas, De Potentia, VII.1 Dc, Dominican,1934,trans.,Vol.lIl,59. 
947 Aquinas De Potentia VII, 1 Dc, Dominican,1934,trans.,VoI.III,59-60 
948 ' Aquinas, ST.la.32.2c,(Leo.IV,352). 
949 Aquinas, De Potentia, VII.11.ad.3, Dominican,1934,trans.,VoI.III,65: 
950 Scotus Ordinatio I d 30 qq 1-2,n.30,(Vat.VI, 181), my trans.: ..re/atlones cr;atu~a:um .ad , 
Deum su;t novae et'~x 'te~po~e, nee propter iI/as in quantum s~nt ad o.eum ut a ermmum 
neeesse est ponere a/iquas re/ationes in Deo ex tempore, termmantes Istas. 
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He does, however, allow of a relation of reason on the grounds that there can 
be something new in God "through the act of the created intellect, but not 
through the act of his [divine] intellect".951 
Since Ockham rejects the very existence of real foundations in relations, his 
notion of what constitutes reality in mutual relations is necessarily very different 
from that of Thomas or Scotus. He devotes a whole question of the Ordinatio to 
positing his own argument explicitly against ScotuS.952 He begins by 
enumerating three items that he regards as false: 1) that some relations are 
mutual and some not, and that this distinguishes [Aristotle's] third type of 
relatives (p.260 above) from the first two types; 2) that all relations of God to 
creatures are relations of reason; 3) that the relation of God to creatures cannot 
be called real, even in the manner of the sun's relation to the things it heats on 
earth.953 
1) Ockham rejects the first as non-Aristotelian, citing Categories VII,954 and 
asserts that "always and in all relatives there is a mutual relation if it [the relation 
itself] is appropriately assigned". 955 What he means by "appropriately assigned" 
becomes clear in his (evidently correct) interpretation of a passage from 
Metaphysics V, which Scotus had used956 to support his argument: 
But what is measurable and knowable and thinkable are said to be relative 
because in each case something else is referred to them, not because they 
are referred to something else.957 
951 Scotus, Ordinatio,l,d.30,qq.1-2,n.43,(Vat.VI, 189): est tamen a/iqua nova per actum 
intellectus creati, nulla autem per actum intellectus sui. 
952 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.30,q.5,(Theo/.IV,374-395). 
953 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.30,q.5,(Theo/.IV,378). 
954 Aristotle, Categories, VII,(6b28-29). . . . . 
955 0 kh 0 d' t' d 30 q 5 (Theo/.IV 388): dico quod semper In ommbus re/atlvls est mutua c am, r ma 10,. ,., ' 
re/atio si convenienter assignetur. 
:56 Scotus, Ordinatio,l,d.30,qq.1-2,n.31 ,(Vat.VI, 181-182). 
57 Aristotle, Metaphysics,V.15,(1 021 a29-30), Rowan trans.,357. 
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Ockham will point out that the remainder of the passage shows Aristotle to be 
concerned with appropriate assignment of relative termini, and not with non-
mutuality. Aristotle continues: 
For by what is thinkable is meant that of which there may be a thought. 
However, a .thought is not relative to the one whose thought it is, for then 
the same thing would be expressed twice. And similarly sight is relative to 
that of which .it is the. s~ght an? not to the one whose sight it is (although it is 
true to say this); but It IS relative to colour or to something of this sort. But 
then the same thing would be said twice, that sight is of the one whose 
sight it is. Things which are said to be relative directly, then, are spoken of 
in this way.958 
Obviously, the same can be applied to Thomas's and Scotus's example of the 
knower and the knowable. It is the knowledge and the knowable that are 
correctly assigned as directly mutually related, rather than the knower and the 
knowable, though it seems that the latter two can be indirectly assigned; 
For that is truly ad a/iquid which, when everything else is removed 
(circumscriptis) , and itself alone retained, is still ad aliquid. But when 
everything else is removed from something knowable and the knowable 
retained, it is still knowable by knowledge. Therefore the knowable is 
properly a relative. Therefore it is not the intention of the Philosopher in 
Metaphysics V that one relative does not correspond to another relative, 
but it is his intention that in the third type [of relation] there is not, on the 
part of one [relative], some absolute name besides the relative name with 
respect to which the other is called a relative, as there is on the part of the 
other.959 
2) Secondly, the relation of God to creatures cannot be only a relation of 
reason, since for God to create depends no more on an act of the (human) 
intellect than for the sun to illuminate or heat, and for God to be creating 
depends no more on an act of the intellect than for Socrates or Plato to be 
white. 
958 Aristotle, Metaphysics,V.15,(1021a30-b4), Rowan trans.,357-8: . . 
959 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.30,q.5, (Theol.IV,388-389),my trans.: QUIa al1qUld est tale, qu.od. 
omnibus aliis circumscriptis ipso solo retento, adhuc est ad aliquid, ta~e v~re ~s~ ad a~/qUld .. S.ed 
circumscripto a scibili omni alio et retento quod sit sci~ile, ve~e est sClentla. sClblle. Igltur ~clblle 
propriissime est relativum. Et ideo non est intentio Phllosophl, V MetaphY~lcae,. quod Un! 
. . . d t . t tl'O sua quod In tertlo modo ex una relatlvorum non correspondeat allUd relatlvum, se es In en . . 
parte non habetur aliquod nomen absolutum praeter nomen relativum respectu CUIUS dlcatur 
aJiud nomen relativum, sicut est ex parte alia. 
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3) So, Ockham says, the relation of God to creatures can 'in some way' (a/iquo 
modo) be called a real relation.96o As he says in his brief opening reply to the 
question: "God is really a creator; therefore he is really referred [to the creature]; 
therefore the relation of God to a creature is real". 961 At the end, he concludes 
with a 'contradiction argument': "it is a contradiction that God should be creating 
(creans), unless something other than God is created".962 
Ockham designates this as a real 'temporal' relation, obviously to distinguish it 
from the real eternal relations in the Godhead. However, he does not (at least in 
this question) explicitly address the issue, which is decisive for Thomas and 
Scotus, of divine immutability or, as Thomas puts it, of the fact that "his action is 
his substance and is wholly outside the genus of created being whereby the 
creature is related to him",963 so that God cannot be "really related to the 
creature so that this relation is something in God". 964 Presumably, this is the 
reason for the 'aJiquo modo' with which he qualifies his 'real relation' of God to 
creatures. Nevertheless, a move away from a theological and metaphysical 
approach to the question in favour of a logical and semantic one is quite 
perceptible in Ockham. 
Ockham: Relations of Reason 
Ockham regards the expression 'relation of reason' as "not a very philosophical 
expression" (non sit vocabulum multum philosophicum), and does not 
"remember reading that expression in Aristotle's philosophy".965 This may be 
960 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.30,q.5,( Theol.IV,384-385). 
961 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.30,q.5,(Theol.IV,375). 
962 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.30,q.5,( Theol.IV,395). 
963 Aquinas, De Potentia, VII, 1 O,Dominican,trans., 1934,Vol.llI,60. 
964 Aquinas, De Potentia, VII, 1 O,Dominican, 1934,trans:,VovLlIII,5;6 (Theo/lX 699) Freddoso.587. 
965 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.30,q.5,(Theol.IV,385); QuodlIbet, ,q., ., . 
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because neither in the Categories nor in the Metaphysics is Aristotle concerned 
with semantics as such in connection with relations. Ockham's ontological (or 
deontological) preoccupations were not Aristotle's. Predication, signification, 
supposition and connotation all figure prominently in Ockham's account of 
relations, as they do in his scheme of ontological parsimony. 
Just as a real relation involves no operation of the intellect, so a relation of 
reason is entirely dependent on one: 
.. when a thing is not, in the absence of an operation of the intellect, such as 
it is asserted to be by means of a relation or by means of the concrete 
[name] of a relation, then there is a relation of reason. For example, since 
nothing is a subject or a predicate in the absence of an operation of the 
intellect - indeed, in order for something to be a subject or a predicate an 
operation of the intellect is required - it follows that the relative concepts 
subject and predicate are called relations of reason.966 
In one sense it might be said that all relations are relations of reason, since as 
Ockham has claimed, '''relation' is a name of second intention and ... 
consequently, it does not signify things outside the soul. And so nothing outside 
the soul is in the genus of relation".967 Only names or concepts are in the genus 
of relation. For this he adduces Aristotle's support: 
Further, in the Categories,968 he claims that all relatives express 
complementarity if they are appropriately assigned. Given this, I argue: We 
do not assign anything except names, just as we do not use anything . 
except names. Therefore, since, according to the Phil?soP9~~r, we assign 
the relatives it is the names themselves that are relatives. , 
Where there are no appropriate names available to be assigned, Aristotle says, 
an appropriate name can be invented, expressing the complementarity of the 
correlatives. This is the principle involved in the relations of knowledge and the 
knowable (above, p.267), where the direct correlative of the knowable is 
966 Ockham, Quodlibet,VI,q.30,(Theol.IX,699), Freddoso,587-8; Ordinatio,d.30,q.5, 
~ Theol./V,385-386). 
67 Ockham, Quodlibet,VI,q.23,(Theol.IX,670), Freddoso,565. 
968 Aristotle, Categories,VII,(6b28,36-37). 
969 Ockham, Quodlibet,VI,q.22,(Theol.IX,668), Freddoso,563. 
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correctly assigned as knowledge, not the knower. Where a suitable name is 
lacking, Aristotle gives the example of 'rudder' and 'boat', where the word 
'ruddered' has to be invented to be correctly assigned as the direct correlative 
of 'rudder'. Likewise with 'wing' and 'winged', 'head' and 'headed', etc., which 
are real relations.97o 
A relation of reason between a word and what it signifies is likewise 
dependent on the voluntary assignation of meaning to words by convention, 
whether now or in the past: 
Likewise, since a spoken word does not signify a thing except by virtue of 
an institution, which is an operation of the intellect - so that if the spoken 
sound 'human being' had never been instituted by the intellect to signify 
anything, then it would neither signify anything nor be a significative spoken 
sound - it follows that the signification of this spoken sound can be called a 
relation of reason. 971 
The same can be said of a coin and its value: 
Likewise, since a coin has no value except by virtue of a voluntary 
institution, an act of the will preceded by an act of the intellect, it follows 
that the value can be called a relation of reason.972 
Ockham: The Imago Dei and Relations of Origin 
Ockham's doctrine of universals, and his associated doctrine of relations, which 
deny any reality whatever in universals or relations apart from absolute and 
singular things extra animam, seem to be on a collision course with the 
Church's doctrine of the divine persons of the Trinity, which identifies the 
. h' I persons as being constituted by relations of origin. But here, as IS IS usua 
970 Aristotle, Categories,VII,(6b36-7a20). 
971 Ockham, Quodlibet,VI,q.30,(Theol.IV,699),Freddoso,588. 
972 Ockham, Quodlibet, VI,q.30,( Theol.IX,699),Freddoso,588. 
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practice, Ockham bows to "the authority of Holy Scripture", and acknowledges 
that "it is unique to God and passes every understanding" that 
Three things are numerically one thing, and therefore the numerically one 
thing is each of those three things, and yet the one of those three things is 
not the other ... (and) that unique peculiarity should not be maintained except 
where the authority of Holy Scripture compels us to do SO.973 
Likewise, the "authority of the Saints" leads him to accept real relations in the 
Trinity: 
Because the authorities of the Saints seem explicitly to posit relations in the 
Godhead - not merely that some relative concepts are truly predicated 
about the divine persons the way we say that Socrates is similar or that 
Socrates is father or son, but that there is there genuine real paternity and 
filiation, and that they are two simple things, one of which is not the other -
therefore I hold with them that the divine persons are constituted and 
distinguished by relations of origin.974 
This leaves to be investigated only the question of Ockham's account of the 
image of the Trinity in the human soul, and whether and how he reconciles it 
with his dismissal of any real distinction between the soul and its faculties, and 
between the faculties themselves. 
Ockham, as he does elsewhere, frequently cites Augustine in support of his 
account of the imago Dei in man. He likewise prefaces his description of the 
imago with one of what constitutes, not an image, but merely a trace (vestigium) 
of the Trinity in creation. Augustine's account, like that of his scholastic 
successors, is based on Genesis 1 :26, "Let us make man to Our own image 
and likeness", and on St. Paul in Romans 1 :20: 
Ever since the creation of the world, the invisible existence of God a.nd his 
everlasting power have been clearly seen by the mind's understanding of 
created things. 
973 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.2,Q.6,(Theol.ll,175), Spade trans .. 5 Te~tsk~57. V 121006 
974 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.26,Q.1,( Theol.IV, 156-7), Adams.trans., cam, 0., . 
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The Imago in Augustine, Aquinas and Bonaventure 
The words 'image' and 'likeness' both feature in Genesis 1 :26. Bonaventure 
reserved the likeness "only to those who are God-conformed,,975 Thomas 
quotes Augustine: "Where an image exists, there forthwith is likeness; but 
where there is likeness there is not necessarily an image",976 and comments on 
this: "Hence it is clear that likeness is essential to an image; and that an image 
adds something to likeness - namely, that it is copied from something else". 977 
Further on, he compares likeness to the transcendentals, 'one', 'true' and 
'good', likeness being "a kind of unity", and having both a general sense and 
sense to do with perfection: 
.. likeness may be considered in the light of a preamble to image, inasmuch 
as it is something more general than image ... and, again, it may be 
considered as subsequent to image, inasmuch as it signifies a certain 
perfection of image. For we say that an image is like or unlike what it 
represents, according as the representation is perfect or imperfect.978 
The true likeness of God is therefore found only in the Son of God, the perfect 
image of God. Mankind is therefore said to be made to the image (Gen.1 :26), 
and not to be the image as such.979 Nor is equality implied by the word 'image': 
Thomas says of equality, 
Yet this is of the essence of a perfect image; for in a perfect image nothing 
is wanting that is to be found in that of which it is a copy. Now it is manifest 
that in man there is some likeness to God, copied from God as from an 
exemplar; yet this likeness is not one of equality, for such an exemplar 
infinitely excels its copy. Therefore there is in man a likeness to God; not 
indeed a perfect likeness, but imperfect.98o 
In the general sense of likeness, all creatures are like to God, merely because 
they exist, or because they both exist and live. Rational creatures alone are like 
God because they know or understand, therefore intellectual creatures alone 
975 Bonaventure, Brevi/oquium,11.12.1 ,(Quar.V,230). 
976 Augustine, QQ.83,q.74,(PL,85-6). 
977 Aquinas, ST.la.93.1 c,(Leo. V,401). 
978 Aquinas, ST.la.93.9c,(Leo.V,412). 
979 Aquinas,ST.la,93.1.ad.2,(Leo.V,401). 
980 Aquinas, ST.la.93.1 c,(Leo.V,401). 
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are made to God's image.981 Thomas designates three modes of imaging, all of 
which concern the acts of knowing and loving God: 
Now the intellectual nature imitates God chiefly in this, that God 
understands and loves Himself. Wherefore we see that the image of God is 
in man in thre~ ways. Firs.t, inasmuch as man possesses a natural aptitude 
for understandl~g and .lovl.ng God; and this aptitude consists in the very 
nature of the mind, which IS common to all men. Secondly, inasmuch as 
man actually or habitually knows and loves God, though imperfectly; and 
this image consists in the conformity of grace. Thirdly, inasmuch as man 
knows and loves God perfectly; and this image consists in the likeness of 
glory. Wherefore on the words, "The light of Thy countenance, 0 Lord, is 
signed upon us" (Ps.4:7), the gloss distinguishes a three-fold image, of 
creation, of re-creation, and of likeness. The first is found in all men, the 
second only in the just, the third only in the blessed.982 
As with Bonaventure, the true 'likeness' is found in humans only as the most 
perfect image possible for man, which is in statu patriae. 
The imago is in imitation of the divine nature, and therefore also of the tri-
personal mode of relations of origin which accords with that nature: 
.. therefore to be to the image of God by imitation of the Divine Nature does 
not exclude being to the same image by the representation of the Divine 
Persons: but rather one follows from the other. We must, therefore, say that 
in man there exists the image of God, both as regards the Divine Nature 
and as regards the Trinity of Persons; for also in God Himself there is one 
nature in three Persons.983 
The image, however, is not found in a trio of human persons, even in a family of 
father, mother and child.984 As a rational creature excels all other creatures only 
by the intellect or mind, so the image is in the mind only. An image represents 
something by likeness in species, whereas a trace does so only by way of an 
effect.98s In assigning the way the mind images the divine Persons, namely by 
acts, Thomas gives us something of a history of Augustine's thought on the 
981 Aquinas, STla.93.2c,(Leo. V,403). 
982 Aquinas, STla.93.4c,(Leo. V,404-5). 
983 Aquinas, STla.93.5c,(Leo.V,406). 
984 Aquinas, STla.93.6.ad.2,(Leo.v,407-8). 
985 Aquinas, ST.la.93.6c,cf.8c,(Leo. V,407,411). 
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matter. Augustine had first identified the image as 'mind', 'knowledge' and 
'love,.986 Thomas refers to this in answer to an objection: 
A~gust.ine observed this trinity first, as eXisting in the mind. But because the 
mlnd ... I~ a way does not know.itself ... he takes [instead] three things in the 
s~ul which ar~ proper ~o the mind, namely, memory, understanding, and 
wllI; ... and assigns the Image of the Trinity pre-eminently to these three as 
though the first assignation were in part deficient. 987 ' 
The development of Augustine's thought is completed by Thomas in the next 
question: he had finally identified the image in the acts of remembering, 
understanding and willing, and, moreover, with God as their object: 
Augustine says: "The image of God exists in the mind, not because it has a 
remembrance of itself, loves itself, and understands itself; but because it 
can also remember, understand and love God by whom it was made". 988 
Much less, therefore, is the image of God in the soul in respect of other 
objects.989 
"Thus the image of God is found in the soul according as the soul turns to God, 
or possesses a nature that enables it to turn to God".99o Thomas now develops 
the image in terms of the acts involved in the divine processions: 
Now the Divine Persons are distinct from each other by reason of the 
procession of the Word from the Speaker, and the procession of Love 
connecting both. But in our soul word cannot exist without actual thought, 
as Augustine says.991 Therefore, first and chiefly, the image of the Trinity is 
to be found in the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the knowledge 
which we possess, by actual thought we form an internal word; and thence 
break forth into love. But, since the principles and acts are the habits and 
powers, and everything exists virtually in its principle, therefore, secondarily 
and consequently, the image of the Trinity may be considered as existing in 
the powers, and still more in the habits, forasmuch as the acts virtually exist 
therein. 992 
Therefore for Thomas, the imago Dei in man consists primarily in the acts of 
understanding and willing, imaging the two processions in the Trinity, and 
secondarily in the faculties of intellect and will, or in their respective habits. 
986 Augustine, De Trinitate,IX,4,(PL.42,963-5). 
987 Aquinas, ST,la.93.7.ad.2,(Leo.V,409),my parenthesis .. 
988 Augustine, De Trinitate,XIV.12,(PL,42,1 048). 
989 Aquinas, ST.la.93.8sc,(Leo.v,410). 
990 Aquinas, ST.la.93.8c,(Leo.V,411). 
991 Augustine, De Trinitate,XIV. 7,(PL,42, 1043). 
992 Aquinas, ST.la.93. 7c,(Leo, V,409). 
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Bonaventure, for his part, retains the Augustinian imago of memory, intellect 
and will, and their acts. His account reflects his view of the whole created 
cosmos as shot through with signs of its Trinitarian source. Each of these three 
mental faculties in turn reveals a further Trinitarian structure: memory "retains 
the past by recalling it, the present by receiving it, the future by foreseeing it". It 
retains the simple principles (the point, the instant, the unit, etc.), the eternal 
principles, and the axioms of the sciences, "and retains them eternally", always 
recalling them "as if it were recognizing them as innate and familiar". 993 The 
intellect is concerned with the meanings of terms, propositions and 
inferences,994 and the will, the power of choice, operates in deliberation, 
judgment and desire. 995 
The Imago in Scotus 
Neither Scotus nor Ockham takes up Thomas's version of the imago, based on 
the two processions in the Trinity and the acts of understanding and willing. 
Scotus bases his on Augustine, De Trinitate, XV. Edmund Hill, in his 1991 
translation of the latter, makes this interesting comment on the fate suffered by 
Augustine's account of the image of God in man: 
Augustine does not discern an image of the Trinity in the three faculties. of 
the soul, memory, understanding, and will. He scarcely speak~ of faculties 
at aiL .. This serious misunderstanding of Augustine's thought IS the 
responsibility of Peter Lombard,996 and is faithfully ~epr~~7~ced ~n what we 
can now happily call, I trust, the late Penny C~tech~sm: In splte9~! th~ fact 
that it was explicitly corrected by Thomas AqUinas In hiS Sumn:a. It IS a 
serious misunderstanding, because it deprives the whole doctnne of the 
993 Bonaventure, ltinerarium, 1I1.2,(Quar. V,303). 
994 Bonaventure, Itinerarium, 111.3,( Quar. V,304). 
995 Bonaventure, Itinerarium,111.4,(Quar.V,304). 
996 
Lombard, Sent.l,d.3,c.2. ..' r 29 and 30 
997 Hill then notes that the 1971 revised edition stili retains the error, In ques Ions . 
998 Aquinas, ST.la.93.7.ad.3,(Leo.V,409). 
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divine ima~e in man of any effective application to the spiritual life of the 
Christian.9 9 
Scotus and Ockham both avoid this pitfall, having, perhaps, taken account of 
Thomas's correction of Lombard. Augustine's imago is constituted by the acts of 
remembering, understanding and willing. Scotus also takes account of 
Augustine's final and definitive observation on the nature of the imago: 
.. it should be noted that the most perfect and ultimate understanding (ratio) 
of the image is when these things concur in the mind with respect to God 
as object, because then the soul not only has the express likeness ... on the 
basis of those things within itself, but on the basis of them as conforming its 
acts to the object. It is therefore the true likeness of act to object. 1Ooo 
The soul is perfected in the image of God by the acts of remembering, 
understanding and willing God. Since Scotus accepts this, it may seem all the 
more odd that he sees no damage to human nature from the acts of forgetting, 
ignoring and disobeying God.1oo1 This reflects the separation he makes 
between nature, associated with necessity, and acts, which are from free will. It 
seems clear that Augustine does not make this separation between the act and 
the nature which has the capacity for the act, as he speaks of "this image, made 
by the Trinity and altered for the worse by its own fault" .1002 
The Imago in Ockham. 
In his question dealing with the imago in the rational creature, Ockham refers to 
a "common opinion" that the image consists in the faculties of intellect, memory 
and will, and not, at least principally, in secondary acts. He replies: 
But this opinion is evidently not true, because there are no such three 
faculties, because as was shown in the second book (Sent.lI,q.20, as 
999 Edmund Hill,trans., Introduction, Saint Augustine. The Trinity, NY, New City Press, 1991,57. 
1000 Scotus, Ordinatio,l,d.3,p.3,q.4,n.590,(Vat.III,349), my trans.: ~otandum est quod . 
periectissima et ultima ratio imaginis est quando ista concurrunt ~n mente respectu Del ut . 
obiecti, quia tunc anima non tantum habet simiJitudinem expresslvam ... ex :a~/?nem e~ru"! In se. 
sed ea ratione qua actus ipsi conformantur obieeto. Est entm aetus vere slmilltudo obleetl .. 
1001 See chapter 3, p.203 above. . 
1002 Augustine, De Trinitate,XV.22.39,(PL.42.1088), HIII,trans.,426. 
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~bove, pp.245-6),. t~er~ is no prior distinction in the substance of the soul 
Itself before the distinction o.f production of secondary acts; therefore there 
are no such three representing the divine persons. 1003 
Furthermore, he points out that between the divine Persons there is a real 
distinction, disqualifying any imago posited in faculties of the soul. 
Nevertheless, the rational creature alone qualifies as image of God: 
.. because .. truly and more eminently and thus properly God is wisdom, 
word, love, mercy, charity and so on, as if these were accidents in God 
and these truly are [accidents] in the rational creature only, therefore th~ 
rational creature alone can in some way be called image of God, although 
not perfectly as if they were accidents in God as well as in the creature. 1004 
He then addresses the question of how the image relates to the Trinity, and 
quotes Augustine regarding the soul being capax Dei: "The soul is that by which 
the image of God is capable of God and able to be a participant in God", 1005 
thus making the connection between the image of God and participation in 
divine life. This is true of the soul according to its substance, therefore, in one 
way, "it is a true image according to its substance". In another way it is true of 
the soul according to its acts of understanding and willing, because without acts 
it cannot attain God and is not capax Dei. But "that by which the soul is capax 
Dei pertains to the perfect image, that is, to the perfection of the image".1006 It is 
by the acts of understanding and of willing that the soul is capax Dei. 
On this basis, Ockham gives his own account of the imago: 
Therefore I say that the complete ratio of the image consists in the 
substance of the soul itself and in the two acts, namely the acts of 
1003 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.3,q.10,(Theol.II,554-5): Sed ista opinio non vi?e~ur~sse ve~a, .q~ia non 
sunt tales tres potentiae, quia sicut declarabitur in secundo, nulla est dlst/~~tlo praevla '~ ,,?sa. 
SUbstantia animae ante distinctionem actuum secundorum productorum; Iglfur non sunt Ibl talla 
tria quae repraesentent divinas personas. . . . . 
1004 Ockham, Ordinatio,d.3,q.10,(Theol.II,556-7): .. quia ita vere ~t e':1me~t~us et Ita propfl~ De~s 
est sapientia, verbum, dilectio, misericordia, caritas, et sic de alliS ~/CUt .Sl Ista essent a~~/d~ntla 
in Deo et ista vere sunt in creatura rationali sola, ideo creatura ratlonalls sola potest d/~1 allquo 
modo imago Dei, quamvis non ita perfecte sicut si essent accidentia tam in Deo quam In 
creatura. 
1005 Augustine, De Trinitate,XIV,c.8,n.11 ,(PL.42. 1 044). 
1006 Ockham. Ordinatio,d.3,q.10,(Theol.II,558). 
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understanding and of willing, and can also consist I'n the s b t f h I 't If d" usance 0 t e 
sou I se an In two habits corresponding to those acts,1007 
He then gives his theological justification for this image: 
A,n? ~hen speaking of ~atural acts, this is the order: just as the Father in the 
diVInity h~s the fecundity for produci~g both the Son and the Holy Spirit and 
communicates to the Son the fecundity of producing the Holy Spirit, and 
~ather and Son produ,ce the Holy Spirit, so the substance of the soul itself 
IS,f~cund an,d productive of both the act of understanding and the act of 
willing; ~nd It produces first the act of understanding, which is also 
productive of the act o,f willing, and then those two causes, namely the 
substan~~ of the soul, Itself and the act of understanding, can produce the 
act of w~lI~n~, so that Just as the Son in the divinity is only from one, and the 
Holy Splnt I~ fr~m the Father producing and the Son produced, so the act of 
~nderstandlng IS from the substance of the soul alone, and the act of willing 
IS from the substance o~ the soul a~d from the act of understanding 
produced, and thus the Image can In some way represent distinct persons 
and the order and origin of them,1oo8 ' 
I would conclude that, since Oneness in divinity is generally appropriated to the 
Father as fons et origo totius deitatis, and each of the Persons is co-equal with 
the whole essence of divinity, this explanation seems perfectly satisfactory and 
capable of obviating any danger of a Sabellian imago emerging, Ockham 
himself clearly envisages no such danger, as he does not include it among his 
subsequent list of six possible dubia. 
This leaves only the element of God as the object of the acts making up the 
imago to be made explicit, in view of Augustine's conclusion that the image is 
rightly conceived in acts of remembering, knowing and loving God. Ockham 
deals with this in answer to the fifth and sixth dubia. To the fifth he replies that 
1007 Ockham, Ordinatio,d,3,q.10,(Theol,II,558-9): Ideo dico quod completa ratio imaginis 
consistit in ipsa substantia animae et duobus actibus, scilicet actu intelligendi et vo/endi, et 
etiam potest consistere in ipsa substantia animae et in duobus habitibus correspondentibus 
~Sis actibus. 008 Ockham, Ordinatio,d,3,q.10,(Theol.ll,559): Et tunc loquendo de actibus naturalibus, iste est 
ordo: quod sicut Pater in divinis habet fecunditatem ad producendum tam Filium quam Spiritum 
Sanctum et communicat Filio fecunditatem producendi Spiritum Sanctum, et Pater et Filius 
producunt Spiritum Sanctum, ita ipsa substantia animae est fecunda et productiva tam actus 
intelligendi quam volendi; et producit primo actum intelligendi, qui est etiam productivus actus 
volendi, et tunc iIIae duae causae, scilicet ipsa substantia animae et actus intelligendi possunt 
producere actum volendi, ita quod sicut Filius in divinis est tantum ab uno, et Spirit~s S~nctus 
est a Patre producente et a Filio producto, ita actus intelligendi est a sola s~b~tantla ammae. et 
actus volendi est a substantia animae, et ab actu intelligendi producto, et SIC Imago potest 
aliquo modo repraesentare distinctas personas, et ordinem et originem earum. 
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The image is most properly ~conceive?]. with respect to God as object, 
because those acts of knowing and Willing are similitudes of God ... and 
therefore blessed Augustine places the Trinitarian image in that which is 
related to eternal things. 1oo9 
Likewise, to the sixth dubium, Ockham replies that there is no image in the 
sensitive part "because it has no act with respect to God". 
On this issue, Ockham's semantic account of the soul and its acts seems 
after all, to accord well with a satisfactory version of the imago Dei in the 
rational creature. However, he does not address the distinction between 
, 
"image" and "likeness" (simi/itudo). More seriously, in my opinion, an important 
element is missing from his account of the soul's capacity to image God (though 
not from the image itself): to be capax Dei is not only to be capable of acting; in 
Augustine's and Thomas's view, it is, firstly and above all, to be capable of 
receiving. 101o The divine relations of origin are not only active: they have a 
passive, receptive, aspect as well. 
Conclusion to Chapter 4 
We have seen (p.248) that, for Thomas, 'relation' is the metaphysical/oeus of 
the soul's participation in divine goodness. It is, in fact, the category most 
closely involved, after 'substance', in circumincession, the intra-divine life of the 
Trinity, in which being is eternally both given and received, and relation is not 
merely an accident. Reality in divine relations differs from the essence only in 
what is meant by 'opposition to a term', therefore it differs from the essence only 
in mode of intelligibility (p.251-2). Between creatures and God (p.249), real 
1009 0 kh 0 d' t' d 3 q 10 (Theo/.II 568): .. quod imago est propriissime respectu Dei ut cam, r ma 10, . ,., '. ., .' . 'd l b t s 
obiecti, quia illi actus cognoscendi et vo/endl sunt slml/ltudmes Del ... Et I eo pom ea u 
Auqustinus imaginem trinitatem iI/am quae est respectu aeternorum. ." 
101(j'See Fergus Kerr quotation and comment about a "theologically fateful semantic shift, 
chapter 1, p.29 above. 
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relation coincides with the reality of dependence, in which creatures are ordered 
to God, but not vice-versa. Thomas's concept of the kind of reality involved in 
the intra-divine relations does not allow him to attribute a 'real' relation of God to 
creatures, due to the contingency of the act of creation (p.251). Mutual real 
relations exist only where there is mutuality of dependence; however, Thomas 
admits the possibility of many logical relations in God to creatures (p.265). For 
Thomas, as well as Bonaventure, real relation in creatures is an aspect of 
finality, as it pertains to the natural order: it is an order of thing to thing, 
whereas a logical relation, such as genus and species, is an order of thought to 
thought. On the other hand, relation is unique among Aristotle's categories in 
having a different kind of being, which does not adhere in any subject (p.248-9), 
and is only 'conceptual' where no dependence is involved. 
Scotus's metaphysics do not allow for the existence of merely conceptual 
relations: all are encompassed under the three modes of real relations he takes 
from Aristotle (above, p.260). His account of relation, combined with formal 
distinction accords well with real relations of origin in the Trinity (p.255). All , 
relations are "distinct from absolute things", but inhere in their foundations, from 
which they are nevertheless distinct. All that is required are real termini, really 
distinct, and which are there "by the nature of things" (p.252). Scotus rejects as 
invalid Thomas's identification of reality in relations, and mutuality, with 
dependence, and admits God's relation to creatures as a real third-mode co-
relation (p.254), not merely 'of reason', and not merely temporal either (p.265). 
The relation of creatures to God is both new and temporal. 
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Relation is one of the eight universal categories to which Ockham denies 
any extra-mental reality whatever. For Ockham, a relation is called real because 
it signifies absolute things (p.258). It is not distinct from absolute things, neither 
does it inhere in them, nor is it identical with them. A real relation exists when 
relative names are assigned to denominate absolute things, outside or inside 
the soul, which would still be as they are without any act of a created intellect 
assigning names. The relatives are names, which signify one absolute thing and 
connote another. A relation 'of reason' exists when an act of an intellect is 
required, for example with the relation between a coin and its conventionally-
assigned value (p.270). Relations do not have 'foundations'; Ockham speaks 
only of 'extremes' or 'termini'. Likewise, mutuality in relations does not involve 
dependence, but only "apppropriate assignment" of relative names (p.266-7). 
On this basis, Ockham can call both the relations of creatures to God and the 
relation of God to creatures real relations. No created intellect has established 
them as they are (p.267). Yet we have moved a long way from Thomas's, 
Bonaventure's, and Scotus's, concern for relational reality based "in the nature 
of things" themselves, independently of any assignment of names. A real 
epistemological "shift to the thinking subject" has taken place. If there is any 
area in which Ockham is rightly called a nominalist, rather than a conceptualist, 
it must surely be here. 
Nevertheless, in his account of the imago Dei, Ockham's adherence to the 
authority of "the Saints and Doctors" has served him well. His imago is not only 
orthodox, but adopts elements from both Thomas's and Scotus's which make it 
a valid variant, if not actually a development, of theirs. It is orthodox, in fact. 
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precisely because it incorporates the 'passive relations of origin', and therefore 
the "receptivity at the heart of being" that I have referrred to elsewhere. 
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Conclusion 
Ockham's account of human nature, as it turns out, owes rather less to his 
nominalism than to his concern for human and divine freedom-of-indifference. 
However, this in itself is greatly facilitated by his radical singularism, combined 
with his doctrine of the potentia abso/uta Dei. In addition, some of the outcomes 
with which I have been concerned are the results of his 'principle of parsimony' 
('razor'). 
Ockham is clearly an inheritor of the view, of which Scotus is a major 
exponent, which sees the operations of nature, as such, as radically 
incommensurable with the operations of free will in human beings. The resulting 
dismissal of natural finality in human nature has considerable implications for 
human self-understanding, as de Lubac (p.30 ), Pinckaers (pp.92-3) and Kerr 
(pp.29-30 ) have pointed out. The aspect I dwell on here (below), is that of 
'receptivity' to divine grace. 
Aquinas's essence/being distinction in creatures provides not only a way of 
distinguishing divine and human modes of being, the one as /psum Esse, the 
other as esse parlicipatum; it also provides a metaphysical basis and context for 
the on-going project of a creature's "seeking its perfection and the fulness of its 
being" in the course of its life. Once the distinction in mode of being is rejected, 
a certain perspective on life, especially human life, must disappear with it. 
Potency or potentiality implies receptivity, since what is potential cannot 
actualise itself; actuality has to be received. In chapter 1 (p.23). I noted that 
"within the tri-personal divine life (circumincession) of the Godhead. being is 
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b th' d . d 1011 Th . . o given an receive . e dignity of receptivity therefore exists at the 
very heart of being". In chapter 2 (p.8?, note 315), I quoted from von Balthasar 
on Existence as Receptivity, and his description of Christ's reception, openly 
acknowledged, of all that he is, all that he says and does, from the Father: a 
receptivity that in no way threatens or diminishes the receiver's freedom, but 
which, like the action of grace, actually constitutes it. In chapter 1 (p.29) I also 
cited Fergus Kerr on human nature's 'long lost' and misunderstood atribute of 
capacitas Dei, which as originally understood was a purely passive principle of 
receptivity of the supernatural, by which the image of God in the soul is formed 
and perfected. 
On this score, it would hardly be fair to Ockham to issue a final verdict on the 
strength of what is not found in his works. What can be said is that there 
appears to be a considerable diminishment in what I would call "awareness of 
the dimension of receptivity, or passivity", where grace is concerned. Indicative 
factors may be the absence of any treatment of the beatitudes and fruits of the 
Holy Spirit, and his account of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which confines itself to 
asking whether they are strictly necessary, since, according to him, the same 
functions are possible for unaided human nature, and to wondering what their 
purpose might be (ch.3, p.232). Parallel to this is the minimal efficacy he 
ascribes to the infused virtues, on the grounds that each of their acts "is of the 
same ratio as an act possible to our purely natural powers". In addition, there is 
Ockham's dismissal of the agent intellect (p.242), regarded by the other three 
scholars examined as mediator of divine illumination to the passive intellect, 
and the absence of any mention of divine illumination, as such. from the rest of 
1011 E.g.,Aquinas,ST.la.33.3.ad.2; SCG.IV,26.12. 
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Ockham's opus. I have also pointed out Ockham's renunciation, as superfluous 
(pp.229-30), of the traditional terms for grace which describe the different 
actions of God in the soul: gratia sanans, gratia elevans etc., and, most 
significantly, gratia co-operans (see Kerr quote, ch.1 ,p.19). If it turns out that 
none of these things is seen by Ockham as indicative of an openness or 
receptivity to the supernatural which is intrinsic to human nature, and cannot 
lightly be ignored or dismissed, then it can be said that he represents a major 
turning point in the understanding of human nature. All of these points, 
however, would bear further investigation. 
What scarcely needs further investigation, as it has received, and continues to 
receive, so much scholarly attention, is the contribution of Ockham's 
nominalism to a "shift to the human subject" in epistemology, whether or not it is 
rightly called "nominalism" or "conceptualism". His account of 'relation' (chapter 
4) is perhaps the most striking example. 
His frequent use of qualifying expressions such as "If I accepted no authority", 
or "because the Saints say so", or "non potest demonstrari" suggests that 
Ockham may have made a significant contribution to the separation between 
faith and reason which developed after his time. This would certainly call for 
much more research. 
It has not been possible to include an investigation of Ockham's Christology, 
even though the question whether his account of "nature" in relation to the 
universal might have implications for the "consubstantiality" of the Chalcedon 
formula would seem to be worth investigating. However, I was surprised to find 
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that Aquinas, too, attributes no reality at all, extra animam, to nature as 
universal, and refers to the community of Redemption as a "community of 
cause" rather than a community of nature (p.39). Scotus's, "common nature" 
seems at first sight to fulfil the requirements for "consubstantiality" far more 
readily than Aquinas's account. But, on closer inspection, its relationship to 
reality extra animam is just as tenuous as Thomas's: Scotus says that it can be 
called a universal only as considered absolutely, abstracted from all reality, and 
in the sense that "an identical name can be given to each suppositum" (p.59). In 
fact, elements of Ockham's "nominalism" can be found latent in this way in both 
Aquinas and Scotus. 
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